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Preface
The Symposium on Corporate Financial Reporting held in New Jersey 
at the Seaview Country Club on November 7 and 8, 1968, was a pioneering 
effort in that it was the first event jointly sponsored by the four leading 
professional organizations concerned with financial reporting. The willing­
ness of the American Institute of CPAs, the Financial Analysts Federation, 
the Financial Executives Institute and the Robert Morris Associates to join 
together and support such a meeting with a major commitment of their 
human resources as well as financial sponsorship bodes well for continuing 
improvement of the reporting environment.
The concept of such a Symposium to promote effective four-way com­
munication and to generate new reporting ideas was originally that of 
John Ingraham of the First National City Bank of N. Y., chairman of 
the Robert Morris Associates’ Committee on Co-operation with Public 
Accountants. He became dissatisfied with the limitations inherent in two- 
way communication among organizations when there were several parties 
involved in corporate financial reporting, and he argued persuasively that 
a common forum for discussion would be an important starting point for 
the long-term improvement of such reporting.
His idea was rapidly endorsed by officers and staffs of the major 
organizations involved. John Carey, Leonard Savoie and Donald Bevis of 
the AICPA, George Hansen of the Financial Analysts Federation, James 
Rutherford and Benjamin Makela of the Financial Executives Institute and 
Dale Freed of Robert Morris Associates met with Ingraham on several 
occasions to discuss the idea. The group gradually developed into a steering 
committee to plan the Symposium after the concept had been approved by 
the four organizations. The chairman and editor was recruited from the 
Columbia Graduate School of Business and agreed to devote part of a 
sabbatical year to the task of organizing the Symposium and editing the 
proceedings.
The steering committee spent many hours agreeing upon the program 
and identifying discussion leaders, paper and critique preparers and partici­
pants. Those so identified undertook their tasks with enthusiasm and each 
contributed significantly to the success of the program. While all their names 
are included at a later point in this volume, the editor must express a 
particular debt to his academic colleagues: Professors Robert Mautz, 
Herbert Miller and Robert Sprouse. These men helped in the planning 
process, led the discussions and assisted the final publication with their 
comments. They and the steering committee are professionals whose con­
tinuing assistance was invaluable.
Additionally, the arrangements at Seaview were flawlessly handled by 
Norman Nestler of the AICPA, the tasks of distribution were smoothly 
completed by Margaret Williams, and the publications staff of the AICPA 
showed skill and forbearance in dealing with the manuscript and the editor. 
All were essential to the end result.
Readers of these proceedings will feel on many occasions a sense of 
frustration resulting from the brevity with which some of the subjects dis­
cussed are covered. This is due primarily to the limited time available at 
the Symposium and to the fact that speakers rightfully assumed considerable 
experience and expertise in the audience to which they were speaking. Those 
readers with an interest in sharing the background of the participants and 
in studying the area of financial reporting in greater depth are referred to 
the professional journals of the sponsoring organizations: The Journal of 
Accountancy, the Financial Analysts Journal, the Financial Executive and 
The Journal of Commercial Bank Lending. Many of the subjects considered 
at the Symposium have been discussed at much greater length in these pro­
ductive sources.
The editor would be remiss if he did not express a personal note of 
appreciation to the steering committee for inviting his participation in what 
was a highly stimulating intellectual experience. If there are any failures 
in communicating this stimulation to non-participants through this volume, 
they must be laid at the editor’s door.
John C. Burton






John C. Burton, Chairman
Leonard M. Savoie, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
Donald Bevis, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
George M. Hansen, Financial Analysts Federation
James J. Rutherford, Financial Executives Institute
Benjamin Makela, Financial Executives Institute
Dale Y. Freed, Robert Morris Associates
John W. Ingraham, Robert Morris Associates
Professors
John C. Burton, Columbia University
Robert K. Mautz, University of Illinois
Herbert E. Miller, Michigan State University
Robert T. Sprouse, Stanford University
Speaker
Ralph S. Saul, President, American Stock Exchange
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
Paper preparers
Thomas D. Flynn, Arthur Young & Company
Joseph L. Roth, Price Waterhouse & Co.
Critics
Clifford V. Heimbucher, Farquhar and Heimbucher
Robert M. Trueblood, Touche, Ross, Bailey & Smart
Albert J. Bows, Arthur Andersen & Company
Other participants
Matthew F. Blake, Hurdman and Cranstoun
George R. Catlett, Arthur Andersen & Company
Sidney Davidson, University of Chicago
Philip L. Defliese, Lybrand, Ross Bros, & Montgomery
Newman T. Halvorson, Ernst & Ernst
Ralph E. Kent, Arthur Young & Company
Louis M. Kessler, Alexander Grant & Company
LeRoy Layton, Main Lafrentz & Co.
David F. Linowes, Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath
Eugene J. Patton, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
J. S. Seidman, Seidman & Seidman
Marvin L. Stone, Stone, Gray & Company
Kenneth W. Stringer, Haskins & Sells 
Arthur B. Toan, Jr., Price Waterhouse & Co. 
Frank T. Weston, Arthur Young & Company
Financial Analysts Federation
Paper preparer
William C. Norby, Harris Trust and Savings Bank
Critics
Charles N. Berents, J. H. Hillman & Sons
David Norr, First Manhattan Company
Louis M. Warlick, Loomis Sayles & Co., Inc.
Other participants
Carl L. A. Beckers, St. Louis Union Trust Co.
Albert Y. Bingham, Chicago Title & Trust Co.
George S. Bissell, Massachusetts Investors Trust
Frank E. Block, Citizens & Southern National Bank
Phillip P. Brooks, Jr., The Central Trust Company 
Arthur K. Carlson, Irving Trust Co.
Thomas F. Clendenin, Clendenin Corporation
Peter R. Musselman, Union Commerce Bank of Cleveland
C. Reed Parker, Duff & Phelps, Inc.
Frank T. Parrish, Jr., Fidelity Management & Research Company 
Thomas C. Pryor, White, Weld & Co.
Dr. C. Stewart Sheppard, The Institute of Chartered Financial Analysts 
Walter D. Silcox, Loomis Sayles & Co., Inc.
David G. Watterson, Boyd, Watterson & Co.
B. V. Wright, Jr., Model, Roland & Co., Inc.
Financial Executives Institute
Paper preparer
Robert O. Whitman, American Electric Power Service Corporation
Critics
Dudley E. Browne, Lockheed Aircraft Corporation
Thomas F. Russell, Federal-Mogul Corporation
Thomas A. Murphy, General Motors Corporation
Robert E. Pfenning, General Electric Company
Other participants
K. D. Bowes, G. D. Searle & Co.
Rexford E. Bruno, United Air Lines, Inc.
J. O. Edwards, Humble Oil & Refining Co. 
Dean P. Fite, The Procter & Gamble Company
L. C. Guest, Jr., Sylvania Electric Products, Inc.
William H. Harrison, General Telephone & Electronics Corporation 
John J. Hartmann, J. Barth & Co.
Howard L. Letts, Radio Corporation of America
Robert W. Martin, McGraw-Edison Company
Charles W. Plum, The Standard Oil Company (Ohio)
E. A. Vaughn, Aluminum Company of America
Earl J. Wipfler, Monsanto Company
Robert Morris Associates
Paper preparer
Charles T. McGarraugh, Northwestern National Bank of Minneapolis 
Critics
Harry S. Meily, The Security First National Bank — Los Angeles 
Harry S. Long, First Security National Bank of Beaumont 
Arthur L. Nash, Brown Brothers Harriman & Co.
Other participants
J. Kenneth Boyles, National State Bank (Elizabeth, New Jersey)
A. W. Clausen, Bank of America
Norman Collins, South Carolina National Bank
G. Kenneth Crowther, Morgan Guaranty Trust Company
Richard H. Dilworth, State-Planters Bank of Commerce & Trusts 
Thomas F. Duffy, The Northern Trust Company
Kent W. Duncan, Harris Trust & Savings Bank 
James A. Ensign, Crocker- Citizens National Bank
John J. Fawley, First Pennsylvania Banking & Trust Co.
Rollo G. A. Fisher, Detroit Bank & Trust Co.
Claude Higginbotham, Wachovia Bank & Trust Co.
John F. Holman, Wells Fargo Bank
Weyman Horadam, Bank of the Southwest
John B. McCarter, Central National Bank (Cleveland)







The Problems of Users and Preparers in Financial Reporting ......................... 15
Introductory remarks by Robert K. Mautz...................................................... 15
The problem of comparability ........................................................................... 24
The role of the Accounting Principles Board ................................................. 30
Disclosure of estimates of the future ................................................................ 38
Surveillance over corporate reporting .............................................................. 43
Section II
The Problems of Income Measurement 47
Introductory remarks by Robert T. Sprouse ................................................... 47
Objectives of financial statements....................................................................... 52
Price-level accounting ........................................................................................ 55
The treatment of accounting changes................................................................ 59
Accounting for inter-corporate investment ........................................................ 61
Section III
The Role of the Auditor ........................................................................................ 65
Introductory remarks by Herbert E. Miller ...................................................... 65
The short-form report ........................................................................................ 67
The responsibility of the auditor ....................................................................... 70
Practice of public accounting in corporate form............................................... 73
Section IV
A View of the Future ............................................................................................. 76
Herbert E. Miller ................................................................................................. 76
John C. Burton ................................................................................................... 77
Robert T. Sprouse ............................................................................................... 79
Robert K. Mautz ................................................................................................. 81
2 Symposium Papers and Critiques
Where Do We Stand?




By William C. Norby, The Needs and Responsibilities of the Investor in 
Equities........................................................................................................... 97
By Charles T. McGarraugh, The Viewpoint of the Credit Grantor................ 112
By Robert O. Whitman, A Financial Executive Views Accounting Develop­
ments ............................................................................................................ 126
By Thomas D. Flynn, Corporate Reporting and Accounting Principles: The 
Viewpoint of an Independent Accountant ............................................... 140
Critiques
By Clifford V. Heimbucher ................................................................................ 152
By Charles N. Berents ......................................................................................... 157
By Dudley E. Browne ......................................................................................... 166
By Thomas F. Russell ......................................................................................... 180
By Harry S. Meily ............................................................................................... 190
The Measurement of Income
Principal paper
By Robert T. Sprouse........................................................................................... 201
Critiques
By Robert M. Trueblood.................................................................................... 220
By David Norr ...................................................................................................... 225
By Thomas A. Murphy ......................................................................................  229
By Harry S. Long................................................................................................. 234
The Role of the Auditor
Principal paper
By Joseph L. Roth............................................................................................... 245
Critiques
By Albert J. Bows ............................................................................................... 259
By Louis M. Warlick........................................................................................... 261
By R. E. Pfenning............................................................................................... 265
By Arthur L. Nash........................................................  269
Introduction
In a society based upon the concept that economic progress can best 
be achieved by the independent actions and reactions of a large number of 
consumers, investors and businessmen, it is of paramount importance that 
the society’s system of economic information be adequate to give these many 
interested parties the data necessary to support rational action. There are 
many dimensions to the data needed but certainly one of the most important 
is the reporting of economic success or failure by the large economic units 
that control and use a substantial portion of the nation’s capital resources. 
Such reporting reflects the economic efficiency of the use of resources and 
directs the flow of capital into the most productive channels. If an economic 
society is to function effectively, it is important that this information be pre­
sented in a timely and meaningful fashion, that it be reliable and that it 
adequately measure economic performance. These are the objectives of 
corporate financial reporting.
Because of its importance in appraising success and making decisions, 
corporate financial reporting is an important interest of many professional 
groups in our economic society. Managers charged with the responsibility 
of reporting the results of their firms’ economic activities clearly have a pri­
mary concern. So do public accountants who must review these financial 
reports and attest to their fairness of presentation. Finally those who use 
this information in decision making of various sorts are also vitally interested 
in its form and content. Among such groups the financial analysts who must 
make investment decisions and guide the decisions of others in allocating 
resources among various investment opportunities in the economy have an 
obvious interest. In addition, commercial bankers who lend depositors’ 
money to corporations depend significantly on the financial reports of their 
clients.
In recent years there have been evidences of dissatisfaction with finan­
cial reporting practices. Articles appearing in the financial press have sug­
gested that managers reporting on their own results could substantially affect 
the nature of these reports by selection of measurement criteria that do not 
reflect the economic realities of their situation. Lawsuits have raised ques­
tions about the adequacy of corporate disclosure and the reliability of the 
information presented and have challenged the auditor’s responsibility in 
attesting to it. There have been evidences of misuse of published data by 
analysts and selected investors. While it would be overstating the situation 
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to say that a crisis exists in the reporting sphere, it does appear that there 
are grounds for concern.
An analysis of the sources of complaint makes it apparent that a sub­
stantial number of the problems that exist today are the result of communi­
cation failures on the part of the various responsible parties charged with the 
obligation of preparing and using financial reports. While many people on 
both sides are complaining, too few are listening. User groups complain 
that financial statements are not sufficiently uniform and do not provide the 
information which they need, while at the same time preparers resist what 
they consider attempts to put them in a reporting straitjacket which would 
not give them sufficient latitude to report the economic reality of their opera­
tions as they see it.
Within this environment it seems clear that improved communication 
is important in order to make the various interested parties aware of the 
problems of the others and to see what steps might be taken to improve 
financial reporting where necessary. In addition, the institutional environ­
ment surrounding financial reporting requires continuing review to determine 
whether it can be made more effective both in dealing with the specific prob­
lems which arise from time to time and in developing a systematic and 
improving framework for corporate reporting.
To these ends, leading members of the four professional organizations 
most concerned with financial reporting met and held a two-day Symposium 
on the subject at Seaview, New Jersey on November 7 and 8, 1968. Attend­
ing were representatives of the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants, the Financial Analysts Federation, the Financial Executives 
Institute and the Robert Morris Associates.
The principal objectives of the Symposium were first to improve com­
munication between the various persons in organizations vitally interested 
in financial reporting, so that each could understand the thinking processes 
of the others; second, to develop some innovative ideas about corporate 
financial reporting in response to the needs of the various parties at interest; 
and finally, to think about the future of corporate financial reporting and 
consider the ways in which the assembled group might take action in the 
light of this future. No attempt was planned nor was one made to produce 
any formal conclusions from the group as a whole. All parties considered 
this an opportunity to discuss, think and understand.
As a basis for the discussions a series of papers was prepared by the 
members of the various groups from their differing points of view. In addi­
tion, each group had members prepare a critique of each paper to obtain 
additional viewpoints. The papers were designed to stimulate thought rather 
than to report on the results of research efforts. These papers and critiques 
were not delivered at the Symposium but were considered in advance by the 
participants, and they therefore served as a background for the discussions. 
Four university professors of accounting served as moderators for the session. 
They began their efforts with a concise summary of the papers as a means 
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of defining the subjects to be discussed. In large part, the professors attempted 
to serve as catalysts to assure a meaningful interchange, rather than as dis­
cussion leaders directing the group toward any specific ends. The Symposium 
opened with introductory remarks delivered by Ralph Saul, president of the 
American Stock Exchange, and the rest of the two days was devoted entirely 
to discussion.
In the course of two days, a great deal of spirited discussion took place. 
Virtually everyone who attended the program participated in the delibera­
tions of the group, both in the formal sessions and in the informal consulta­
tions which took place during meals and in the evenings. In the course of 
these discussions, participants heard the views of others and made personal 
arrangements for various forms of continuing dialogue to take place after 
the Symposium. For the participants themselves, therefore, the seminar 
achieved its objectives of increasing communication and understanding of 
the various interests involved in financial reporting. The participants in­
creased their understanding of the theoretical and institutional framework 
for the development of accounting principles, and they came to recognize 
that no simple answer existed to the questions of financial reporting raised 
by the papers and critiques.
The participants left, therefore, with what one of them described as 
“a feeling of warmth and accomplishment,” leaving the chairman and editor 
of the proceedings with the problem of communicating the results of the 
Symposium to the group that was not present to receive the personal advan­
tages of attendance. To aid him they left 350 pages of transcript and the 
memories of numerous stimulating discussions. The editor’s communication 
problem, therefore, was acute.
One option was simply to reproduce the entire transcript with appro­
priate grammatical changes where syntax had wandered. After a careful 
reading of the transcript, however, it was apparent that such a course would 
create a document that was hard to follow and would not communicate the 
essence of the conclusions reached and not reached at this Symposium. In 
the course of two days’ discussions, a number of subjects kept recurring and 
were reconsidered at a number of points. In addition, there was a substan­
tial amount of repetition of ideas as different members of the group reinforced 
the arguments of others by repeating their position and elaborating somewhat 
upon it.
The editor ultimately concluded, therefore, that the only viable approach 
was to condense and group the comments made by the participants into 
major subject areas and thus distill the essence of the discussions. This 
decision necessitated the omission of many supporting comments and expres­
sions of concurrence. Some participants will perhaps be concerned that their 
words of wisdom are not made fully available to readers. Nevertheless it is 
the feeling of the editor that the transcript which follows is faithful to the 
basic conclusions and discussions of the two days. In such an editing job 
the personal bias of the editor must show to some extent, but in no place were 
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new comments created after the Symposium simply to present an editorial 
point of view.
Before the Symposium began, it was agreed that in the ultimate publica­
tion participants in the discussion would not be identified by name. This was 
done to enable people to speak without feeling that they were going on record 
in any formal sense. The transcript does indicate the basic professional orien­
tation of each speaker so that this can be associated with his comments.
The papers and critiques follow the edited transcript in this volume. 
This rather unusual ordering was adopted because it was felt that it reflected 
the relative emphasis placed on discussion in the organization of this Sympo­
sium. The participants did not come to consider scholarly papers in sequence 
but rather to exchange ideas. The papers and critiques served the purpose 
of presenting background and stimulating ideas. The discussion ranged widely 
and did not relate specifically to the papers in turn. The essence of the 
Symposium proceedings, therefore, is contained in the edited transcript. Here 
the flavor of both new and old ideas presented to the group is revealed, and 
the conflicts and agreements are highlighted.
From the broad nature of the objectives of the Symposium and the 
diverse points of view expressed, it is clear that no definitive statement of 
policy can emerge from the Symposium. Even this edited transcript will not 
chronicle all the expressed views of all the participants. Many ideas are dis­
cussed on which there is no agreement despite spirited discussion. There are 
some ideas where a consensus is achieved, and, in addition, there are thoughts 
and innovations suggested about which there are many differences of opinion.
Comparability and Flexibility
The Symposium begins with the consideration of one of the most 
important areas discussed: the need for comparability on the one hand and 
flexibility on the other in financial reporting. The recent “literature of pro­
test” emphasizes the deficiencies in financial reporting due to the acceptability 
of varying accounting principles to describe the results of operations in finan­
cial reports, the control that corporate management can exercise over reported 
income as a result and the lack of comparability among the reports of different 
companies.
It is apparent that the Symposium group feels that while a problem 
exists, it is not as acute as many outsiders believe. Both financial executives 
and public accountants point to many situations in which different accounting 
principles are used because the economic realities involved are different. 
They emphasize the enormous diversity of fact that exists, and the virtual 
impossibility of prescribing a single set of accounting procedures that would 
fit every diverse factual situation which might arise. In addition, while it is 
acknowledged that some firms may take advantage of diverse accounting 
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principles to control reported income in a misleading way, such cases are 
thought to be relatively rare.
On the other side, analysts point to several cases where it appears that 
the same economic reality is being described differently as, for example, in the 
diverse depreciation policies followed by computer leasing companies, and 
to situations in which companies have changed accounting methods with 
substantial effect upon income where there was no evidence that economic 
facts had changed.
After considerable discussion, it seems apparent that the users of finan­
cial information are not asking for absolute and rigid comparability, nor 
are the preparers of this information seeking complete flexibility, and a 
middle ground generally satisfactory to all emerges.
In approaching this consensus the users give up the idea of rigid defini­
tion of all principles in favor of a plea that in any given set of circumstances 
to which a number of alternative accounting practices might apply there 
should be one of those practices which is recognized to be more appropriate 
than any of the others. In seeking this practice, it is recognized that a given 
practice might be appropriate in one industry and quite a contrary practice 
in another. One practice may be appropriate in a given set of circumstances, 
but changing circumstances might make another preferable.
In this approach, the group seems to move toward the suggestion in 
William Norby’s paper that accounting principles should be outlined by 
industry. These appropriate practices ought to be stated and known by users, 
and any choice of another practice ought to be disclosed. It is generally agreed 
that management does have the right to use another practice, but if this is 
done, that fact should be highlighted and a justification given for the use of 
the alternative procedure. In addition, the users feel that the effect of this 
departure should be disclosed. Disclosure is not a complete substitute for 
comparability, but where it is necessary to have departures, adequate dis­
closure should be made and should include both a description of the departure, 
the reasons why it is necessary in particular circumstances and its effect so 
that users can judge its validity.
Finally, the user group feels that there should be as few alternative 
practices as possible in order to have comparability in those situations where 
economic facts are the same.
The financial executives emphasize their responsibility in presenting 
financial statements. They identify reporting to the stockholders and the 
public as an important part of their stewardship function. Accordingly, they 
believe that the ultimate authority to decide the reporting principles followed 
must rest with management, subject to the check of public accountants for 
general acceptability and regulatory agencies for conformity to law.
In addition to feeling that it is appropriate to have responsibility and 
authority for financial reporting go together, the preparers suggest that they 
are in the best position to know what accounting describes the operations of 
their company most meaningfully. Any financial statements rest to a sub­
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stantial extent on knowledge of a firm’s plans, expectations and intentions 
about which management is best informed. Thus, where there are alternative 
accounting methods available the management should have the freedom to 
adopt that method which in their judgment best reveals the progress and 
status of the firm within the peculiarities of its own condition and situation. 
Additionally, they feel that they need the freedom to adopt a different method 
when necessary to meet changing circumstances or conditions. Nevertheless, 
preparers agree that some ground rules are necessary to make reporting useful 
and they do not demand complete flexibility. This attitude, combined with 
users’ acceptance of disclosure as at least a partial substitute for uniformity, 
leads to the conclusion that the users’ and preparers’ viewpoints are recon­
cilable if adequate communication exists between the groups.
The Role of the Auditor in Comparability
Despite this general conclusion, there is no clear definition of the role 
that the public accountant should play in the selection among alternative 
accounting principles. Several individual analysts and bankers express the 
point of view that the auditor should be satisfied that the accounting principles 
selected by management were the best accounting principles for the particular 
situation, not just principles which fall within the broad range of acceptability. 
At the extreme there are a few who feel that the auditor should be the 
professional reporter presenting the results of the firm as he sees fit from the 
financial records of the firm. This group argues that since it is management 
that is being reported on, it is inequitable for management to select their own 
principles.
The majority, however, seem to feel that management should take 
primary responsibility but that the auditor should exercise a greater responsi­
bility in determining that the principles followed were the best in the circum­
stances rather than simply “generally acceptable.” This point of view is 
probably best summed up by the participant who said, “I would like to think 
that the certificate means that the auditor in reviewing the financial statements 
has exercised his professional influence to have these presented in the best 
way he can—not that he has searched through accounting literature to find 
a means of supporting the way the management may have elected to present 
something that he doesn’t really completely agree with himself.”
The Accounting Principles Board and Accounting Research
A second major part of the discussion centers on institutions for the 
definition of principles of financial reporting and the way in which such 
institutions should operate. General agreement exists that such institutions 
will be most effective if they are developed voluntarily within the private 
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sector of the economy rather than through government action, although the 
latter is considered inevitable if private groups do not act.
Despite some harsh words in papers and critiques, a rather surprising 
consensus emerges from the discussions that the Accounting Principles Board 
as currently constituted is an appropriate body to define accounting principles. 
The participants seem to feel that professional accountants are the most suit­
able group to consider and define accounting principles in general, and that 
it is desirable to have the national professional body of accountants qualified 
for public practice select Board members from its membership.
The questions as to whether or not there should be non-CPAs repre­
sented on the Board is extensively discussed and the consensus of the group 
seems to be that there is no need for such representation. The Board’s current 
practice of including in its membership a limited number of individual CPAs 
who are professors of accounting and financial executives is applauded, but 
only a few feel that formal representation of other groups and non-CPAs 
should be required.
On the other hand, the groups feel very strongly that there must be 
extensive and early consultation by the Board with the various user and 
preparer organizations both when it is establishing its agenda and when its 
subcommittees are studying particular subjects. The members of the Board 
generally indicate an enthusiastic support for such participation and indicate 
that there are steps already being undertaken to encourage it.
Some participants suggest that a well-publicized institutional means for 
communication with the Board be established so that specific subjects can 
be referred by interested users. Analysts particularly believe that in the 
course of their work they may become aware of accounting problem areas 
arising at a very early stage, and that if they know that there is a group 
charged with the responsibility of serving as an early warning system for the 
Board they would be encouraged to contact it.
The structure of the Board is found in large part to be satisfactory. 
There is some support for the idea that some or all members of the Board 
serve on a full-time basis with appropriate compensation and prestige to 
supervise the development of research and expedite the decision-making 
process of the Board. Concern is expressed, however, that such a step would 
reduce the very high quality of members of the current Board since firms 
could not make senior partners available on a full-time basis. The majority 
of the group seem to feel that additional high-quality staff support will serve 
the desired purpose.
There is considerable discussion about the role of research in developing 
principles of reporting and the way in which it should be accomplished. Some 
participants argue for extensive basic and applied research while others feel 
that in most cases the definition of the issue is quite clear, and what is needed 
is a means of making a decision among alternatives after weighing the various 
pros and cons.
This difference in viewpoint is also apparent in the discussion of whether 
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the best approach to improving financial reporting is to start with the basic 
problem of what is being measured and deal with problems of application 
only within a defined framework or if the topic-by-topic approach largely 
adopted to date by the Board is the most practical one. No firm conclusion 
is reached on this subject, but the majority of participants seem to lean 
towards the latter approach, particularly after a somewhat frustrating attempt 
by the group to achieve agreement on the objectives of financial reporting 
and the definition of income in basic terms. At the same time, concern is 
expressed at the lack of a coherent and stated framework of objectives for 
financial reporting; there is considerable support for the position expressed 
in the critique by Robert M. Trueblood that the Board should issue state­
ments of accounting objectives both in general and in specific subject areas 
and supplement these with practice bulletins on specific topics rather than 
emphasize procedures as seems to be the current trend.
Despite expressed doubts about the effectiveness of research, most of 
the group favor its expansion in the financial reporting area, particularly on 
an applied basis. Some participants suggest a single research body which 
would be supported by all organizations interested in the area and which 
would control the research effort most effectively. Representatives of the 
four organizations represented at the Symposium do not seem to favor this 
approach as the sole means of achieving research, however. Members feel 
that each organization should be encouraged to sponsor projects in the area, 
but it is pointed out that most groups would have interests in research 
projects in other areas as well as in financial reporting. It is also felt that 
fund raising from members of each separate group for a central body would 
be more difficult.
There seems agreement, however, that all research efforts in the area 
should be carefully co-ordinated to avoid duplication and assure coverage of 
vital areas, and the possibility of establishing a jointly supported research 
co-ordinating group is mentioned as is the use of the Accounting Principles 
Board research apparatus for this purpose.
The Auditor's Responsibility
The role of the auditor, both as it is and as it is perceived by the public, 
is considered. From the comments made, it is evident that even within the 
Symposium group there are many who are uncertain as to what an auditor 
does and should do. It is agreed that the auditor’s function should be more 
clearly explained to analysts, bankers and the general public; various means 
of achieving this are considered. One such means is changing the auditor’s 
standard short-form report to include more explanation of what he has done 
and what he has not done. There is considerable support for changing the 
form of the report, but there is also doubt as to whether this would achieve 
the desired purpose.
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There is some sentiment for expanding the auditor’s reporting function. 
Some participants suggest that the auditor should regularly offer an opinion 
on the adequacy of a client’s internal controls, while others suggest that the 
auditor’s opinion should cover the entire annual report and perhaps the quar­
terly reports of the corporation. Both public accountants and financial exec­
utives point out the problem of setting standards in these areas, and no 
general conclusion exists as to the desirability of expanding the auditor’s 
report in these directions.
In discussing audit reports, a number of bankers indicate a desire to 
continue to receive long-form audit reports with substantial supplemental data 
about their clients, and members of the National Conference of Bankers and 
CPAs explain the current efforts of that group to develop a standard report­
ing format which banks can ask corporations to provide, perhaps on an 
industry-by-industry basis. There is a general feeling among bankers present 
that this is a productive effort, although most seem to feel that no special 
accounting principles need to be developed for banks as long as there is ade­
quate disclosure in financial statements.
The question of the auditor’s legal liability is discussed and the various 
groups seem sympathetic to the problem mentioned by the CPA members of 
disproportionate liability. In response to a specific question, there is a com­
pletely favorable response to the possibility of auditors practicing in a cor­
porate form, although it is not felt that this fully solves the liability problem. 
During this discussion, the problem of independence is touched upon and 
the auditor’s responsibility as a “public reporter” is examined.
Disclosure of Future Expectations
Some of the most significant and interesting ideas discussed in the two 
days are those about which no consensus exists. In a group of involved men 
with diverse interests and viewpoints, it is inevitable that several innovations 
in reporting will be suggested which other members of the group view with 
concern, and with worry about their practical implications.
Perhaps the most significant of these is the request by several of the 
financial analysts for disclosure of future plans and expectations by corpora­
tions. The analysts point out that investors are most interested in what will 
happen and use past data to help in predicting the future. Since management 
is most sophisticated in applying forecasting techniques and is most knowl­
edgeable in respect to the factors which would affect the business, its expecta­
tions would be more likely to be accurate than the guesses of outsiders. In 
addition, it is pointed out that substantial sums are being spent on forecasting 
by management and that virtually all management information systems today 
include long-range plans and budgets which are used for the internal purposes 
of the firm. Without being specific as to what data is desired, the analysts 
press for disclosure of such future-oriented information.
In making these suggestions, it is apparent that even the strongest 
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advocates are aware of many of the legal and practical problems that would 
arise, but they feel that the benefits in terms of improved data for investment 
decisions would be such as to warrant serious consideration of these sug­
gestions.
Most financial officers in responding to this suggestion indicate an even 
more acute awareness of the problems involved. They speak of this as open­
ing Pandora’s box, exposing the corporation to unknown and undefined 
liabilities, and significantly dampening the innovative tendencies of corporate 
management through increasing the costs of failure to include public dis­
closure of the fact.
They feel that as disclosure expands, so does the danger that the infor­
mation presented would mislead rather than enlighten the investor. This 
might be the case even in expanded disclosure of historical information, as 
in the case of product-line information, where users of the data would be 
unaware of the necessary but arbitrary allocations of costs among products 
and the interrelationships between different parts of the business and hence 
might draw totally erroneous conclusions from the data. Were disclosure of 
anticipated results to be required, the uncertainties would be magnified many 
fold. Users’ understanding of the many estimates which go into budgets 
and forecasts is limited, and there would be great danger that they would 
take the forecasts as indicating assurance about the future that cannot exist. 
One end product of a few bad experiences might be a loss of faith in all 
financial data. Finally, the competitive disadvantage of revealing plans is 
emphasized.
The CPAs in discussing this subject indicate a recognition of the need 
but a severe concern about the practicalities of such disclosure and the prob­
lems of attestation associated with such prospective financial data.
All present are concerned about the overemphasis on earnings per share 
presently found in both the financial press and analysts’ reports, but there 
are no good answers as to how to deal with the phenomenon. The analysts 
feel that it would be useful if some index of the quality of earnings could be 
developed, but there are no specific suggestions as to how this index could 
be constructed. Some aspects of future disclosure are felt to be steps in this 
direction.
Quality Control Over Financial Reporting
Another innovative suggestion that is presented and discussed is the 
development of some institutional means of quality control over financial 
reporting practices. Several analysts feel that it would be desirable to estab­
lish some mechanism whereby they can call attention to situations in which 
they feel that corporate reporting practices are less than satisfactory. They 
mention that on the positive side they are now offering awards for the most 
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informative disclosure, but they feel that there is no vehicle by which they 
can bring inadequate reporting into the public eye in order to discourage it.
The present practice review procedure which is currently carried on 
both at the AICPA and at the accountants’ state society levels is designed as 
an educational tool, and no publicity is given to examples of deficient report­
ing. In addition, the system is primarily designed to deal with the auditors’ 
certificate rather than with the adequacy of disclosure in financial statements.
The principal concern of users of financial reports is not necessarily 
technically deficient auditors’ opinions but inadequate disclosure for the 
complete analysis of financial statements. What constitutes incomplete dis­
closure to an analyst may not be technically incorrect from the viewpoint of 
a CPA. Practice review as currently constituted is felt to be ineffectual in 
this regard. There seems agreement that some further investigation of possible 
institutional arrangements for surveillance of public financial reporting should 
be undertaken, but there is no consensus as to the kind of system that might 
be appropriate.
Summary
The Symposium clearly achieved improved communication and under­
standing among those attending. There was a general realization that finan­
cial reporting cannot be the sole province of any one group, but that many 
interested parties have a significant interest, need and right to be heard. Past 
efforts at co-ordination have generally involved only two groups, and the 
greatest strength of this gathering was the commitment of four organizations 
to a dialogue which proved beneficial to all.
All parties listened to the others and came away with an increased 
appreciation of the problems of other groups. Preparers recognized the needs 
of users for comparable data and indicated a willingness to accept some con­
straints on their freedom to report as they wished. Bankers and analysts, on 
the other hand, increasingly recognized the difficulty of imposing a simple 
set of measurement principles on a multidimensional reality.
Many unanswered questions remain. The need is great for research by 
all parties into the basic need for financial statements and the appropriate 
constraints on use of statements. The impact of the computer on both credit 
analysis and security selection make the understanding and quality of the 
underlying data increasingly significant. The computer forces its user into 
the analysis of a problem through a series of logical steps, and the traditional 
intuitive feel associated with interpreting financial data will have to be increas­
ingly systematized.
While the Symposium was felt by its participants to have been successful, 
there was general agreement that it was only the first step and its success 
would ultimately be measured only by the actions which were taken subse­
quently by the people and organizations participating. Plans for future meet­
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ings, co-ordination of research activities, consultation in the development of 
reporting principles and practices and other institutional contacts are all under 
discussion, and the specific results are as yet unpredictable.
Final evaluation, therefore, must await the germination of the seeds 









The largest amount of time at the Symposium is devoted to the meshing 
of the viewpoints of users and preparers of financial statements. Four papers 
and five critiques are devoted to this subject and about half of the group’s 
discussion time is related to the area.
Professor Robert K. Mautz introduces the subject by summarizing the 
papers and critiques and sets the stage in general for the discussions to follow. 
Many subjects are touched upon in the discussion, but the four which seem 
to recur regularly are the problem of comparability, the role of the Accounting 
Principles Board and two new and unresolved issues: the need for reporting 
of future expectations and the possible desirability of some form of institu­
tional surveillance over financial reporting. The transcript is, therefore, 
divided into these sections.
Introductory Remarks
Professor Robert K. Mautz
My attitude toward this assignment has passed through several stages 
and at this point represents something of a compromise among them. On first 
learning of the nature of the Symposium and receiving an invitation to take 
part, my feelings were much like those of the small boy who learns that there 
is about to be a fight in the neighborhood and that he has a particularly good 
spot from which to view the carnage. Knowing the capabilities of some of 
the participants at argument and intellectual infighting and the strong feelings 
which some of you have on certain of the subjects before us, there was little 
question in my mind but that the contest would be vigorous, skillfully fought, 
and a spectacle to behold. Some of you have been waiting a long time for 
just such an opportunity as this, an opportunity to exchange arguments with 
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some of those who need to be set straight on a few important matters. No 
one with any sporting blood at all would want to miss such a contest. I was 
delighted to accept the generous offer of a ringside seat.
But with the passage of time, I am pleased to report, came a more 
mature attitude toward this meeting. The obviously good intentions of the 
members of the steering committee, the quality of the designated participants, 
the importance of the subject matter, and the nagging feeling that unless this 
group could clearly demonstrate an ability to compose differences and show 
the way to co-operation in improving financial reporting the possibilities for 
progress were slim indeed—all combined to impress upon me the very real 
importance of this Symposium.
The first problem to confront me, if it may be called that, is in the nature 
of an embarrassment of riches. Selecting from the generous offerings of the 
contributors those items most warranting attention calls not only for sensitivity 
and perception but also for a great deal of luck in not offending someone 
whose favorite subjects are omitted.
The papers and critiques differ somewhat in the nature of the questions 
which their authors think should be brought before this group. Some are 
interested in the discussion of specific problems such as the recording of 
merger and acquisition transactions in the accounts of the acquiring com­
panies or the accounting for long-term leases. Others prefer to give attention 
to more general topics such as the need for firm rules to provide a greater 
degree of comparability in reported data. Some are much concerned with the 
composition and method of operation of the Accounting Principles Board, 
placing this ahead of all else at this meeting. Others would stress the possible 
expansion of the responsibility of independent auditors into new areas, such 
as the review of interim statements. Any one of these might consume our 
entire discussion time; from among them only a portion can be selected for 
any significant consideration.
A second, and perhaps the major, problem faced in preparation for this 
discussion today is concerned with the method of presenting the topics 
recommended for discussion.
Both Dudley Browne and Harry Meily in their critiques pointed out 
that as they read the papers they found relatively little indication of a desire 
to compromise, to meet other people halfway. The statements were vigorous 
and strong and forceful—an “I’m going to straighten you people out” 
approach. And I must say, as I read them, I found the same thing.
Time and again a writer will indicate that he understands the arguments 
that the other side will advance, and he doesn’t think much of them. “We 
know the other side of the issue, and we know it’s not very good. But we 
don’t think they know our side of the issue, so we want them to listen.” Per­
haps each one of us ought to be listening more ourselves.
A very useful thought is found in Clifford Heimbucher’s statement: “The 
most important task that this Symposium could accomplish would be to build a 
framework for a mutually acceptable system of developing, enunciating and 
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applying accounting principles.” And I don’t think any of us would disagree. 
In fact, the same thought was expressed a number of different ways by others.
But how are we to accomplish anything constructive if we all come to 
the table only with demands, complaints and objections, only with a desire to 
make the other man’s shortcomings known to him? On this point Dudley 
Browne noted: “But, if the four papers I have read beforehand are repre­
sentative of the others, then again, we are in grave danger of talking and not 
listening, of seeking not to give but only to take. Let us resolve for once to 
seek to understand views advanced by others that are at variance with our 
own. Only in so doing are we likely to go away from this Symposium with 
a sense of accomplishment.” What can we do in this discussion session to 
put some effective emphasis on listening to one another so that we may work 
toward the kind of goal Mr. Heimbucher suggests?
One should not read a criticism of those who wrote papers into these 
remarks. Their task was to express a point of view as effectively and as articu­
lately as possible. They were to put the issues before us, to point up contrast­
ing views. This they have done remarkably well. The critics have likewise 
performed well in further emphasizing differences of opinions and comment­
ing on what they regard as omissions or other weaknesses in the papers. But 
in view of the fact that this has been done so well for us, should we not now 
proceed to the next step?
Given the choice, most of us here would delight in an opportunity to 
point out to our fellow Symposium participants their shortcomings, their 
errors, their failures to understand the realities of life as we do, their inability 
to comprehend the inherent rightness of our own positions. Yet if we take 
that course during this brief and precious time together, what will we gain? 
True, we may have the time of our life joining in a thoroughly enjoyable 
intellectual “rumble,” but we will have accomplished little, if anything, con­
structive and may well have irritated one another to the point that any 
significant co-operation among the members of this very important group 
of leaders is lost completely. Unless we can listen as well as speak, unless we 
can accept criticism as well as admonish others, unless we can give a little as 
well as push, unless we can empathize as well as complain, the substantial 
effort in bringing us here will be largely wasted—and so will one of the most 
remarkable opportunities ever provided to advance the cause of financial 
reporting.
If we were to try to outline the steps necessary in order to reconcile the 
differences within a group like this so we could be constructive and move 
toward the objective that Mr. Heimbucher and others suggested for us, the 
steps might look something like this:
1. Seek a thorough understanding of the positions and claims of others. 
Precisely what do they request and why do they do so?
2. Make a fair evaluation of the reasonableness and practicability of 
such claims.
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3. Review our own position to determine whether we suffer injury or 
only indignity in meeting such claims.
No doubt the majority of you have found that most people—at least 
most people able enough to attain positions of responsibility—have reasons 
for what they do. They do not act arbitrarily and without cause any more 
than do we. Further, there is a generous amount of goodwill in the world, 
of helpfulness, of appreciation for the problems and ambitions of others. Very 
few of us would deliberately obstruct others if at no undue cost we could find 
a way to facilitate rather than impede their progress. But first we must find 
out what they want—not what we think they want but what they say they 
want.
Let me make a few comments about the papers and critiques as a group. 
A first impression is that they are forceful and vigorous expressions of strongly 
held views. There is little attempt to be conciliatory, to seek compromise, to 
ask questions. Most of them press claims, voice objections, and indicate dis­
satisfactions. Of course these generalizations are not true of all papers and 
critiques, but they reflect the general tendency. Even those who commented 
on the force with which others made their claims found the tendency infectious 
and succumbed to a similar approach.
The contributors often indicated at least some degree of familiarity with 
the arguments which they anticipated others would use, but rarely was this 
accompanied by an apparent respect for such arguments. In some cases, 
assertions by authors of papers were read very critically by those assigned to 
review them, thereby revealing a substantial sensitivity. But, in many in­
stances, an automatic defensive reaction appears to make sympathetic under­
standing of contrary positions difficult.
My reason for stressing this tendency on the part of some of the con­
tributors is to remind us once again that we are here to seek some constructive 
result, not merely to express our strong emotions.
In sum, the contributors express quite articulately the well-known argu­
ments on each side of the principal issues and add to them a number of points 
which, if not completely novel, at least throw additional light on some of the 
issues. They keep reasonably well within the bounds of their assignments and 
although there is some spilling over into the subject matter of later sessions, 
this is not unexpected in view of the nature of the subject. Those who wrote 
papers for other sessions faced the same difficulty.
Also not surprisingly, different contributors undertook their assignments 
with differing degrees of enthusiasm and with varying talents. Some have 
strongly presented their positions, apparently to be read, not only by those 
they consider to be in opposition to their own views, but particularly by those 
they “represent.” Others have passed judgment much more casually, evidently 
feeling no responsibility to a “constituency.” Happily, some went beyond the 
presentation of a position to suggest means by which progress in improving 
accounting principles might be achieved.
Both Mr. Whitman and Mr. Russell urge the development of criteria to
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judge the appropriateness of alternative procedures as a means of reducing the 
freedom of statement preparers to select from among a number of optional 
accounting procedures entirely at will. Mr. Whitman writes:
The desirable goal of narrowing differences can best be achieved by 
endeavoring to define the situations in which various methods are 
most suitable rather than arbitrarily proscribing alternative procedures 
which may provide the most realistic and informative financial pre­
sentation in particular applications, especially where a reasonable 
dichotomy of opinion exists.
Mr. Russell offers the same solution in slightly different words:
... an attempt must be made to narrow differences in accounting 
methods which are not based on sound principles of accounting or 
which are not justified by variations in factual circumstances. To 
justify alternative methods, the criteria for alternate methods must 
be established.
One of the subjects we should discuss today is the extent to which this pro­
posal holds promise for mutually acceptable progress.
Granting that rather explicit instructions were given by the steering 
committee to each participant, there is still remarkable agreement among 
them on the issues they find most interesting. The several contributors start 
from a common base; they find the financial data reported in published 
annual reports of great importance, not only in their own professional activi­
ties but as an influence on the decisions of others and on the economy at 
large. The unanimity on this point is impressive. There seems little doubt 
within this group that the subject before us is of sufficient significance to 
warrant the attention we are here to give it.
They are almost equally agreed on the need for improvement in our 
accounting and reporting practices. No contributor urged that we let well 
enough alone. All agreed that improvement was not only necessary but a 
matter of some urgency. One does find differences, however, in the speed 
with which individual contributors advocate achieving such progress, some 
urging a greatly increased output of pronouncements as rapidly as possible 
while others counsel for more deliberate action and additional precautions 
to forestall unwise statements.
Closely associated with the desire for improvement in financial reporting 
is insistence upon integrity and reliability in financial data. Explication of 
the importance of reliability led in two directions, one concerned with the 
need for better accounting principles, the other directed at the responsibility 
to be accepted by those who serve as independent auditors.
Although different contributors took different positions on major points, 
the issues themselves stand out vividly. There appears little excuse for me to 
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try to summarize the arguments advanced by those who took opposing 
positions because you have their words before you. Hence the following 
brief listing presents no more than the major issues implied in the contrib­
utors’ writings.
1. The comparability/flexibility issue
a. The meaning of comparability
b. The meaning of flexibility
c. The “management” of earnings
d. The influence of materiality tests on comparability
e. The desirability/danger of firm rules
f. Recommended solutions to the comparability/flexibility issue
2. The authority/participation issue in the development and establishment 
of accounting principles
a. Appropriate location of the right to establish authoritative accounting 
principles
b. Extent of participation appropriate for each interest in financial 
reporting
(1) Demanded by the interest
(2) Expected of the interest by others
c. The composition of the Accounting Principles Board
d. The “acceptability” of opinions by the business community as a con­
dition precedent to their issuance by the Board
e. Certain operating procedures of the Board
(1) The “exposure draft” procedure
(2) Selection of topics for opinions
(3) Effectiveness and extent of reliance on research
(4) Increasing/decreasing the rate of output of the Board
3. The desirability/cost of extending the independent auditor’s responsibility
a. Adequacy of the responsibility now accepted for financial statements
b. Review of interim financial statements
c. Review of annual report material other than financial statements
d. Possible unbearable burdens of increased CPA liability
4. The desirability/hazards of additional disclosures
a. Evaluation of internal control
b. Forecasts and budgets
c. Contingent liabilities, special covenants, tax claims
d. Current values of assets
e. Accounting methods and accounting judgments
5. The significance/dangers of the earnings per share figure
6. Specific accounting problems
a. Recording acquisitions and mergers
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b. Segment reporting by diversified companies
c. Depreciation charged by computer-leasing companies
d. Accounting for research and development
e. Accounting for the investment credit
f. Accounting for long-term leases
If the unequivocal opinions expressed by the contributors are repre­
sentative of the views of the others present, mere mention of these issues 
should raise the temperature in this room an appreciable amount. For this 
reason, if for no other, little good can come from using such a listing for our 
discussion. One fears that raising the same issues would lead only to repeti­
tious discussion of the points already made quite effectively in the papers and 
critiques. Given these issues, how can we come to understand one another’s 
positions on them more clearly? How can each of us, no matter what his own 
views on these issues may be, come to understand more precisely, and hope­
fully more sympathetically, what makes those of contrary views differ with 
us? How can we discover more specifically just how we do differ so that we 
can determine realistically whether we are close enough to one another for 
compromise on a mutually acceptable solution?
Susanne Langer, the philosopher, has stated: “If we would have new 
knowledge, we must get us a whole world of new questions.” Perhaps we 
are not here seeking new knowledge in the sense that Miss Langer has used 
the term, but we do badly need a new approach if we are to do anything 
more than continue firing the same ammunition in the same old battle. So 
I offer the following questions as a basis for our discussion in the hope that 
if we turn our attention to illustration and specification rather than to argu­
ment, we may come to understand one another better. This may in turn 
provide for a more charitable evaluation of those who fail to see things quite 
our way. And who knows what may come from a charitable attitude?
Questions for Discussion
I. On the comparability/flexibility issue—
A. Can users of accounting data supply, by example or otherwise, a 
reasonably specific indication of the extent of comparability they 
consider essential?
1. Can they illustrate inadequate and excessive comparability?
2. On what terms do they desire data to be comparable?
a. Results for the same company over time?
b. Companies in the same industry?
c. Companies in different industries?
d. Companies which have segments operating in similar in­
dustries?
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B. Given Thomas Flynn’s working definition of operational compar­
ability in accounting principles (“Accounting principles should help 
make like things look alike, and unlike things look different”), can 
illustrations be given of how and why differences among companies 
require and justify flexibility in accounting principles?
1. What are some illustrations of appropriate flexibility necessitated 
by company differences?
2. What are some illustrations of inappropriate flexibility?
3. Can reasonable controls be established to control misuse of such 
flexibility?
C. Is there any significant gap between the minimum comparability 
required by users and the minimum flexibility required by issuers?
D. Can criteria be developed which will, in all but rare cases, indicate 
when one of a number of optional accounting practices is appropriate 
and when it is not?
1. Would such criteria effectively eliminate all but one preferred 
practice in a given situation?
2. Would development of such criteria meet the “firm rule” require­
ment of those seeking greater comparability?
3. Can an illustration of such criteria be given?
II. On the authority/participation issue in the development and establish­
ment of accounting principles—
A. What type of participation in the functioning of the Accounting 
Principles Board does each of the following groups desire?
1. Bank credit officers
2. Financial analysts
3. Corporate financial executives
B. What contribution to the success of the Accounting Principles 
Board’s activities can each of these groups make? What are the 
responsibilities of each group to support the Board’s activities with 
funds and efforts?
C. In view of the nature of the Board’s operations, can the “exposure 
process” be made more effective (1) in terms of the number of people 
invited to respond, (2) in terms of responsiveness by the Board to 
comments on exposure drafts, and (3) in terms of obtaining the 
kinds of response to exposure drafts that are most helpful to the 
Board? If the exposure process is expanded to achieve greater par­
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ticipation, will this unduly lengthen the total time needed for issu­
ance of opinions?
D. What is implied in the emphasis on “greater acceptability to business” 
of Board pronouncements?
1. What procedural steps that are not now followed would provide 
for determining such acceptability?
2. Is there a feeling that objection by a large number of respondents 
to exposure of a draft Opinion should block that proposed 
Opinion from issuance by the Board as a generally accepted 
accounting principle? If so, how large a response, or what pre­
ponderance is required for that purpose?
E. Is the Accounting Principles Board, established as it now is as an 
arm of the independent public accounting profession, the appropri­
ate agency to develop and establish accounting principles as author­
itative?
1. Does its present composition require modification? 
If so, in what way?
2. What are the advantages of its present membership?
F. Are there practical means by which interests not now represented 
on the Accounting Principles Board can offer (1) recommendations 
for topics to be considered, and (2) comments or advice on subjects 
before the Board?
G. What rate of progress can we reasonably expect from the Board in 
(1) developing a basic statement of accounting principles, and (2) 
providing solutions to specific problems? Are there specific sug­
gestions by Board members or others of how this procedure can be 
shortened?
III. On the desirability/hazards of additional disclosures—
A. In what specific form are additional disclosures desired?
1. For an evaluation of internal control?
2. For forecasts and budgets?
3. For current values of assets?
4. For accounting methods and accounting judgments?
B. What reasons explain present absence of these items in published 
financial statements?
IV. On the significance/dangers of the earnings per share figures— Can the 
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emphasis on earnings per share as a crucial measure of managerial and 
enterprise performance be reduced in any significant degree?
The Problem of Comparability
Obtaining comparability among corporate reports has long been an 
objective of users of financial reports. At first glance, there seems to be no 
reason why a single set of accounting principles cannot be defined and used 
by all. Much of the literature critical of financial statements is focused on 
this problem. The conventional argument is buttressed by a few examples 
of alternative acceptable procedures and concluded by a plea that somebody 
should choose the best principle in each area and make everyone use it.
As the discussion develops, however, the difficulties inherent in this 
simple answer soon become apparent. The same set of facts seldom exists in 
different economic endeavors, and as the facts differ, so may the measure­
ment principle that best describes economic reality. While a number of situa­
tions are described where the accounting principles chosen by various firms 
seem to show greater differences than the economic facts would warrant, 
several other examples are at least in part refuted by the description of 
changing facts by the financial managers involved. At the same time, the 
need of analysts for comparable data so that they can make reasoned judg­
ments between the many investment media available is also made clear. 
While no formula is agreed upon, some understanding of the problems of 
the other groups is developed in the discussion of the subject which follows.
CPA: I am one of the staunchest proponents of comparability, and 
my concept of comparability applies not merely to a period of time in the 
same company, but to the comparison of one company with another. That, 
I feel, is in this practical world something that the users of accounting data 
want and need.
At a minimum, then, I would imagine that the least we can agree upon 
is comparability under the same set of facts. And this is not the case today. 
To illustrate: In the case of the investment credit, the facts are identical, but 
we have two ways of accounting for those same sets of facts that can yield 
entirely different results over a period of time.
Another illustration might be the handling of intangible drilling costs 
within the same set of circumstances. A million dollars of intangible costs 
invested in a successful well may be capitalized, expensed or capitalized and 
offset by a deferred tax.
The concept of comparability, as I see it, is limited to the same account­
ing treatment under the same set of facts. In cases where the facts are not 
the same, I do not envision that the use of the word “alternative” is appro­
priate. If the facts are not the same, it is not a matter of alternatives. It’s a 
different situation, therefore, calling for its own accounting treatment.
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Financial Executive: I can’t agree that the investment credit is an 
area of complete comparability of facts. In the airline industry, for example, 
you have problems of capital outlays that bunch in particular years, but in 
the petroleum industry, or steel, you have on-going capital programs. These 
are different facts. I don’t profess to know the answer to the investment tax 
credit accounting question in the airline industry, but I think it’s very inappro­
priate that the same answer be applied also to all other industries.
Analyst: A current example of where comparability might be useful 
to a user occurs in the steel industry.
In this industry changes are being made in depreciation accounting 
and the investment tax credit. For most of these companies, where they are 
changing their investment tax credit accounting to the flow-through approach, 
you can observe a change in their earnings of 5 to 10 per cent, resulting 
from the accounting change.
In the depreciation area, where they are shifting from accelerated depre­
ciation to straight line, changes are in the magnitude of 15 to 25 per cent 
of the earnings per share reported.
The analyst would surely like to have comparability on this kind of item 
within the steel industry, so that he can compare one steel stock with another 
and with similar industries, such as the aluminum industry where straight-line 
depreciation for stockholder purposes has long been customary.
This accounting change in the steel industry gives the analyst more 
comparability, but the timing of this and how it happens is simply a choice 
of the companies, and it tends to occur in a year in which earnings are bad 
in a given industry.
Analyst: My view of the comparability question relates to the fact 
that both lenders and investors have many options as to where they can place 
their money. These options cross industry lines, and even if you get some 
similarity of the accounting of companies in a given industry, it is still most 
difficult for us to make comparisons between companies in different industries. 
Examples might be a steel company versus a bank. We have to decide where 
we are going to invest our money.
Because of that, I think what we really need in comparability is some­
thing very close to economic reality. If the statements of those companies 
describe economic realities, then we can make the comparisons we need 
to make.
CPA: I am concerned that in order to reflect this economic reality and 
in order to pick the depreciation method that we want everyone to use in a 
comparable fashion, we have got to back up one step and ask again: What 
is it that we are seeking to measure in economically realistic terms by the 
depreciation process, and by the inventory-measurement decisions on which 
cost flow method we are going to use?
I am concerned that in the effort to get a practical and immediate 
answer to specific problems we may foreclose the possibility of getting a solu­
tion that is going to be more satisfactory in the long run. And so I can’t 
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help but enter the plea that, rather than jumping forward in saying that all 
steel companies should use one depreciation method or another, maybe our 
better step is to move backward and say what is it that the depreciation 
process is realistically supposed to be measuring for steel companies.
CPA: I want to ask just what comparability really means. Let us take 
a specific example such as depreciation. Does comparability mean that every­
one uses straight-line depreciation, or does comparability and economic reality 
mean that each management chooses the method of matching the expiration 
of its equipment costs against its revenues in the way that it thinks is the 
most appropriate?
Analyst: I think you probably should have ability to choose the 
method that will produce the realistic results, but the question that then tends 
to get raised by a user is whether there is a potential difference in realistic 
results among any of the eight largest steel companies in depreciating their 
steel plant. Is it realistic to suspect that one company could justify a 15-year 
life, and another one as much different as 25? Or that for one company 
double-declining balance depreciation really produces the most realistic 
result, whereas another company in the same industry with the same kind of 
plants could justify something as different from that as straight line?
And then, when you go even beyond the steel industry, what about the 
aluminum industry or the paper industry or the chemical industry, or other 
heavy capital businesses? Does reality really differ very much in fact? And 
if it doesn’t, is it reasonable to let the management have the flexibility to 
choose whichever method they feel to be more realistic?
Analyst: For many years the answer from the steel industry was that 
reality varied in each company. There were different operating policies, and 
different lives were necessary.
Now that the companies seem to be changing en masse to straight line, 
one can only question the effectiveness of their arguments. I think in this 
case, straight line should be defined as reality.
A better illustration of comparability problems occurs among the com­
puter companies. I can imagine blast furnaces with different lives because 
of different economic policies; but when the first-year depreciation of an IBM 
computer is 40 per cent, and when the same computer is sold to a leasing 
company it is 10 per cent, while comparable equipment has write-off rates 
of 15 to 33 per cent in the case of other computer companies, I just can’t 
imagine economic reality differing by this degree as a result of different 
operating practices.
Financial Executive: We must remember that reporting is only one 
facet of the entire business play. I think to focus on reporting when it’s just 
a small part of management’s overall responsibility is an unfortunate thing. 
I think that everybody could agree that management should have complete 
flexibility in making and implementing their business decisions. If we then 
say that every business shall account for such an item as depreciation on a 
uniform basis, with uniform rates, we are overlooking the fact that reporting 
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is a culmination of a management decision to invest in a plant or rehabilitate 
a plant, or whatever.
I think flexibility in the reporting then is a desirable thing, provided 
there is adequate disclosure so that the investors and the users of the financial 
data can make their decision in the light of all the facts.
Analyst: I agree that management should have the right to report as 
they wish in terms of their management decisions. As an example, National 
Cash Register developed a new Century series of computers. They have 
decided to defer certain salesmen’s costs, because they don’t get the revenues 
from these rental computers for a period of time, but they pay their salesmen 
starting immediately when the order is booked.
I think that it is management’s prerogative to defer certain of these 
costs, and not penalize their income statement immediately. National Cash 
Register does do this in their quarterly report. They do indicate how much 
is being delivered. And as an analyst who follows National Cash closely, I 
do take this into account and adjust their earnings in connection with this 
particular nonrecurring charge.
So I think management has the right and obligation to manage their 
business as they wish, as long as they make full disclosure of how they have 
changed reporting practices. This helps us immeasurably.
Analyst: I think some people are confused about the amount of 
adjusting that most investors are able to do with the figures that are reported. 
Disclosure is helpful, but these problems are so complex, and there are so 
many companies, and the whole tempo of our industry moves so fast that I 
think relatively few investor organizations are really devoting their time or 
energies to making the kind of adjustments you would need to make, pro­
vided you had adequate disclosure to put these things on a comparable basis. 
And I don’t think this is done nearly as widely as most people in accounting 
would assume.
CPA: The example of salesmen’s costs being deferred is an excellent 
point for discussion. The question, really, is not whether management should 
properly decide to expense, but whether there should be a principle that sets 
the guidelines for that accounting under those particular circumstances.
I think that’s what we should be talking about. In the case of deprecia­
tion I doubt that anyone who stresses comparability feels that a uniform rate 
for all buildings is the answer. Rather, the question is whether a depreciation 
method should be specified for a particular set of circumstances whenever 
they recur.
Financial Executive: It would still be very difficult to come up with 
one method as to whether to defer costs or not because management still has 
to determine the likelihood of a benefit from the costs in the future, and this 
is still a subjective matter, not something that you can establish as a one- 
phase rule.
Analyst: One of the problems that we get into in this area of com­
parability relates to the pressure for performance, which in many ways 
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translates itself into pressure on management to get earnings reported at the 
soonest possible moment, rather than at a later moment. This leads toward 
a Gresham’s law transferred into accounting: As time goes by and no single 
generally accepted accounting principle is adopted, one by one by one, and 
sometimes industry group by industry group, the accounting method is shifted 
by those who have been using the method that tends to defer the reporting 
of earnings to the method that tends to get it into earnings quicker.
The investment tax credit, of course, is an example. If you spread the 
benefit, it tends to delay the reporting of earnings. If you flow through, the 
benefit reaches earnings more quickly.
The same thing happens in the depreciation area. What have we seen 
recently? I can think of one company, International Harvester, which has 
shifted from straight line to accelerated, and I can think of many companies 
that have shifted the other way.
So if you are really seeking economic reality and the best way to report 
a given transaction, we don’t have forever to arrive at this decision, because 
when we don’t reach some answer, one method gets adopted—usually the one 
that gets earnings into the income statement quicker.
CPA: I guess that you would find that various alternatives have sprung 
up for good reasons historically, in response to conditions that dictated that 
this or that was a more meaningful method. But once having been estab­
lished, they become available forever, and we can pick and choose among 
them and make changes even if there are no basic reasons to do so. I think 
this is too much flexibility.
The Accounting Principles Board has asked that two research studies 
be made, one on pricing and one on depreciation methods. These may not 
eliminate any of the various alternative accounting methods, but they may 
well set up guidelines under which the use of a particular principle might 
be limited to those circumstances under which it would apparently make the 
most sense.
CPA: We must all recognize that the thrust for comparability is not 
meant to exclude management judgment. Management judgment is para­
mount in any accounting determination. Whether or not a cost should be 
deferred is predicated upon its future potential, and this is a management 
judgment decision, and therefore should be dealt with on that basis. The 
economic usefulness of a property is a judgment decision which frequently 
will be predicated upon policies regarding replacement. The same piece of 
equipment could have a longer life with one company than with another, 
depending on variations in those policies.
Consequently, we should not inject this element into the discussion con­
cerning comparability. The real question is whether or not there is a basis 
of permitting two methods of depreciation where the same useful life is 
assured, and whether or not there should be a principle which permits defer­
ment. If you permit deferment as a principle, there should be a uniform 
requirement to defer or not to defer under given circumstances.
28
Analyst: We need to realize the increasing public interest in good 
financial reporting and the importance of this in maintaining a flow of funds 
from the market into corporate treasuries for expansion of business. Given 
this public interest, a corporation, no matter how well-meaning and honest 
in its own eyes, is probably going to have to conform a little more to certain 
standards if they have access to the public marketplace.
As financial analysts we are a kind of intermediary, and as such we are 
becoming more aware of our responsibilities in the reporting process and 
want to contribute to it in various ways which will facilitate the flow of capital.
We think it is very important in this respect to get some accounting 
issues resolved in many of the areas where problems come up. The question 
is really not what method of accounting is right or wrong, but rather getting 
one method which all companies will follow. In many of these areas the 
solution lies not in research but simply in practical and perhaps arbitrary 
decisions. You are never going to prove one way or the other exactly right, 
but it pays to have everything done the same way.
This is rather like a baseball game. There is no particular reason why 
we should have three outs per inning instead of two or four, but this is the 
way it has been decided. So everyone plays baseball with three outs per 
inning. Given this view, perhaps we could resolve problems more quickly.
Financial Executive: The baseball analogy is not exactly appro­
priate, since in that case it is clearly in everyone’s best interests to have a 
single set of rules. We must recognize that in financial reporting issues, the 
legitimate demands of interested parties are in conflict and in the novelty 
of this confrontation we may fail to be aware of the give-and-take which must 
occur if conflicting views are to be composed.
In this discussion, Symposium participants have learned of the con­
flicting views. I am not so sure, though, that they recognized that the diver­
gences and alternatives existing in our present generally accepted accounting 
principles have, from a practical viewpoint, served to insure their wide 
acceptance. I fear that every step to lessen the divergences or alternatives 
found in generally accepted accounting principles will serve to alienate the 
affected group. Finally, when we reach the ultimate in comparability, we will 
be devoid of support. This process has a direct analogy to the multi-party 
political systems of Western European countries. We should recognize then 
that complete attainment of any one group’s position is probably impossible 
and, were it to be attained, it would be achieved at the expense and loss of 
support of other groups.
Professor: Perhaps I am an incurable optimist but I feel that we are 
reaching toward a consensus on the issue of comparability versus flexibility. 
The user’s plea for comparability consists of asking that in any given set 
of circumstances to which a number of alternative accounting practices might 
apply, there should be one of those practices which is more appropriate than 
any of the others.
I avoid the use of the term “preferred” because preferred seems to attach 
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to the practice as if it is always a preferred practice, while appropriateness 
relates the practice to the situation. I think the point was clear that a given 
practice might be appropriate in one industry and quite a contrary practice 
in another. One practice might be appropriate in a given set of circumstances, 
but changing the circumstances would make another appropriate. The users, 
therefore, seem to think that there ought to be a most appropriate practice 
within these kinds of bounds.
Second, they think that the appropriate practice ought to be known 
and that any choice of another practice ought to be disclosed. They do not 
say that the management does not have the right to use another practice, but 
if such is used, there is an obligation to disclose the fact and the reason for 
the departure, and the effect of this departure on the financial statements.
Finally, it has come through fairly clearly that users feel that it is 
desirable to have as few practices as possible in order to have comparability. 
Disclosure is not a complete substitute for comparability, but where it is 
necessary to have departures adequate disclosure is a pretty good substitute.
On the other side, the preparers express their need for flexibility. They 
feel that they should have freedom to adopt that method, where alternative 
methods are available, which in management’s judgment best reveals its 
progress and status within the peculiarities of its own condition and situation. 
Secondly, management also feels it should have freedom to adopt a different 
accounting method when it is necessary in order to meet changed circum­
stances or conditions.
When we state the user’s and preparer’s positions in this fashion they 
do not seem so far apart. Since the views are not basically inconsistent, they 
can be reconciled when adequate communication between the parties exists.
The Role of the
Accounting Principles Board
The feeling that there should be well-known and understood “appro­
priate” practices leads immediately to the question of who should define 
such practices. At the present time, the Accounting Principles Board plays 
this role to the extent that it is performed, and the group seemed to feel that 
the Board is the right institution, although increased participation both in 
selecting topics and in research is sought.
In the discussion, the interesting question as to the productivity of 
research in developing accounting principles was raised. Some view the 
Board as a forum in which conflicting interests clash and an essentially polit­
ical answer emerges with the compromises inherent in the need for satisfying 
various groups. If such is the case, the role of research must be limited to 
identifying issues and determining the various views held.
On the other hand, others view the Board as a seeker of truth—namely 
the best accounting practice to describe economic reality. This group sees 
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in research the source of answers as to the nature of the truth being sought. 
This approach to the Board’s function might be labeled as judicial interpreta­
tion of its role, while proponents of the political approach view the Board as 
a quasi-legislative body.
While there is perhaps surprising agreement in the discussion that follows 
that the Board is the appropriate institutional vehicle for the determination 
of accounting principles, the more basic issue of how the Board should act 
remains unresolved.
Professor: The emphasis in the papers on the authority and participa­
tion in the APB proceedings was such that I think we ought to give that subject 
some attention. I wonder if we couldn’t start by asking those other than prac­
ticing certified public accountants to indicate what kind of participation their 
group ought to have in the functioning of the APB.
Banker: It is my view that I certainly don’t know very much about 
accounting, and I would hesitate, from what I know about the type of men 
who are on the Accounting Principles Board, to attempt to do more than 
offer constructive advice where some consideration was being given to an 
element which might affect the interpretation of financial statements by a 
bank credit analyst or by a bank lending officer.
Banker: The Robert Morris Committee on Co-operation with Public 
Accountants does review the exposure drafts, and this has been very inter­
esting, and we appreciate that privilege, but we think that these accounting 
principles are really the province of the accounting profession and the essen­
tial responsibility rests there.
Analyst : My views are similar. What we need on the Accounting Prin­
ciples Board is the best brains, not merely representation of a narrow view.
Analyst: I have no disagreement with what has been said. I just think 
as analysts we can be much more helpful when we can be brought into the 
deliberations of the APB.
Financial Executive: I would like to propose that the development 
of acceptable accounting principles should be the responsibility of an inde­
pendent research body, not dominated by any one group. Financial analysts, 
Robert Morris Associates, financial executives, CPAs, university professors, 
and other interested parties should be represented on such a body.
Financial Executive: It seems to me that we have good accountants 
not only in the certified public accountant ranks, but also in industry and 
the banking profession and financial analysts, and so on. The mere title CPA 
is not the final measure of the ability and the capability of people to speak 
on subjects in which we are interested. For this reason, it seems to me that 
all groups should logically be represented on the APB.
The reason I suggest representation on the Board is that this is really 
the only guarantee of being heard. I think the APB has missed an oppor­
tunity, if I may suggest it, to draw on the suggestions, the knowledge, the 
abilities of other people, particularly within industry. There are a lot of 
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practicalities that are involved in some of these accounting principles. The 
AICPA has a tremendous amount of knowledge because of its broad contacts 
throughout industry. At the same time they are not living with some of the 
problems that face accountants within industry day in and day out, and I 
think that it behooves them to take advantage of the opportunity to draw 
on this knowledge and to draw opinions which reflect the practicality as well 
as the academic approach or the theoretical approach to some of the problems 
to be faced.
Banker: I don’t see how the accounting profession can profess to a public 
trust in their position of being public accountants and at the same time give 
up any of the decision-making obligations as well as responsibility for setting 
the practices that are acceptable to them. I think this is a public trust, and 
while certainly they should seek out the advice of all those who are capable 
of giving good advice, I don’t think they can delegate their decision-making 
responsibility to others.
I’d like to get to something fundamental. By whom have generally 
accepted accounting principles been accepted? By the investing public, the 
accounting profession, or the clients? I always thought it was by the account­
ing profession.
I think we have to decide who is going to be the promulgator, and 
probably the expert, on generally accepted accounting principles.
If the accounting principles to be accepted are those of the AICPA, 
then it is their body which is the one to establish them; whereas if it is a 
more general grouping, then it probably has to be some other organization.
CPA: It disturbs me a bit to have the concept that public accounting 
involves a public trust, which I think it does, coupled with the responsibility 
of the CPA to determine accounting principles.
I think that industry management is the really definitive source of the 
principle.
The APB, or any other comparable body, has to stand at a somewhat 
higher judgmental level, perhaps, in weighing these principles that manage­
ment evolves and develops, but I believe that the principles themselves should 
be a reflection of managerial judgments. We can try to appraise their appli­
cability and relevance, but we should not be the definers of principles in a 
basic sense.
Professor: One of the questions that was raised by an accountant was 
the extent of participation which the accountants would like to have from 
the other groups. I wonder if any of those who have served on the APB or 
are now serving would like to comment on the kind of help that they feel 
would be most useful from the other groups that are represented here.
CPA: I was the chairman of the APB for three and a half years, and I 
have struggled in many, many ways with the question that has been raised. 
I am very sympathetic with the point of view that has been expressed by 
industry, financial analysts, academicians and others.
You may remember that a few years back the membership of the Board 
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was enlarged in order to include members from industry. The result was 
that we acquired three very capable men who have been extremely valuable 
additions to the Board. However, as it developed, they really did not repre­
sent industry either in the sense of being able to speak for industry or in the 
sense of carrying the message back to industry. They were simply three 
additional good members of the Board.
If the Board is going to continue to be effective and do its job better, 
it cannot become too large, and cannot be a symposium like this group. I 
think we need a large symposium like this frequently to get the point of view 
of all, but I’m sure nobody here would suggest that this group could write 
an opinion on accounting principles. It would be totally impossible to func­
tion in a committee this large.
I think the same thing would happen if we were to expand the APB in 
size, to have representation from all the different groups. Therefore, it seems 
to me that the logical alternative to that is to try to break down the responsi­
bility in some way.
The APB in order to speed up its work and increase its effectiveness 
has been broken down into subcommittees each attacking a single, specific 
problem. Each subcommittee will make an effort to discuss the matter with 
outsiders, prepare point outlines, find other groups that are interested, and 
then come to the Board itself. In this way a highly knowledgeable, highly 
articulate group prepares a proposal and defends it in a larger group. This 
approach might well be adapted to include the efforts of other groups.
For example, the FEI as a group could examine certain parts of a prob­
lem and have their own research and their own committee which would 
then meet with a subcommittee of the APB working on the problem. The 
Financial Analysts Federation, Robert Morris Associates and the American 
Accounting Association could do the same thing, and in this way we could 
achieve real participation on a broader scale, rather than just a kind of a 
face-saving membership of one or two members on the Board.
Financial Executive: I would like to agree with the comments just 
made. I feel that the present relationship and the working arrangement that 
has been set up between the APB and the FEI is a solid one.
Many of the problems in the past have been largely related to timing 
and the need that the APB felt to do something in a very short time frame, 
which did not permit early involvement in the research that some of the FEI 
members thought should have been done early in the review of the problem.
The time to get the various groups working together is at the very 
conceptual stage of each project; because in that way all the interested groups 
can feel as if they have been brought along as the research itself is developed.
Financial Executive: I concur that having a representative on the 
APB is not our objective. We would like to get in on the early stages of the 
research; and I think at that point we could make capable individuals available 
on specific projects and put in the time necessary to accomplish this.
We can criticize ourselves in that we are constantly reacting rather than 
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doing the planning, and a reaction is always a defensive mechanism. Our 
feeling basically is that we want to be part of the planning aspect. I think 
the APB should stay as it is, but broaden its base of participation in all 
phases of its decision-making process.
Analyst: What I’m a little unhappy about in the suggestion that each 
organization have its own subcommittees is that this kind of research would 
represent a particular point of view—the organization that is preparing it. 
I would hope that what we could do is enlarge the research effort by financing 
studies to be done as objectively as possible, rather than having a study 
prepared by one group such as the analysts as representative of their views.
Financial Executive: It seems to me that if we could have some 
means of making a research study when a problem comes up that would 
include the viewpoint of all groups, and then have a group get together with 
the APB that would be representative of all the other groups, so the APB 
would hear at one time the comments and thoughts of all of these groups 
and get them into context, I think this would be quite useful.
Frequently, the views of bankers, financial analysts, and corporate man­
agers are quite close together, but since the APB gets its feel separately from 
each group, there isn’t the cohesiveness that there would be to the viewpoints 
if it were done as a joint effort, rather than singly.
Professor: I wonder whether we are not losing sight of what the APB 
is. At the present time it is still a part-time committee staffed by voluntary 
members from the AICPA, and the basic talent of the APB—the members— 
is financed by the individual firms who pay them while they spend several 
days a year, or in some cases several weeks a year, on this service.
Would it not be desirable to develop an APB which has a number of 
full-time members financed in some other way, who are devoting all of their 
time to this for a defined period, such as a year or two years? And would 
this not be a more important contribution that some of the accounting firms 
could make, as opposed to the substantial commitment of time that some of 
their partners now put in?
Financial Executive: I am concerned that the caliber of man on the 
Accounting Principles Board would go down if this suggestion were carried 
out. I just can’t imagine your getting the managing partner of a big firm on 
a full-time basis, and I think most of them are on the Board or have repre­
sented their firms there. Perhaps it would be sufficient to develop a full-time 
professional staff of the highest caliber to serve the Board while still using 
the top people on it.
Financial Executive: Personally, I like the idea of people working 
full time on some of these very major problems. However, I don’t think the 
final decision as to the accounting principles to be adopted necessarily has 
to be made by full-time people. I think you need the best talent in the world 
to make the final decision, but I think the answer to this thing is really in 
getting more full-time people employed in basic research to get the answers.
We have talked about uniformity, comparability, flexibility this morning, 
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and we have really come up with no definite conclusions. In my mind this is 
a very deep-rooted problem, and we have to have more research. Whether 
this is done partially by the FEI, partially by the AICPA, partially by the 
FAF, and maybe the National Association of Accountants, and other organi­
zations, we have to have it.
Perhaps we should have an Accounting Principles Foundation which 
would be a completely independent research arm, and some of our organi­
zations and our corporations could contribute to it on a continuing basis to 
come up with some sound impartial research and some basic solutions.
I think this is the place where the full-time effort is needed.
CPA: I do think the way things are going we may be forced to gravitate 
toward full-time Board membership, with a smaller number of the highest 
caliber men on the Board. Such APB members would devote their full time, 
divorced from practice during the time that they were serving, and would be 
very highly paid for it.
CPA: Someone has to bring up the subject of money! Some years ago 
we considered whether or not other organizations should be brought into 
the financing of APB research effort. The general feeling was that we should 
not have corporations make contributions, because of the possibility that 
there might be some linkage which would lead to the thought that the 
Opinions are not as objective as they might be.
However, if the groups represented here were to develop a budget for 
accounting research, and this money moved through their respective organi­
zations without identification of the donor, this might bring in funds that 
would enable the Institute to carry on deeper and more extensive studies, and 
be more comfortable about it.
Analyst: Didn’t the donation of $120,000 or so by the FEI to the 
Mautz study on conglomerates point the way? In such cases, there is no 
linkage or taint, and I thought it was an admirable job.
CPA: I have been interested in listening to this discussion to see the 
relative emphasis that has been placed on research as opposed to the decision­
making process. This indicates a hope that research somehow or other will 
indicate the single solution or the couple of solutions which will be applicable 
under rather specific sets of circumstances.
I for one have some doubts that research will actually accomplish this, 
although it will clarify the issues and will line up a tremendous number of 
pluses and minuses on the sides of the various alternatives that are available.
It seems to me if this desire which has been frequently stressed for com­
parability under similar circumstances is to be achieved, someone has to 
make the difficult choice among principles. This choice can be based in part 
on the facts from the research study, but in part it will have to be made on 
a somewhat arbitrary basis.
Therefore, I would think that the decision-making point, which at the 
present time is the APB, would have been the main topic of discussion, rather 
than the ability or the desire to participate in the research itself. And if I 
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hear correctly, there does not seem to be any particular clamor on the part 
of the other groups to become part of the decision-making process, so much 
as it is to become part of the research which goes into that process.
Financial Executive: I agree with you. We are not interested in 
sitting on the Board to make the final decision. I think there are competent 
people on the Board to make these decisions; but we are interested in the 
research. We are interested in making ourselves heard on some of our prob­
lems that we feel are relevant to the decision-making process.
We have no quarrel with the APB making the final decision after they 
have seen all the facts that we can bring into focus.
Analyst: I think an important background point to keep in mind is 
that if the Accounting Principles Board is unable or unwilling to come up 
with good, well-researched answers to hard questions, the alternative will be 
poorly designed answers without research produced by the SEC. And if I 
have a choice of which court I want to go to, I’d rather go to the Accounting 
Principles Board.
CPA: It might be worthwhile to review the current procedures of the 
Board. We generally start our consideration of a topic with a three-year 
research study, which is not generally done by anyone on the Board. This 
leads into a two-year deliberation by a subcommittee. The FEI is attuned 
now to deliberate to get on board almost immediately by establishing a sub­
committee to work with our subcommittee. The machinery has been set up. 
It probably has not worked as well this first year as it should, but I know 
there have been instances where there has been consultation.
Going back to research, there has been machinery set up so that at 
least the research bodies of these different groups (including also the National 
Association of Accountants) have lines of communication. Each supposedly 
knows what the other is doing.
The FEI is getting into research, which we are very happy about. They 
are undertaking a research study now in connection with which one of our 
members will sit on their Advisory Board.
In our research studies, we have advisory boards where members repre­
senting different skills and different outlooks sit. We would like very much 
to have all the help we can. We have probably fumbled. We have probably 
made mistakes. But we have developed improved procedures bringing in 
outside parties and we would like it very much if the FAF and other groups 
could follow the lead of the FEI and give organization to their desire for 
participation so that they could be in tune on a timely basis to help us delib­
erate. We invite this.
Professor: I wonder if it is necessary to have several different groups 
undertaking research. We are all concerned with the same problems of 
accounting principles.
One of our great difficulties in developing accounting principles has 
been the slowness of research studies, just because there is no one group that 
has responsibility for it. It seems to me that the most rapid rate of progress 
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that we could get in securing comparability would come about if we had 
research studies emerging in a more timely fashion; and we have seen in the 
conglomerate study that if we do provide adequate support and permit people 
to give their undivided attention to a project, we can get a thorough and 
timely research effort.
Many of the AICPA studies are being done on a part-time basis by 
partners from accounting firms and accounting professors who are already 
more than 100 per cent occupied with other duties, and thus we make little 
progress.
This part of our discussion has seemed to call for a united research 
activity on the part of all four groups represented here and the NAA and 
several others. I don’t see that research done by the Financial Executives 
Institute ought to be any different from that which is done by the American 
Institute of CPAs.
Financial Executive: I feel strongly that this is the only solution; 
that if we have a group research effort that is financed by all the organizations 
with a nucleus of a paid research staff supported by a board of directors 
representing all organizations on a part-time basis, we are going to accom­
plish the most in the shortest time.
Financial Executive: I think we are using the word “research” here 
in a little broader sense than we really mean. I think what we are talking 
about is complete inputs. Thomas Russell’s Committee on Corporate Report­
ing for FEI is not really, in fact, doing a great deal of research. They are 
accumulating inputs, so that all of those inputs do get to APB before the 
decision process starts.
I think that the relationship that has been now established with FEI could 
very well be considered by these other groups in getting all of the input 
information into APB before the decision-making process comes about.
Now, where you get into a major subject, like our conglomerate study, 
there’s no question about the desirability of independent research, and all 
of the groups here were represented on our advisory panel, which is most 
desirable.
I question whether you can in fact set up an independent research body 
and get the inputs any better than you can by a co-operative working rela­
tionship between APB and the organizations represented here.
Financial Executive: There seems to be wide acceptance of the role 
of the APB, albeit with early and wider participation by other groups. Implicit 
in our discussion, however, is a lack of understanding of how the APB oper­
ates. The APB has a choice between being (1) theoretical, (2) pragmatic, or 
(3) authoritarian. It was founded ostensibly upon a theoretical approach and 
this is supported in its interest in research. But at times it issues Opinions 
unsupported by research or departs from the findings of its research. It 
appears pragmatic in its calls for opinions with respect to disclosure drafts 
and then departs from the weight of evidence. In its departure from either 
the theoretical or pragmatic approaches, it appears authoritarian, but if it is, 
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it is stymied by the present requirement of a two-to-one vote for approval.
Were the Securities and Exchange Commission to usurp the field, we 
undoubtedly would have fewer divergencies and more comparability, if not 
outright standardization. In this eventuality, both groups of preparers would 
have to be relieved of their present responsibilities and the product would be 
unacceptable to most. Management, investors and creditors would all have 
to make their desired adjustments to achieve their ends.
Thus, in a political sense, we are precariously balanced between des­
potism on one hand and anarchy on the other, with both extremes being unde­
sirable to all. But this is freedom. When each group recognizes that progress 
cannot be made without a true appreciation of the legitimate demands of 
other parties, then and only then can we move ahead.
Professor: In summarizing this discussion, it seems to me that while 
there is not unanimity, there is fairly strong consensus that the Accounting 
Principles Board as presently constituted is an appropriate body to establish 
accounting principles. There is some disagreement as to the degree of partici­
pation wanted by non-CPAs in the development of those principles and there 
is some feeling that the operation of the Board would be more effective if 
full-time Board members of sufficient competence could be recruited, but in 
general I think there is satisfaction with the present Board.
Additionally, it is clear that financial executives, analysts, and bank 
credit officers are ready to be of assistance to the Board in its work and in so 
doing, they want to participate in the development of principles at as early a 
stage as possible. They want a genuine opportunity to express their views 
early enough in the total process so that they believe that those views are 
given fair consideration before any decisions are reached. While it wasn’t 
said, I detected a feeling that the APB will disregard this particular desire at 
its own peril.
The members of the Accounting Principles Board have indicated that 
they will welcome such participation and that steps have already been taken 
to facilitate it. In addition, it was also clear that the APB welcomes effective 
independent research on significant subjects, however that research is spon­
sored.
While some feel that there are advantages in a central research body to 
do all accounting research, the preponderance of opinion seems to be that 
this would be difficult to achieve and finance due to diverse interests within 
the various groups.
Disclosure of Estimates of the Future
The discussions of comparability and the role of the Accounting Prin­
ciples Board represent primarily a commentary on the reporting environment 
as it exists today. A number of the participants, however, were not content 
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with reporting in its present form. The analyst group particularly suggested 
that the best remedy for such problems as the current overemphasis on earn­
ings per share and the actions of corporate reporters resulting from this fact 
was the development of new and innovative reporting forms. Most frequently 
mentioned in this respect was the possibility of reporting future expectations 
of management. It is clear from the discussion that no consensus exists that 
such reporting is desirable or what form it should take if it is to be done. Ideas 
seem to range from a published budget and long-range plan to a general man­
agement statement about short-range expectations. There are also questions 
as to whether the auditor should be involved in future disclosure in any way.
While no answers and agreements emerged from the Symposium on this 
topic, the feeling of need on the part of some users was clear. If such a need 
in fact exists, the Seaview discussions on the subject may be the forerunner 
of continuing exploration by the groups involved of the forms which such 
reports might take to meet the need. At the same time, the various risks 
associated with such disclosure that are pointed out by the financial executives 
must be fully considered.
Professor: One problem that was raised frequently in the papers and 
critiques was the need for additional disclosure and, more specifically, dis­
closure of future expectations. Is this something corporations and auditors 
should be concerned about?
Analyst: I would like to propose that management consider making 
public statements as to the future prospects of their company on a periodic 
basis, in whatever form they feel is most appropriate. This is not only desirable 
from a user’s point of view but from a management viewpoint as well, particu­
larly in today’s environment.
In some instances this is already being done. Some companies periodically 
give indications as to where they think their company is going in the near 
future. And there are varying degrees of precision that are used, and most 
appropriately so, because certain industries have the stability to make fore­
casts which top management is willing to make public. With others it is 
more difficult because of the obvious vicissitudes of the economy and the 
industry, which would make it most difficult for a forecast to be meaningful.
When we are considering disclosure today, we must consider more than 
just the income statement and the balance sheet. We must consider the overall 
aspects of a corporation’s image in the community.
One of the best ways that a corporation can present meaningful infor­
mation for the investment community is through forward thinking, rather 
than disclosure of the current situation and what the past record was. Stock 
prices are primarily influenced by future expectations, and accordingly I think 
it is management’s responsibility to make comments as to what this future 
prospect may be.
This is not simply another analyst’s request for more information. In 
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today’s world, when there are problems of liability arising from inadvertent 
disclosure of what may turn out by hindsight to be material information, it 
may be very beneficial for management to change the scope of their full dis­
closure policy. The best disclosure may be to set the stage on a public basis 
of where you think your company is going.
Then you can talk about the detail and the background within that 
framework without having the concern of, perhaps, tripping a move in the 
stock price by some comment that may have been inadvertently made about 
some aspect of the business.
I would like management to consider this prospect. There are many 
ways of achieving it, but I think that if we take it from a flexible point of view, 
this could be a very meaningful step forward both in reducing the overem­
phasis on earnings per share, and in reducing the emphasis on short-term 
as opposed to long-term implications for stock prices.
These factors, I think, will give more healthy strength to stock prices 
and bring the investor more in line with the attitudes and ambitions and 
desires of management in managing a business as a going concern over a 
period of time.
Financial Executive: I can’t agree on that one. I think this would 
really open up a Pandora’s box. A whole new series of problems relating to 
public disclosure of forecasts will be created, but the problem you are trying 
to solve will not go away. As soon as the actual facts unfold you are going 
to have the same type of market reaction that you would have when you just 
focus on the earnings per share.
Financial Executive: It seems to me that the idea is impractical. 
For such disclosure to be meaningful, it would have to be put in a context 
where it could be fully understood by a reader. But users of financial infor­
mation are addicted to brief summary figures; forecasts in these terms would 
be more misleading than helpful.
Today the APB is arguing over dozens of different ways of determining 
what earnings have been, and there is general agreement that readers don’t 
understand what the final figure arrived at really means. Since we do not 
have understanding of past data, how can we expect the reader of a report to 
understand the implications of projections of the future?
So I think we had better try to solve our problems now without intro­
ducing more of them.
Financial Executive: I think the last speaker is right. We have so 
many problems of trying to decide where we are and where we have been 
that I would hate to see us spend too much time on the question of forecasting. 
I think it would be wasted time.
Analyst: I have great respect for the integrity and the sense of responsi­
bility of 99 per cent of our companies to do the best job possible in developing 
and presenting budget figures. I agree there is the problem of those who will 
go overboard, and it should be up to the analysts to filter out these, so that 
we do not give weight to irresponsible statements. From time to time com­
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panies do get reputations for a credibility gap, but hopefully these are going 
to be very few.
CPA: I am told that in England the forecasting of the type that was 
just mentioned is actually being done by management, and is even being 
reviewed by chartered accountants, although not in the same form as an attes­
tation of historical data; and it seems to me it makes eminently good sense.
The earnings per share takes on a disproportionate meaning for people, 
because it is the best handle they can think of to make their own forecasts. 
We are in the position of giving a do-it-yourself kit to the analyst and telling 
him to make his own forecast, while management, who are certainly the best- 
qualified people to do it, have already done this. They have engineered a 
complete budget and are making management decisions on the basis of it. 
Why hide this valuable, well-constructed information, and instead let the 
public and the financial analysts and others construct their own rather inept 
forecasts on the basis of much less information?
I’m naturally not too anxious to take on the liability as a CPA of attesting 
to all of this, although if this information is to be useful, it must be reliable, 
and to make it more reliable perhaps ultimately CPAs should be attesting 
to it or at least reviewing it.
I cannot buy the idea that everyone should go out on his own and guess 
the best way he can while there are people on the inside who have worked 
hard to develop reasonable budgets and forecasts. Why leave people on their 
own?
Financial Executive: I am petrified at what I have heard here about 
making public forecasts. This is not going to take the emphasis off earnings 
per share; whatever forecast you make would be converted to earnings per 
share.
The thing that bothers me after listening to everything that has been 
said is that I think we are seeking to get some easy way of appraising a whole 
complex company or group of companies. This way does not exist.
I don’t think you are ever going to get comparability or anything else 
with a bunch of numbers, be they earnings per share or anything else, that 
is going to allow you to compare one company with another. There must be 
some information in addition to that. What we must do is to work out what 
companies can give those who are interested in their affairs in the way of 
information to help them make that evaluation beyond the earnings per share 
and third decimal statistics.
CPA: In discussing some of the ways of revealing the results of opera­
tions or management accomplishments, it seems to me that we must think 
about our financial writers. It seems to me that not only should they be at 
symposiums of this sort as an integral part, but, further, that in our dealings 
with financial writers we should emphasize the importance of not taking these 
figures and considering them the end-all in terms of trying to evaluate the 
accomplishments of management. This is the factor that is so often missing 
and becomes a great void in all of our communication in this field.
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Professor: We have had testimony that users would like future-oriented 
disclosure. Joseph Roth, in his paper, indicated that there might be demand 
for auditor’s representations on these published forecasts. Should the auditor 
be involved?
Analyst: I don’t think so. Anything involved with prospective aspira­
tions or results of corporations is developed by the corporate management, 
and it is their best estimate of what the future may hold. At best it is based 
on assumptions and probability and a lot of other factors which cannot be 
tested in a precise manner.
Banker: The thing that concerns most bankers who are dealing with 
smaller companies is the fact that many such companies operate by the seat 
of their pants and neither have nor know how to prepare or use budgets and 
forecasts. I have recommended many times to borrowing clients that they 
develop such tools and I have suggested that they discuss the matter and work 
with their CPA to assist them in preparing these statements.
I do not visualize that I would ever look to the CPA for warranty as 
to the accuracy of budgets, but I would like to feel that CPA firms would assist 
our clients in the preparation of such items.
CPA: The accounting firms do perform such management advisory 
services to a very substantial extent without any relationship to attestation. 
But one thing which CPAs might do would be to provide an attestation that 
sound principles were followed in areas other than the preparation of tradi­
tional financial statements.
For example, we might make an examination of a firm’s budgeting 
process and attest to the fact that sound budgeting principles have been applied 
in preparing a budget that has been presented, without saying anything about 
the accuracy of the figures.
Many budgets are weak because management is not fully aware of how 
to approach the planning process systematically, and our attestation might 
be helpful to outsiders and the management in protecting against this problem.
Financial Executive: I am very much afraid that people would think 
that they were getting something that they were not getting. Anybody who 
has ever had anything to do with budgets certainly knows that if your pro­
cedures are bad, you have less chance of getting a good budget, but even 
when they are good there are so many things involved that the fact that your 
procedures are good does not make it an accurate prediction of what income 
will be. People would interpret an auditor’s certification of procedures to 
represent assurance of accuracy, and it can’t be that.
CPA: British accountants are contemplating reports on forecasts. A 
recent magazine article there indicated that accountants can, within limits, 
properly undertake a critical and objective review of the assumptions on 
which profit forecasts are based and can verify that the forecasts have been 
properly computed on a basis consistent with the company’s previous account­
ing principles in the underlying assumptions and data. In other words, they 
can attest that the compilations are based upon the assumptions.
42
Banker: While most of us are satisfactorily assured that large corpora­
tions do a conscientious job of forecasting, this is not applicable to the largest 
number of borrowers. For such smaller companies we do need some sort of 
an attestation to the validity of the premises and the assumptions underlying 
the budgets and the forecasts that we are working with. It would be helpful, 
and we would encourage it.
Financial Executive: I continue to take strong exception to the basic 
concept that it is desirable to publish budgeted results.
We have budgets, of course, but we also know that they are variable, and 
they are not always attained. To put out figures representing to the public 
that a particular result was expected would be a grave mistake.
Professor: In summarizing this discussion, all I can say is that there 
is a significant absence of agreement. The analysts’ group feels a need for 
various forms of disclosure of future estimates while the corporate executives 
present are extremely concerned by the implications of this proposal. It is 
certainly an area for additional investigation and communication between the 
groups.
Surveillance Over Corporate Reporting
In addition to seeking new forms of reporting, several changes in the 
institutional environment of reporting were suggested during the Symposium. 
Some of the suggestions regarding the Accounting Principles Board repre­
sented institutional innovations, and the expressed desire of all groups to 
participate in the selection of APB topics and the research on those topics 
make it likely that some new stages in the APB process will be developed.
Beyond this, there was an expressed feeling that lacking in today’s 
institutional environment was a means by which corporate reporting could 
be systematically reviewed for its adequacy in individual cases. Analysts 
seemed to feel that most reporting was good, but that exceptions did exist. 
They felt that some way should be found to call attention to these exceptions 
with the hope of remedying them and reducing the number of times that they 
occur. Ideas varied from the suggestion that there be a joint body which would 
be available to receive and comment upon protests by statement users to the 
idea that a continuing body should be established to review all public reports.
This is another area where ideas are still largely in an embryonic stage 
and there is a need for more research to consider whether a real need exists 
and how it should be met if it does. The discussion which follows simply 
introduces the problem.
Professor: Both in reading the papers and in hearing the discussions 
over the past few days, I have the feeling that there is some dissatisfaction, 
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not with all corporate reporting, but with some examples of it. Analysts 
particularly have cited examples of situations in which disclosure was felt to 
be inadequate or the accounting principle selected inappropriate for the 
particular circumstance. The question that seems logically to arise, therefore, 
is whether there should be some institutional means of surveillance over 
corporate reporting so that these examples, if indeed they are unsatisfactory, 
can be brought to public attention.
Analyst: At the present time the Financial Analysts Federation has a 
corporate information committee which is increasing its activities in the area 
of evaluating the corporate reporting process. We have a group of subcom­
mittees which are grading the efforts of management in reporting, and where 
we find excellence we are making awards to the companies.
In this connection we have not yet wrestled with the problem of poor 
reporting; we certainly do not give enough awards for excellence to brand 
all other reporting as poor. Eventually, however, if we continue our process 
it may be that we issue hundreds of certificates and ultimately begin to get at 
poor reporting by not identifying it as good.
To do this, of course, we have to set standards which we feel are minimum 
in this area and we are now thinking seriously about putting criteria on paper. 
This is a difficult process and will take some time, but we are now gathering 
together the criteria of the various subcommittees in various industries which 
we cover. We hope that this will be a document that could be used to identify 
and push those who do not meet the qualifications of good reporting.
The question remains as to what we do about abuses. Public accountants 
are in a difficult position to push for better accounting principles and disclosure 
with their own clients. Analysts are in a stronger position to assert a point of 
view, but we have not yet done so.
Perhaps in co-operation with the other groups represented here we could 
form a standards committee which would have the necessary strength and 
influence to enforce reporting standards in those fringe elements of the report­
ing community which presently do not hold to such standards. It must be 
recognized that the number of abuses which we are really talking about is 
very small in both relative and absolute terms but we do have to be able to 
deal with them.
I might also add that analysts have problems to be solved in the area of 
policing reports and activities of other analysts as well. Some of our members 
do not meet the standards which we believe should be followed by qualified 
financial analysts. As yet we have not solved this problem.
CPA: I assume that this discussion refers primarily to deficiencies in pub­
lished annual reports of the type that represent insufficient disclosure from an 
analyst’s point of view, even though no technical accounting or auditing 
violation may have taken place. We have no administrative machinery to 
deal with such problems.
On the other hand, we do have a practice review committee, both at the 
AICPA and in many of the larger state societies. The AICPA committee 
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works mainly with published financial reports. Anyone who feels that there 
is an accounting deficiency which relates to the financial statements or the 
auditor’s report may send to the AICPA office a copy of the report with their 
questions. The report and the questions will then be transmitted on an anony­
mous basis to the practice review committee which will take up the questions.
The committee will then raise questions with the particular auditing firm 
involved to get additional information in order to be able to form an opinion 
as to whether there is a shortcoming in reporting. Since this is an educational 
process for the benefit of the member, the committee will render a final opinion 
to the public accountant involved. No opinion will be rendered to the man who 
sent in the report because we feel our principal objective is to educate our 
members. This is not a disciplinary proceeding and, in fact, the practice 
review committee cannot turn the report over to the ethics committee for 
disciplinary purposes. We would certainly be very happy to have bankers and 
analysts submit reports to the committee.
CPA: At the New York State level we have been working on a procedure 
in co-operation with bankers which will bring to our practice review committee 
private as well as public reports. Bankers are invited to submit reports to a 
Robert Morris group which then disguises them so that neither the name of 
the auditor nor the client is included and then submits them to our practice 
review committee. This committee reviews the report and sends its comments 
back to whoever submitted the case, through the Robert Morris representative. 
It is then up to the banker to discuss the matter with the accountant and 
perform whatever educational processes which he feels desirable. Once again, 
this process is entirely educational and not disciplinary.
We have now been at this process for three years, and, if the number of 
cases is any criterion, I must say that it represents a tribute to the discipline 
of the public accounting profession. In the three years during which we have 
existed, we have had a total of 40 cases and the pattern of these cases is highly 
repetitive. The most frequent situation is one where the auditor gives an 
unqualified opinion in the face of inventory submitted by management or 
receivables unconfirmed.
As a result of this experience I have increasingly questioned whether the 
output of this committee warranted the time invested in it. We must consider 
both whether there is a substantial amount of substandard reporting and 
whether bankers and credit grantors are sufficiently concerned to devote effort 
to enlisting aid from the accounting profession in dealing with such reports.
Banker: I believe that the practice review program is far from a failure. 
The success of a penal system is not judged by the number of people who fill 
the jails; it’s judged by the number of empty cells. The mere fact that this 
practice review committee exists has been a tremendous help to credit grantors 
in obtaining the type of financial report which they would like to see from 
their borrowers. On several occasions in the past three years I could have sent 
in substandard reports, but I followed the practice originally envisioned when 
we set up the committee of first talking with the CPA involved. I have talked 
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with him quietly about the report, and on some occasions I have intimated 
that I would certainly not want to go to the practice review committee. By 
this device I have made many friends and improved reports. I therefore feel 
practice review has been very successful, even though I have not sent in a 
single report.
CPA: I agree that practice review is useful, but I don’t think that this in 
all instances will really satisfy the financial analysts. Even when they use this 
system they pass along their comment when they think there is a deficiency, 
but that is the last they would ever hear of it. I think that education should 
be a two-way street.
In some cases, for example, there may be good and legitimate reasons 
why the report is as it is, which may not appear on the surface. In any event, 
it might be that any deficiencies are not the responsibility of the reporting 
corporation or the public accountant, but rather are a matter for the whole 
profession or the Accounting Principles Board. Such facts should be com­
municated back to the analyst who submits a report for review.
It might be desirable to set up some kind of special system of communi­
cation that would make known to the AICPA all of the various comments and 
criticisms on specific reports. This might be supplemented by a system which 
would permit financial analysts to talk to some counterpart in the AICPA 
and explore the implications of a report together, without necessarily prefer­
ring a charge against the accountant that would come before the ethics 
committee or even specifically asking the practice review committee to deal 
with the matter.
Analyst: I support this idea wholeheartedly. The Financial Analysts 
Federation may not have enough strength in its own organization to achieve 
what we would like to achieve, and perhaps if all of us are together and in 
agreement, we can develop the necessary strength.
Professor: In summary then, I sense the feeling that there is a need for 
some surveillance mechanism over corporate financial reporting beyond that 
provided by the practice review committee and the ethics committee of the 
AICPA. This surveillance activity would have as its principal objective to 
educate and inform rather than to discipline, although there might be some 
encouraging and deterring force in the publication of its activities where good 





It is extremely difficult to divide a discussion of financial reporting into 
parts, since the interrelationships among all topics are great. In the previous 
section, discussions relating to the institutional framework of reporting and 
the forms in which reporting should take place were summarized, and included 
were many comments on the problems of defining accounting principles.
In this section, the related problems of accounting measurement are more 
specifically considered. Robert Sprouse introduces the area with a general 
discussion of income measurement objectives and then deals with a number 
of specific problems which are currently active subjects of discussion by the 
business community and the Accounting Principles Board. The transcript of 
the discussions is similarly divided into a section on the objectives of financial 
statements and three sections on specific topics: price-level accounting, the 
treatment of accounting changes, and accounting for intercorporate investment.
Introductory Remarks
Professor Robert T. Sprouse
I have approached the problem of the measurement of income in two 
ways. In the first half of the paper, I have attempted to deal with the general 
problem of income measurement on a very broad scale. My academic bias 
leads me to favor discussing that area to a considerable extent. I have been 
very much concerned with the lack of attention to the general problem of 
income measurement on the part of the Accounting Principles Board in its 
pronouncements and their almost exclusive preoccupation with specific issues. 
I frankly doubt that it’s possible to make substantial progress with specific 
issues without some more fundamental groundwork having been laid.
The second half of the paper does deal with some specific accounting 
issues that face us today. The area selected for special attention was inter­
corporate investments. A research study of this area, sponsored by the Ameri­
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can Institute, is now under way. The APB will soon be taking up specific 
issues related to intercorporate investments, including the problems of acquisi­
tions and mergers; a study in this area has just been published on accounting 
for goodwill. But, although the area is increasingly important, with the 
exception of the purchase or pooling controversy it has not received a great 
deal of discussion.
At the outset of the paper I made the assertion that the purpose of 
financial statements is to provide information which is useful in making 
rational economic decisions—specifically, rational investment decisions.
In the four critiques it becomes apparent that this is not an accepted 
assertion. While David Norr agreed, Thomas Murphy and Harry Long did 
not; Robert Trueblood did not deal with it directly.
Thomas Murphy disagrees with this statement of purpose, saying that 
“the primary purpose ... is to discharge management’s obligation to report 
to its stockholders on its stewardship and to society on the progress of the 
business.”
Harry Long’s statements are along the same lines, arguing that the prime 
purpose is not to serve investors but to satisfy demands for reporting made by 
society. He advocates an extension of accounting measurements to manage­
ment, stating: “A primary purpose of financial reports is to measure the 
performance of management. . . .” In the course of the critique he suggests 
that there ought to be a management audit performed by certified public 
accountants as well as merely an attestation to the financial statements.
I think this difference in the objectives of financial statements is the first 
issue that must be settled. I don’t know how progress can be made in any 
direction whatsoever without agreement on what purpose financial statements 
are intended to serve. I hope that we can have considerable discussion on that 
most fundamental point. It is an area that has been almost totally neglected, 
and perhaps that is the reason why we have alternative methods and disagree­
ment within the APB. It may be that the members voting “Yes” and the 
members voting “No” on a particular issue are not even thinking about the 
same purposes to be served in presenting a set of financial statements.
Given the assertion that I made about the purpose of financial statements, 
I tried to raise the question of what concept of income would be most useful 
to serve that purpose. There are three suggestions here: first, one based on 
invested cost measured in number of dollars, regardless of their purchasing 
power (which, to a great extent, represents financial reporting today); second, 
one based on invested cost measured in real dollars, reflecting changes in 
purchasing power; and third, one based on current values, where determinable.
Robert Trueblood apparently tends to favor the latter two, because he 
refers to the “unreality of the profession’s failure to take into account price­
level changes,” and he suggests that “perhaps the greatest need by way of 
improving financial accounting is to move toward the use of current values.”
Again we have disagreement. Thomas Murphy states that the steward­
ship approach, which he advocates as being the primary purpose of financial 
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statements, “precludes the necessity of recognizing purchasing power or 
price-level changes.”
Harry Long argues that “income determination should move closer to 
taxable income,” which is a suggestion that we don’t have to worry about a 
concept of income; we can look to the Internal Revenue Code. He does argue 
that full disclosure would permit parties to recast the information for their 
own purposes and needs, and that overall adjustment for inflation would be 
at best guesses and difficult to make. The idea is that if you have full dis­
closure, each individual user can adjust to the concept of income which he 
favors. The providers of financial information, therefore, would not have to 
be committed to one particular concept of income.
This seems to lead us back to the basic question of whether it is possible 
to make progress in financial reporting without having some underlying 
framework to which reference is repeatedly and consistently made. Is it 
possible to develop a meaningful measurement of income by deciding on an 
ad hoc basis what should be and what should not be included in its measure­
ment, without first resolving the nature of income?
In this regard, Mr. Trueblood makes some specific recommendations 
about the entire process. He notes that leadership is needed in designing and 
suggesting basic improvements in generally accepted accounting principles 
at the higher, broader levels. Then he outlines specific steps that he sees as 
being needed in the process of developing a measurement of income: first, 
research; second, a statement of general objectives of financial accounting; 
third, a series of statements of accounting objectives in specific subject areas; 
and fourth, the preparation of a series of practice bulletins codifying currently 
acceptable practice. In his advocacy of these steps, he looks to the APB to 
carry out the last three.
Most of the Board’s current Opinions have been of the practice bulletin 
type and Mr. Trueblood expresses the hope that before it undertakes pro­
nouncements about specific accounting issues within particular areas, such 
as price-level accounting and business combinations, that it would first issue a 
statement of the objectives to be served in accounting in those areas.
I think this is an important distinction. There is a very great difference 
between rendering Opinions which offer specific rules for handling accounting 
transactions and developing a statement of objectives to be served in determin­
ing the rules that are to be implemented.
Turning to the specific problems of measuring income, the answers to 
accounting questions depend largely on what the user of the data is looking 
for in the income figure. In determining when revenue should be considered 
“earned,” for example, is the user looking for cash receipts? Is he looking for 
the results of arm’s-length transactions, whether or not cash has been received? 
Is he looking for measurable changes in well-being, whether or not cash has 
been received and whether or not the business entity itself was a party in an 
arm’s-length transaction?
David Norr makes the point that income is whatever ends up at the end 
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of the statement, and uses an interesting analogy: “Time is what we measure 
with a watch. Income is what we measure with a profit and loss statement.” 
I have some doubt about this being a useful approach for the Accounting 
Principles Board.
With respect to measurement of expenses, there are several problems. 
First, there is the question of whether the measurement of income can be 
improved by giving greater recognition to the impact of the time value of 
money by using discounted present values, in contrast to the current practice 
of equating all dollars, regardless of when the payments or exchanges of 
dollars are made. This is relevant in connection with leases, depreciation, 
income tax deferral and other areas.
Secondly, would income measurement be improved by taking into 
consideration changes in the general price level, or by taking into consideration 
changes in the specific prices of assets?
Mr. Murphy agrees with my assertion that the primary constraint on 
recognition of revenues is indeed the feasibility of objective measurement, 
not these other things. With respect to measurement of expenses, he states 
that changes in purchasing power and changes in the specific value of assets 
are factors to be considered in fiscal management, but not in management’s 
financial statements.
Harry Long urges that inventories, as a specific example relating to this 
point, should be conservatively valued in order to perpetuate tax savings. I 
think this was consistent with the remarks made earlier that he sees some 
advantages in moving toward a taxable income figure rather than some kind 
of separate income figure for financial reporting purposes.
In addition to the problems of recognizing revenue and expense, the 
treatment of gains and losses in the measurement of income must be considered. 
APB Opinion No. 9, which deals with this subject, differentiates between 
operating items, extraordinary items, and prior period adjustments. This is 
a major step toward greater comparability, but there are still differences of 
interpretation. The entire problem has certainly not been solved by this 
Opinion.
With respect to the more specific items in the area of intercorporate 
investments I think there are three distinguishable problems. The first is how 
to account for the income from intercorporate investments involving less than 
50 per cent ownership? That is, should the income be based on cash dividends 
received? Should it be based on the share of earnings in the particular company 
in which investments were held? Should it be based on market values, and 
changes in those market values?
Thomas Murphy suggests that fair presentation is the controlling factor. 
This is consistent with the notion of flexibility, and allows management to 
decide which is appropriate.
The second problem arises in the currently popular joint venture with 
some other corporation where the ownership is split 50-50. Should income 
measurement in such a case be based on cash dividends received or on the
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share of earnings, either by including a single figure or by consolidating half 
of the enterprise? Market value is not an option here, because there is no 
market value for such securities.
Finally, there is the case of more than 50 per cent ownership where, 
presumably, control exists. Should the income measurement be based on cash 
dividends or share of earnings or consolidation? In this case Mr. Murphy 
agrees with certain of my assertions that legal segregation is not a basis for 
excluding the results of a subsidiary. And Mr. Long would leave this to the 
independent judgment of qualified independent CPAs in every instance, not 
to management.
A final issue to be considered in this area is the purchase-versus-pooling 
controversy. The basic problem to be considered here is whether a business 
combination should be accounted for as an acquisition reflecting the market 
value of securities exchanged or as a pooling which ignores the market value, 
or whether management should be given the choice.
If purchase accounting is to be used, we have the problem of accounting 
for goodwill. What do we do with it? Should it be reported unamortized? 
Should it be amortized over some necessarily arbitrary period of time? Should 
it be written off in a lump sum immediately—the most recent recommenda­
tion? Or should it be written off in a lump sum eventually?
In this instance Mr. Murphy agrees with the assertion that the pooling 
concept has deteriorated far beyond its original meaning, but he would not 
discard this concept entirely. He states that the fault lies within the accounting 
profession for agreeing with the shortsighted practices of those who have gotten 
out of bounds.
I note that he has argued elsewhere that management’s responsibility is 
most significant and is of paramount importance in any consideration of the 
adequacy of corporate financial statements, and that management should not 
be placed in a straitjacket by accounting rules. Mr. Murphy seems to be 
saying that management should take the credit and the accounting profession 
the blame!
Mr. Long, I think, is really rather easy to get along with: full disclosure 
of the transaction, whether it be purchase or pooling, is the most important 
thing, and he is somewhat concerned about possible moves within financial 
reporting that might make mergers less attractive.
Finally, I would like to turn to David Norr’s critique which I think is a 
most important one, but which did not fit in with the specific questions I have 
been discussing and which I have, therefore, not yet treated fully.
Mr. Norr is very impatient with the lack of progress under the current 
approach to solving accounting problems. That’s very evident from his paper. 
He offers constructive suggestions as to how greater progress might be made, 
and his main pitch is on sharing the research burden. I think that in no place 
in the paper does he suggest that the Financial Analysts Federation or others 
should be involved in the decision-making process; however, he cites examples 
of how useful it would be if when the Accounting Principles Board got ready 
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to take up a problem there were research results from several sources available 
to the Board to assist it in making a better decision. His major recommenda­
tion is that there be a massive step-up in accounting research.
Objectives of Financial Statements
A starting point in discussing the problem of accounting measurement is 
the determination of why income is being measured in the first place. Pro­
fessor Sprouse suggests in his paper that the purpose of financial statements and 
income measurement is to supply useful information to an investor, but in the 
discussion that follows it is obvious that this point of view is not shared by all of 
the participants. The investment orientation for financial statements implies 
that the past is reported primarily as a means of forecasting the future. Many of 
the participants, and particularly the financial executives attending the Sym­
posium, feel that the past is reported primarily in order to account for manage­
ment’s past stewardship over assets rather than with any forecasts in mind. In 
the discussion which follows, the differences in these philosophies are outlined 
and the group considers whether there is a real difference between these points 
of view or whether good stewardship accounting is also good investment- 
oriented accounting.
Analyst: Many of us in the financial community as professionals are, 
in effect, fiduciaries. We are involved in managing or guiding people on very 
significant sums. So I think we have to have a sense of responsibility, and 
broaden the purpose for which financial statements are prepared to embrace 
this public concept—usefulness to the investor.
Analyst: I don’t understand what difference there is between your state­
ment that the purpose of financial statements is to provide data to make 
rational investment decisions, and Mr. Murphy’s idea that their purpose is 
reporting on the stewardship of management.
If the management is reporting on its stewardship to stockholders, I think 
you said, then they are telling about what they have done, and the stockholders 
are going to react to this in one of three ways. They are going to make a deci­
sion whether to buy, hold or sell that security in relation to other opportunities 
to buy, sell or hold securities.
So it seems to me that the management reporting on its stewardship to the 
stockholders is supplying information to investors.
Financial Executive: I think that there’s an enormous difference be­
tween these two purposes. A rational investment decision means, to me, essen­
tially an assessment of the future. This assessment of the future considers 
many things in arriving at an aggregate decision, including investment climate, 
outlook for the technology, the political climate, the behavior of the market— 
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many other things which in the aggregate are so essential to knowing whether 
that investment should be made or not.
Now, it’s true that the past history of the enterprise is also one of the 
important ingredients of that decision, but it’s pretty far down the scale of 
factors or components that have to be weighed in coming up with that decision.
On the other hand, reporting on stewardship itself is a tremendously im­
portant process, one that should be looked upon as an end in its own right. 
It would seem to me that many of the accounting concepts that we struggle 
with are premised on this very assumption that it is essentially a means of man­
agement reporting on its own stewardship. The main purpose of the statements 
is to report on past performance, not to make projections into the uncertain 
future about all the intangibles and unknowns that can affect the welfare of 
the enterprise.
Financial Executive: I think the measurement of income is going to 
be different things to different people. I think it depends upon what your 
investment is for. Is it a short-term or long-term investment? Is it in the form 
of debt or equity?
I think these things are certainly going to have an effect on what you say 
your definition of income is, and what your objectives are going to be for the 
measurement of that income.
Professor: Let me see if I can illustrate the different approaches by 
means of an example. Take the case of earnings per share. If the purpose of 
the earnings-per-share computation is to report on management’s stewardship, 
I see no reason whatsoever for going any further than the legalistic approach— 
the earnings per share this year, based on this year’s shares outstanding. Why 
in the world would you take future dilution into consideration if you are 
reporting on management’s stewardship?
But if the real reason we want an eamings-per-share figure is so that we 
can make a better prediction of the future earnings per share, then the dilution 
becomes relevant.
Banker: I am not convinced that your example is a good one. If you 
report earnings per share on a purely historical legal basis I think you are mis­
leading people on a stewardship basis, because if a corporate management has 
gotten earnings today through a series of financial transactions which are going 
to lead to future dilution, I think that is a part of their accounting and their 
stewardship today. If you report on a proper basis on your stewardship, you 
are reporting useful information for investors. If you report useful information 
for investors, you are properly reporting for stewardship. That’s the only point 
that some of us are trying to make. We do not see there is any difference 
between the two.
CPA: It seems to me also that the two are really identical. It’s hard to 
see how, if we were to say good stewardship accounting calls for certain prin­
ciples, and then good accounting for reaching rational economic decisions calls 
for certain principles, would the principles differ? I think not. I can’t think 
of a single case where good stewardship accounting would call for something 
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different from what you would do if you were reporting in order to enable 
people to make rational economic decisions.
CPA: There is a very subtle change taking place that we ought to think 
about for a minute. There are really two different concepts of the income 
statement involved here, and I think we have a transition and evolution going 
on, almost without realizing it.
To me the old-fashioned way of looking at income was what you might 
call a stewardship approach, the presentation of a historical record of what has 
transpired.
We are now involved in an evolution to what for lack of better termin­
ology might be called the earning power concept of an income statement. 
When the investment community looks at an income statement, what is being 
sought is a measure of the continuing earning power of the entity. The in­
vestors are only looking at it to enable them to make decisions with respect to 
the future. This earning power concept of an income statement implies that 
past history ought to be presented in such a way that it can be used in a most 
meaningful and useful manner to make decisions for the future.
This orientation doesn’t mean you are necessarily going to put in fore­
casting budgets or other new data, but when you start thinking in those terms 
it starts infiltrating your decisions on all accounting problems and you may 
come to different conclusions. There’s no doubt in my mind that the earning 
power concept of the income statement is the income statement of the future, 
and where we are all heading.
This does not mean that earning power statements are not also good for 
stewardship purposes and other purposes, but the emphasis is different.
Financial Executive : I would agree that if an income statement serves 
both of these purposes, as well as any number of other functions that we could 
think of, then ideally it’s the kind of income statement that we want, but I 
think we have to put emphasis on the word “primary”.
If the primary purpose is to help us make investment decisions about the 
future, then it would seem to me that the accounting profession will have to 
reach a little further, perhaps, to give a little more consideration to such things 
as value concepts and real dollars.
Let’s take the extractive industries. Is the cost basis proper? Should we 
try to measure the accretion of reserves in place from year to year? This type 
of thing introduces a real question of objectivity in measurement, and I believe 
that if you put your emphasis on stewardship, objectivity goes very high on 
the scale of values that you are going to rely on. But in an investment-oriented 
measurement system, objectivity is less vital. Therefore, I think that we have a 
real problem of identifying the primary purpose; this has been a source of 
continuing trouble for the APB in trying to reach some of these accounting 
principles.
Professor: To summarize, it seems apparent that analysts are ready to 
agree that financial statements are primarily intended to help them make 
investment decisions, and therefore past income must be determined in a way 
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that makes it useful in forecasting the future. Other groups, however, are not 
willing to concede that there is a single primary purpose for financial state­
ments. They tend to emphasize the function of measuring past stewardship 
while at the same time recognizing investors’ needs.
Equally basic, it seems to me that the fundamental nature of this income 
that we are trying to measure is still very nebulous. And while it is not at all 
clear what income means to anyone, everyone seems to have very strong feel­
ings about what should and should not be included in its measurement. Per­
haps we must come back to David Norr’s suggestion that income is what we 
measure with a profit and loss statement, even though this seems to me an 
inoperable basis on which to seek improvement in measurement.
Price-Level Accounting
One of the subjects which the accounting profession both in the United 
States and abroad has been wrestling with for years is the need for financial 
statements adjusted on a price-level basis. Accountants have long recognized 
that the implied assumption in financial statements that a dollar represents a 
constant measuring stick is not a valid one, but at the same time it has seldom 
been clear how distorting this error was, and whether its correction would 
incur more costs in lack of understanding than it would provide benefits in the 
form of improved economic measurement.
At the Symposium, members of an AICPA subcommittee on price-level 
accounting indicate that significant differences in net income will be produced 
by the application of a price index and that useful information might be given 
if such price-level-adjusted data was presented on a supplemental basis. On 
the other hand, all recognize that the educational problem is a substantial one 
and some major concerns are expressed by analysts and bankers as to what the 
resulting financial statements would in fact mean. Specifically, it is obvious 
that the distinction between current-value financial statements and statements 
based upon price-level-adjusted historical costs must be further explored and 
communicated if meaningful results are to be obtained.
Professor: Let us next see if we can get some expression on the part of 
the four groups here with respect to your interest in price-level adjustments 
and greater concern with current values.
CPA: I think there is a trend already in evidence in a recent AICPA 
booklet on audits of personal financial statements. It proposes that personal 
financial statements should be presented in parallel columns, the first column 
being prepared on traditional cost-based accounting principles, and the second 
column with data based on current values where determinable by appraisal 
or quoted market, with income tax deferments to bring them to a real current 
dollar value. The auditor’s certificate applies specifically to the first column.
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I think this may be a significant development for the future, because it 
doesn’t seem to me that any single method satisfies all of our needs. The 
method based on cost reflects accomplished facts, something where decisions 
have been made which are irreversible; whereas those based upon current 
worth reflect values not yet confirmed by a transaction. Current values are 
extremely important, particularly for investors, but they are reversible, and 
therefore it would be dangerous to try to mix the two.
Analyst: I think that current value is of tremendous use to us in cal­
culating true returns on invested capital and things of that sort. That is very 
valuable additional information. But we should not eliminate the old cost basis, 
because we are still able to manipulate those figures to some good advantage.
As to the fluctuations in the gross national product implicit price deflator 
and recalculating statements on that basis, I think the only problem that the 
financial analysts have with that is when we get the answer, we have no idea 
what to do with it.
We already know what inflation has been doing to us for the last 20 years, 
and proving it to ourselves is an interesting exercise, but I don’t know what 
we do with the figures when we get them. Perhaps others do.
Analyst: I think, as William Norby wrote in his paper, most of us 
analysts are just afraid of all the possible figures and the interpretation of what 
could come out of price-level accounting.
As for inflation, I think the statement of funds to some extent offsets this, 
because there you have the increasing capital requirements on new equipment.
Analyst: I agree. To me this is a typical academician’s impractical 
theory and practitioner’s morass.
I think when a firm invests dollars in a capital project, the primary inter­
est at that time is the return on those dollars over the period of years that the 
asset is being used. If they begin worrying about how much the price of that 
asset is going to go up over the next year, and begin thinking that they should 
buy one asset because its price is going to go up 25 per cent in the next ten 
years while the price of another one is only going to go up 15 per cent, then 
their decision-making process is a terrible morass, and accounting for it is even 
worse. I would say that in the discussion we could skip over this very quickly.
Analyst: I think perhaps there is more to this than we analysts realize. 
Certainly, comparing a service company with a capital-intensive company in 
a period of rapid inflation we do need to make some adjustments so we can be 
sure that the capital-intensive company is making adequate provision for 
replacement of assets, which, of course, are costed out only over a very long 
period of time.
CPA: The APB did make a research study which was published three or 
four years ago. They spent a good bit of time on an exposure draft of an 
Opinion. Instead of putting it out for exposure, it was used as a research docu­
ment, and it was tested by 16 companies with their own actual figures.
The Opinion itself does not prescribe a change in accounting in the United 
States. It urges experimentation on a supplementary basis. It says that price­
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level accounting on an adjusted historical cost basis is the kind that should be 
followed in countries like Brazil.
For those of you who say, “I can judge the effect of inflation on my set 
of figures” without doing this—I really don’t think you can. You cannot really 
generalize the effect of inflation on a set of financial statements just by saying 
the rate of increase has been two per cent or three per cent, because the actual 
impact on any particular company differs a great deal depending on the com­
position of its assets and their age, its capital structure, debt ratios, and other 
things. The differences between reported net income and adjusted net income 
for the 16 companies varied from virtually nil up to 233 per cent.
That top figure was an extreme, of course, but of the remaining 15, seven 
were affected by ten per cent or less; five were in the range of 11 to 20 per cent; 
and three were in the range of 21 to 30 per cent.
Other relationships in the statements changed as well. In one company, 
for example, tax rates jumped from an effective income tax rate of 31 per cent 
on the historical cost basis to 38 per cent on a price-level basis. Cash dividends 
were 72 per cent of income on a historical basis and 90 per cent on a restated 
basis. That’s an invasion of capital, possibly.
I should emphasize that what we are urging is not an experimentation in 
revaluing assets. All we are trying to do is take the rubber out of the dollar. 
We are trying to stay with the same accounting principles based on cost that 
we have today, but measuring this cost in terms of a dollar that doesn’t change 
its general purchasing power.
CPA: I would like to report on a meeting which was held last week with 
the 16 companies who had been kind enough to co-operate with the APB on 
the price-level study. Two things came out of that meeting that can probably 
be described as general conclusions.
The first thing that was quite clear was that the principal concern of all 16 
companies that participated was that there would be confusion and misunder­
standing about the data. The questions raised here earlier about the meaning 
of price-level-adjusted information and how it should be used bothered every­
one at the meeting. This clearly indicates that if these things do have any 
usefulness and any real meaning, that there is an educational problem involved.
Interestingly, however, most of the people who have worked with such 
price-level-adjusted statements during the course of the study seemed to feel 
at the end that they did have some meaning and that they did provide some 
information over and beyond the historicals; but these men also seemed to be 
concerned about how everybody else would react—and, I think, fairly so.
The second agreement that emerged from the meeting was a decision 
made by the subcommittee that the next step will be to invite representatives 
of the groups that are represented here for a one- or two-day in-depth discus­
sion with the members of the subcommittee. This discussion will take place 
in small groups and will be oriented entirely toward the figures, without any 
concern about the techniques for making adjustments.
Financial Executive: I don’t think that we can with any degree of 
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accuracy or meaningfulness ignore technology when we are trying to get price­
level accounting. Every manufacturer has been through tremendous changes 
in technology over the last few years. When you try to revalue plant and equip­
ment that is 20 or 30 years old, you are not going to get a replacement value on 
that particular plant or that particular set of equipment. You have got to take 
into consideration the technological changes that have taken place in the indus­
try and the improvements in material efficiency, the reduction in labor content.
I think, frankly, that any attempt at this stage to get to price-level account­
ing is going to be much more confusing than it will be desirable to anybody in 
the whole community that’s going to use it.
Banker: I think there will be a tremendous resistance on the part of 
credit grantors generally towards an involvement of price-level accounting. 
The historical method is a method on which you can base your calculations 
with some certainty, and if there is a floating re-evaluation, with all the uncer­
tainties and technological changes that we have spoken about, I think there 
would be definite resistance on the part of the credit grantors.
CPA: I think we should be clear about what we are discussing. There are 
three possible bases for preparing financial statements: actual historical cost, 
historical cost adjusted for changes in the general price level, and current value. 
The second of these does not purport to represent replacement values or cur­
rent values. There are a lot of people who argue that it would be better to go 
to the third level, and others say you ought to stay on the first; but we are 
considering the second. Such a general price-level adjustment simply means 
that we are expressing a balance sheet in terms of 1968 dollars, which is not 
the same as in 1940 dollars. This is like the procedure which we currently 
follow when we translate currencies around the world into a common unit— 
a dollar.
Financial Executive: But consider that the 1968 balance sheet that 
you are trying to revalue would not be there if it hadn’t been for inflation and 
technological change. Some of the expenditures made to take advantage of 
technological changes would never have been made if labor costs had stayed 
at 25 cents an hour. This is the reason that I don’t think you can separate the 
effects.
The balance sheet is the result of management actions taken within a 
particular set of social and economic conditions. When you try to adjust this 
statement to eliminate the effect of certain economic conditions which did exist 
and which had a significant impact on management’s decision, you are pre­
senting an unreal picture of something which never in fact occurred.
CPA: I should add that the proposal which the APB is considering only 
recommends that these price adjustments be made as supplementary informa­
tion, and that the presentation of such information would be voluntary.
Analyst: I think most of us would applaud such a proposal. It would 
give us a little time to get used to the data and to see what values we derived 
from it.
Analyst: Could I suggest that perhaps the APB ask a few of these com­
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panies to prepare statements on a current cost basis as well? Because I think 
that if you introduce this general price level as supplementary information, you 
may be creating an error in the case of companies which have very little to do 
with the general price level. You then may be creating a false sense of security 
in the minds of people who use it feeling that they are getting better informa­
tion, when in actual fact they might very well be getting worse.
Professor: I think that we can all learn a lesson from this discussion on 
price-level accounting. This has been a major subject of research and discus­
sion in accounting circles for at least 15 to 20 years, but we have never really 
sought out users to discover their need for price-level-adjusted statements, nor 
have we made any systematic attempt to explain to them what such statements 
are attempting to do and the problems of bringing them into being.
Thus when we come to them with research results, it is very natural that 
we should get a negative response, since we are presenting them with something 
new that they have not fully thought about and do not really understand. We 
can clearly see this negative reaction in the comments made here today despite 
the fact that I believe there is a consensus in accounting circles that price-level 
information would be a good thing.
If we are to hope to get acceptance and use of new forms of accounting 
disclosure such as price-level data, we must lay a careful groundwork by com­
municating the objectives, benefits and difficulties of implementing price-level- 
adjusted financial information.
The Treatment of Accounting Changes
Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 9 left undetermined the way 
in which changes in accounting should be reflected in financial statements. 
Recent practice has varied between treating such changes as prior period 
adjustments to retained earnings, as extraordinary items in the year when the 
change took place, and by restating all prior years. The reported pattern of 
net income over the years can be significantly affected by the alternative chosen. 
The discussion indicates varying points of view on the subject with concern 
expressed on the one hand for the validity of reported trends and on the other 
for the problems of retroactive changes in historically reported data.
Professor: One accounting problem which is currently under discussion 
is how a change in accounting procedures should be treated in the income 
statement.
Let’s try an example. Suppose a company was capitalizing research and 
development, and as a matter of policy without a significant factual change 
they have now decided to switch to a policy of writing it off as incurred. What 
do they do with the part that has already been capitalized on the balance sheet? 
Should they go back and recast past income statements? Should they amortize 
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the capitalized R&D in the future? Should they write it off immediately to 
income or to retained earnings?
Financial Executive: From the standpoint of corporate management, 
I don’t think there could be the situation that you have described, so I think 
it’s very difficult to answer. Corporate management would not change its mind 
without some reason, and the reason for making the change would seem to me 
to have something to do with how it’s treated.
Analyst : I don’t care how they do it, as long as they fully disclose what 
they have done. I don’t wish them to go back and recast, as long as they tell 
me what they have done and the effect on net income. That’s all I ask.
Analyst: One of the things that the investment analyst does with per- 
share figures, both currently and on a historic basis, is to relate them to com­
mon stock prices. Common stock prices occurred when they occurred, and 
the security was valued in the market based on the earnings that were then 
either reported or about to be reported or expected to be reported. So if you 
make an accounting change ten years later, you can restate the figures if you 
want to, and it may be quite interesting to look at them on a restated basis for 
some purposes, but if you are trying to see what has been the historical price­
earnings ratio pattern of this stock, how high investors have been willing to 
value it, how low, and where the midpoint is, then you don’t want these recast 
figures, because you would be changing one part of the fraction but not the 
other.
There is an example in the steel industry relating to the treatment of the 
investment tax credit. The company formerly deferred the credit and then 
amortized it. They are now shifting to flow-through. They are not only flowing 
through this year for tax credit, but continuing to amortize what they have in 
the past. This, I think, is wrong.
CPA: Let us look at this investment credit example and consider the 
alternative ways of dealing with the amortized credit that exists at the time of 
the change.
Clearly, there are three choices: restate earlier years, make a lump-sum 
adjustment as an extraordinary item, or spread it over the remaining years.
I agree that to spread it over the remaining years is going to give you just 
an absolutely distorted earnings trend. You are going to compensate for your 
earlier understatements of income, according to your current theory, by over­
stating income in the later years. This is totally unsatisfactory.
If it is all picked up this year, then you get one big flip in income. It does 
appear as an extraordinary item, but you are still reflecting two sides of com­
pletely different principles in reported net income.
On the other hand, if you go back and restate, you are going to get an 
earnings statement that is stated on the same basis all along.
You do have different reported earnings than investors were acting upon 
when they set these prices, but if you do live up to the reporting that is called 
for in APB No. 9, you reflect both the earnings as reported in those earlier 
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years and the increment year by year as a result of the change. So you can 
have the best of all worlds.
It seems to me that the restatement is the only one that’s going to show 
the trend of earnings through the years.
CPA: Among accounting circles every time this question of restatement 
is discussed, one of the questions that’s always considered to be important is 
the extent to which restatement of previously reported earnings tends to con­
fuse or shake confidence in the financial community by implying that the 
restatement is being made because there was something wrong, or that some 
management wants to change a trend line. I would like to hear from analysts 
how serious the psychological impact of restatement of earnings really is.
Analyst : In any restatement, the competent analyst ought to try to look 
to the facts. What was the reason for restatement? Was it in fact an economic 
change that had occurred and the new principle now reflects a more accurate 
statement of reality?
I would ask that question of steel companies today. Did they make the 
change in depreciation and investment credit accounting because they sud­
denly discovered—all of them at the same time—that a better statement of 
economic reality comes from their new method of accounting? And if I don’t 
find the answer to be “Yes,” then I say: For what other reason did they do it?
In the case of some companies when we see one change this year, followed 
by another two years from now, we begin to have a feeling that this is done 
simply to improve the reported earnings.
But I think we must attack each one of these changes and find out what 
are the facts. If it’s simply to dress up the earnings, then it does shake our 
confidence. If it’s changing to reflect economic realities, then we say “Great!”
Analyst: One thing restatement seems to do is to open the door to 
abuses. Things that should have gone through the income statement, such as 
excess start-up costs, suddenly get buried in prior years with no impact on 
current financials.
CPA: The fundamental problem that has to be faced up to is the impro­
priety of a free choice of accounting method, and then the right to go flip-flop 
on those methods. And until that problem is dealt with we are going to have all 




One final specific accounting problem that is considered by the Sympo­
sium is accounting for inter-corporate investment. Time does not permit a 
very comprehensive discussion of this problem and its various ramifications, 
but it does become apparent that the participants feel that when control exists 
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the earnings of the subsidiary should be included in the parent company’s 
reported income. It is also apparent that changes in market value are not 
enthusiastically regarded as a measure of investment performance in a com­
pany where a substantial holding is involved.
Some of the more basic issues in this area are not explicitly considered. 
For example, the question of pooling of interests accounting is touched upon 
briefly in one of the papers but not brought up since it is felt that a large 
amount of literature already exists in the area. Similarly, the problems of 
reporting associated with conglomerate enterprises are ignored. These issues 
were discussed informally as inevitably they must be when interested financial 
men get together, but there are no conclusions of significance to report.
Professor: Accounting for inter-corporate investment is one of the 
reporting problems receiving considerable attention today. I think we can 
discuss this problem in three parts: the less than 50 per cent owned corpora­
tion, the joint venture, and the majority-owned subsidiary. In each of these 
situations, there are three possible accounting alternatives: (1) reflecting the 
investment at equity and reporting the earnings of the corporation in the in­
vestor’s income statement, either in a single figure or by means of consolidation, 
(2) reflecting the investment at cost and reporting earnings in the investors’ 
statements only when dividends are received, and (3) reflecting the current 
market value of the investment and reporting both dividends and change in 
market value in the income statement of the investor. Can we develop any 
guidelines here?
Analyst: I think where an integrated sort of operation exists the equity 
in earnings should be reported as regular income. When you don’t have that 
relationship, and when the majority of the stock or a substantial block of stock 
is in public hands, control is not definitely in the hands of this company, and 
there is no business relationship between the two companies; then all you can 
look at is dividends, because that’s all you can get your hands on.
Analyst: I think part of the key is the permanence of the investment. 
If you acquire ten per cent of a company as part of an attempt to merge with 
the intention of disposing of your stock if you do not, then you record only 
dividend income. But if it is a permanent investment, such as Owens-Illinois 
has in Owens-Corning Fiberglas, I feel the investors’ share of the income 
should flow through to its income statement.
Financial Executive: Owens-Illinois, I think, suggests an interesting 
argument for recognizing in the investor’s income statement each year the 
change in the potential liquidation value of that investment.
First of all, they are quite free to dispose of it, as I recall. Second, the 
stock after increasing tremendously in value has been quite flat for some time. 
If you look at the year-by-year quality of the decisions of the management of 
the companies that have held that stock, and you look from the beginning to 
the present, it looks as if they made a brilliant investment. If you look for the 
last ten years, it probably indicates they made a miserable decision. If they 
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had something better to do with the money, they might have been better off 
liquidating.
Analyst: I think to have net income affected every year by fluctuations 
in the market value wholly distorts the picture.
Analyst: Don’t you distinguish between operating income and gain or 
loss on security holdings? I would go along with the idea that you show the 
difference in market value from year to year, rather than wait for realizations. 
If you show it from year to year, the market gain or loss on the holding is a 
separate capital item, as against an operating income item. And then at least 
everybody knows what they are talking about, and they can make such com­
binations as they wish.
Financial Executive: My answer would be that when you have a 
unitary business, you consolidate; and when you don’t, if you have an asset 
of which you can estimate the value—the alternative value to you—you recog­
nize that value. When you have a pipeline that is an integral part of the oper­
ations of the company, it should be consolidated. If you have investment in 
something that’s not a part of your business, and you are quite free to go in 
and out of it, you should recognize the change on what you can realize.
Financial Executive : I think the key should be control. Whether it’s 
one-third or one-sixth or 50 per cent, if you have the ability to leave the money 
in the operation for reinvestment or to have it remitted as you choose, then I 
think you should go to share of earnings.
On the other hand, if you can only realize through dividends that are 
actually paid or through the sale of the asset, then it seems to me that you have 
to look to the cost or the market method.
Banker: It seems to me that if the management of the company that you 
are looking at is not in a position to exercise its discretionary judgment on the 
application of the net income of the company in which it is investing, either 
by retaining it in the business, using it to purchase another investment, or pay 
dividends, I cannot count it as good income. If it is earned in Brazil, for 
example, and the Brazilian government won’t let you bring it out, then to me 
it is not good income.
Analyst: I think that when you have a more than 50 per cent owned 
subsidiary, you should have a consolidation, and you should also have separate 
financial statements available on the finance company subsidiary or the oddball 
subsidiary that is totally unrelated to the parent.
In this way, you can look at the separate companies independently. But 
I think consolidated statements should still be presented, because in some cases 
there are claims against the parent’s assets that are not made clear when you 
fail to consolidate.
Professor: To summarize, it seems to me that the two most important 
factors that must be considered in deciding how to account for intercorporate 
investments are the existence of a business relationship rather than simply a 
passive investment relationship between the companies and the presence of 
effective control. If these two criteria are met, the consensus seems to be that 
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the companies should be consolidated or the parent’s share of the subsidiary’s 
net income should be included in the measurement of its own income. In the 
absence of these two conditions, the cost method is still favored. The reaction 
of the group seems generally unfavorable to recognizing changes in market 
value in the financial statements although disclosure of market value is con­
sidered to be appropriate in some cases. The main difficulty with market values 
is that they fluctuate too much, and there is something undesirable about things 
that go up and down.
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Section III
The Role of the Auditor
In addition to the users and preparers of financial statements, a third 
party is intimately involved in the reliability and usefulness of financial reports. 
This is the public accountant who has the responsibility of attesting to the 
fairness of presentation of reported results within the framework of generally 
accepted accounting principles.
There has long been a lack of understanding about the nature of the 
auditor’s role in financial reporting, in regard to both what it is and what it 
should be. Auditors have tended to bask in the tacit acceptance of a public 
image of infallibility, even while their professional literature and standards 
described a far more limited obligation and responsibility. This inconsistency, 
at least in part, has contributed to the disillusionment with the profession that 
has been evidenced both by an increasing number of lawsuits against auditors 
and by critical literature which has recently appeared.
The profession, therefore, has been faced with the problem of whether 
it should attempt to move in the direction of meeting public expectations and 
thus expand its role as it has traditionally stated it or whether it should try to 
change its public image so as to limit its functions and its liabilities.
These important issues for the future of public accounting pervade the 
discussion of the auditor’s role. Professor Herbert Miller introduces the 
subject and leads the group through consideration of the current short-form 
report and the responsibility of the auditor in financial reporting.
Introductory Remarks
Professor Herbert E. Miller
Joseph Roth has identified the function of the independent audit as that 
of adding credibility to the financial statements. This definition of the auditor’s 
role might at first hand strike one as modest, but it is probably realistic, and I 
think it is very important.
Perhaps the thing that disturbs us is that this role of adding credibility does 
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not square with the role expected by statement users, and Mr. Roth acknowl­
edges this. Hence we have a misunderstanding that is of serious proportions.
Arthur Nash in his critique suggests that users believe the auditor has 
prepared the financial statement, and that the figures shown on the financial 
statements are the auditor’s figures. If this is true, it would indicate a most 
significant misunderstanding.
How much if any of this misunderstanding is attributable to the short­
form opinion? Our authorities differ. Robert Pfenning is doubtful that this 
is a source of misunderstanding. Mr. Nash agrees with Mr. Roth that this 
may be a source of serious misunderstanding.
In my view, anything that hasn’t changed in 34 years, such as the present 
short-form opinion, probably needs overhauling. At the least, it certainly 
warrants a very serious reconsideration by preparers and users.
There is evidence in the critiques associated with the role of the auditor 
that the authors are concerned about the existence of a choice of accounting 
alternatives. Mr. Roth states that the auditor must be satisfied that the financial 
statements constitute a fair presentation. For an impractical accountant like 
me, this raises an interesting question. Can the CPA assume that reliance on 
generally accepted accounting principles will always result in financial state­
ments that achieve a fair presentation? I doubt it.
We may have semantic difficulties here. If fair presentation is defined in 
terms of the total impression you get from financial statements, then it seems 
to imply an added responsibility for the auditor. I believe that there might 
be misunderstanding on this point on the part of statement users.
Mr. Roth raises the interesting question whether the auditor should 
undertake to evaluate management’s performance. He doubts whether the 
auditor is capable of doing this, and indicates that such a development is 
remote, and I am relieved.
If evaluating management’s performance ever becomes part of the 
objective or the role of the auditor, then probably we will have to take a 
fresh look at financial statements, because they will come to be viewed as the 
vehicle by which managerial performance is communicated and reported.
If they are being used for such a single purpose, then I believe we must 
reconsider the propriety, or sense, of continuing to prepare financial statements 
which are general purpose in character and presumably suitable for a wide 
variety of uses.
If they are going to be used for a single purpose, might that not change 
the relevance of some of the concepts, rules and conventions that we have used 
for many years?
If we do get into evaluation of management more directly, then it seems 
to me that we face the problem of setting criteria. I would have no objection 
to giving management initially considerable voice in the selection of criteria 
by which their performance is to be evaluated, but I have some doubts as to 
whether management should be given any voice in the application of such 
criteria.
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Mr. Roth’s paper also indicates an awareness of the desire to improve 
the predictive quality of financial statements. This issue is raised in connec­
tion with the possibility of auditing budgeting results. As Mr. Pfenning 
indicates, he’s petrified. He feels that attesting to the validity of budgeted 
results or forecasts would be one of the better ways of destroying the auditor’s 
credibility. Albert J. Bows opposes auditing such budgeted results, because 
that kind of auditing would amount to a mere technical performance, a 
performance without substance.
Also of interest to this group would be the question of auditing quarterly 
financial statements, which would represent a very significant expansion of 
the role of the auditor. Whether such specific expansion of the audit function 
will occur is uncertain, but it is certain that the auditor’s role is in a constant 
state of evolution and expansion.
It is somewhat surprising that in commenting on the evolution and 
expansion of the role of the auditor, Mr. Roth attaches only slight influence 
to the client and the accounting profession. The real forces for change are 
the statement users, the regulatory authorities, and the courts. With existing 
lines of communication, such rate of change will be slow, and perhaps happen 
in a zigzag pattern. For some, such as Louis Warlick, the pace of change 
will be much too slow. He makes an appealing case for a greatly expanded 
role for the auditor, including an interpretative role. This, I think, has opened 
the door for many interesting possibilities for discussion. But if we do expand 
the role, there is the serious question of legal liability to be faced which all of 
our groups must be concerned with. And perhaps this question of legal 
liability, if it is raised, will raise the question of incorporation of accounting 
practices.
It is apparent from the thoughts and ideas expressed by our authors— 
Roth, Nash, Pfenning, Bows, Warlick-—that we have many more challenges, 
it seems to me, than we have conflicts in this area, but there are many ideas 
and differences of opinion worthy of discussion.
The Short-Form Report
Professor: Perhaps a logical starting point for this discussion of the 
role of the auditor is the auditor’s ending point—the short-form report. Does 
this form of report do its job? Should it be changed?
Analyst: I think the short-form opinion is misleading. The wording 
does not indicate clearly what responsibility the auditor is taking. The key is 
in the words “present fairly.” I think there is a lack of pointing out that it is 
management who supplies figures and chooses the accounting principles, and 
that the auditor has merely applied certain sampling techniques and other 
requirements to be reasonably sure that the books are being kept properly.
I think back to the “fairness through the eye of the beholder” concept. 
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The auditor would be much better off if he didn’t say he thought the statements 
were fair or unfair. He should find more appropriate wording.
Financial Executive : I think the short-form report serves its purpose 
very well for those technicians who are familiar with its background. Our 
problem arises from the fact that the user group is expanding and includes 
many without technical expertise. We are therefore attempting to force a 
technical document into the hands of laymen, and expecting them to use it.
Banker: I feel that there is a tendency to regard the short-form certificate 
as a form of Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval. Users are supposed to 
assume that the auditors have done everything necessary and that the state­
ments tell the full story. But as a credit grantor, I deal with many CPAs of 
different capability, and I like additional details from them as to what they 
have done and what the various numbers represent so that I can use my 
judgment and form my own impressions of them and their client. This means 
I like long-form reports.
I am not sure that a revised short-form report would solve my problem, 
but I am interested in hearing what changes in it, if any, are being contem­
plated.
CPA: The AICPA’s committee on auditing procedure, which is the body 
charged with responsibility for auditing and reporting, has had this matter 
on its agenda. Several versions of a revised report have been prepared by 
individuals and each of the individuals likes his version, but they don’t like 
one another’s.
The committee has been trying to determine in what ways it should be 
changed. We might just change a few words, but this will not solve our major 
problems; and additionally we find that every change creates problems in 
other parts of the report.
We have considered expanding the report enough to try to explain more 
about the nature of the examination that is made, and possibly the nature of 
the financial statements themselves. The committee at this point is a little 
reluctant to agree that we have a responsibility to tell others what financial 
statements are, but it may be that this is the most efficient way of doing it.
Unfortunately, many other more urgent matters have come onto the 
agenda of the committee, so this subject is no longer on the top of our list 
of priorities.
CPA: I’d like to inquire of the financial executives here whether you feel 
there would be any particular degree of resistance on the part of management 
if the standard short-form report included near the beginning some sort of 
categorical statement to the effect that these statements were prepared by the 
management. This seems to be one major point of misunderstanding.
Financial Executive: Personally, I would welcome the change.
Financial Executive: The only problem I see with including such a 
statement in the auditor’s report is that it might imply that if the auditor had 
prepared the financial statements he would not have done it in the same way, 
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when actually we have had a meeting of the minds with our auditors.
Financial Executive : I think you are completely right in putting such 
a statement in the report as part of the process of educating users.
Analyst: It seems to me that fundamentally the auditor’s responsibility 
and management’s responsibility for the financial statements that appear in 
the annual report are inseparable. Presumably the auditor would not have 
put a certificate on any statement that he did not approve of. So when he 
lets a statement of management reach the light of day with his certificate on 
it, he has as much responsibility for it as management has. He is saying that 
it is prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, 
and this is where the user runs into problems, because for many purposes the 
range of accounting principles is pretty wide. If the range is going to be 
narrowed by the work of the Accounting Principles Board, then it seems to 
me the auditor’s report would have more meaning.
Banker: I don’t really understand why the accountants are so anxious 
to attribute the statements to management, since they have certified them. If 
they have certified them, what difference does it make whether they prepared 
them or not? I really don’t understand why this is so important to them.
CPA: The word “seal” was used earlier in reference to the certificate. 
This is indicative of the general impression held by many that the certificate 
represents an insurance policy or a guarantee of the statements presented. 
This is a sore point with CPAs. We have to educate the business layman as 
to what the significance is of our report.
We are not guarantors. We are not issuing an insurance policy. The 
short-form report, if it is read properly and if the reader understands the 
terminology, cites exactly what we have done and what we report on. But 
the public doesn’t understand the meaning of “generally accepted accounting 
principles” or “generally accepted auditing standards,” and so they misunder­
stand our report. What is needed is education of the business public but I 
am not sure this can be done simply by changing the certificate.
CPA: If we do revise the short-form report, we can move in several 
directions. One alternative is to make the report a page or two long and to 
say in it that the statements are management’s, and they are estimates, and 
the use of judgment is involved, and describe accounting principles and fair 
presentation and consistency. Then we would have a nice educational docu­
ment in that certificate. Of course, one would have to look carefully to find 
any qualifications to distinguish it from the so-called clean opinion.
At the other extreme, we might follow a procedure similar to one used 
in South America where documents are stamped “fisco bueno.” That means 
“approved.” There is no qualification or mention of consistency or auditing 
standards. When it says “approved” it means all of those things.
The question therefore is whether we should make the short-form report 
an educational document or try to educate the public in other ways and 
perhaps go to the other extreme in our report.
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The Responsibility of the Auditor
Professor: One of the important questions which we have been discuss­
ing by implication we might now turn to explicitly: What should the auditor’s 
role be in financial reporting? Should the CPA assume a larger and more 
responsible role?
As I read the papers by Charles McGarraugh and William Norby, I 
sensed a plea that the auditor assume the role of professional reporter rather 
than acting purely as auditor. On the other hand, I have heard management 
express very clearly the feeling that financial statements must be their 
responsibility.
How do users in general feel about this? Should the professional account­
ing expertise of the auditor be used by making him an independent professional 
reporter who selects accounting principles which he feels are appropriate and 
tells the story as he sees it in the manner of a newspaper reporter?
Analyst: I think that this relates to the discussion about flexibility and 
comparability. On the one side we say we have to have flexibility to report 
true economic facts, and on the other we would like to have more compara­
bility. But as we look at the real world, it seems as if there is a lot of evidence 
of companies shifting from one accounting procedure to another not in fact 
to reflect economic reality but for some other purpose. This leads us to the 
question: Who is responsible? I have the feeling that management seems to be 
using the accounting profession in this respect.
Professor: Recently I heard a learned member of the public accounting 
profession say that within the purview of generally accepted accounting 
principles there were good principles, adequate principles, and obnoxious 
principles—all generally accepted. He said that in giving his opinion on 
financial statements he was indicating that the accounting principles used were 
generally accepted and he would sign an unqualified opinion on a set of 
financial statements that he did not feel represented the best reporting merely 
because the principles used fell within the framework of generally accepted 
accounting principles.
Banker: I would think that this should not be done.
CPA: If we are going to be responsible for our opinion, I think our 
approach must be like a doctor. The doctor doesn’t care whether the client 
accepts his findings or not—they are the doctor’s findings.
I think our standard must not be what is generally accepted but rather 
what in the accountant’s opinion is the most appropriate to the particular case. 
I am in favor of changing the wording of our certificate so that it is expressed 
in that way.
Financial Executive: I think the certificate should describe the deci­
sion-making process which actually went on. In most large companies the 
financial statements are prepared by management and the accounting principles 
are selected by management. In many smaller companies the statements are 
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prepared by the public accountant who selects the principles that are to be 
used. I think the certificate ought to reflect what actually happened.
Analyst: To me as a user the certificate means that the records have 
been checked and there is no fraud. The range of acceptable accounting 
principles is so broad, however, that they cannot be used as a measurement 
of the quality of the earnings report. The quality of earnings is the responsi­
bility of management, and management must disclose the various elements 
that go into the numbers so that the quality of earnings can be discerned by 
a reader.
CPA: I should emphasize that our examination is not made for the 
purpose of discovering fraud but rather for the purpose of expressing an 
opinion on the fairness of the financial statements as a whole. In a sense we 
are really just rendering an opinion on the quality of the earnings of the 
corporation.
Analyst: As a user I would have to say that a true determination of 
quality is not being achieved by the CPA.
Banker: I would like to think that the certificate, when it says that 
financial statements have been prepared in accordance with generally accepted 
accounting principles, means that the statements have been prepared by 
management and that the auditor in reviewing the presentation has exercised 
his professional influence to have these presented in the best way possible— 
not that he has searched through accounting literature to find some means of 
supporting the way that management may have elected to present something 
that he doesn’t really agree with himself.
Perhaps the certificate should be worded in such a way that the reader 
can know whether the auditor feels that management has used accounting 
principles which are acceptable, although he does not feel they are completely 
right in the circumstances, or whether the principles are those which he feels 
are the best.
Financial Executive: I still have not heard anything that won’t be 
cured by the Accounting Principles Board limiting the areas where there is 
more than one acceptable method of accounting. The accountants themselves 
must resolve these questions because there is no one else to sit in judgment. 
The accountants are the best we have in this area and if they do not define 
principles some government agency will.
Analyst: When we talk about expanding the auditor’s role perhaps we 
should also consider whether there is a need or an advantage of having the 
auditor review and be responsible for various aspects of the annual report 
other than the financial statements. This can be done either by an explicit 
statement confirming the accuracy of the particular data or by a report indicat­
ing that the auditor had surveyed the balance of the annual report and felt 
that all figures were consistent with the fully audited financial statements. I 
know that the Securities and Exchange Commission is very much interested 
in this problem, and has given consideration to this very point. How would 
auditors feel about making such a statement?
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CPA: I don’t think that the CPAs would object to assuming such responsi­
bility but I think that management and users would have to recognize that if 
such a statement is being made our responsibility is being broadened and this 
must be paid for. If we are to attest to conglomerate reporting, backlogs and 
other quantitative data in the annual report, we would have the difficult task 
of obtaining objective evidence as to the validity of such information. But I 
do believe we could express an opinion on many more things if we were paid 
to do so.
Analyst: I believe that underlying this question is the practice which 
we have noticed of reporting selected highlights from the financial statements 
in the remainder of the report without disclosing facts which would make the 
data misleading. Recently we have found a company that reported 39 cents a 
share of ordinary income and 19 cents of extraordinary income in its financial 
statements. But in the president’s letter income was said to be 58 cents per 
share without any indication of what was extraordinary. It is things like this 
which disturb us and which blunt the efforts of the Accounting Principles 
Board.
CPA: Many accounting firms do today insist upon looking over the 
president’s statement, and other material that will go to stockholders; in so 
doing they pay particular attention to those figures which tend to interpret 
what’s presented in the financial statements that have been attested to by the 
accounting firm.
Even though this is done, we generally do not accept any responsibility 
for it.
CPA: I think if any auditing firm found a gross error in the representa­
tions of the president or the chairman of the board or the financial highlights 
or review, the accounting firm would take some exception to it, either in his 
report or by refusing to issue a report.
CPA: One way in which this has been done is to force the inclusion of 
additional information such as earnings per share in the financial statements. 
Then the auditor must be responsible.
CPA: Before we leave this discussion today I would like to suggest that 
we raise our sights a notch or two.
It seems to me that what is at stake is really the free enterprise system, 
and what is involved is the public interest. All of us are involved with the 
public interest. The reason for having public accountants is the public interest. 
Managements have greater and greater responsibility to the public as evidenced 
by court cases and other public actions. I think it has become evident that 
their responsibility runs far beyond stockholders today to the general public. 
Financial analysts have a great public interest in helping and protecting 
investors, and they are going to have more legal and ethical responsibilities in 
this area. Banks are involved because they are lending money to the public on 
the basis of financial statements.
I think we have to realize that the regulatory agencies that we are all 
subject to in one way or another are representatives of the public. Courts are 
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representatives of the public. Court decisions, regulatory decisions, and every­
thing else are going to be in the direction of greater and greater public interest. 
I think that is evident, and it is something that we should all think about, 
because we are going to be subject to it.
If we ever hit a point—and we’re all involved in this—where the public 
feels that corporate financial reporting is not sufficiently reliable and has 
insufficient integrity, then the whole free enterprise system is going to suffer. 
And if that happens, we are all going to suffer with it.
I think at times we worry too much about legal liability and the wording 
of the short-form certificate and all these other things, which all have their 
place, but are not the main problem. The main problem is that each of us 
do a better job at what we are trying to do.
Auditors right now are worrying too much about legal liability. I think 
that if we worried more about improving the standards of our profession and 
doing a better job, we wouldn’t have to worry about legal liability so much.
And so the problem is for each of us to do a better job at what we are 
trying to do. I think the accounting profession needs better auditing standards 
and accounting principles. We need to do a better quality of work as a 
profession. The public feels that when we certify statements we are giving 
our general approval to those statements, and I think the courts will so hold 
when these cases come up. I don’t think the wording we use in our certificate 
is going to be a defense if we haven’t done a good quality job.
So I think we had better sit back occasionally and look at the overall 
thing, the total picture, and recognize that the public interest is going to prevail, 
and the public interest is going to be determined by what the public thinks, 
regardless of what we think.
Practice of Public Accounting
In Corporate Form
CPA: I would like to explore with this group a problem with which the 
accounting profession is currently grappling—the possibility of the corporate 
practice of public accounting.
As CPAs we are subject to a code of ethics which says that we shall not 
practice in corporate form. Many of the state societies and state boards have 
similar rules. There is no prohibition against practice before the Treasury 
Department in corporate form. In this day of liberty we are subject to a good 
many pressures from members around the United States who are seriously 
questioning why they should not be able to practice accounting in corporate 
form. Our immediate past president, Marvin Stone, has spoken widely and 
written several articles on this subject, as a matter of fact. We have had a 
study committee in the Institute examine this question. It’s still in process 
under the chairmanship of Matthew Blake.
I think if we started from scratch we would reach the conclusion that 
73
there is no reason why it should be appropriate to practice accounting in 
partnership form and inappropriate to practice accounting in corporate form. 
This is quite aside from whether we are discriminated against by practicing 
in partnership form for tax purposes.
It does also touch on the question of liability that you mentioned. We do 
seriously feel that the legal responsibilities that the profession has with respect 
to the Securities Act of 1933 are totally unreasonable, and too harsh, and 
should be amended.
The facts of life are that if you have a $50 million registration statement, 
the limit of the liability for the CPA is $50 million, the gross offering price.
This has brought up the question of practicing in corporate form in the 
minds of many of the members of the Institute. They don’t see, realistically, 
why they should work all their lives and then possibly late in life have some 
lawsuit hit them and put them in personal bankruptcy. Many people feel this 
is an unreasonable thing to impose on a professional man.
We are considering permissive incorporation for other reasons such as 
continuity of the firm. Some of the large accounting firms are the largest type 
of partnership operation in the world.
We are a little concerned as to whether the business community, whose 
opinion of us we respect, would feel we were running for cover on liability 
if we sought to limit our liability to typical corporate liability.
Those are the questions that we are really struggling with in our study 
group. It would be very helpful to the study group if we could get some type 
of informal expression of opinion among this group as to whether they think 
it would be appropriate or totally inappropriate for accounting firms to 
practice in corporate form.
It will be a long, hard struggle just to achieve the right to practice in 
corporate form, particularly for the large firms that practice in most of the 
states. It requires changing the state laws to permit the practice of accounting 
or any other profession, for that matter, in corporate form. It requires going 
to the government agencies. This might take five to ten years, $2 or $3 million, 
and a tremendous amount of time. We don’t want to take that if the end result 
isn’t worthwhile.
Analyst: I see no more reason why accountants shouldn’t operate in 
corporate form than, say, a large New York Stock Exchange firm.
Banker: In July 1967 we conducted within our bank a survey of 20 
senior credit officers as to this very question. Almost unanimously the opinion 
was that it wouldn’t matter.
Financial Executive: Having been a public accountant at one time, 
and knowing the relationship with public accountants through the years, I 
see no reason why they should be subject to any greater liability because of a 
partnership form of organization than any other firms that we have in the 
United States. I definitely think they should incorporate.
Financial Executive : As a financial manager of a business I am very 
much concerned over the liability that has been imposed upon the accountants. 
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I think in the final analysis we are going to have to pay whatever the cost is. 
The real problem, I think, is broader than just the corporate form. It 
gets into the field of risk management; we are very careful about the risks that 
business accepts, and if we can’t diminish them we go out and find, if we can, 
insurance against them.
I think we have to look at the character of the risk that has been imposed 
upon the profession. We have to see whether it can be adequately insured and 
minimized through the corporate form, if need be.
Banker: I have no objection to the CPA practicing in corporate form. 
However, practically speaking, you act as individuals when you act. I am not 
sure that you will get the insulation as a corporation that you are seeking by 
practicing in this form.
Financial Executive : I don’t think it would make any difference to the 
firms that are here as to whether they are incorporated or not. I think the 
code of ethics under which they operate is much more important than the form 
in which they are organized. I don’t think that makes a bit of difference.
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Section IV
A View of the Future
Throughout the Symposium, many views are expressed which imply 
varying forecasts of the future. Explicit forecasting is deferred, however, until 
the last afternoon when the four discussion leaders are allowed to present their 
“blue sky” forecasts of the reporting firmament in ten to 25 years. Professors 
Miller, Burton and Sprouse all predict major changes, while Professor Mautz 
expects only gradual evolution.
Professor Herbert E. Miller
Joseph Roth has defined the role of the auditor as adding credibility. 
Even within this constraint, we will see the scope of auditing expand into per­
formance audits. Furthermore, we will not, in spite of the resistance expressed 
this morning, beat down the desire for forecast information in some form or 
another, and auditors won’t be able to rely on Institute pronouncements to 
limit their responsibility to traditional areas.
These changes will be accommodated somehow within the role of adding 
credibility, but I don’t think that this is going to be the extent of the auditor’s 
role in the long run.
More and more coming into focus is going to be the question: Whose 
financial statements are they? Whatever the answer, this kind of questioning 
is going to raise some real issues as to who sets and applies the measurement 
criteria. I believe that those with an interest in our free enterprise system, not 
necessarily just management or the groups represented here, are going to feel 
that they need some voice in setting the kind of measurement criteria to be 
applied, so that they can obtain the kind of readings and measurement desired.
Then there will be the question of who applies the criteria. In the kind 
of society toward which we are moving, it is fundamental that the party being 
evaluated by the financial reporting process should not have the jurisdictional 
right to participate in the measurement of his own performance. Given this 
trend, I doubt if the public accountant’s role will be limited to adding credi­
bility to management’s financial statements.
In the area of accounting principles, I anticipate a growing awareness 
that agreement on broad principles is not the key, nor is it the best or the 
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practical route to the elimination of dissatisfaction with financial statements. 
Hence I predict that there will be a noticeable lessening of effort devoted to 
working at the broad conceptual level in the Accounting Principles Board 
and similar groups.
The suggestion now controlling that we first settle broad conceptual 
principles and then get down to details is an enticing one, but I think it is 
inappropriate for accounting. While many of our disagreements are based 
on differing basic premises, I doubt that we can solve problems at that level, 
because it is at that level that agreement is most difficult to obtain and there is 
no empirically determinable truth that can be discovered to help settle such 
basic arguments.
Largely for this reason, I also anticipate a gradual disenchantment about 
the amount of help believed to be forthcoming from research. Our failure 
to find solutions to many problems cannot be attributed to insufficient hours 
in the library reading books or at the computer manipulating and simulating. 
I see the possibility that after great efforts in research we may conclude that 
it really does not help us as much as we thought it would.
Accordingly, I would anticipate a return to the view that the avenue 
offering the greatest potential for a lessening of dissatisfaction with financial 
reporting lies in the direction of resolution of specific issues. If we could 
resolve one specific controversy and then another and then another, we would 
be accomplishing quite a lot.
I also believe that the role of accountants in establishing measurement 
rules is going to diminish in the distant future, because accounting principles, 
procedures and policies are very much like public policy issues. These things 
belong to the public, and it is only going to be a matter of years before the 
public becomes aware that they have as much at stake in accounting policies 
and principles as they have in other public policy issues. And when this 
happens, I believe the public will want and expect some kind of representation 
through a much more broadly based vehicle than the boards and committees 
we presently entrust with establishing positions on accounting principles and 
procedures.
Professor John C. Burton
I too see both an expanded role for the auditor in the future and a major 
change in the manner in which he performs his function. Increasingly, public 
accountants will be viewed as professional reporters and hence will be playing 
a greater role in determining what information is available to the public.
Related to this, the auditor’s approach to the audit will change. The work 
he does will be directed increasingly toward the evaluation of the total infor­
mation system of the firm. He will be determining whether it satisfactorily 
meets all the demands placed upon it by management, labor, government 
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agencies, analysts and others. A standard set of financial statements for public 
reporting purposes will be only one of the outputs required from the system, 
and the auditor will therefore have to be prepared to offer reports on his exami­
nation which go far beyond today’s short-form report.
An early step in this direction will be an auditor’s opinion on the adequacy 
of internal control. I believe that this will become a standard part of the 
auditor’s reporting function in the near future; indeed, such opinions are now 
being given in the case of a few banks and in the questionnaire prepared by 
auditors in connection with brokerage firm audits.
Further in the future, it is possible that the auditor’s opinion will be 
sought and published on the adequacy of various management procedures, 
although I doubt that a complete management audit report to the public will 
be standard within the time dimension we are discussing.
Certainly one of the implications of this view of the auditor’s role is the 
need for increasing closeness between the consulting and auditing functions 
in public accounting firms. I believe that this will occur, and that the current 
concern that consulting affects independence will gradually disappear.
As an aside, I also expect that public accountants are going to have to 
publish their own financial statements. As the significant public role of the 
auditor expands, there will be increasing demand for information about the 
economic characteristics of firms shouldering this responsibility, and the 
demand will have to be met. It may be that such disclosure will be one of 
the prices paid for moving into the corporate form.
On the disclosure side, I think I agree with Herbert Miller that the pleas 
of the analysts for future-oriented disclosure will be met, and it would be my 
guess that various forms of budget and planning disclosure will exist in the 
10- to 20-year time span.
One factor which has not been discussed very much here but which will 
have a significant role in financial information is the growth of the computer 
orientation of information. Only the very largest companies in the future 
will have their own computer systems; others will be operating through 
computer utilities of one sort or another. This will lead to substantial econo­
mies in information processing, and also to considerably more standardization 
of information among companies than you currently have.
This development, when coupled with increasing demands for up-to-date 
information by analysts and the increasing regulatory pressure to limit the 
selective disclosure of information to some people and not to others, may lead 
to a system of on-line access to corporate information systems by users. Under 
such a system sensitive data which would aid competitors would be blocked out. 
This would represent a reversal of our philosophy today under which selective 
data is given to users. In the future, we will be arguing about which data may 
be blocked under generally accepted principles of disclosure rather than what 
should be made available.
By way of giving management some solace, it seems very likely that users 
would have to pay for information under such a scheme. In addition, major 
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problems of liability for all parties would have to be solved before implementa­
tion.
In summary, if a symposium is held 25 years from today, its participants 
will discuss the problems of corporate reporting within an institutional setting 
significantly changed from that we have considered in the past two days.
Professor Robert T. Sprouse
It takes a lot of guts to be so presumptuous as to tell you what we think 
is going to happen during the next 10 or 20 years. But it’s nice to have the 
opportunity, anyhow.
My predictions are directed primarily to the future development of 
accounting principles. The Accounting Principles Board was established just 
about ten years ago to replace a group called the committee on accounting 
procedure. The reason that this change took place was dissatisfaction with the 
way in which accounting practices were being promulgated by the committee, 
primarily the lack of any relationship from the study of one problem to 
another problem. In the charter of the Accounting Principles Board it was 
specified that the first thing the Board should concern itself with would be a 
set of basic postulates of accounting and broad accounting principles which 
could then serve as the fundamental framework by which other specific 
accounting issues could be analyzed. Each new pronouncement would be 
related back to those fundamental principles.
Ten years have now elapsed, and that initial charge specified in the 
charter of the Board has not begun to be taken up. This would lead me to 
predict that it is not going to be taken up, and ultimately that the activities 
of the Accounting Principles Board will be deemed to be unsatisfactory.
There are several reasons for this. One thing that the charter called for 
at the outset was for research studies of the issues to be taken up. Quite a 
large number of research studies have indeed been commissioned, but there 
has been an unexpectedly long time involved in the completion of such studies. 
I think the goodwill study took four to five years. It, in turn, arose out of a 
study that had been completed earlier by Arthur Wyatt dealing with business 
combinations, so that whole subject has been under research for the full ten- 
year period of the Board.
There is a study on extractive industries which has been under way for 
several years; I have no idea when it is due for completion. There is one on 
intercorporate investments, and since a subcommittee of the Board has now 
been appointed, I assume that the Board has given up on that one being 
completed in time to be used. Somewhere there is one floating around on 
foreign operations, which surely is one of the most crucial issues that might 
be discussed currently. Finally, somewhere in the background, somebody 
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suggested that materiality deserved some consideration; I understand such a 
study has not even been commissioned, although it has been talked about for 
a couple of years.
This is past history, but it is the basis for my prediction that the current 
procedure for establishing accounting principles will not succeed. At the 
present time the Accounting Principles Board members are, in effect, doing 
their own research. This is an extraordinarily inefficient method for such a 
group to use. I suppose, indeed, in some cases there isn’t any research being 
done at all.
My prediction, therefore, is that the Securities and Exchange Commission 
will play an increased role. We already have evidence of an increasing activity 
on the part of the SEC, and I certainly foresee a continuation of this trend. 
This trend will be accelerated if the Accounting Principles Board continues 
on its current path of doing what could be done more easily and more quickly 
and more economically by a group of one or two or three people in the office 
of the SEC. I guess I must confess that it is not at all clear to me that the 
results would not be at least as satisfactory, or perhaps more satisfactory.
A couple of possibilities have been suggested here at Seaview for changes 
in the future that might divert this trend. Specifically, it has been suggested 
that the Accounting Principles Board concern itself with broad objectives, and 
leave all the rule-making to some other group, which certainly would not need 
to be a group of the high caliber that the Accounting Principles Board repre­
sents. I think this is a possibility, but I am not optimistic, in view of past 
performance, that this particular route will be taken.
With respect to the subject matter itself, ever-increasing attention will be 
given to the needs of the user. I think it is evident that some are uncomfortable 
with this trend at the present time, but surely we are going to become increas­
ingly sensitive to the needs of users. I think that today’s rather high-sounding 
phrases about management obligations to the public and to society will become 
much more specific in respect to information needs.
I predict that there will be increasing awareness of the inadequacy of 
historical information, and I think this will come about particularly with new 
generations that are already upon us. These generations are oriented toward 
a questioning attitude toward those things which we elders hold dear and 
sacred—things like realization and conservatism and the matching principle.
Herbert Miller made the prediction that research was not the answer, 
and that, indeed, there would be less research. How there could be less research 
is not quite clear to me, but his prediction is probably right. The consequence 
that I think is inevitable is the demise of accounting, as it is known today, as a 
legitimate subject of study in the universities, even in business schools. This 
is already upon us. You would not recognize as accounting courses many of 
the things that are now being taught in the universities under that title; many 
of the things that you might recognize as accounting are no longer being 
taught. The kind of research that is now taking place is entirely different from 
the kind of research that we have been talking about. That sort of thing is 
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just not being done; it is no longer considered acceptable in many of the 
universities.
This does not necessarily mean fewer CPAs or fewer students interested 
in accounting. Indeed, there might be a side benefit. If we stop teaching 
technical accounting in the universities, there might be a lot more people 
interested in it as a career!
It does mean that a great educational burden will be shifted to the 
accounting firms. The technical training will be left to a far greater extent 
in your hands, but you will need some way to appeal to these young people 
whose ideas are at a different level.
Professor Robert K. Mautz
After these fellows get through, there is really nothing left for me to 
predict except total atomic disaster!
I remember an advertisement of one of the leading airlines several months 
ago describing the way it will feel to take a flight on one of these wonderful 
new jumbo jets. And the pitch was something like this: If you really want to 
know how it’s going to be, take a ride on one of our present jets, and it will 
be just like that, only more so.
That is how financial reporting is going to be in 20 years. It is going to 
be just like now, only more so. If we were to have done this kind of predicting 
in 1948, 20 years ago, we would have described 1968 pretty well if we had 
forecast in these terms, and I don’t see any evidence that leads me to believe 
that I should change my technique.
We had a committee on accounting procedure that was functioning then 
at a slightly different pace, but was just as confused as the subcommittee chair­
men of the present Accounting Principles Board. There was the same kind of 
disagreement. They were searching very hard for principles. People were 
unhappy with the state of accounting practices, but somehow we were getting 
along.
I really don’t think there is going to be any great change. We are going 
to be facing the same kinds of problems in much the same kinds of ways.
There is likely to be one difference. Business management is going to find 
a way to express its views and its case. I think it has a case, a very important 
case to all of us. Unfortunately, somehow managers are not as articulate as 
they should be.
Frequently we have heard expressed the idea that the dissemination of 
information is a very good thing. It’s like motherhood; you have to be for it. 
But just as undisciplined or illegitimate motherhood destroys the family, too 
much information may sacrifice a company’s competitive edge. If everybody 
knows everything, no one has any competitive advantage. We don’t have any 
reason to work very hard.
True, the suggestion has been made that we will block out certain kinds 
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of information that will damage the firm. What kinds of information? How 
does anybody define innovations, for example? We are not going to have any 
innovations unless we have rewards for them. We are not going to get rewarded 
for an innovation that everybody else knows about.
I think we have to have confidences. They are essential to innovation. I 
think we have to have freedom to develop judgment, or we aren’t going to have 
anybody with judgment. If there is only one way to do something, we don’t 
have any choices. We will have leaders that have never had any experience in 
making judgments, and their judgments aren’t going to be any good.
So my expectation is that we will have just more of the same. It’s going 
to be harder; it’s going to get more difficult, but you will get paid more for it, 
and it’s not going to be too bad a situation.
I am not at all despondent about the possibilities for improvement in 
financial reporting. In fact, I think financial reporting is going to continue to 
improve, as it has, but at a faster rate, and the improvement will come from 
the most logical source. I am just naive enough to believe in a great profession, 
and I think that public accountants as a group are just about ready to reclaim 
the responsibility that they have abdicated to the SEC. I think they are just 
about ready to see the futility of substituting rule-making for judgment.
Ultimately, events will force them to do this, but in any case I think they 
are ready to begin to exercise their own professional judgment, plus the 
necessary amount of courage to whip wayward management into position. 
If they do this they will have the support of responsible management. That is 
where the improvement in public reporting is going to come from.
I disagree with Bob Sprouse completely about accounting not being an 
intellectual discipline or being abandoned in the universities. I think it is just 
coming into its own.
We have depended upon economics for years and years to be the funda­
mental discipline upon which business is based, and of course it has made 
great contributions, but economics is going off in all directions these days. 
It is becoming much more concerned with social welfare, with macro-economic 
measurements, and such, and is giving relatively little attention to the theories 
of the firm and to decision-making within the firm.
Now at the same time accounting is becoming less procedural and much 
more conceptual. We have borrowed a great many concepts from other fields, 
such as law and economics, and now we are beginning to develop our own. 
There isn’t a concept like realization in any other field. There isn’t a concept 
like matching.
We cannot borrow the economic definition of income, which really starts 
with the income of a human being, and convert that right over to an enterprise, 
because an enterprise is not really the same sort of thing as an individual. 
We have talked about well-being, for example. You can’t talk about the 
well-being of an enterprise in the same terms as you talk about the well-being 
of an individual.
We are just beginning to develop these concepts. They are just emerging;
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but I would say that within the next 15 or 20 years we will see accounting 
developing as the basic economic discipline for analysis of the firm. I stay 
away from the word “measurement.” The word “measurement” bothers me. 
It is used by too many people in too many different ways, and I don’t know 
what it means. I think of accounting as a method of analysis that is peculiarly 
adapted to the progress and status of the enterprise. We are going to see more 
and more and more of this, and it is going to come into its right as an intel­
lectual subject as well as a field of special activity.
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Where Do We Stand?
By Ralph S. Saul
President, American Stock Exchange
The pace and number of developments in corporate financial reporting 
complicate the task of summing up where we stand today. In fulfilling that 
assignment, I hope not to be guilty of Winston Churchill’s comment on a 
political adversary, “He had the gift of compressing the largest amount of 
words into the smallest amount of thoughts.”
In my discussion, I intend to cover two points. First, I will describe some 
of the important changes in the environment which appear to affect corporate 
financial reporting and then relate each of these changes to current develop­
ments. Finally, I want to offer some tentative thoughts about possible future 
directions and objectives.
Corporate financial reporting is now caught up in the type of controversy 
which seems to permeate our society. In a sense, it is anomalous that while 
financial reporting and accounting standards in the United States are emulated 
elsewhere in the world, we are now engaged in an intense debate on the form 
and content of full disclosure.
How did we arrive at this state of affairs? What is the reason for the 
dialogue on corporate reporting—for this meeting—at this point in time? It 
seems to me that underlying changes in three areas—the business, investor, 
and legal environment—are largely responsible.
Changes in the Business Structure
The most significant factor affecting corporate financial reporting is the 
far-reaching change now taking place in the structure of American business 
through merger.
The current merger trend is unique in a number of ways. It has lasted 
longer than any such trend in American economic history—for nearly the last 
two decades, with a burst of activity during the past two years. It is also sub­
stantially larger than any prior merger movement. In 1967, and again this 
year, the number and size of mergers in manufacturing exceeded by wide 
margins the previous peaks of merger activity in the 1890’s and 1920’s.
This merger trend is also unique because of the types of mergers being 
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consummated. In prior periods of merger activity vertical and horizontal 
mergers dominated the scene—now conglomerate mergers are dominant. 
Conglomerates will probably account in 1968 for almost 90 per cent of total 
acquired assets in large mergers* —horizontal mergers accounting for only 3.7 
per cent and verticals for 6.4 per cent.
* Defined by the Federal Trade Commission as mergers involving $10 million or more in assets.
We are also witnessing significant changes in the types of conglomerate 
mergers. In prior years most conglomerate mergers involved a market or 
product extension by the acquiring firm. A market extension merger is one in 
which two firms selling the same product, but in different geographic markets, 
merge. In a product extension merger, the acquiring firm brings together a 
number of related products which may be distributed through the same mar­
keting channels. However, during the past several years there has been a sub­
stantial increase in conglomerate mergers in which there is little discernible 
relationship between the activities of the acquiring and the acquired firm. In 
1968, it is expected that almost 60 per cent of all conglomerate mergers will 
involve the acquisition of companies engaged in businesses unrelated to those 
of the acquiring companies. It is also significant that there has been a substan­
tial increase in the size of firms acquired.
When we consider that the structure of American business is undergoing 
a fundamental change and that this change appears to be accelerating, we can 
place some of our financial reporting problems into better perspective.
The conglomerate merger movement has forced us to focus on three 
immediate questions in financial reporting. How is an acquisition to be treated 
—as a purchase or as a pooling of interests? How can we assure that the 
resultant earnings per share figure is stated as accurately and as consistently 
as possible? Finally, how do we disclose the financial data which will show 
the relative contribution to earnings per share of the various lines of business 
of a conglomerate?
The common factor running through all of these questions is the impact 
of a business combination upon earnings per share.
For the corporate manager, earnings per share is the ultimate measure of 
his stewardship. One way to improve earnings per share is through the appli­
cation of accounting rules which permit the addition of the earnings of one 
company to another as though both companies had in fact been divisions of 
one company all along. Many informed accountants and the SEC agree that 
accounting rules which permit companies to choose between pooling and pur­
chasing on the basis of which makes earnings look better, are unsatisfactory 
and need to be changed.
Accounting problems are further complicated when an acquisition in­
volves an injection into the capital structure of complex securities. An analysis 
of the balance sheets of several of the better known conglomerates shows a full 
spectrum of securities—convertible notes, convertible debentures, convertible 
preferred, non-convertible preferred and common stock. Since investors rely 
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primarily on the per share earnings figure in their evaluation of a company’s 
record, the dilution factor is of prime importance. Investors also want to know 
the effect of an acquisition upon earnings per share and to be able to compare 
earnings through acquisitions with earnings through internal growth.
When a company diversifies into unrelated activities, the investor may no 
longer receive information from the financial statements of the acquired com­
panies. The prospects of the conglomerate are then measured by a figure which 
reports the total profitability of the enterprise and which tells him little about 
the risk, profitability or growth of each segment.
Significant progress is being made to resolve each of those problems. The 
Accounting Principles Board has recently published a research study on 
accounting for business combinations which may provide the basis for new 
standards in this area. In Opinion No. 9, the Board has prescribed ground 
rules for the reporting of earnings per share and is about to expose a further 
draft to clarify this area. Finally, to improve financial reporting by diversified 
companies, the Financial Executives Institute sponsored a comprehensive study 
by Professor Mautz which recommended reporting guidelines for diversified 
companies. Many companies are now publishing reports in line with these 
guidelines.
Any discussion of accounting problems relating to conglomerates should 
take note of the studies now under way by the Federal Trade Commission and 
other government agencies of the implications of the current merger movement. 
We must assume that difficult questions will be asked in the months ahead 
centering on whether the current trend of events is in the public interest and 
consistent with antitrust policies. Certainly we cannot assume that a basic 
restructuring of American industry can occur without a critical analysis of its 
implications for the economy.
Another change in the business environment that may have an important 
impact on public reporting of financial data is the improvement in internal 
reporting systems of corporations.
With the formidable assistance of the computer, the financial manager 
has developed systems for providing, almost on a real time basis, information 
about revenues and costs, both for the corporate entity and for product lines 
or segments within the entity. Internal reports are usually an integral part of 
the profit plan for the corporation and for measuring the performance of 
managers responsible for the control of costs.
The financial executive regards internal reports as a management tool 
and feels that publication of these reports might both mislead investors and 
help competitors. He rightfully points to problems of common cost allocation, 
pricing of intra-company transactions and consistency from one period to the 
next. Also, the company has a legal responsibility for the reliability of pub­
lished financial data. However, as internal reporting systems become more 
sophisticated, more timely and more reliable, I would foresee increasing de­
mands for more disclosure of material information derived from these reports.
Financial managers, particularly conglomerate financial managers, may 
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be faced with a dilemma. Internal reporting systems are providing more and 
better information about segments of the total enterprise. At the same time, 
published overall operating results tell less about the different degrees of risk, 
profitability and opportunities for growth of the individual segments. If a 
development within the enterprise is material to the whole enterprise, man­
agement may be under an obligation to make timely disclosure of that 
development.
Finally, corporate reporting is complicated by accelerating technological 
changes in the business environment. These changes have created new indus­
tries, such as computer leasing, where the accountant must apply accounting 
principles to novel business transactions and arrangements.
Changes in the Investor Environment
The overriding change in the investor environment has been the emphasis 
upon the concept of growth in investment analysis and portfolio management. 
It is this emphasis which has created the “earnings per share syndrome.”
I think that the preface to the most recent edition of Graham and Dodd’s 
classic work on “Security Analysis” illustrates the change that has taken place 
in analytical concepts. Older criteria for the valuation of common stocks took 
into account wide fluctuations in former markets and average earnings for a 
number of past years and then established upper limits for “a permissible price 
in relation to such earnings.” Under these older criteria, said the authors:
. . . favorable possibilities of future growth were to be looked for 
and taken advantage of when feasible: but the investor—as disting­
uished from the speculator—was to keep the premium paid for such 
prospects within a modest maximum.
Continuing inflation, a rising stock market, and the growth in the econ­
omy provided the background for acceptance of new criteria. The new edition 
now gives more weight to measuring investment values in terms of expectations 
of future earnings.
To sum up, securities analysis is firmly bottomed upon an analysis of 
growth and earnings per share is an essential part of that analysis.
Additionally, corporations must now reckon with a new investor—the 
institutional portfolio manager. This constituency is informed, active and 
skeptical. Several interrelated factors are responsible for the needs of these 
managers for more financial data.
Institutions are placing more equities into their portfolios and it would 
appear that the demand for equities continues to grow. Even where the 
institution is a creditor, the portfolio manager is seeking some form of equity 
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participation. As the institutional investor becomes increasingly equity-ori­
ented, he tends to be more interested in corporate developments which may 
have an impact on earnings.
Competitive pressures on portfolio managers for performance have in­
creased. Because of the liquidity of the securities markets, information can 
be used quickly; that is, investment decisions can be immediately translated 
into an execution at a price reasonably close to the last sale. Under these 
circumstances, portfolio managers want to know all corporate developments 
which may affect earnings per share, even over the short term.
These factors—growing equity orientation of institutional portfolios, 
competitive pressures upon portfolio managers and increasing liquidity of our 
securities markets—tend to explain, in part, the needs of institutional investors 
for more and better financial data.
Of overriding importance in the investor environment is the growth in 
the number of investors—both institutional and individual. These investors 
want greater comparability of data between companies, more accurate and 
comprehensive earnings data and more adequate disclosure of accounting 
principles employed.
Changes in the Legal Environment
As we are all well aware, changes in the legal environment have had an 
impact upon financial reporting.
The growth of the institutional investor, his greater sophistication and 
access to companies, has raised questions about fairness in the distribution and 
timing of the release of material corporate information. The near instant 
liquidity of our securities markets which makes it possible to act upon infor­
mation quickly, explains regulatory preoccupation with questions of fairness.
It might appear that recent legal developments in the disclosure area 
represent a new departure. Actually, the SEC and the exchanges have been 
concerned for many years with insuring fair dealing in the markets.
The securities markets are now public markets both in fact and contem­
plation of law. The markets of the twenties were professional markets which 
represented themselves as public markets. Now the markets have become truly 
public markets which must be shared with professionals, including institutions. 
If the individual investor is to continue to have confidence in the markets, he 
must be assured that these markets do, in fact, serve individual investors.
It seems to me that emphasis on two facts in recent cases—Cady Roberts 
and Texas Gulf Sulphur—in the disclosure area will help to provide some 
perspective. First, these cases involved information which had a sharp and 
immediate market impact—a cut in dividends, a major mineral discovery. 
Second, insiders, or those with a special relationship to the company, allegedly 
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traded on the basis of inside information. If these facts had been kept in mind, 
perhaps there would have been less overreaction to recent legal developments.
The basic disclosure questions are not easy to answer in specific situations. 
What is material information? When should a company make disclosure? 
And how should that disclosure be made?
At the Exchange, we have to answer these questions every day in the 
administration of our timely disclosure policy. We therefore bring some work­
ing experience to these questions. Hopefully, we also bring flexibility. We 
find a tendency to talk about many disclosure problems in the abstract and in 
legalistic terms without getting into the more difficult operational problems.
I think that the exchanges have an opportunity through their timely dis­
closure policies to provide operational guidelines to companies. The difficulty 
with Commission Rule 10b-5 is that it does not provide a precise guide in 
making decisions about disclosure. Continuing extension by the courts of the 
reach of Rule 1 Ob-5—a rule based upon fraud concepts—has only served to 
increase corporate anxieties in the disclosure area.
At the Exchange we are now reviewing our timely disclosure policy to 
see if we can provide better guidelines for listed companies, for analysts and 
for member firms. For example, we are exploring whether we can devise a 
better system for publication, perhaps through the filing of a release with the 
Exchange. Another area would be to provide rules of thumb on the timing 
of insider purchases and sales.
Direct government regulation of corporate publicity has inherent limi­
tations. The volume of corporate publicity, the paramount aim of full and 
prompt disclosure, the difficulty of making judgments concerning specific items 
of publicity and the proximity of this field to the constitutionally protected 
right of freedom of expression—all combine to make legal control an imperfect 
instrument.
Under a vigorous chairman, the SEC has taken a more aggressive role in 
corporate financial reporting. Although it has urged voluntary action by the 
accounting profession and financial managers, it has not hesitated to use its 
own powers where it felt that voluntary action did not go far enough. There 
have been two recent examples of this attitude.
In its release on accounting for pooling of interests and convertible secu­
rities, the SEC departed from the Accounting Principles Board’s Opinion No. 
10 and stated that potential future dilution, by itself, determines whether a 
security is a residual and that companies having only common stock and other 
residual securities outstanding should present earnings per share figures solely 
on the basis of equivalent outstanding common shares. Then came another 
release in which the SEC made its own proposals for reporting by diversified 
companies on the ground that voluntary disclosure recommended by the 
Financial Executives Institute had achieved only “mixed results.”
I think we must assume that there is a third item on the SEC’s agenda 
which will be dealt with through government action unless there is a satis­
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factory solution in the near future—the criteria to be used in determining the 
applicability of a purchase or pooling accounting in a combination. If we are 
to forestall government action, this matter should be high on the agenda for 
self-regulatory action.
There is another matter on the SEC’s agenda—its disclosure study which 
is reviewing the rules and policies of the Commission relative to disclosure 
under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. As Commissioner Wheat has 
stated, the study is not attempting a statutory integration of the two acts but 
rather to concentrate on what can be accomplished now through use of the 
Commission’s rule-making authority.
From this study we can hopefully expect expansion of the use of the short­
form registration to certain specialized types of offerings, guidelines on cor­
porate publicity and broker-dealer recommendations when a company is “in 
registration” and clarification of the private offering exemption and Rule 154. 
It would also appear that the study will make recommendations for a more 
timely and useful Form 10-K and for extension of quarterly reporting require­
ments to unlisted companies.
The SEC disclosure study is already bringing tangible results by imple­
menting arrangements for the dissemination of filed information through the 
use of a new reproducing technique.
The most controversial development during the past year has been a 
widening of accountants’ legal responsibilities as a result of judge-made law.
Accountants must work under the federal securities laws which impose 
liability even for non-negligent mistakes. And if, for example, a company goes 
bankrupt, they inevitably find themselves in the middle of controversies be­
tween creditors, stockholders, and others.
Traditionally, suits against accountants by other than clients were unsuc­
cessful. The landmark decision, the Ultramares case, seemed until recently 
to foreclose successful investor actions against accountants for false and mis­
leading financial statements. This has been slowly changing over the years 
and decisions such as that in Yale Express indicate that the courts are not 
reluctant to extend accountants’ liability.
At the time of adoption of the federal securities laws, the decision was 
made that an independent accounting profession rather than government 
auditors should be the means for assuring the public of full and fair corporate 
financial reporting. The responsibilities of auditors to shareholders and in­
vestors were not precisely delineated. The results of present litigation may 
hopefully bring a better definition of these responsibilities consistent with both 
the practicalities of accounting and the policies of the federal securities laws. 
Perhaps the profession itself could assist in that definition by adopting addi­
tional guidelines for the practitioner.
For the accounting profession, the “litigation explosion” is a fact that 
must be lived with. I think we must assume that in the event of an economic 
decline the number of suits against auditors will increase. Eventually, however, 
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the present “time of troubles” for accountants will pass and I am sure we will 
all survive.
Where Are We Going?
This review of where we stand in corporate financial reporting will con­
clude with some tentative thoughts about future directions and objectives.
I do not believe that the current interest in financial reporting is a tran­
sient or passing phenomenon. Financial reporting is in the limelight and the 
environment within which reporting must operate is generating continuing 
pressures for change. The government, the academic community, the financial 
press and the investing public are constantly asking difficult questions and 
pressing for answers. We all face what someone has termed “consumerism”— 
a state of affairs in which the consumer expects higher standards of responsi­
bility from the private sector. Increasingly, he will want to be told things as 
they are rather than as we might want them to be.
If we start from this premise, our objective should be to develop new 
principles and practices through responsible self-regulatory action rather than 
through direct government regulation. More aggressive and vigorous use of 
self-regulatory power would avoid the need for government action.
A second objective should be to continue to provide vehicles similar to 
this Symposium to anticipate reporting and accounting problems and to devise 
solutions more promptly. It would seem to me that any vehicles devised should 
attempt to bring together all interested parties—accountants, analysts, creditors 
and financial executives—to assure that these parties can contribute their 
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There are many types of investors in public companies. Individual stock­
holders are by and large inarticulate on matters of financial reporting but 
skilled and sophisticated financial intermediaries represent them in increasing 
degree. The financial analysts employed by these intermediaries thus stand in 
the place of the equity investor and have become one of the most important 
users of financial data reported by corporate managements and certified by 
CPAs. This paper will be concerned with the needs and responsibilities of 
financial analysts in relation to corporate financial reporting.
The Use of Financial Information
In Equity Investment
The financial analyst endeavors to determine relative values among 
alternative investment opportunities. In the long run, the return on an invest­
ment is measured by the income received plus capital appreciation arising from 
growth of the enterprise through retained earnings. In addition, securities 
traded in public markets demonstrate wide fluctuations in the valuations placed 
on expected returns, both over time and between companies. The most 
attractive investments are those which are expected to show the greatest total 
return on the investment, allowing for the degree of risk, relative to other 
alternatives.
The keynotes of this selection process are “expected,” “risk,” and “rela­
tive.” The financial analyst must deal with the uncertain future, using the 
past as a guide, in contrast to the accountant who deals largely with the 
hardened facts of today and yesterday. The analyst tries to estimate expected 
future returns for periods of one to five years for many companies because he 
seeks the best relative return on current price. There are no absolute values 
in investment but only an ebb and flow of values as between companies and 
as between types of securities. Thus, the relative value approach requires 
constant comparison over time and between enterprises. Risk is the poten­
tiality of loss. Obviously, risks are great when many future variables must be 
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forecast. There are risks in erroneous economic forecasts, in reversals in 
investor psychology and in incorrect appraisals of company expectations. The 
latter risk can be reduced through more accurate analysis of past performance 
and present position of the enterprise.
Selection of equity investment begins with an analysis of present and pros­
pective earning power of individual companies. The financial analyst employs 
a wide variety of techniques to make this analysis but the starting point is the 
financial data reported in the annual and quarterly reports. From these data 
he analyzes the comparative historical trend of earnings—their growth and 
variability; the capital requirements; profitability in relation to sales and 
capital. Financial data alone are useful but they must be related to general 
and industry economic factors, to product development, to past capital invest­
ment decisions, and to company organization in order to assess their full 
meaning. Net earnings remain the final measure of financial power and 
management stewardship. They are the common denominator of all corporate 
enterprise.
A projection of future earning power is necessary to calculate future 
returns and begins with the foregoing analysis of historical and present earning 
power. An estimate of the future involves a wide range of variables including 
economy and industry forecasts, product marketing projections, management 
capabilities, and competitive developments. Financial analysis has not yet 
developed any rigorous method of correlating all of this information, and 
indeed the nature of the problem may preclude it. Financial data will be used 
in different ways, and perhaps inconsistent ways, by different analysts. Mathe­
matical techniques have been applied to give an appearance of rigor but are 
as likely as not to prove quite misleading in the long run. A wide variation in 
forecasts is to be anticipated under these circumstances.
Financial information is the heart of an analysis of a company’s cur­
rent position and of a projection of future earning power. While financial 
analysts may use these data in different ways, they all start on the presumption 
that the financial reports are accurate and consistent. To the extent that finan­
cial reports fall short of this standard, there can be no question that improved 
financial data can provide a better base for appraisal and projection of a 
company’s earning power which in the long run should narrow the range of 
forecasts and hence of investment values.
Data Requirements
Given the extreme range of industries and companies in the U.S. econ­
omy, it is not possible to delineate all comprehensive and specific requirements 
for financial data in this paper. Perhaps some general principles can be 
outlined.
The financial analyst gives primary accent to the earnings statement 
because he bases investment value primarily on earning power. Generally 
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there should be sufficient financial data on sales and revenues and the signifi­
cant elements of costs and expenses to make possible an understanding of the 
economic and financial dynamics of the enterprise. For example, the analyst 
needs to know how costs such as labor, materials, selling, etc., vary in relation 
to volume changes; how revenues relate to investment in plant and working 
capital; and how all of these factors relate to economic data for the company 
and the industry. The latter, while outside the scope of the certified financial 
statements, are essential to an adequate understanding of the enterprise.
The balance sheet is necessary to provide an integrated understanding 
of the business but normally the analyst gives it secondary consideration 
because the market value of the business is not directly related to the fair 
value or book value of the assets. This is not to say that assets and capitaliza­
tion are unimportant, for the earnings return on capital in most companies 
tends to fluctuate within a moderate range. But the emphasis of the analyst 
differs from that of other users of financial statements and his concern with 
accounting problems is mostly directed to the earnings account.
Each industry group of companies must have its own list of specific 
requirements for financial data. Through the Financial Analysts Federation 
Corporate Information Committee, analysts are making known their data 
requirements, industry by industry. The great diversity of American enterprise 
makes the industry approach necessary; broad statements applicable to all 
companies have little value. The general standard should be adequate earn­
ings, asset, liability and supplementary data to provide an understanding of 
the economic and financial dynamics of the enterprise.
In the light of this standard, the need for more detailed information about 
widely diversified or conglomerate companies is readily apparent. When a 
company has major segments of its business in home building, hotels, elec­
tronics manufacture, bread baking and telephone utilities—just to mention 
one of many weird business combinations now in existence—consolidated 
financial information does not provide an understanding of the economic and 
financial dynamics of a company. The analyst must understand the dynamics 
in each distinct segment and therefore requires segmented sales and profit 
information which can be related to economic variables. This is a thorny 
accounting and reporting problem but the recent rapid expansion in the num­
ber and size of conglomerate companies is now making more data essential 
for adequate financial analysis. Progress has been made in the recent study 
commissioned by the Financial Executives Research Foundation. Further 
development of concepts is desirable and new accounting rules or conventions 
may be necessary.
The Role of Earnings Per Share
Financially, the final measure of the success of a company and the ulti­
mate objective of investors is net earnings available for dividends on the 
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common stock. Hence great stress is placed on net earnings in all investment 
analyses. The amount, trend and variability of earnings relative to capital 
investment are the final expression of the results of all of a company’s en­
deavors.
For the investor, of course, net earnings per share is the significant figure 
since his participation is proportionate. It is a small number which is more 
easily remembered and it permits a more ready comparison between companies 
of different size. It can be related to market price of the stock. The number 
of stock issues in the security markets is large and growing. It is beyond any 
individual’s or organization’s competence to follow all of them. The financial 
press cannot provide complete data on them. Hence earnings per share is the 
quick shorthand for capsuling the financial progress of companies.
This emphasis sometimes leads non-investment people to think that all 
investment analysis is structured on this one number—a shallow approach 
indeed. However, the wide range of capitalization ratios applied to earnings 
per share demonstrates that investors recognize variations in quality based on 
analysis. Nevertheless, reported changes in earnings per share can have a 
great impact on stock prices; and therefore every effort must be made to have 
the earnings per share figure as accurate and consistent as possible; to insure 
that it rests on the application of fair and correct accounting principles to 
aggregate net earnings.
The problem with the earnings per share figure is really an information 
reporting problem. It is the figure which gets the headlines in the press and 
therefore makes an impact without any qualifications from explanatory foot­
notes or other background. But it is fair to say here that if the range of 
generally accepted accounting principles can be narrowed and greater con­
sistency and comparability achieved in the reporting of net earnings, some 
of the reporting problems concerned with earnings per share will evaporate.
Comparability and Other Accounting Matters
The investment process is the comparison of relative values. Comparison 
requires comparability of financial statements—over time and between com­
panies. To achieve comparability we must have strict, practical accounting 
rules which do not permit deviation, and uniform application by the accounting 
profession. Granted that much is being done by the American Institute’s Ac­
counting Principles Board to give “general accounting principles” more pre­
cision, much remains to be done—perhaps beyond the boundaries of present 
thought in the profession.
A plea for stricter definition and application of accounting principles is 
always countered by arguments for flexibility and judgment in the preparation 
of financial statements, by protests against the stultifying effects of hard and 
fast rules on the development of accounting principles, and by statements that 
forced comparability will merely make unlike situations appear alike.
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Obviously a practical balance must be struck between the needs of 
investors and sound accounting in the quest for comparability. First, many 
of the unlike situations that are said to require different accounting treatment 
are really reasonably alike from a practical viewpoint. Different accounting 
treatment is not likely to yield more useful information. Second, while methods 
of allocating some revenues and related costs between periods can be debated 
theoretically, the investor will find a practical rule enforced in all similar 
situations preferable to a more precise interperiod allocation which varies 
between companies. In the long run aggregate revenues and costs over a life 
cycle will be the same for all companies and in the short run comparability is 
more important to the investor. Hence it is desirable to eliminate variations in 
accounting treatment not clearly justified by the circumstances.
A case in point is the by now tiresome subject of the investment tax credit. 
In the interests of comparability it would be better to have a flat rule on this 
subject than variable treatment and continuing debate regarding the account­
ing theories involved.
There are many comparability questions more difficult than the invest­
ment tax credit. Consider depreciation policies applied to computers, by now 
a fairly standard piece of hardware, as between the various manufacturers.












10% (mostly IBM equipment)
There ought to be some practical judgment on the appropriate first year 
write-off of a computer which is applicable to all manufacturers and would 
make their earnings statements more nearly comparable. Granted this would 
require a degree of agreement between accounting firms, managements and 
the APB that would be called utopian, consider also the tremendous market 
value of the securities of these companies. If for example, 25 per cent write-off 
is a representative rate, then IBM’s earnings are understated and stockholders 
misled as to the true earning power of the company. Honeywell’s are over­
stated as are those of the leasing companies to an even greater degree. A 
current phenomenon in the market is the rapid promotion of new computer 
leasing companies and their success is importantly dependent on more liberal 
depreciation policies; in fact these securities probably could not be marketed 
if they followed the depreciation policies of the manufacturers.
In the airframe industry, Boeing charges off development costs of new 
programs as incurred; Lockheed inventories these costs and charges out as 
deliveries are made and revenues received (with provision for current charge 
off of cost overruns). While both methods no doubt have validity, analysts 
are noting currently that Lockheed may show a better earnings record in the 
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next several years, partly because it will not have heavy charge-offs for devel­
opment costs as Boeing will have, entirely because of different accounting 
policies. This tends to make Lockheed appear the more attractive investment 
(other factors are at work also). Perhaps the analyst should not play on this 
difference in accounting policies as a market factor, but then how can he make 
the statements comparable for his analysis?
Another aspect of comparability is materiality. The degree of materiality 
applied in statement preparation probably varies from company to company, 
accounting firm to accounting firm, and perhaps from year to year. But the 
small differences can have an investment significance beyond that suspected 
by accountants. Even items of 1 per cent to 2 per cent of total earnings can 
have an important effect on market prices, if accounting decisions are all 
applied in the same direction. In recent years investors have considered con­
sistent earnings growth from year to year as a primary factor in appraising 
common stocks. For example, growth of 8 per cent to 10 per cent may be 
capitalized at over 20 times. In this context an extra 2 per cent to 5 per cent 
of reported earnings in a year from favorable treatment of “immaterial” items 
may appear to indicate an acceleration of the growth rate, which may tend to 
boost the price earnings ratio of the stock.
In summary, comparability of financial statements is essential to deter­
mination of relative investment values—not the only factor but the starting 
point. Investors would prefer consistent application of a practical rule to all 
similar situations, even at the expense of some elegance of accounting theory. 
The various arguments against comparability do not appear substantial when 
weighed against the potential effects of non-comparability on market values 
of securities. The real source of resistance to comparability comes from a 
desire for individual expression by accountants and by managements. Admit­
tedly these statements in support of comparability are more extreme than the 
practicalities of the real world will support, but comparability needs more 
attention than it has been getting from accountants and management.
Accounting for Business Combinations
Another accounting subject of current importance, in which investors 
have an important stake, is mergers, acquisitions and poolings of interests. 
There is a great deal of discussion and controversy over accounting theory in 
this field, none of which can be resolved here. A cursory analysis may be 
useful in highlighting the analyst-investor point of view on the matter.
The primary financial interest of investors in mergers and acquisitions 
is the impact on the earnings per share and the capital structure. No matter 
what theory may be used in accounting for the merger, there will be a new 
amount of aggregate earnings, a new number of shares outstanding and a 
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resulting new earnings per share. Investors are interested in knowing over a 
period of years what the impact of mergers and acquisitions has been on 
earnings per share as contrasted with internal growth. This requires retro­
active adjustment of per share earnings with each new acquisition. In the 
final analysis, however, it is the actual earnings per share reported each year 
which is the final measure of the performance of the company, whether these 
earnings arise from internal growth or from ability to make acquisitions on a 
basis favorable to shareholders. There is a need to standardize the presentation 
of aggregate earnings and earnings per share for acquisitive companies, prob­
ably one which would show both actual and earnings adjusted for acquisitions 
over the last five years. In fact, there does not seem to be much controversy 
about this approach to accounting for mergers and acquisitions, and most, 
but not all, companies now show some form of retroactive adjustment for 
acquisitions.
Most of the accounting controversies on accounting for mergers and 
acquisitions center around the method of recording the acquisitions on the 
balance sheet. Should the assets of the acquired company be shown at original 
book value or at the acquisition value as determined by the bundle of cash 
and/or securities issued in exchange? Should securities issued be credited 
at market value or at stated book value? Fundamentally, it would seem that 
accounting for mergers and acquisitions should be the same regardless of the 
method of payment and should show real cost. In the last three years or so 
the merger and acquisition movement has proceeded so rapidly in the Ameri­
can economy that the price of many available companies has been bid up to 
high levels. Perhaps many acquisitions would be hard to justify if managements 
had to show in their accounting the real cost of the companies acquired. The 
objection to the pooling of interests method of accounting is largely based on 
the fact that it conceals such costs from the balance sheet. On the other hand, 
the pooling of interests method does not credit capital accounts with the excess 
of market value over book value of shares traded. It is the “Chinese money” 
created by inflated stock prices which enables conglomerates to buy other 
companies at inflated prices; under pooling of interests, the inflation is elimi­
nated from both sides of the balance sheet.
In some cases promoters of conglomerate companies have been able to 
create income out of capital when under the pooling of interests method, 
acquired property is later sold at a profit. This capital gain would not exist 
if the property had been recorded on the books at an amount equivalent to 
the market value of the shares exchanged for it. Needless to say, extra earnings 
from any source are welcome to promoters.
In the fast-moving world of conglomerate high finance many new and 
difficult accounting problems have been created and abuses in financial report­
ing have been obscured by accounting complexities. We see here then a need 
for a rigorous accounting theory for mergers and acquisitions which will 
standardize the approach and preclude the use of accounting technicalities to 
obscure the real costs and the real results of these developments.
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Disclosure Problems
There are a number of problems associated with disclosure of corporate 
financial information which affects its interpretation and use. First is the 
question whether disclosure of differences is sufficient to meet the needs of 
users. Many analysts have taken a position over the years that full disclosure 
of accounting methods was of greater importance to them than actual com­
parability of data because the analyst could make his own adjustments to 
produce comparisons which were meaningful to him. This approach does not 
any longer seem practical because of the rapidly increasing number of public 
companies to be followed and the difficulty of maintaining desired adjustments 
up to date. Investment inquiries are more costly to handle if time must be 
spent on each inquiry to ascertain the accounting method and make the neces­
sary adjustments in the figures to achieve comparability. Not every review of 
a security can be an exhaustive treatise with a careful review of accounting 
details. The whole apparatus of the financial press and financial services 
makes it too cumbersome to try to adjust in myriad ways individual company 
financial data to make them comparable with similar companies. The absence 
of such adjustments when presenting summary financial data might easily 
lead to incorrect conclusions. Therefore disclosure in itself is not a satisfactory 
substitute for comparability in accounting methods.
Comparability is not a complete substitute for disclosure, however. In to­
day’s complex economic environment almost every company encounters excep­
tions to standard which require explanation. The annual report continues to 
be the place where these qualifications and judgments on financial statements 
can best be expressed, and specifically in notes to the financial statements. It 
would seem desirable to make the financial notes more comprehensive, more 
literate, and less technical in an effort to entice the user to read them. If the 
analyst has the annual report available, it is reasonably likely that he will go 
over its supporting notes to the financial statements, but too frequently it has 
been difficult to discern their importance. The effects of accounting decisions 
should be spelled out in dollar terms.
These explanations and qualifications can easily be lost in the publication 
of company statements in manuals and financial news media. In the interests 
of brevity, such publications may drop footnotes so that the user is handi­
capped in making a complete analysis unless he has the annual report itself. 
Emphasis in some way on the two or three most significant footnotes, plus an 
educational effort with the press might resolve some of this problem, but there 
will remain with the investor the responsibility of reading with care the annual 
and quarterly reports to be fully informed.
The disclosure of quarterly financial information in the press or in 
quarterly reports to shareholders is normally not subject to the scrutiny of 
the accounting profession. Quarterly data have almost as much significance 
as annual data in today’s investment markets, for stock prices frequently 
respond promptly to the ups and downs of quarterly earnings. This may or 
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may not be a sensible approach by investors, but it exists and must be dealt 
with as a fact of life. Should the accountant review these quarterly statements 
before they are released to insure that they conform to accounting principles 
and are not misleading? It is probable that some companies consult their 
accountants before preparing quarterly statements. Perhaps some opinion 
short of certification might accompany these statements.
What should be the role of the accountant in the disclosure of information 
through the text of annual or quarterly reports? We sometimes see the careful 
work of accountants in preparing an accurate measure of changes in the 
company’s financial status overridden by the management comments in the 
text of the report, or in the press releases derived therefrom, which try to put 
the best foot forward and are sometimes misleading. For example, recently 
we have seen conglomerate companies which emphasize in letters to share­
holders that sales and net earnings were up by some large percentage, but 
closer examination reveals that these figures refer to aggregate dollars which 
have been enlarged by mergers in the current year (i.e., not retroactively 
adjusted) and that earnings per share may have decreased for the period. This 
is an attempt to maintain the euphoria which has been surrounding conglomer­
ate companies through misleading disclosure. In order to control this sort of 
thing, which of course involves only a minority of companies, would it be 
desirable for accountants to state in their opinion that they have read manage­
ment’s letter to the shareholders and find the financial references therein 
consistent with the financial statements?
As in most any other aspect of life, it is not enough to have the right idea 
or the right information; it must be successfully communicated to be meaning­
ful. Therefore effective disclosure and communication of financial data are 
equally important with the careful preparation of such statements in accord­
ance with established accounting practice. To bring this about may require 
some leadership from the American Institute of CPAs as the independent 
group closest to the company management which prepares the statements, and 
from users as well.
Conflicts Among the Parties at Interest
The presentation of financial statements is the responsibility of corporate 
management. The professional accountant attests as to their correctness. The 
user and interpreter of these statements is the investor, or the financial analyst 
acting for the investor. In theory these parties have a common interest in 
accurate financial statements. In fact, however, their immediate interests tend 
to diverge. The resulting conflicts are at the root of some of the accounting 
and reporting problems plaguing investors today. Perhaps if the conflicts are 
laid bare, they can be more readily resolved.
Corporate management has the primary responsibility for the preparation 
and issuance of financial statements through annual and quarterly reports, 
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press statements, and other media. Management has broad latitude in its 
accounting policies so long as they fall within the framework of “generally 
accepted accounting principles,” or regulatory requirements in some instances.
Corporate managements wish to prepare fair and accurate reports for 
shareholders, and American investors are favored with the most comprehensive 
financial data of shareholders anywhere. There are a minority of companies 
which fall short of the general standard, however, and almost all managements 
are affected by subtle motivations in the preparation of reports. An executive 
is by nature optimistic if he is to be successful and, since the financial results 
contained in the report are the measurement of his personal success as a 
manager, there may be tendencies to put the best foot forward and cover up 
adversity. Stock options and trading activity in the company’s stock may 
tempt a few to overdo the optimistic accent. By contrast, some managements 
have a predilection to understatement in the interests of conservatism. Man­
agement is only human in its distaste for public retreat and if internal reserves 
are available, unexpected reversals can be absorbed without affecting reported 
earnings.
“Managed earnings” combine these tendencies. Sufficient flexibility exists 
in most companies to allocate some revenues and costs between periods, in 
such a way as to show a steady (hopefully rising) trend of earnings, a quality 
highly valued in the market place. This may not be entirely misleading, 
however, since the earning power of a company is really a continuum which 
cannot be precisely allocated between time periods, particularly quarterly 
periods. Frequently, the high points are not really as favorable as the “unman­
aged” figures indicate, nor are the low points as bad.
Any and all of these reporting tendencies by management are in conflict 
with the interests of investors. The investor may be led to overvalue or under­
value his stock, or perhaps acquire a false sense of security regarding the 
steady progress of his company. However, the investor may be able to develop 
from these tendencies an independent measure of management which could 
be useful in appraising the quality of his investment.
Responsibility of the Financial Analyst
The financial analyst’s responsibility is to study all available information 
about a company and its industry in order to form an objective conclusion 
about its investment attractiveness. Dealing with many uncertainties, the 
analyst’s natural tendency is to seek all possible details about a company and 
always more than management wishes to release. A conflict arises between 
disclosure of adequate data for analytical purposes and protection of data 
which might compromise a company’s competitive position or which is useful 
primarily for management control purposes. Analysts do not need to act like 
news reporters looking for a “beat” on some financial detail. Nor do analysts 
need to be in management’s chair to make a fair appraisal. They are better 
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advised to retain a broader perspective. Most large companies today provide 
reasonably adequate data for analytical purposes, but there remain some 
laggards.
The financial analyst has not always used accounting data properly, nor 
has he fully understood the nature of some of the accounting problems inherent 
in his criticisms regarding comparability and disclosure. As a matter of fact, 
analysts by and large are not well versed in accounting theory. Only a very 
small percentage of analysts have degrees in accounting and their knowledge 
is largely in statement analysis.
The analyst also has hidden motivations which affect his objectivity. 
Sometimes he is anxious to “sell” an investment idea. Sometimes he is swept 
along in stock market fads. Occasionally he may succumb to the flattery of 
management.
Hence, carefully prepared financial statements may sometimes suffer in 
the hands of the analyst who incorrectly interprets them from an accounting 
standpoint, and it is his report that intervenes between the company and the 
ultimate investor rather than the company’s own annual report. Clearly the 
financial analyst has a responsibility to both the company and the reader of 
his analyses to exercise care in the interpretation of financial statements. His 
analytical report and investment recommendation may have a more direct 
impact on security prices than the corporate report. This responsibility is not 
easily monitored; only through education and leadership can it be enhanced. 
This role falls largely to the Financial Analysts Federation as the professional 
body of analysts, but has not yet been actively assumed. The FAF should, in 
due course, establish better guidelines for use of financial data and for analyti­
cal procedures.
Role of the Public Accountant
The public accountant is the man in the middle of this conflict. Thought 
by analysts and other users to be the final arbiter of accounting questions 
arising in a corporate financial statement, he is in fact responsive to the wishes 
of management so long as they are within accepted accounting principles, 
which are very broad. The accountant is retained by management, not by 
investors (despite occasional formalities of stockholder approval). His attes­
tation to a financial statement is thought by users to reflect a fiduciary 
responsibility, but in fact, it is a limited certificate. This misunderstanding 
of the extent of liability of accountants in their attest function seems to be 
reflected in the growing number of suits filed against accounting firms on 
grounds that certified statements were misleading. It is not easy for profes­
sional accountants to balance these conflicting views when on the one hand 
the management which hires them has its own fixed ideas about what it will 
report, while on the other hand the users of financial statements tend to criticize 
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accountants for failure to perform a quasi-fiduciary function which they do 
not quite have.
Standing in the wings is the Securities and Exchange Commission which 
has the power to prescribe accounting principles for statements submitted to 
it under various requirements of law. The SEC has eschewed this role, prefer­
ring to rely on the accounting profession, but in one or two instances it has 
in fact acted on its own and in a manner considered arbitrary by some. There 
is always the fear that if the accounting profession does not move more rapidly 
to satisfy the needs of investors, the SEC will act for it and accounting rules 
and principles will tend to become inflexible under government aegis.
Other government regulatory agencies have a strong voice in financial 
reporting in some industries—e.g., utilities, transportation, banking. They 
sometimes establish accounting rules to serve their own ends which conflict 
with generally accepted accounting principles or do not serve the needs of 
investors. These actions compound the problem of comparability and are 
hard to get reversed.
The expansion of the economy, the proliferation in types of enterprises, 
and the explosion of stock market activity and investment all require a resolu­
tion of these conflicts and an improvement in the understanding and co-opera­
tion of all parties at interest in the preparation and use of financial reports. 
Managements sometimes resist outside dictation by accountants, financial 
analysts or anyone else in the preparation of financial statements, making it 
difficult to obtain agreement on a uniform approach to a particular accounting 
treatment among all companies. (The American Bankers Association demon­
strates unseemly inconsistency when, as a user, it asks for improvement in 
accounting principles and in their application, while as an issuer it protests 
newly developed principles applicable to banks and recommends that members 
ignore them and accept limited certificates on annual reports.) However, most 
managements today demonstrate concern for investors and so it is reason­
able to expect that their responsiveness to accounting changes and new 
requirements of investors can best be brought about through persuasion and 
example rather than by edict. The Financial Analysts Federation through its 
Corporate Information Committee is in a good position to present investors’ 
requirements and should redouble its efforts to develop more systematically 
statements of analysts’ requirements and mobilize a greater consensus for them 
among analysts. It must be willing to criticize as well as praise corporate 
reporting standards in an effort to upgrade the laggards.
The accounting profession can resolve its conflicting middle position by 
fully assuming the fiduciary role that is being thrust on it anyway. Its certificate 
on a financial statement is valuable to the issuer and therefore the accountant 
has a point of leverage to secure adherence to new and stricter accounting 
principles by his clients. The scope of the certificate might well be enlarged 
to include financial data in the texts accompanying the statements and possibly, 
on some basis, interim reports.
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Before these developments can take place, the accounting profession 
needs to resolve more quickly some of the debates over accounting theory. It 
is admitted that the Accounting Principles Board already has a herculean task 
in this field. Perhaps, however, it needs to level its attention to the more 
practical issues confronting investors, particularly those concerning compara­
bility. Some matters which have been undertaken are too theoretical to have 
much impact in the practical investment world. APB Opinion No. 10 on 
accounting for convertible securities is a case in point. While the proposal 
here might have brought about a more precise allocation of costs of this kind 
of financing, such accounting adds nothing to measurement of year-to-year 
earning power development which is the concern of investors. Another peren­
nial problem of theoretical interest but little practical importance to earning 
power determination is price-level adjustment of carrying value of assets.
Practicality should be the lodestar in development of accounting prin­
ciples. Where several alternatives may be equally acceptable on theoretical 
grounds, one should be established as the rule for all to follow. Such principles 
and rules must be backed with greater force by the entire profession so that 
an individual accounting firm is in a better position to insist on conformance 
by its corporate clients. Persuasion and example by the analyst, coupled with 
greater power by the professional accountant to assume a fiduciary position 
between corporate management and the investor should accelerate the adoption 
of improved reporting practices.
Communication Between Parties at Interest
Someday it may well appear in retrospect that development of improved 
corporate reporting practices and more rigorous definition of accounting 
principles progressed very rapidly in the 1960’s. During these years, however, 
it has sometimes seemed very slow, particularly in relation to the dynamic 
changes in investment markets and in corporate financial practices. While 
more effort is being made today to bring about change, the present mechanism 
does not appear sufficiently responsive to the need.
For example, merger and acquisition activity and the development of 
so-called conglomerate enterprises has come very swiftly. During this period 
of time there has been criticism of some of the practices used in accounting 
for mergers and acquisitions. We may well be near the crest of this movement 
in the current decade, yet we will not have settled the accounting problems. 
To protect the investor, it would have been desirable to have developed the 
necessary accounting changes much more rapidly. The investment tax credit 
is a similar example. While this credit has now been available for six or seven 
years, we still do not have an accounting principle that will produce compara­
bility of reporting. By now, however, the practices of individual companies 
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have become so firmly imbedded in their accounting that any single standard 
would be most difficult to achieve.
Some form of structured communication between the principal organi­
zations involved, beyond the present interorganization liaison committees, 
might give sharper and more current focus on accounting and reporting 
problems and bring a quicker resolution of them. Perhaps this Symposium 
group could evolve into a continuing organization to provide a forum for prac­
tical dialogue and interaction regarding current accounting problems while 
they are still current. If such a conference concentrated on developing an 
understanding of the requirements of each party at interest, and these require­
ments could be brought into greater harmony, possibly debates on accounting 
could be resolved more quickly.
Key leaders from the Financial Executives Institute, representing cor­
porate management, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
representing the accounting profession, the financial Analysts Federation rep­
resenting investor users, and the Robert Morris Associates representing credit 
users, would form the basic group. Participation by Securities and Exchange 
Commission representatives would be desirable. Other regulatory agencies 
could be invited when required by the topic. Government agencies should 
help resolve accounting and reporting problems rather than become a part of 
the problems.
This annual Symposium would require some continuing effort by repre­
sentatives of each of the participating organizations, who would have to offer 
studied opinions if it were to be effective. In turn they would have to take 
responsibility for communicating the consensus of the Symposium within their 
own organizations and work toward acceptance. There is much work to be 
done.
Summary and Conclusion
1. The needs of stockholders in public companies should have great 
weight in the development of corporate financial reporting standards, including 
accounting principles, because of the constant expansion of investor interest 
and ascending market values.
2. The financial analyst, as intermediary for the investor, endeavors to 
determine relative values among alternative investment opportunities. This 
determination is heavily based on expected future earning power. The finan­
cial analyst, therefore, requires accurate and comprehensive earnings and 
other financial data prepared by accountants as one basis for his projections.
3. Since he is interested in relative values, these financial data must be 
comparable over time and between companies. A more rigorous definition of 
accounting principles and a reduction of alternatives by the accounting pro­
fession is desirable in order to achieve greater comparability of data between 
companies.
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4. Adequate disclosure should be made of accounting principles em­
ployed and exceptions thereto. But the whole apparatus of financial reporting 
places a premium on comparability of data. Practical rules to achieve this 
objective have greater importance to investor users of financial data than 
application of elegant accounting theory to achieve small gains in precision.
5. More rapid determination and development of accounting principles 
is needed in today’s rapid pace of change in the corporate sector of the 
economy. New rules should be established when change is beginning, not 
when it is over. Accounting for mergers and acquisitions and reporting by 
conglomerate companies are current examples of lag in development of ade­
quate accounting principles.
6. Management has the responsibility of preparing its financial state­
ments and has broad latitude within the framework of generally accepted 
accounting principles. While most companies wish to present their data fairly 
there is a minority of situations that could be improved. The connection 
between financial data and stock market prices is a powerful one. Greater 
support of accounting changes by managements and possible extension of the 
role of the accountant to review quarterly statements and the financial data 
appearing in texts accompanying statements might resolve some of these 
reporting problems.
7. The financial analyst stands between the company and the investor 
in a position of great responsibility. He must exercise care in his analysis and 
interpretation of financial data. Analysts need to expand their knowledge of 
accounting theory and practice to understand the limitations of financial data. 
Through their professional organization, the Financial Analysts Federation, 
analysts can articulate their requirements for financial data to management 
and the accounting profession.
8. There is need for some better means for the resolution of conflicts 
between management as issuers of financial data, investors and other users 
of financial data, and accountants who develop accounting principles and 
attest as to their application. There is the aforementioned need to focus more 
promptly on new accounting problems. An annual symposium of the key 
leaders of the professional associations representing the various groups plus 
government might well achieve these objectives. Each organization must also 
work for greater consensus among its own members regarding financial report­
ing requirements.
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The Viewpoint of the
Credit Grantor
By Charles T. McGarraugh
Senior Vice President, Northwestern National Bank of Minneapolis, repre­
senting Robert Morris Associates
The years following World War II have clearly demonstrated that the 
corporate financial report is one of the essential tools for the credit grantor. 
Although he may use other techniques and information, the increasing com­
plexities of the conglomerates and the multi-product corporations have created 
barriers to the effective personal communication once possible. Corporations 
located throughout the United States, businesses with credit needs involving 
many sources of funds, time limitations of both the corporate executive and 
the executives of the lending organizations—all of these factors make it 
imperative that the corporate financial report assume this role of the primary 
medium of communication.
Credit grantors are not in agreement as to the information they need, 
for there seems to be no uniform opinion, even among bankers, as to just what 
procedures are to be followed in arriving at a credit decision. However, one 
fact should be self-evident: that, although it is clearly the responsibility of the 
credit grantor to make the assumptions necessary to arrive at his credit deci­
sion, he must have confidence in the underlying data, the corporate financial 
report. His judgment must be an informed judgment.
Decision making as practiced by all lenders is predicated on an evaluation 
of the factors which affect the two ordinary ways of getting a loan paid. First, 
the earning power of the organization—the continuing ability to service debt, 
and, second, the quality of the assets or the margin of safety for that loan. The 
methods of presentation of the data necessary to understand these two factors 
ought to be re-examined with the knowledge of the heavy reliance given by the 
credit grantor to the corporate financial report. Should the credit grantor get 
a special report? Consider some of the varying needs.
The short-term lender (12-18 months maturity) may look first to the 
liquidity and turnover of current assets. He needs to be well informed about 
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the principal assets, inventories and accounts receivable and the timing of 
their conversion to cash. Along with the examination of the current assets, 
the overall working capital position must be related to the aspirations of the 
company. There must be a review of the cash flow represented by this conver­
sion and the contribution to that flow represented by an evaluation of future 
possible profits.
The long-term lenders, and this can include maturities from 18 months 
to 20 or more years, may place their primary emphasis on a comparison of a 
projection of historic cash flows with the planned debt maturities. Although 
the traditional source of long-term loans in the past came from non-bank 
sources, there in recent years has been a significant lengthening of maturities in 
the average bank loan portfolio, so the banker, too, has need for enough 
information to develop his assumptions to project cash flows to match with the 
expected projected financial requirements.
Essential to the development of cash flows is the necessity to distinguish 
between earnings reported on an accrual basis and cash earnings. Disclosure 
of the measurement standards used in arriving at accrual earnings is an obvious 
necessity to all who have reviewed statements of computer leasing companies, 
the construction industry or industries with significant deferred developmental 
expenses.
However, the essential distinction between the needs of the short-term 
lender and the long-term lender remains a difference only in emphasis, with 
the short-term grantor relying more on the orderly conversion of current assets 
and the long-term grantor more on debt-servicing ability through cash flow.
The equity investor, in theory at least, should be the best informed of all 
suppliers of funds as his is the ultimate risk. The primary objective of the 
average equity investor is a maximum return in the long run from a combina­
tion of dividends and capital appreciation. In order to attain that objective, 
the analyst must review a number of factors: the quality of the management, 
the potential for growth, and the projection of future profits. Although it 
appears that oftentimes the small investor substitutes marketability of the 
security for comprehensive financial information, the needs of the able equity 
investor for comprehensive fair financial reporting are similar to those of the 
credit grantors.
The problem appears to be a serious gap between the needs of the various 
groups for complete financial reporting and the type of financial reports we 
are now receiving. The items which appear to create that gap should be 
examined with the objective of attaining a bridge built on co-operative under­
standing.
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
“Generally accepted accounting principles” includes a multiplicity of 
alternative acceptable accounting principles. More information is needed to 
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identify the particular principles used to understand the statement under 
review. For instance, there seems to be a number of different ways of evaluat­
ing assets and liabilities under the umbrella of “generally accepted accounting 
principles.”
Even though there are real problems involved in attempting to arrive at 
conformity or uniformity in any area of reporting, some confusion seems to 
have been created by the number of different ways of acceptable asset valua­
tion. A historical study of the motivation for some of the various methods no 
doubt would be most interesting. One might suspect that too often the method 
was dictated by somewhat extraneous reasons, i.e., tax regulations, specific 
industry regulations, etc. Serious study should be given to a simplified proper 
accounting method for stating asset valuation.
Consider, first, inventory costing as now practiced and the effects such 
pricing methods can have on operating results for any given period. The 
most generally accepted inventory valuation is cost or market, whichever is 
lower. But this has been varied by the use of Fifo (first in—first out), Lifo (last 
in—first out), or a moving average cost method. Again, the pricing of inven­
tories in a manufacturing concern tends to have variations as shown by the 
diverse ways of capitalizing overhead and, more particularly, by the capitali­
zation of research and development expense. The inventory issue may be 
further confused by differing treatment of inventory obsolescence or in the 
method of recording an inventory with a disproportionately high market value 
in relation to cost value.
Most financial reports seem to accept “the cost or market, whichever is 
lower” concept in the valuation of securities and investments. However, in 
most cases the reporter realizes that market valuation and comparative cost 
figures are an essential part of the report, and generally both values are given. 
For many valid complex reasons, accountants have not yet been willing to 
advocate a price-level accounting system. However, an enlightened approach 
to the valuation of fixed assets other than original cost ought to be considered. 
Perhaps the comparison of original cost and current market values ought to 
be shown.
The problems the credit grantor has in properly evaluating statements 
of the manufacturers of computers, particularly those that both sell and lease 
their manufactured product, vividly portray the necessity of some disclosure 
of judgmental decisions in both the evaluation of the inventory and of the 
fixed assets held for leasing purposes. Without a knowledge of these measure­
ment standards it is not possible to analyze the statement with any degree of 
proficiency. The use of the various accepted methods of depreciation and/or 
amortization can have a markedly differing result in asset values.
The financial reporter is reluctant to give much credence to other than 
cost value until the applicable asset has been sold and the profit or loss has 
been realized. For this reason frequent misstatements of fair financial condi­
tion occur because of the generally accepted principle of original cost 
presentation of fixed assets.
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It may be unnecessarily complicating to record the tax consequences of 
constantly varying values for assets with the resulting effects on the operating 
statements. This should not, however, preclude some sort of presentation of 
an asset value where the market value is materially higher or lower than as 
presented in the financial statement. Fixed assets can have a real obsolescence 
factor just as do inventories, and the recognition of that factor is important in 
any considered financial analysis of a corporate situation. For instance, the 
reports of the meat-packing industry ought to show some important examples 
of this principle. Conversely, in some older, well-established companies, it is 
not at all uncommon to find recorded real estate values that have very little 
resemblance to current market or appraisal values. The materiality of these 
discrepancies and the extent to which they are known to a potential credit 
grantor or an investor cannot help but influence his ultimate decision.
The recording of deferred research and development expenses also can 
be done by several acceptable accounting methods. Although the method is 
properly selected by the financial reporter, the credit grantor needs to know 
what standard was used.
One becomes more aware of the whole problem of proper asset evalua­
tion and the resultant effects on profit and loss accounting when the “pooling 
of interests” accounting treatment is studied. The extensive acquisition pro­
grams of many corporations during the past few years have created some very 
complicated company structures. Many of the new combinations have had an 
insatiable demand for credit from all sources. The investor or the credit grantor 
has often found that there is not enough information in the corporate financial 
report to disclose all of the standards of measurement that were judged desir­
able, necessary and accurate by the statement preparer. If there were only one 
acceptable standard, then the user, perhaps, could be deemed as knowledge­
able. But this is not often the case.
The analysis of the financial reports of conglomerate corporations by 
credit grantors usually indicates three areas of concern: the method of origi­
nally recording the asset values (again, that important problem of proper asset 
evaluation) and the resultant effect on current operating earnings; second, the 
inability of the user to get proper segmented information related to the 
important product or subsidiary divisions of the company; and third, the 
enormous problem of getting properly comparable operating statistics.
If it is proper to consider that one of the goals of financial reporting ought 
to be the presentation of fair asset value on the balance sheet, a concept readily 
understandable by the average credit grantor, then it is hard to justify the 
use of the “pooling of interests” concept if, by its use, the assets are stated at 
a value substantially different from their fair value. The mere fact that the 
assets had previously been carried at that value on the previous company’s 
books does not seem to be sufficient justification for continuing that value. It 
seems obvious that at the time of an acquisition there are value decisions made 
in arriving at the price, and usually these values are related to the asset 
acquired, including a valuation for goodwill, if there is determined to be one. 
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Again the real problem for the credit grantor is not to determine how the 
acquisition is to be recorded but to have access to the facts necessary for him 
to arrive at an understanding of the fair values involved.
Receiving sufficient detailed operating statistics for the various divisions 
or subsidiaries of the company presents a somewhat different problem. The 
confrontation is not so much with the accounting principles involved as it is 
with management’s reluctance to give out specific details on relative operating 
profitabilities. Audits that include consolidating balance sheets and consoli­
dating profit and loss statements are a most desirable form of financial reporting 
if the conglomerate organization has retained the various separate corporate 
structures as operating entities. In other cases, perhaps, financial reporting 
by profit or product centers might accomplish the desired end which is simply 
to determine as accurately as possible the contributions made to the overall 
results by the various divisions involved. Anything less than this detailed 
reporting makes credit decisions less effective.
The third problem—comparability of financial data over a period of time 
for a company involved in an active acquisition program—is a particularly 
troublesome one. Even in those few cases where the financial reporter has 
endeavored to restate the operating statements of the past, results have not 
been too satisfactory. The hard fact remains that the combination is really 
a new set of operating conditions that may or may not represent a reasonable 
continuation of past operations. It is suggested that profitability and progress 
of the conglomerate might be shown more precisely by other standards of 
measurement than those of comparison with the past or even with other 
conglomerate corporations.
Proper financial reporting for the conglomerate corporation is one that 
deserves continued study by the public accounting profession. Accounting 
Research Study No. 5, A Critical Study of Accounting for Business Combina­
tions, completed in 1963 by Arthur R. Wyatt, Ph.D., CPA, for the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, helps to clarify the various complex­
ities of this accounting problem. As with so many of the other areas of 
financial reporting, the important consideration should always be to so present 
the data and the judgmental decisions made that the user understands the 
makeup of the data shown.
The liability section of the balance sheet does not present quite the 
magnitude of problems inherent on the asset side. Nevertheless, the increasing 
tendency for companies to enter into long-term leases for a variety of reasons 
presents special problems in showing the impact of that very real liability. 
Although the accounting profession has ruled that such liabilities are not 
properly a balance sheet item, the increasing use of leased assets in material 
quantities suggests further review of this decision. Certainly, an analytical 
review of financial reports loses valid comparability if this factor is not directly 
reported.
The balance of the emphasis on the reporting of liabilities can be centered 
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on the necessity for full disclosure of material contingent liabilities, special 
covenants, disputed tax claims and like items.
Income Reporting
The judgmental decisions made in the presentation of the asset and lia­
bility sections of the balance sheet almost invariably affect the income accounts 
of the company. In considering this section of the financial report, it is well to 
keep in mind the objectives of fair income and expense reporting. Those 
objectives should be to prepare the report so that it can be compared fairly, 
not only with previous reports of the same company, but also with the reports 
of other companies engaged in similar operations. A more important objective 
is to report fairly the results of the operations attributable to the period under 
review. In examining the possibility of attaining these objectives, it is well 
to recognize, once again, that “generally accepted accounting principles” do 
provide some alternative methods of presentation which can change materially 
the results of operations reported. Financial reports simply are not comparable 
unless the standards of measurement are known to, and understood by, the 
user of those reports.
It is necessary to know not only the decisions that have been made in 
valuing the various assets and the resultant effect on the charges to operations, 
but, also the methods of apportioning those charges. In addition, income report­
ing tends to become confused because of the apparent differences in approved 
accounting principles used in recording income tax expense. The permitted 
alternate methods of recording income tax accruals, although clarified by the 
Accounting Principles Board’s recent ruling, is still somewhat confusing. 
There also is some confusion in the way the investment credit tax benefit and 
some special allocations of income are recorded for differing reporting periods.
Companies in the construction industry, whose work is principally in­
volved in producing contract work with a fixed future selling price, create 
some particularly difficult judgmental decisions for the financial reporter. It 
is not uncommon in the heavy construction field for one contract to require 
several years to complete. If the contract is one which carries a predetermined 
lump sum price, the problem of reporting the affected company’s financial 
position at intervals during this particular time is difficult. Yet, if the reporter 
has not made a careful review of the estimated cost to complete the contract, 
both the balance sheet and profit and loss statements may present an inaccurate 
statement of the facts. There seems to be a general acceptance of the principle 
that a loss should be recognized as soon as it is known, which, in these situa­
tions, implies that a review of future events has to be made. Therefore, it 
seems clear that in order to convey a fair presentation of the financial position 
of any company whose volume of work includes a material amount of fixed 
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contract work, the financial reporter should ascertain the estimated cost to 
complete.
At this point, it is obvious that there are, indeed, alternative “generally 
accepted accounting principles” whose use may produce alternative balance 
sheets and differing income accounts. It is clear that comparability of financial 
data, within a company at differing points of time, and between companies, is 
a highly desirable characteristic for financial data and of great importance to 
all users of financial reports. It follows that comparability can be attained to 
the extent that sufficient disclosures are made as to the judgmental decisions 
made in selecting the accounting procedure. How should those disclosures be 
made, and is there a possibility that some of the alternative procedures might 
be eliminated?
Supplemental Reports
Most of those who review financial reports for the purpose of arriving 
at sound credit decisions would prefer to have as few alternative choices to 
identify and understand as is feasible yet still have a fair presentation of 
comparable data. In addition, most would prefer to have the significant data 
recorded as a part of the statement itself to the greatest extent possible, in 
order to minimize the amount of collateral information needed to arrive at 
sufficient understanding of the data shown in the balance sheet and income 
accounts. Ideally, a perfect financial report would be one wherein the particu­
lar user in question could have full comprehension and a fair presentation of 
data shown, without any footnotes or other disclosures required to give that 
degree of comprehension.
The ideal objective of an understandable comparable financial report, 
uncluttered with footnotes and other types of disclosures, is probably not 
attainable. However, there does appear to be an important potential for 
simplification, and it is encouraging to note that the Accounting Principles 
Board is currently devoting considerable study to that end. As the professional 
financial reporters work toward simplification, there are some criteria that 
appear pertinent to the use of disclosure.
Disclosures ought to be specific enough so that meaningful comparisons 
can be made between companies in similar lines of business. Judgmental 
decisions directly affecting the valuation of the published items on the balance 
sheet and profit and loss statement ought to be included as a part of that 
statement. Other material information, such as the valuation of fixed assets 
not yet converted, forecasting the estimated costs to complete, or scheduling 
cash budgets, more properly would be shown in supplemental exhibits or text. 
All of the data that is needed to provide sufficient information to give a 
reasonably well-trained credit grantor a proper base for decision making 
should be a part of the financial report presented to him for that purpose.
A financial report, to be of the greatest value to the credit grantor, not 
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only needs to include comparative balance sheets and profit and loss state­
ments, but also requires supplemental data to inform the lender. In a general 
way, these data can be classified into two categories. The first type presents 
data that would be helpful in almost all corporate reports reviewed, and the 
second, unique data related either to specialized industries or to a specific 
condition applicable only to the corporation under review.
An example of the first type of supplemental report desired would be a 
statement by the firm’s independent auditor regarding the quality of the internal 
control system maintained by the company. Generally accepted auditing 
standards require a careful review of the system of internal control established 
by the corporation and also the extent to which the system is implemented. 
Presently, there is no effective way of transmitting the results of that review 
to the credit grantor. There seems to be a policy among the financial reporters 
that if the condition is not directly “figure” oriented, it does not belong in the 
financial report. Certainly, the results of a review of a system of internal 
control by individuals trained for that purpose could have a great impact on the 
quality of the final credit decision. The complexities of the modern corporate 
structure, with the tendency toward increasing mechanization of data record­
ing, further demonstrate the need for careful system study. Although it appears 
that all competent financial reporters do carry out such a study, virtually none 
report the results to those who have a right to that knowledge. For example, 
the letter report which is often made to the board of directors is usually not 
available to the credit grantor or the investor.
Other useful tools for those analyzing financial conditions are statements 
depicting the cash flow of the company, what was experienced in the past, 
the present condition and estimates of future probabilities of cash generation. 
These cash generation data reports are becoming more and more valuable 
since they provide the lender a summary of the sources and amounts of the 
cash which will be available to service debt maturities and other fixed charges. 
There do not appear to be any unusual problems for the reporter in the com­
pilation of the past and present statistics. However, the estimating of the 
future is, of course, subject to many errors. Still, a short-term projection 
prepared by professionals based on the announced plans of management can 
attain a high degree of validity and be of great value, not only to the lender 
but also to the management of the company. Most competent managements 
already have prepared such corporate budgets. All that remains to be done 
is to have the estimates and the judgmental premises reviewed objectively by 
an independent professional reporter. The addition of at least the shorter 
term projections in the financial report would be of great value to all those 
using it.
The general class of additional financial information required certainly 
should include a report of the compliance with the provisions of special 
contracts and agreements that may be in effect at the time of reporting. As 
mentioned previously, a disclosure of any other information that might be 
material to a fair appraisal of the company’s condition should be made.
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Some industries have unique characteristics that provide opportunities 
for the presentation of supplemental financial data that can be utilized both 
for comparing with similar industry performances and for providing addi­
tional detail most useful to the lender. As an example, most financial reporters 
use similar additional reports for presenting specialized information relating 
to those corporations engaged in the finance business. These special purpose 
statements have been accepted both by those that find the detail helpful and 
by those preparing the detail. The value to the lender of these reports has 
been well demonstrated.
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants has published a 
bulletin, Audits of Construction Contractors, which explains a number of 
recommended special-type schedules to be included in each financial report. 
In many cases, these suggestions have been followed and the additional data 
have been of significant value to the lender. Finally, there are a number of 
specialized summaries of financial statistics that are commonly used for many 
of those industries under some degree of control by civil authorities. Public 
utilities and segments of the transportation industry are examples of this type 
of industry.
For the most part, special-purpose reports can be prepared from data 
already accumulated by the corporate financial staff. These data nearly always 
contribute to better understanding by the user. The data may often be essential 
to provide the user with a base for an evaluation decision.
Responsibilities
Persons preparing financial reports should recognize that their obliga­
tion is not only to corporate management but also to those who are making 
financial decisions based on the report. Once this principle is accepted, then 
the extent of the disclosures needed for reasonable comprehension should not 
present a serious problem.
Generally, corporate management is reluctant to disseminate financial 
information that might conceivably be of value to the competition and, 
thereby, harm the corporate competitive position. Indeed, the publishing of 
any detailed financial information at all is a comparatively recent develop­
ment. However, because of various governmental regulations and the multi­
plicity of investors interested in corporations, more detailed information has 
had to be made available to attract the capital base required to support the 
desired volume of operations.
In order to reconcile management’s desire for competitive secrecy with 
the lenders’ wish for complete financial information, certain rights of privileged 
information need to be respected. Robert Morris Associates, a national asso­
ciation of bank loan officers and credit men, recognized this problem and as 
long ago as 1916 devised a code of credit ethics for the exchange of credit 
information. The code has been amended several times over the years, but 
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still is used and provides a measure of responsibility in the use of privileged 
financial information. At the same time this code provides a degree of flexi­
bility for the responsible administration of credit information.
There is a serious responsibility for the proper use of financial data 
placed on everyone who receives this information. The responsibility goes 
beyond that of only protecting the information in line with the methods sug­
gested by the Robert Morris code of ethics. Those who are permitted access 
to the financial data have the obligation for the requisite knowledge, back­
ground and training to properly interpret the given information.
In order to keep abreast of recent developments in financial practices, 
the banking profession has a number of formal programs for the continuing 
education of those engaged in lending activity. There are many graduate 
banking schools and specialized seminars dedicated to this task. Presently, 
there are at least two new exciting programs to be implemented within the 
next 12 months. One is sponsored by the American Bankers Association, 
directed toward furthering the education of those newly assigned to credit 
responsibilities and the other, sponsored by the Robert Morris Associates, is 
for those members who have had senior credit responsibilities for some time. 
These and similar efforts should continue to improve the capabilities of the 
members of the banking fraternity.
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants also has formal 
training programs and fosters continuing education for its members. The 
profession should continue to inform the various users of their reports of 
the changes in accepted principles of accounting and the implications of these 
changes. It is well known that the quality of financial reports varies and that 
some audits are substandard to the point that they convey erroneous informa­
tion, even to the most sophisticated analyst. This problem, which is a result 
of the great demand for auditing services (resulting in the increased use of 
less experienced help) is recognized by the accounting profession. Some of 
the substandard audit reports are immediately identifiable as such, by the 
better trained lending officers, while some are so labeled only after subsequent 
events have painfully pinpointed the errors. The problem can assume a terri­
fying collision course when the substandard audit report is analyzed by the 
inadequately trained lending officer.
Both the accounting profession and the lenders have indicated a desire 
to eliminate such inadequate work and have jointly devised a means to accom­
plish this end. Several chapters of the Robert Morris Associates have set 
up means for the systematic referral of substandard work to a practice review 
committee of the auditing profession. Although proper safeguards have 
usually been provided to assure that no liability for libel can accrue to either 
the lender or the practice review committee, the system has not been particu­
larly effective. Some of its failure can be attributed to the lack of under­
standing on the part of the lenders as to the extent of the liability exposure. 
A significant part of the ineffectiveness of the system seems to result from 
the feeling, on the part of the bankers, that no real corrective action will 
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be undertaken by the accountants. This is a continuing serious problem for 
financial report comprehension which is difficult enough without contend­
ing with inadequate audits.
For the purposes of this paper, the term financial reporter has been used 
to identify the one who is responsible for the financial report. It is necessary 
to designate that individual more accurately and to determine the scope of 
his responsibility. The criteria for delineation are threefold. Actions taken 
that create the financial data are distinctly the responsibility of management. 
Accurate accumulation and compilation of the data created is the task of 
the corporate accounting staff which is responsible to management and 
accountable to the certified public accountant. Review of the accuracy of 
that compilation and the principles utilized in its presentation to the ultimate 
user must be delegated to the professionally trained, qualified certified public 
accountant. Only the certified public accountant can be deemed objective 
and well-enough trained to present fairly the data to the user. The concerned 
auditor should willingly accept this responsibility.
Contrasting with this viewpoint, consider the position of the certified 
public accountant’s responsibility as set forth in the bulletin, “The Auditor’s 
Report—Its Meaning and Significance,” published in July 1967 by the certi­
fied public accountant members of the National Conference of Bankers and 
Certified Public Accountants. The introduction to this publication states in 
part as follows:
While the auditor has the sole responsibility for his opinion as 
expressed in his report, the primary responsibility for a company’s 
financial statements, including any accompanying footnotes, rests 
with management, and this responsibility cannot be relieved by the 
engagement of an independent auditor. . . . At the same time, the 
auditor recognizes that the significance of the opinion expressed in 
his report enables him to exert considerable influence on the financial 
statements and to make recommendations that will assure a fair 
presentation of information contained therein.
The posture the accountants assume of placing the responsibility of 
statement presentation on management, instead of recognizing the real value 
of their influence, is again emphasized by the statement on page 4:
This emphasizes the fact that the financial statements are repre­
sentations of the company.
A slight inconsistency is suggested, however, when the qualifications 
of the professionally trained auditor are set out on page 6 of that report as 
follows:
It recognizes that however capable an individual may be in other 
fields, including finance and business, he cannot meet the require- 
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merits of the auditing standards without proper education and experi­
ence in the field of auditing. The attainment of proficiency in 
accounting practice and auditing procedure begins with the auditor’s 
education and extends into his subsequent experience.
The bulletin further stresses the importance of the independence and 
the training of the auditor. Little disagreement is likely with the theory that 
the independent certified public accountant ought to be objective and bet­
ter informed on current accounting principles than the accounting staff in 
the average corporate accounting office. As a practical matter, he will also 
be the individual who will suggest the proper form of statement presenta­
tion and, no doubt, usually will prepare the statement footnotes. Indeed, 
although the auditor cannot be expected to control the events that give rise 
to the financial data that are to be presented, he must have the responsibility to 
control the form that the statement takes. It is the public accountant who is 
expected to be well versed on the applicable “generally accepted accounting 
principles” required in any particular situation. An auditor’s responsibility 
is to provide the professional skills required to get the financial report in 
the proper form so that the user may understand and depend upon its con­
tent. Anything less than the acceptance of this responsibility tends to weaken 
the importance of the auditor’s contribution.
Part of the preface of “The Auditor’s Report” deserves to be reread:
This is public accounting as it is, not necessarily as bankers might 
hope it to be. This is public accounting as it must be understood by 
all who look to audit reports for assurance and guidance in the mak­
ing of credit judgments on the strength of financial statements.
If one is to infer from that statement, and others previously mentioned, 
that the auditor is unwilling to accept the responsibility for the fair and 
accurate presentation of the statements that he certifies, the whole status of 
corporate financial reports must be re-examined. Most business enterprises 
today are finding the proper recording of financial data an increasingly diffi­
cult task. The responsibility for transmitting the data in an understandable 
form to those who are entitled to its use frequently requires training and 
abilities not available within the corporate staff. Furthermore, the require­
ments imposed by the user of the financial report for independent objectivity 
in its preparation precludes use of the company’s own accounting staff. These 
criteria are valid and directly emphasize the need for the certified public 
accountant’s service.
The certified public accountant is already eminently qualified to satisfy 
the needs of both management and the user. He is already performing that 
function, even though he may wish to avoid the responsibility for the finan­
cial report that is prepared. But there are indications that the responsibility 
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is so inherent in the function of certification that it attaches, regardless of any 
disclaiming statements. Numerous legal actions (the latest of which is the 
BarChris case) indicate that the responsibility cannot be abrogated. In any 
event, the economic function of objective reporting is an increasingly im­
portant one and hopefully the accounting profession will willingly accept the 
responsibility they are or should be so eminently well qualified to handle.
Needs of the Credit Grantor
The credit grantor and the commercial banking officer have a variety 
of criteria that are reviewed and judged in order to arrive at a credit deci­
sion. Certainly, one of the most important of these criteria that he must 
rely on is an understandable and accurate financial report. As banking has 
become more and more impersonal, the reliance on the objective financial 
report has increased.
The credit grantor’s reliance on the financial report has increased as has 
his need for more detailed information. No longer is it always possible to 
interview corporate management of the company and accumulate all of the 
data that may be pertinent to its financial position. In addition, it is getting 
more difficult for both management and the credit grantor to find time for 
sufficient dialogue to provide the desired objectivity of financial review. 
Often the only practical effective way of presentation of this all-important 
data is to have it accumulated, reviewed and properly presented by a trained 
objective professional. As far as the credit grantor is concerned, this presenta­
tion ideally should include more detailed information than is now usually 
available. Adequate disclosure of the judgmental decisions is essential for 
an intelligent analysis of operating results and comparative positions. An 
outside evaluation of the internal control system is most helpful in evaluating 
management compliance and interim reports.
There must be a common language used in the financial reports so 
that the banker can translate the data shown into the conditions that are exist­
ing and intended to be shown by the auditor. Such a common understanding 
will become more prevalent as the competence of both the auditor and the 
lending officer is improved through a continuing process dedicated to that end.
Both modern corporate management and lending officers expect that 
the financial report, independently certified, must provide the means of data 
communication, and, since significant financial decisions are largely based on 
its reliability, there ought to be assurance of responsibility exercised in its 
preparation.
Methods of communication and new communication media have pro­
vided some of the most exciting new techniques in our business world. It is 
unfortunate that the corporate financial report has not kept up with this 
dynamic trend and its failure to do so seems to be because few have recog­
nized the very vital expanding role that it must perform to keep business 
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dynamic. The most efficient and progressive corporation should recognize 
that progress is best achieved when all concerned—management, credit gran­
tors and owners—work together for the common objective. The unified 
effort is attained only when each party has sufficient comprehensible financial 
information to understand its proper role and responsibilities. An expanded 
and revitalized corporate financial report, independently and objectively pre­
sented, appears to be the best medium to accomplish that end.
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A Financial Executive Views 
Accounting Developments
By Robert O. Whitman
Vice President and Treasurer, American Electric Power Service Corporation, 
representing the Financial Executives Institute
Accounting developments are a subject of great importance to corporate 
executives because they can influence the content of published reports and 
thus affect communications with the financial community. They affect the 
interests of present and potential investors, the ability of the company to 
raise additional capital, the governmental regulation and taxation to which 
it is subjected, and relations with its employees and the public. Directly or 
indirectly, accounting developments can affect a corporation’s pricing policies, 
dividend declarations, wage and benefit structure, and investment decisions. 
The cumulative impact of these effects on the national economy is a matter 
of concern to the company as well as to society.
The focus of these influences is in the annual report to shareholders. 
Their importance is reflected in the very considerable effort and expense 
devoted by the great majority of the larger corporations to the achievement 
of excellence in the presentation of not only the basic certified financial 
statements but also supplementary statistics and reports on corporate per­
formance, plans, products and prospects. It is generally recognized that the 
users of American corporate reports receive more and better information 
than their counterparts in other countries. Since this has been the result of 
a continuing evolutionary process, it is a matter of particular concern that 
there are to be heard in some quarters allegations of a “crisis” in financial 
reporting and agitation for abandonment of proven principles and methods 
of development in favor of an enforced uniformity imposed by some form 
of centralized authority. Since confidence and acceptance are indispensable 
to effective reporting, charges of crisis tend to be self-fulfilling, and in such 
an atmosphere hasty action may be taken without regard for its immediate 
practical effects and long-run economic consequences. Therefore, it is 
vitally important to the financial executive that responsibility and authority 
for financial reporting be properly defined and that the most effective means 
for true improvement be established.
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Primary Role of Management
The primary responsibility for the reporting of financial information 
must remain with management under existing authority-accountability inter­
relationships. Few have argued otherwise and the principle is long estab­
lished, procedurally operative, fully codified and, indeed, the only realistic 
alternative.
Underlying all committee opinions is the fact that the accounts of 
a company are primarily the responsibility of management. [Intro­
duction to AICPA Accounting Research Bulletin No. 43]
The fundamental and primary responsibility for the accuracy of 
information filed with the Commission and disseminated among 
investors rests with management. Management does not discharge 
its responsibility in this respect by the employment of independent 
public accountants, however reputable. Accountants’ certificates are 
required not as a substitute for management’s accounting of its 
stewardship, but as a check upon that accounting. [In the Matter of 
Interstate Hosiery Mills, Inc., 4 SEC 721 (1939)]
Management is assigned the responsibility for conducting the affairs 
of the corporation and is accountable for that stewardship subject to the 
attestation of independent accountants. Various groups such as shareholders, 
creditors, employees, tax authorities, customers and suppliers have continuing 
and sometimes conflicting relations with a company and depend upon its 
reports to disclose matters affecting their respective interests. Management 
must see that the single set of financial figures that is released is the fairest 
possible presentation of performance and current position, or impairment 
of relationships with one or more interested parties can be created.
Management has the intimate knowledge of past transactions and future 
plans necessary properly to match revenues and expenses and portray present 
conditions in terms that are significant in relation to the long-run trend of 
operations. Certainly, if financial reporting is to continue to be meaningful, 
management must agree with the adequacy of the principles and concepts on 
which the statements are prepared or it can no longer be held fully account­
able for the results.
Roles of Other Parties
Asserting management’s primary role is not to deny the importance of 
the requirements and contributions of others in the development of account­
ing principles. In our pluralistic, government-regulated free enterprise system, 
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conflicting demands must be balanced and compromised in a manner which 
satisfies as nearly as possible the legitimate requirements of all groups.
1. Security analysts, credit grantors, and other users should express indi­
vidually and collectively, in general and to specific companies, their 
special informational requirements. At the same time, they must recog­
nize the inherent limitations of the accounting process and accept the 
fact that financial reporting serves varied purposes simultaneously. In­
formation can not always be presented in the exact form most desired 
and statements require study and analysis. Nevertheless, management 
can often accommodate requests for information which are reasonable 
and relevant, and suggestions for improvements and modifications in 
reporting from investor groups always receive serious consideration.
2. Certain governmental agencies, as a special class of users, are empowered 
to specify various accounting treatments necessary to the performance of 
their regulatory or tax functions. However, they should recognize that 
reporting for other purposes may call for different presentations and 
should not require that it conform in all respects with reporting to the 
agencies. This is especially true where the interests of investors are 
adequately safeguarded by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
3. Independent accountants have an obligation to provide management 
with advice and technical assistance regarding the best financial reporting 
practices. The accounting profession has the responsibility for assisting 
in developing a body of generally accepted accounting principles to serve 
as the standard for reporting. This work must be done with full recogni­
tion of the problems and needs of those who report financial information 
and those who use it and must avoid conflict of accounting theory with 
the realities of the business world by allowing sufficient flexibility to 
permit adaptation to circumstances.
4. The Securities and Exchange Commission and the stock exchanges have 
a duty of protecting the public interest by promoting good reporting 
practice, which is best accomplished by continuing emphasis on full 
disclosure as the cornerstone of security regulation. Occasionally, it 
may be necessary to require a recalcitrant minority to adhere to pro­
cedures for which a true consensus exists or to caution an overzealous 
few from attempting to compel a conformity of unproven merits.
Since so many groups properly should play parts in the development 
of accounting principles, full recognition should be given to the contributions 
of each, and the basis for generally accepted accounting principles should 
be sought in SEC releases, stock exchange requirements, court and regulatory 
commission decisions, the literature of the accounting profession, and espe­
cially the established practices of the business community.
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Conflicts in the development and acceptance of accounting principles 
very commonly revolve around the question of comparability. The contro­
versy over comparability is not new. But an overemphasis on this objective 
over the years has probably become the greatest impediment to agreement 
on the principles that serve the proper objectives of accounting. This is 
because the unsophisticated insistence by some on uniformity as the con­
trolling standard can only be satisfied by sacrificing other important criteria 
of sound accounting, such as the relevancy, consistency and matching 
concepts.
The problem of comparability is that different things are not in fact 
easily comparable and that attempts to make them so lead inevitably to a 
devotion to form rather than substance. It is like insisting that the proper 
way to compare an oak with a pine is to strip off the leaves and cut off 
the branches in order to clearly demonstrate differences in height and girth. 
Unfortunately what is left after removal of the foliage is not an oak nor a 
pine—nor even a tree. If we forget what we were looking for in the first 
place, it may seem that lopping and trimming is the answer until one dis­
covers that some of the characteristics removed are more important than the 
measurements of denuded poles.
Similarly, some accommodating accounting nurserymen stand ready to 
lop off real tax reductions, twist leases into the shape of freehold property, and 
tell us that through uniformity they have created comparability. Actually, 
they would not only distort or obliterate some very significant differences but, 
by creating the illusion of easy comparability, they encourage us to base our 
judgments on those factors alone and to disregard important fundamental 
distinctions.
To reject indiscriminate uniformity is not to advocate unbridled diversity 
but to recognize that some degree of flexibility is necessary to provide for 
the changing conditions and varying circumstances existing in the real busi­
ness world. The desirable goal of narrowing differences can best be achieved 
by endeavoring to define the situations in which various methods are most 
suitable rather than arbitrarily proscribing alternative procedures which may 
provide the most realistic and informative financial presentation in particular 
applications, especially where a reasonable dichotomy of opinion exists. This 
approach has been advocated by many discerning authorities.
The aim should be to satisfy the investors’ need for knowledge 
rather than the accountants’ sense of form and respect for tradition 
and make very clear the basis on which accounts are prepared. [From 
the pamphlet, “Audit of Corporate Accounts”]
This evolution has also led to a demand for a larger degree of 
uniformity in accounting. Uniformity has usually connoted similar 
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treatment of the same item occurring in many cases, in which sense 
it runs the risk of concealing important differences among cases. 
Another sense of the word would require that different authorities 
working independently on the same case should reach the same con­
clusions. Although uniformity is a worthwhile goal, it should not be 
pursued to the exclusion of other benefits. Changes of emphasis 
and objective . . . have led, and doubtless will continue to lead, to 
the adoption of new accounting procedures. . . . [Introduction to 
ARB No. 43]
It would be convenient if some automatic comparability among financial 
statements could be attained via simple arithmetical computations. However, 
few of our analyst acquaintances seem to be alarmed about the possibility of 
being replaced by clerks or computers. They appreciate that the operations of 
a modern corporation can be highly complex. Enterprises operate across in­
ternational frontiers, produce myriad goods and services, have millions of 
transactions of many varying types, face a multiplicity of different and some­
times unique financial, regulatory and tax conditions and undertake projects 
lasting decades, subject to every conceivable combination of economic, polit­
ical, technological and other environmental risks.
Considering the foregoing complications, it is no small accomplishment 
that the affairs of a corporation, summarized periodically on a few sheets of 
paper and even expressed as a single statistic of earnings per share, have 
received such wide acceptance. It may reasonably be argued that this is 
because a degree of flexibility in generally accepted accounting principles 
has permitted the application of professional and managerial judgment to 
differing conditions in accomplishing the paramount objective of meaningful 
financial reporting.
The Lessons of the APB
Any consideration of the means by which changes in generally accepted 
accounting principles should be brought about requires review of the method 
of operation and the results of the work of the Accounting Principles Board 
of the American Institute of CPAs. This organization has contributed to an 
increased awareness of the importance of accounting and has played a leading 
role in recent years. But, while recognizing its contributions and accomplish­
ments, many financial executives feel that exception must be taken to some 
aspects of both its methods and the results.
The general criticism centers on what appears to be undue reliance on 
prescriptive authority, misdirected emphasis on uniformity, insufficient atten­
tion to good research, and inadequate consideration of the comments of the 
business community regarding the practical implications of proposals. It is 
recognized that there has been an increasing internal awareness of these de­
130
ficiencies and that changes are being made to correct them; therefore, the 
comments that follow are not intended to pillory the past but to help formulate 
agreement as to the proper goals and methods to be followed in the future.
Attention should be directed to the quality and general acceptability of 
Opinions rather than to their early and frequent release. Pronouncements are 
accorded the influence they deserve based on their inherent and intrinsic 
merits. No attempt should be made to impose them on the public or pro­
fession by substituting the bludgeon of compulsion for the power of persua­
sion. Reliance on fiat is likely not only to encourage superficial consideration 
but to become increasingly ineffective. Two outstanding instances are APB 
Opinion No. 2, “Accounting for the ‘Investment Credit’ ” and APB Opinion 
No. 10, “Omnibus Opinion-1966,” relating to accounting for convertible 
securities. The first was so widely disregarded that it was necessary effectively 
to rescind it, and the second received even less acceptance and has been sus­
pended, at least temporarily, as impractical.
Some Opinions have displayed an appearance of persuasion in that a sub­
stantial portion of the text has been devoted to presenting the pros and cons, 
but in the end the Board has simply stated its conclusions without rebuttal of 
the contrary arguments, some of which are considered by many to be quite 
convincing. This tends to impair the position and persuasive tone of the 
Board, especially when it is well known that the conflicting opinions are 
widely held by many persons of recognized standing.
When the Board presents persuasive reasons for more than one method 
and ends by adopting only one, there must be a strong inference that con­
siderations of uniformity materially influenced the conclusion. It has been 
stated that it is the Board’s policy to narrow differences rather than to im­
pose rigid uniformity, but we find that in the case of APB Opinion No. 11, 
“Accounting for Income Taxes,” comprehensive income tax allocation is re­
quired irrespective of when, if ever, a net “reversal” is expected to occur. 
This treats alike those companies and those transactions in which fluctuations 
in income may be expected within a relatively short period of time and those 
in which the interval between the origin of the tax effect and the reversal is 
so long as to make them for all practical purposes completely unrelated 
events. The continuing pressure to force deferral of the investment credit— 
against the vehement opposition of management and others—and indications 
that the accounting for leases by lessees is to be reviewed, without any clear 
demonstration that present accounting is unsatisfactory, are symptomatic of 
emphasis on uniformity for its own sake.
Operating under comprehensive rules obviously provides some protec­
tion by obviating the need for the exercise of those judgments which in border­
line situations can create the opportunity for litigation. However, it can also 
eliminate useful information and be contrary to full disclosure. A surface 
uniformity may—by obscuring the economic facts in particular circum­
stances—conceal more than it reveals and be affirmatively misleading. The 
proper objective is the elimination of unjustifiable differences in accounting 
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combined with the preservation of adequate flexibility to handle real differ­
ences in cases.
A good illustration of the latter approach is APB Opinion No. 8, “Ac­
counting for the Cost of Pension Plans.” An improvement was attained in 
spite of the failure of this statement to satisfy extremists of all persuasions. 
Essentially, it accomplished three things:
1. Elimination of practices having minimum justification and open to great­
est potential abuse
2. Expression of a preference for the guidance of those requiring a general­
ized recommendation
3. Recognition of practices which were generally accepted and have strong 
theoretical and pragmatic support.
Overemphasis on uniformity is especially apparent and detrimental to 
accounting progress when it is the sole criterion for action without judgment 
being passed on the relative merits of alternative practices. A recent example 
involves the area of discounting deferred income tax adjustments. Several 
informed individuals, including the author of the Institute’s own research 
study, discern distinct possibilities in this proposition and believe it should 
be explored. Discounting theory is employed in several other situations and 
is implicit in the Board’s initial proposals for treating convertible securities. 
Nevertheless, the APB enjoined any extensions in the tax area in 1966 pend­
ing further consideration. The prohibition was reaffirmed in 1967 without 
any indication of when the subject may again be included on the agenda.
Another danger associated with an obsession with uniformity is that it 
encourages an emphasis on the avoidance of any immediate expansion of 
alternative procedures at the expense of endangering future progress by sti­
fling present initiative and innovations in reporting practices. We have not 
achieved the present level of financial reporting by waiting for change to 
spring full-grown from the forehead of Theory or requiring modifications to 
be centrally sanctioned. Rather, progress has occurred through evolution 
based on many companies adopting and improving the presentations first 
pioneered by an imaginative few which were well received by users.
One example of this is the large number of historical summaries now 
included in annual reports in order to provide a basis for making significant 
comparisons of current conditions with the long-run trend of operations. 
Annual reports are only a chapter in the continuing history of the company 
and, as had been said, if these interim installments were not absolutely 
indispensable, they would be completely indefensible. These summaries range 
in coverage from repetition of a few key financial statistics to comprehensive 
presentations of income statement and balance sheet detail. These disclosures 
represent voluntary actions by management—based on suggestions of its in­
ternal and independent accounting advisers—going far beyond any externally 
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imposed requirements such as furnishing two-year comparative figures, or even 
five-year summaries of earnings as required for certain SEC filings. This 
evolution towards more and better long-term financial reporting is one of the 
most important recent accounting developments.
Other illustrations of upstream development include use of the equity 
method of accounting for unconsolidated subsidiaries, inclusion of funds state­
ments, and reporting in round thousands. In varying degrees after the value 
of these and other new methods have been demonstrated through use, they 
have been accorded formal recognition in Institute releases.
Responsibility for Adequate Research
It is a truism that financial events should be reported as they actually 
occur, absent compelling reasons to the contrary. Those who would depart 
from reflecting actual transactions have the burden of showing that the modi­
fications will increase the usefulness of reports to management, investors and 
other users. When accountants adopting or approving practices differing from 
Opinions of the Accounting Principles Board are assigned the obligation of 
justifying their actions, it would seem equally appropriate to require that the 
pronouncements given such presumptive authority should represent something 
more than the unsupported personal preferences of a two-thirds majority of 
present Board members. The Board has, however, at times chosen to act with­
out conducting what many consider to be adequate prior research. This is 
not to suggest that as a general practice the Board reaches its conclusions on 
the basis of snap votes, that preliminary studies are not made, or that many 
members of the Board do not conscientiously consult their broad knowledge 
of the thinking of others on the subject. However, in many cases there is not 
any published evidence of the adequacy or even the fact of preliminary study 
or research, and, in at least one case, the research as published appears to 
have been directed toward implementation rather than toward foundation. 
The consequence has been in some cases an unsatisfactory pronouncement 
occasioning widespread noncompliances and a weakening of confidence in 
the authority of the Board.
Faulty research employed in the formulation of Opinions without the 
benefit of factual analysis of actual business is evident in the history of inter­
period allocation of income taxes. There have been numerous conflicting 
statements released in the literature of the profession and pronouncements 
by organs of the AICPA without the benefit of comprehensive first-class 
research as to the proven propriety, practical implications, and economic 
consequences of particular approaches. One need only cite official AICPA 
Opinions in order to document the indecision which surrounds this issue.
Accounting Research Bulletin No. 44, “Declining-balance Depreciation,” 
was released in 1954 after adoption of major modifications to the Internal 
Revenue Code and then revised four years later. The original pronounce­
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ment accepted the basic arguments for partial allocation but the restatement 
clearly called for comprehensive allocation with respect to book/tax timing 
differences relating to depreciation. Little or no justification of the change in 
position was presented. The year 1962 introduced another tax consideration 
in the form of the investment credit which resulted in an APB promulgation 
requiring deferral. In 1964 the Board rescinded this rigid requirement and 
announced the acceptability of the flow-through treatment which, in spite of 
the original pronouncement, had become the prevailing practice.
Finally in 1966 the AICPA published Accounting Research Study No. 
9, Interperiod Allocation of Corporate Income Taxes by Homer A. Black. 
Although this document defined and differentiated alternative methods of 
allocation in a competent manner, the report was largely devoted to matters 
of computational mechanics and classification. Unfortunately, this study did 
not provide a balanced presentation of pertinent information regarding prac­
tical aspects of accounting for income taxes from a business perspective. 
Neither was there any attempt to provide an objective review of the basic 
issue of whether comprehensive, partial, or some other income allocation 
policy was most appropriate from the standpoint of reporting to shareholders. 
This limitation of scope was explicitly stated:
The study begins with two accounting assumptions which have 
long been accepted by the majority of the profession: (1) income 
taxes are expenses rather than distributions of income, and (2) 
income taxes are to be allocated to applicable periods (corollary— 
disclosure of tax timing differences in a note is not an acceptable 
substitute).
These very issues were not completely decided at that time and are, 
indeed, still being debated today. Thus, the author actually “assumed away” 
the problem that he or someone else should have been investigating. Indeed, 
he justified his assumptions by quoting from an Accounting Research Bul­
letin, which is a classic case of circular reasoning. This shortcoming was 
pointed out in the introductory comments by the AICPA’s director of ac­
counting research, Reed Storey:
The study does not answer fundamental questions about the nature 
of the income tax and the validity of the concept of interperiod income 
tax allocation. Whether income taxes are conceptually expenses 
or distributions of income has not really been resolved by the pro­
fession. Similarly, whether taxes should be allocated or whether the 
taxes currently payable should be the income tax expense for a period 
has never been adequately studied. ... I sincerely hope that these 
fundamental questions will be studied by others.
The aforementioned research study was one of the main items considered 
by the Board in issuing APB Opinion No. 11 on this subject. Although 
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paragraphs regarding deferral of the investment credit were eliminated from 
the final Opinion because of the extensive criticism received concerning the 
reactivation of this proposal, which, significantly, was not covered by the 
research study, the provision prescribing comprehensive allocation of income 
taxes was retained. The Opinion recited the basic arguments for partial and 
comprehensive allocation and reviewed the deferred and liability procedures 
for calculating desired adjustments. Although the evidence was seemingly 
balanced in many respects, the majority simply stated in paragraph 34, with­
out supplying its reasoning, that:
The Board has considered the various concepts of accounting for 
income taxes and has concluded that comprehensive interperiod tax 
allocation is an integral part of the determination of income tax 
expense. Therefore, income tax expense should include the tax 
effects of revenue and expense transactions included in the determina­
tion of pretax accounting income. . . .
To many, this Opinion represents a disappointment because of their 
belief that income taxes are a real expense which, depending on available 
alternatives and elections, produce real and varying results. They believe 
that the income statement should reflect these realities. Many also think that 
accounting should reflect the economic probabilities that additional tax pay­
ments will actually be required in the foreseeable future. However, all must 
experience some regret that again the nature of the income tax itself was not 
explored and that no answer was given to those who argued the importance 
of practical consequences, including the impact upon the national economy. 
Argument by assertion is inadequate substantiation for pronouncements which 
are intended to affect reporting by thousands of corporations to millions of 
individuals for billions of dollars of investments.
The inadequacies of research relating to tax allocation are exceeded only 
by the complete absence of any published study in the case of convertible 
securities, where, as in the case of the investment credit, it was necessary for 
the APB to retract its previously untenable position. Thus, the problems which 
have been encountered with these particular topics underscore the need for a 
firm foundation for any Opinions.
It would be appropriate to summarize this subject, which is critical to 
future progress in financial reporting, with the observation that many cor­
porate executives have considerable experience with large and complex 
research projects and are able to evaluate these endeavors without becoming 
expert or immersed in details. Many are prepared to provide advice and 
assistance since there can be no disagreement with the fundamental objectives 
of the accounting profession. However, if progress is to be accelerated and 
mistakes avoided, it is imperative that there be a firm resolution that really 
adequate financial research must first establish a firm foundation for all future 
accounting Opinions.
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An example of the need for and the proper approach to financial 
research is to be found in the area of segment reporting for diversified 
companies which has been receiving increasing attention in recent years. 
Difficult problems are involved in the question of the amount of disclosure 
that is appropriate in financial reporting. Present investors are entitled to 
the information necessary to pass judgment on management’s performance 
and to appraise the true value of their holding. Potential investors are en­
titled to similar information. Neither should be at a disadvantage in relation 
to “insiders,” which include not only management and principal stockholders 
but others who by means of special efforts and sources may obtain information 
that might reasonably have been provided to all. On the other hand, few 
would advocate that financial reporting should unnecessarily injure the com­
petitive position of the enterprise.
Beyond the question of relative rights to information are the issues of 
the practicality and best means of publishing results on some basis more 
detailed than total company operations. An initial reaction might be to 
require the furnishing of information on profit and revenues by standard in­
dustrial classifications, existing organizational units, or major product lines. 
Closer study reveals that this could require some companies to functionalize 
themselves into unnatural components. There are also many difficult prob­
lems of joint cost allocations and varying interdepartmental transfer pricing 
practices which must be considered. Indeed, in some situations the added 
disclosure could be more misleading than meaningful to those not intimately 
acquainted with the affairs of the corporation.
There is little question that disclosure will be greater in the future than 
has been common in the past. This reflects a greater public need resulting 
from generally expanding diversification of corporate operations, culminating 
in the advent of the conglomerate enterprise, combined with an increasing 
appetite for additional information by all classes of governmental and private 
users.
Because of the many practical as well as theoretical problems involved, 
it is important that business participate actively in the development of means to 
satisfy these requirements. The recently completed research study, Financial 
Reporting by Diversified Companies, released by the Financial Executives 
Research Foundation represents an initial response in this area. All available 
evidence indicates that this comprehensive and balanced report has been well 
received. It represents a noteworthy example of the contribution that may 
be made by business through research conducted in a thorough and objective 
manner and with representation of all interested parties.
This report recommends guidelines for greater component reporting 
but does not attempt to codify rules. It recognizes that the application of 
judgment to existing circumstances is essential to meaningful results. This 
freedom may result in an inconvenient variety of presentations but is preferable 
to a meaningless artificial uniformity.
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Commitment to Communication and Full Participation
The number of persons interested in improving financial reporting is 
constantly increasing. The fisting would include large numbers of accountants 
in public practice, their thousands of corporate colleagues and a considerable 
assemblage in other occupations. It is axiomatic that each of these groups 
has a contribution to offer which cannot be ignored. There is an issue, 
however, as to whether present operating practices are optimum to assure 
that industry and other views are actively solicited and given serious con­
sideration well before final conclusions are reached.
One of the most constructive aspects of this Symposium is that it brings 
together members of the accounting profession, academic world, and business 
community to discuss accounting developments. Similar joint conferences 
on specific subjects should be equally beneficial. There are other areas in 
which communications might be improved contributing to an acceleration 
of progress.
First, industry and user representatives should actively participate from 
an early stage of project development. These groups have a detailed experi­
ence with practical problems and an intimate awareness of informational 
utilization that can offer much-needed guidance to the Accounting Principles 
Board and the accounting research division of the AICPA. On any particular 
subject, there are many real experts whose assistance could be invaluable in 
increasing the soundness of statements and improving the reception they 
receive. Indeed there ought to be much greater representation of industry 
and user interests on the APB than presently exists.
Any Opinion which is going to be successful must have the support not 
only of independent accountants but also of financial executives and invest­
ment advisors and analysts. To attain this confluence might necessitate a 
major modification in organization of the APB with greater use of task forces 
assigned to specific projects and less emphasis on an omniscient superstructure. 
Subcommittees of the full Board are a partial reflection of this approach but 
represent at best a compromise. The full task force approach, not restricted 
to members of the Board, offers the following advantages:
1. Services of individuals with special competence and experience in partic­
ular areas can be solicited.
2. Scope of assignment can be made more commensurate with the extent of 
participation which can be assumed by most persons with other full-time 
responsibilities.
3. The study would tend to be more comprehensive and the group would 
not be confronted with the present need to issue some statement before 
annual membership turnover occurs.
4. Simultaneous progress on several fronts would be possible because total 
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resources would exceed those available to committees formed from a 
limited body.
5. Representation of, and liaison with, other interested organizations would 
be improved.
Secondly, an adequate interval between the issuance of a research study 
or exposure draft and subsequent action should be provided to afford oppor­
tunity for careful examination and orderly consideration of the many points 
involved. This is required not only to provide the accounting equivalent of 
legal due process, but to protect against the issuance of Opinions which will 
require revision and against the impairment of the reputation and influence 
of the APB.
In establishing schedules and target dates, the profession should not be 
stampeded by critics who foretell financial collapse if long-standing practices 
are not changed forthwith. Consistency and stability are important to sound 
reporting. Appropriate recognition should be given to the high priority of 
many other matters competing for the attention of the parties who are entitled 
to contribute to decisions. The simulation of results and the full review of 
economic implications can be major undertakings. Incidentally, the magni­
tude of this task varies inversely with the adequacy of accompanying research. 
Equally time-consuming is the preparation of those consolidated comments 
outlining supporting reasoning which the APB prefers. Many trade associa­
tions have more elaborate clearance arrangements than are in existence in the 
American Institute to ensure that a true consensus of views exists before 
official statements are released.
Finally, the commitment to communications is not a collection of pro­
cedures or a public relations campaign politicizing particular pronouncements. 
It is an attitude which fosters both dissemination and receipt of ideas with 
the aim of improving the reporting process.
Conclusion
The pace of accounting developments has quickened in recent years 
in response to the growing demand for more complete and exact financial 
information from an expanding body of investors. It is most important that 
corporate executives participate actively in these developments supporting 
those offering significant and needed improvement, but also resisting those 
representing unsophisticated oversimplifications in the name of uniformity 
or comparability which are not in conformity with the realities of the business 
world.
Consistency in reporting economic facts and effects is of the utmost 
importance if comparisons of results are to be meaningful and public con­
fidence maintained in the integrity of financial statements. If we are to achieve 
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continued progress by evolution rather than risk regression via revolution it 
is absolutely essential that there be a firm commitment to better and broader 
research as the prerequisite to any future recommendations for implementa­
tion of proposed accounting reforms.
Symposiums such as this serve a useful purpose by bringing together 
representatives of the major groups most interested in improving financial 
reporting, and afford an opportunity to review the serious implications of 
accounting developments which attempt to travel too far down the road of 
purely theoretical reasoning without the solid backing of practical experience. 
Through combined co-operative efforts we will most expeditiously achieve 
our common goal.
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Corporate Reporting and 
Accounting Principles: 
The Viewpoint of an 
Independent Accountant
By Thomas D. Flynn
Partner, Arthur Young & Company, Past President of the American Institute 
of CPAs, representing the American Institute of CPAs
Corporate reporting in the United States has come a long way in the 
last twenty-five years in revealing information about the financial and eco­
nomic facts which bear upon the life and growth of American businesses. 
We often overlook this healthy development in our concentration on the 
things in corporate reporting which require improvement or correction. A 
number of influences have affected this development. Corporate manage­
ment, the accounting profession, the SEC, the various user groups and the 
financial press can all claim some part of the credit.
Another factor which is also overlooked in our focus on the deficiencies 
in corporate reporting and on the development of accounting principles is 
the immense complexity of the publicly owned enterprises with which we are 
primarily concerned. The solutions to the reporting and accounting prob­
lems of these companies become much more difficult as the emphasis in 
corporate reporting is shifted from the historical performance to the future 
performance of companies. The historical record is useful now only to the 
extent it can contribute to predictions of future performance.
Still another factor which complicates our search for better accounting 
principles is the unhealthy emphasis by our financial community on the figure 
of net income per share as a yardstick to measure performance. It is under­
standable that the investor would like to have one single measuring device or 
unit on which he can rely to tell him what he needs to know about the past 
and future performance of a corporate enterprise. But the financial and 
economic factors involved in corporate life and growth are so complex that 
there is no reasonable hope that such reliance can ever be placed solely on 
“net income per share” no matter what progress we make in agreeing on 
better accounting principles. The recent Opinions of the Accounting Prin­
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ciples Board dealing with earnings per share should be useful in developing 
a better perspective by the financial community on this useful financial 
measurement.
Role of Accounting Principles
Perhaps at this point it is appropriate to ask what we should expect 
accounting principles to do for us. In my opinion, accounting principles 
should help us to describe, in financial terms and with reasonable accuracy, 
economic events and transactions affecting business enterprises. As we all 
know, business transactions exhibit tremendous range and variety. Account­
ing principles are a kind of financial grammar which is indispensable in 
helping to describe these transactions in financial terms with reasonable 
accuracy. In our quest to reduce the number and variety of accounting 
principles, we must not let our efforts carry us too far. We need to have 
enough accepted ways of accounting for transactions so that we can tell the 
reader of a financial statement what he needs to know about the significant 
business facts which can be expressed in monetary terms. We should not 
require all business enterprises to use a kind of accounting Esperanto in the 
preparation of their financial statements. To be unable to express adequately 
the variety in business transactions would be as unsatisfactory as to have too 
many alternative accounting principles.
Good accounting principles are an essential element in organizing 
intelligently the financial facts of a business so that the management of the 
business can understand what is actually taking place. Management needs 
for information are, indeed, much greater than those of investors. In spite of 
these greater needs, there are relatively few situations where management 
requires different accounting principles for internal reporting purposes than 
those required for reporting to stockholders. After all, the same set of facts 
and transactions is being reported upon in both cases. Accounting principles 
should help make like things look alike, and unlike things look different. This 
thought was expressed by the special committee on the Opinions of the 
Accounting Principles Board. The committee concluded that one of the 
objectives of the Board should be “that variations in accounting items gener­
ally should be confined to those justified by substantial differences in factual 
circumstances.”
Part of our difficulty in agreeing on accounting principles is the present 
inability of existing accounting principles in many cases to describe economic 
and business events as they really are. For example, you are all familiar with 
the pooling-purchase concept in accounting and its inability to deal with the 
tremendous variety of real-life situations involving corporate mergers and 
acquisitions. At one end of this merger spectrum is the classical purchase of 
a company for “cash on the barrel head,” and at the other end is the pooling 
of two large public companies of equal size through an exchange of common 
stock with no gimmicks of any kind. In actual fact, however, there is a wide 
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range between these two extremes, and most mergers can be located at some 
point in between. However, until quite recently we could classify mergers 
for accounting purposes in only two ways—either as a pooling or as a pur­
chase. It is as if we were required to describe a vivid modern painting—a 
Jackson Pollock, perhaps—in terms of either white or black, but not both, 
much less other colors.
Recently, accounting has recognized that there are gradations of color 
in between simple white and black. We now account for some mergers on 
the basis of a “part pooling—part purchase.” This may be a step in the 
right direction, but we have a considerable distance to go. As it is now, there 
are many cases of mergers in which it is difficult to determine how the trans­
action should be accounted for, the transaction being balanced on a “knife 
blade” between a pooling and a purchase. Yet, the accounting consequences 
of treating the transaction as a pooling may be vastly different from those of 
treating it as a purchase.
There are other examples of the inadequacy of existing accounting 
principles to express fully the economic realities of business transactions. The 
present accounting for leases is a good example of the kind of inadequacy 
which I have in mind. There are a tremendous variety of leases, ranging in 
almost imperceptible steps from the rental of equipment for a few hours to 
leases which are scarcely distinguishable from purchases with all the rights 
of ownership. Our accounting principles at present can handle such trans­
actions only as a lease or as a purchase.
Another important example has to do with the effects of the changing 
value of our monetary unit of measurement—the dollar. We account for the 
dollar as if it were stable, yet we all are well aware of the erosion in its value 
which has taken place over the last 25 years. Users of financial statements 
should insist that the statements be adjusted to the changing value of the 
dollar. It is feasible to prepare such statements.
The failure to consider the present (discounted) value of assets and 
liabilities is another area of accounting which should be explored more 
vigorously. Application of present value measurements would, in many 
instances, present the facts more realistically. The present value of an invest­
ment credit to be spread over a future period should probably take into 
account the effect of interest on the balance deferred to future periods. For 
example, assume that a credit is to be deferred over a period of 20 years 
with a 6 per cent interest factor. At the end of the first year only 56 per cent 
of the investment credit would be deferred to the remaining 19 years as 
compared with 95 per cent if discounting to present value were not used.
Changing Attitudes of Users
At this point, it might be useful to consider briefly the changing attitudes 
of investors and credit grantors as they have evolved over the last 30 or 40 
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years. These attitudes constitute an important part of the environment in 
which independent auditors operate, and will become even more important as 
more and more people exhibit a greater interest in corporate securities. Buy, 
hold and sell are decisions which now face not only the affluent investor of 
former years, but also the man with relatively few dollars to invest. As 
communication becomes increasingly instantaneous through telephone and 
television, greater publicity will be given to management decisions—to build 
new plants or develop new products and to engage in other projects affecting 
future operations. Such information helps to excite the interest of the investor 
in the future events which determine the market value of the securities which 
he owns or wishes to buy. Increasingly, the investor is interested in the past 
only as a guide to the future.
Historically, financial statements have been regarded as a report of 
stewardship to the stockholders by management for the assets, capital and 
business entrusted to its care. Not so many years ago the balance sheet was 
viewed as having more significance than the income statement. With this 
attitude, emphasis was placed on conservatism and periodic dividends. Con­
sequently, assets and liabilities were viewed more in terms of their liquidation 
values than in terms of their effects on income in future periods.
In recent years, the income statement has assumed the dominant position 
in the financial statement sweepstakes. Users have become more concerned 
with the growth potential of a company than with the ability or need to pay 
a cash dividend. The periodic changes in economic resources of a business 
entity now assume a primary importance as an indication of the likelihood 
of future dividend prospects or capital gains, on which a choice among a 
number of alternative investment opportunities may turn.
The measurement of this periodic change might appropriately be re­
ferred to as the “earnings-per-share syndrome.” The symptoms of this malady 
can be found most frequently in the practice of measuring the value of a 
security in a particular industry at a particular point in the business cycle 
in terms of a price/earnings multiple. Investors have now realized that 
multiplying a figure of earnings per share by some multiple only magnifies 
any purported defect in the earnings per share figure. The defect most often 
mentioned is the lack of comparability of the resultant values between two 
companies because of variations in the application of generally accepted 
accounting principles.
It is in this environment that users have come to feel that an independent 
auditor’s responsibility goes beyond more conformity with generally accepted 
accounting principles, and also comprehends “fairness” which, as with its 
physical counterpart, is found only in the eye of the beholder. To be fair is 
to be useful. To be useful, however, depends upon who the reader is. This 
leaves unanswered the variety of demands placed on the corporate financial 
executive and the independent auditors to tell the financial story in such a 
way as to satisfy those demands.
How do we public accountants fit into this environment? What is our 
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role in the search for better accounting principles? We are usually grouped 
with the preparers, as distinguished from the users, of financial statements. 
Independent auditors, however, resist the implications that the word “pre­
parers” connotes. Their association with financial statements is not as a 
preparer. The distinction between the responsibilities of auditors and those 
of corporate financial executives is spelled out in the accounting profession’s 
literature. Statements on Auditing Procedure No. 33, “Auditing Standards 
and Procedures,” issued by the American Institute of Certified Public Ac­
countants discusses this distinction as follows:
Management has the responsibility for adopting sound accounting 
policies, for maintaining an adequate and effective system of accounts, 
for the safeguarding of assets, and for devising a system of internal 
control that will, among other things, help assure the production of 
proper financial statements. The transactions which should be re­
flected in the accounts and in the financial statements are matters 
within the direct knowledge and control of management. The audi­
tor’s knowledge of such transactions is limited to that acquired 
through his examination. Accordingly, the fairness of the represen­
tations made through financial statements is an implicit and integral 
part of management’s responsibility. The independent auditor may 
make suggestions as to the form or content of financial statements 
or he may draft them in whole or in part, based on the manage­
ment’s accounts and records. However, his responsibility for the 
statements he has examined is confined to the expression of his opin­
ion on them. The financial statements remain the representations 
of the management.
This statement was issued in 1963, repeating a similar statement made 
in 1960. In the last two or three years, however, there has been pressure to 
involve the CPA to a greater extent in the preparation of a company’s finan­
cial statements and to increase his responsibilities for those statements. This 
pressure has been coming from the changing attitudes of investors, credit 
grantors, financial analysts, and other users of financial statements.
While independent public accountants are not preparers, we have a 
primary interest in the development of the very best accounting principles— 
those which will be most useful to investors and management and to their 
advisers.
The Role of the Accounting Principles Board
It was this challenge which prompted the AICPA to review its role in 
the development of accounting principles, and to create the Accounting 
Principles Board in September 1959. This Board superseded the committee 
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on accounting procedure, which had been created in 1938 to deal with 
accounting matters and which functioned until August 1959. The APB’s 
activities are supported by a greatly expanded accounting research program 
of the Institute. As you know, it is the duty of the APB, “to issue in its own 
name pronouncements on accounting principles. It may also, in its discretion, 
revise or revoke, in whole or in part, or issue interpretative statements as 
to any pronouncements previously issued.” The APB is designated “the sole 
group within the Institute having authority to make or authorize public 
pronouncements on accounting principles,” and its pronouncements are 
expected to be regarded as authoritative written expressions of generally 
accepted accounting principles. Pronouncements of the Board on accounting 
principles are not required to be presented to the Council or to the member­
ship of the Institute for approval.
To give added status to APB Opinions, the Institute’s Council, in 
October 1964, unanimously adopted a Special Bulletin entitled “Disclosure 
of Departures from Opinions of Accounting Principles Board.” While recog­
nizing that general rules may be subject to exception, it provides that the 
burden of justifying departures from Board Opinions must be assumed by 
those who adopt other practices, and that such departures must be disclosed 
in footnotes to the financial statements or in independent auditors’ reports 
when the effect of a departure on the financial statements is material.
Procedures of the Accounting Principles Board
A description of the procedures followed in developing opinions might 
be helpful in answering questions regarding the modus operandi of the APB. 
A prospectus outlining accounting issues to be investigated is prepared for 
discussion and approval of the full Board. The chairman of the Board and 
the director of accounting research select the research project to be under­
taken. The director assigns the project to a project advisory committee 
(usually five to seven members) which is appointed by the director with the 
approval of the APB chairman. The committee ordinarily is selected partly 
from the Board, with a member of the Board acting as chairman, and partly 
from the general membership of the Institute, but individuals from industry 
and other sources outside the Institute may be invited to be members. Drafts 
of the study are exposed to the project advisory committee and, frequently, 
to others interested in the project. Comments and opinions are sought.
Upon completion of a study, the director and a majority of the advisory 
committee decide whether to publish it. Any committee member not agreeing 
with the conclusions of a study may express his disagreement. His remarks 
are included in an appendix to the study. Each study as published bears a 
clear statement to the effect that it has not been approved or disapproved by 
the Board or by the Institute, and does not necessarily reflect their views. 
The full study, upon publication, is widely exposed in the accounting profes­
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sion and in business and financial circles. A summary is published in The 
Journal of Accountancy. Comments are solicited. APB members review the 
study and the comments received and decide whether an Opinion is advisable. 
If advisable, a draft Opinion is developed by a subcommittee for review by 
the full Board.
After review by the Board, an exposure draft of the proposed Opinion 
is prepared and widely exposed for comment to give interested persons oppor­
tunity to present, for consideration by the Board, memoranda in addition 
to those previously presented on the subject. The proposed Opinion is also 
published in The Journal of Accountancy. The APB studies the comments, 
discusses any proposed changes, and, after a reasonable period, prepares a 
final draft for balloting by the Board. Each Board member must assent, 
dissent, or assent with qualification. In the latter two cases, a statement of 
the member’s position is published with the Opinion. The final Opinion must 
represent the considered opinion of at least two-thirds of the members of the 
Board. The Opinions are not intended to be retroactive unless otherwise 
stated and are not intended to be applicable to immaterial items.
The Activities of the Board
As mentioned earlier, the Board has the responsibility to issue, in its 
own name, pronouncements on accounting principles in accordance with the 
overall objective. The Council of the AICPA, its governing body, expressed 
this objective as follows:
The general purpose of the Institute in the field of financial account­
ing should be to advance the written expression of what constitutes 
generally accepted accounting principles, for the guidance of its mem­
bers and of others. This means something more than a survey of 
existing practice. It means continuing effort to determine appropriate 
practice and to narrow the areas of difference and inconsistency in 
practice. In accomplishing this, reliance should be placed on persua­
sion rather than on compulsion. The Institute, however, can, and it 
should, take definite steps to lead in the thinking on unsettled and 
controversial issues. [Report to Council of the Special Committee 
on Research Program, September 1958}
Is the APB meeting the challenge which the accounting profession has 
accepted to improve accounting principles, and to eliminate alternative 
accounting principles which cannot be justified by variations and differences 
in circumstances? I believe that the Board is meeting this challenge in 
magnificent fashion. It has worked exceedingly hard, and it has moved as 
fast and has accomplished as much as can rightfully be expected. If anything, 
in their zeal to make progress, the members may have moved too fast in some of
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the complicated problem areas in which they have issued Opinions. Within 
the last two years, the APB has issued five Opinions. These Opinions, among 
other things, have improved:
• The accounting for and reporting of the cost of pension plans
• The reporting of the results of operations, particularly the treatment 
of extraordinary items, and the computation of earnings per share
• The recording and reporting of investments in unconsolidated domes­
tic subsidiaries
• The allocation of income taxes among periods and to related trans­
actions
• The disclosure of depreciation methods for major classes of depre­
ciable assets.
In addition, the Board has under study a number of other projects, the 
majority of which will probably lead to Opinions by the Board. Included in 
these efforts are projects on the following subjects:
• Principles underlying financial statements of business enterprises
• Financial statements adjusted for price-level changes
• Accounting in regulated industries
• Accounting for components of an entity
• Reporting (and accounting) by diversified companies
• Business combinations and goodwill.
The scope of these projects suggests that the tempo of the Board’s work 
load is increasing rather than slowing down. But is this necessarily in the 
best interests of the profession or the financial community? If the mounting 
pressure for change invites too hasty a response which later proves to be 
unacceptable, are not all parties hurt?
This has, in fact, happened on two recent occasions. The first was with 
regard to the accounting for the investment tax credit. Many agree that only 
one method of accounting should be used—either a method of deferring the 
credit over the useful life of the related asset, or a method whereby the benefit 
is permitted to “flow through” to income. The difficulty is that agreement 
cannot be reached as to which method should be required. The APB moved 
to require the deferral method, and later had to revise its position.
The second revision to a Board position occurred in connection with 
its earlier requirement, now temporarily suspended, to require an attribution 
of a portion of the proceeds of the sale of convertible debt or debt issued 
with stock warrants to the conversion feature or the warrants.
I submit that, in responding to the challenge of change, the Board may 
have tried to move too fast. Like the extensive tests required of an airplane 
before certification, the draft Opinions of the Board should be extensively 
tested by business and industry by application to real conditions with all of 
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their complexities. This will require management, especially the financial 
executives, to take a much more active interest in the activities of the APB 
before Opinions are issued in final form. It is not enough for business to 
review the draft Opinions and submit comments based upon their general 
knowledge. They should carefully apply the draft Opinions to the operations 
of their own companies for a sufficient period of time to ensure that all 
relevant real life situations have been appropriately dealt with, and that there 
are no surprises or ambiguities hidden in the language of the Opinions. Cer­
tainly the financial community and management were both caught by surprise 
as to the meaning and significance of the Board’s Opinion on the accounting 
for residual securities and for convertible debt. This element of surprise 
could have been avoided if both groups had tested the proposed Opinion 
against actual business situations. In this testing phase, the implementation 
of the draft Opinions will not infrequently suggest areas which require better 
definition or revision.
This means, however, an even longer period of gestation for Opinions, 
particularly in the final stages. Adequate time must be given management 
and user groups to explore the implications of the draft Opinions of the APB. 
Those of you who have read the Opinion on income taxes and have attempted 
to apply it to various business situations undoubtedly realize how compli­
cated such a subject can get. Often the complications do not become 
apparent until real-life situations are studied in depth.
I should point out that my views on the present pace of the APB are 
not endorsed or shared by all of my colleagues. The executive vice president 
of the AICPA, Leonard M. Savoie, believes that the pace must be stepped 
up. Addressing the Council meeting of the AICPA in the spring of 1968, 
he said:
The accounting profession has earned the right to set accounting 
principles by giving constant and careful attention to the elevation 
and maintenance of accounting standards. But if the profession is 
to continue to enjoy this privilege, it will have to redouble its efforts 
to meet rising expectations of a better-informed public.
* * *
The predominant view of all but the management groups is that 
the accounting profession should accelerate its efforts to improve 
financial accounting principles and to narrow areas of differences 
in accounting practices.
We probably are not as far apart in our thinking as these statements by 
Mr. Savoie might imply. I do not want the APB or the accounting profession 
to rest on their laurels or to slacken their efforts. I am against meeting self­
imposed deadlines without the necessary study and testing of draft Opinions 
by groups in our society who have a vital interest in them. If the APB or the 
profession can increase its present efforts and pace, so much the better.
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The Means of Developing Accounting Principles
What should be the role of the various groups in our society who have 
a stake in the development of better accounting principles and improved 
financial reporting?
It seems to me that the present arrangement is basically sound. This 
places the accounting profession, through the APB, in a position of leader­
ship with other groups such as the SEC, the FEI, the FAF, the national 
associations of investment and commercial bankers, the stock exchanges and 
the professors of accounting occupying influential and co-ordinating positions.
Legally, of course, the SEC has had the authority since its inception in 
the thirties to prescribe the form and content of financial statements, and the 
underlying accounting principles for companies coming under their control. 
They have wisely left this task primarily to the managements of the companies 
and to the accounting profession. A few years ago, the SEC gave indication 
that it was becoming restive under this policy and might exercise to a much 
greater extent the authority conferred upon it by law. In the last two years, 
however, the SEC has expressed its satisfaction with the work of the APB. 
I am confident that as long as the APB and the other groups having an 
interest in accounting principles and financial reporting address themselves 
with vigor and in an orderly manner to the various important problems, the 
SEC will co-operate with understanding as it has in the past.
While I fully concur in the proposition that the accounting profession 
should exercise leadership in the search for improved accounting principles, 
I believe it cannot and should not try to accomplish the job without close and 
active co-operation with the other groups represented at this Symposium. I 
have been pleased with the increased efforts by these groups within the last 
two or three years, particularly those of the Financial Executives Institute. 
Their study of conglomerate reporting represents a real contribution to this 
difficult subject. I am hopeful that all of these groups will step up their 
efforts even more over the next few years. This means more organized com­
mittee work, more permanent full-time and competent staff assistants and 
directors, and much more financial support than has been devoted, even in 
the recent past, to the development of accounting principles and to improve­
ments in financial reporting.
Some people, particularly users of financial statements, regard this 
arrangement as too loose, too lacking in definition of the precise areas of 
responsibility assumed by each of the groups, including the accounting pro­
fession. They want to make very much faster progress. Their impatience 
may cause them to look elsewhere for a solution. This could be unfortunate.
Not a small part of the problem, in my opinion, is that many users of 
financial statements are not sufficiently aware of the difficulties inherent in 
the effort to improve accounting principles. There are not too many easy 
problems left, since the easier problems have been solved. Greater awareness 
of the factors involved in the current problems should enable the user groups 
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to contribute more effectively to the solutions. It is not enough for them to 
stand on the sidelines shouting encouragement or hurling abuse at the 
accounting profession and others working to improve accounting principles 
and financial reporting. These groups must be active participants. They 
should work through their own organizations by financial support and by 
personal effort.
While the present arrangement which I have described for moving 
forward in the area of accounting principles and financial reporting is not 
working perfectly, the alternatives are much less attractive. Some people 
would turn to the government for the resolution of accounting problems and 
for the enforcement of the decisions reached. A prominent public accountant 
has advocated the establishment of an accounting court—a Supreme Court 
of accounting consisting of members appointed for life by the President of 
the United States and confirmed by the Senate. The court would make its 
decisions on the basis of briefs submitted by interested parties and would 
thus “eradicate the contradictions now existing” with respect to accounting 
principles and auditing standards.
Proposals along these lines may have superficial appeal to the unin­
formed. It is obviously possible to point to many alternative accounting 
principles in use today and to wide variations in the methods of disclosure 
in published financial statements. To some people this is evidence of an 
unhealthy condition which requires immediate and drastic action as a means 
of bringing order out of what they regard as chaos.
In the long run, I am convinced that such proposed solutions would be 
disastrous, would tend to impose a straitjacket on American business and 
finance, and would make these institutions far less responsive to change than 
under our present economic system. This is particularly relevant when we 
consider that we are in the initial stages of the greatest scientific and tech­
nological revolution known to man. Change is the order of the day. Cer­
tainly we should not now adopt a system of accounting determination which 
would make us less responsive to change. Of course, it is understandable for 
people to seek for uniformity and certainty and to try to set down precise and 
elaborate rules for achieving these objectives. In his book, Self-Renew al, 
John W. Gardner made an exceedingly astute comment about the growth, 
development and decay of an organization which has some relevance to this 
objective in our dynamic economy:
The new organization is loose in procedure, unclear in organiza­
tion lines, variable in policies. It is willing to experiment with a 
variety of ways to solve its problems. It is not bound by the weight 
of tradition. It rushes in where angels fear to tread. As it matures, 
it develops settled ways of doing things and becomes more orderly, 
more efficient, more systematic. But it also becomes less flexible, 
less innovative, less willing to look freshly at each day’s experience. 
Its increasingly fixed routines are congealed in an elaborate body of 
written rules. In the final stages of organizational senility there is a 
rule or precedent for everything. . . .
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Those who wish to impose a rigid system of accounting determination 
by an arm of the federal government might well take heed of the wisdom of 
Mr. Gardner’s observations.
I do not want to leave the impression that I am opposed to the present 
effort of the accounting profession and by the groups to improve accounting 
principles and financial reporting. On the contrary, I am in enthusiastic 
support. We need, however, to have a good understanding of the difficulties 
involved so that we can realistically judge our rate of progress and can decide 
objectively and through careful analysis what changes, if any, we should make 
in the structure and in the methods we are using to reach our objectives.
I have been stressing the role of the accounting profession in the im­
provement of accounting principles much more than I have its role in 
improving financial reporting. I have done this not because accounting 
principles are more important than financial reporting, but because they are 
the cornerstone—the foundation—on which good financial reporting must 
rest. Accounting principles, in this context, are often difficult to consider or 
to discuss independent of financial reporting. For example, at the present 
stage of pension accounting, it is all but impossible to deal with this subject 
without consideration of the extent of disclosure necessary or desirable in 
financial statements.
Role of Other Groups
However, taking a broad view of financial reporting, it is clear that other 
groups in our society should have relatively more important roles in this area 
than they have in the determination of accounting principles. Quite rightly, 
in my opinion, the Financial Executives Institute undertook the study of 
financial reporting by conglomerates. Similarly, I believe that the various 
user groups should undertake serious studies of their specific needs in finan­
cial reporting within the practical limits of our system to produce such 
information, and with due regard to competitive, legal, and other factors which 
might restrict their right to have access to such information.
As might be suspected in the light of my views on the need for close 
co-operation between the various groups in our society who have a stake in 
accounting principles and financial reporting, I strongly endorse the holding 
of conferences such as this one to identify needs and problems. These con­
ferences should be held annually, and perhaps more often. While the subject 
matter of the present conference is excellent for a first meeting, at some 
future conference I would like to see an important problem area of much less 
scope tackled in depth. A few years ago the Harvard Business School held 
an “accounting round table” which inquired into “the measurement of 
property, plant, and equipment in financial statements.” Other subjects of 
comparable importance should provide future conferences with the oppor­
tunity to gain new insights and to advance the development of accounting 
principles and to improve financial reporting.
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Critique
Of the Norby, McGarraugh, Whitman and Flynn papers
By Clifford V. Heimbucher, Farquhar and Heimbucher, Member of Exec­
utive Committee and Past President of the American Institute of CPAs, Former 
Chairman of the AICPA Accounting Principles Board, representing the Amer­
ican Institute of CPAs
It has been said that if one cannot be famous then it is better to be 
infamous than to be ignored. Surely the Accounting Principles Board has 
escaped the fate of being ignored or neglected. It has accomplished this feat 
by becoming both famous and infamous and is at the same time the frequent 
target of bouquets and brickbats, often from the same source.
Therefore it is no surprise that the APB is the principal subject of all 
four papers prepared under the title “Users and Preparers: Needs and Re­
sponsibilities.” All four contain both praise, in varying degrees, and dissatis­
faction ranging from impatience to outright condemnation. More important, 
however, is that all four accept the Board as a potent force and all offer 
constructive ideas, suggestions, and programs for future improvement.
Rather than review or criticize each paper individually or as a whole I 
should like to direct attention to the suggestions for future development. 
That is the basic purpose of this entire meeting. If we are to lay a ground­
work for future joint progress then we should explore and discuss the different 
philosophical approaches that are evident in these papers and attempt to 
ascertain if they are really as irreconcilable as they at first appear and what 
steps may be needed to bring about a higher level of harmony and co-operation.
To approach this subject I shall compare the points of view expressed 
on three subjects covered by all of them and thus try to distill questions for 
further discussion. The questions relate not so much to conclusions as to 
attitudes.
Whose Statements?
Mr. Whitman starts his paper by stressing the primary role of manage­
ment in the reporting of financial information. He states: “Few have argued 
otherwise and the principle is long established, procedurally operative, fully 
codified, and indeed the only realistic alternative.”
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In discussing this same subject, Mr. Flynn reaches the same conclusion 
but states it quite differently as follows: “We are usually grouped with the 
preparers, as distinguished from the users of financial statements . . . there 
has been pressure to involve the CPA to a greater extent in the preparation 
of a company’s financial statements and to increase his responsibilities for 
those statements. . . . while independent public accountants are not preparers, 
we have a primary interest in the development of the very best accounting 
principles . . . .”
Now hear Mr. Norby, again on the same topic: “The presentation of 
financial statements is the responsibility of corporate management .... It 
is not easy for professional accountants . . . when . . . the management 
which hires them has its own fixed ideas about what it will report, while . . . 
the users . . . tend to criticize accountants .... The accounting profession 
can resolve its conflicting middle position by fully assuming the fiduciary 
role that is being thrust on it anyway. . . . the accountant has a point of 
leverage to secure adherence to new and stricter accounting principles . . . .”
The author of the fourth paper, Mr. McGarraugh, reaches this con­
clusion: “Accurate accumulation and compilation of the data created is 
the task of the corporate accounting staff which is responsible to manage­
ment and accountable to the certified public accountant. Review of the 
accuracy . . . and the principles utilized . . . must be delegated to the . . . 
CPA.”
Are these different conclusions of four thoughtful leaders in the field in 
agreement or in conflict? They appear to be essentially in agreement as related 
to present responsibilities and authority in the preparation of financial infor­
mation. It is clear, however, that they have reached these conclusions by 
different philosophical routes and different degrees of emphasis. From this 
we may also assume that they may have different directions of departure for 
future evolution.
Comparability
In reviewing what these authors have to say about the subject of com­
parability we again observe that the differences appear to be primarily in 
degree and emphasis rather than in kind.
Mr. Flynn says: “Accounting principles should help make like things 
look alike and unlike things look different.” He also quotes from a committee 
report that: “variations in accounting items generally should be confined to 
those justified by substantial differences in factual circumstances.”
I do not find any directly contrary view expressed in any of the other 
papers. Nevertheless, the language used is so different that diverse frames of 
reference can be inferred.
In discussing comparability Mr. Whitman uses such phrases as “. . . 
overemphasis on this objective . . . has probably become the greatest impedi-
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ment to agreement on the principles . . . “. . . unsophisticated insistence
.. . .” “. . . different things are not in fact easily comparable and . . . attempts 
to make them so lead inevitably to a devotion to form . . . .”
On the other hand, Mr. Norby states: “. . . we must have strict, practical 
accounting rules which do not permit deviation, and uniform application by 
the accounting profession.” “. . . much remains to be done—perhaps beyond 
the boundaries of present thought.” “. . . many of the unlike situations that 
are said to require different accounting treatment are really reasonably alike 
from a practical viewpoint.” “Practicality should be the lodestar . . . where 
several alternatives may be equally acceptable on theoretical grounds, one 
should be established . . . .”
Roles of Interested Parties
The most important task that this Symposium could accomplish would 
be to build a framework for a mutually acceptable system of developing, 
enunciating, and applying accounting principles. I am sure that everyone 
here would agree that we do not yet have such a system, that we should have 
one and that it should include significant roles for all of the groups represented 
here and others as well.
If we are to succeed in this task we must examine the premises from 
which we start. We should do so critically, but in a spirit of mutual respect 
and co-operation and in the light of the long-term public interest. We must 
each ask ourselves what changes may be necessary in our own established 
attitudes in order to accommodate them to a mutually acceptable set of 
relationships.
So far I have quoted selectively and without comment from the papers 
submitted in order to point up the different attitudes which prevail in our 
several disciplines.
Now I should like to examine what the authors appear to be saying about 
the appropriate roles of the interested parties and add some comments of my 
own for the purpose of raising questions which deserve full discussion.
Mr. Whitman clearly feels that management should have the final say 
in the determination of accounting principles. He recognizes that the SEC 
and other governmental agencies have certain legal authority which he implies 
should be exercised only on a minimum basis. All other interested parties he 
relegates to an advisory role.
A few quotes: “Security analysts, credit grantors, and other users should 
express individually and collectively, in general and to specific companies, 
their special informational requirements.” “Independent accountants have an 
obligation to provide management with advice and technical assistance regard­
ing the best financial reporting practices.” His key statement, however, is: 
“Certainly, if financial reporting is to continue to be meaningful, management 
must agree with the adequacy of the principles and concepts on which the 
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statements are prepared or it can no longer be held fully accountable for the 
results.”
In actual operation it would appear that what is being advocated is a 
system under which the APB and others would propose accounting principles 
and each individual company management would pick and choose among 
them and adapt them to its own requirements. I suggest that this is a clear 
case of separating responsibility and authority. Presumably, reliance for 
improvement in financial reporting generally would rest on the public acclaim 
accorded to those enlightened managements who adopted the best principles.
There can be no disagreement with Mr. Whitman’s statement that: “. . . 
progress has occurred through evolution based on many companies adopting 
and improving presentations first pioneered by an imaginative few which were 
well received by users.” What I suggest is that the present dissatisfaction with 
the rate of progress shows that this has not been enough and, with the rapid 
expansion and increasing complexity of the capital market, cannot suffice for 
the future.
From this we can discern at least one element needed to improve our 
present structure—greater collective responsibility of management.
Mr. Norby notes that: “Managements sometimes resist outside dictation 
by accountants, financial analysts or anyone else in the preparation of financial 
statements . . .” and “The American Bankers Association demonstrates 
unseemly inconsistency when as a user, it asks for improvement in accounting 
principles and their application; while as an issuer it protests newly developed 
principles applicable to banks and recommends that members ignore them
Another element that is needed to improve our present structure is 
greater participation and responsibility by industry groups.
Commenting on the swift development of merger and acquisition activity 
of recent years Mr. Norby notes: “. . . it would have been desirable to have 
developed the necessary accounting changes much more rapidly.” On the 
investment credit he says: “By now, however, the practices of individual com­
panies have become so firmly imbedded in their accounting that any single 
standard would be most difficult to achieve.” These views support the conten­
tion that we should accelerate our efforts to improve financial accounting 
principles and to narrow areas of differences in accounting practices.
On the other hand, Mr. Flynn states: “I submit that . . . the Board may 
have tried to move too fast.” In support of this position he cites the experience 
with the convertible debt issue. This was a case where the APB moved to close 
the barn door in time in order to forestall the imbedding of undesirable prac­
tices in financial reporting. The Board did not take this step without a sincere 
and intensive effort to enlist the aid and co-operation of the investment banking 
community. The result was an almost complete wall of stone raised up against 
any infringement of individual management’s right to choose its own principles. 
The issuance of the Opinion raised an immediate howl of protest, accompanied, 
at last, by an offer to collaborate on a collective basis.
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Conclusions
Despite the divergent views expressed by the four authors all of them 
agree that the improvement of financial reporting is a collective responsibility 
and that all of us must play important roles.
I submit that the most fruitful area of discussion for this group is the 
problem of the appropriate division of authority and responsibility in the 
improvement of financial reporting and how the two can be interwoven so as 
to achieve a system that is responsive to the public need but is not dictatorial 
or inflexible.
A good place to start is to ask how management collectively can provide 
money, ability, and interindustry communication to cope constructively with 
the developing need. Numerous leaders of industry have made notable con­
tributions by service on the APB, service on industry committees, public 
speeches, and by individual example. These are individual actions, however, 
and these men cannot speak for management as such. The notable exception 
to this is the recent action of the Financial Executives Institute in implementing 
a research program and providing capable leadership which can command the 
respect of management. Further activity by the FEI along these lines can 
provide the nucleus to furnish the collective responsibility that has been lacking.
Similar programs by industry groups and by professional groups like 
those represented at this Symposium can also contribute importantly.
Such efforts must be matched by the APB through changes in its methods 
of operation so as to provide early interchanges with management, industry, 
and professional representatives; mutually acceptable divisions of labor in 
research and publication; and suitable forums for constructive criticism in 
both directions.
In my view increased representation by industry or other professional 
groups on the APB is not an answer. Such representatives are individuals who 
may provide constructive ideas and valuable assistance but they cannot speak 
for anyone else and there is therefore no flow-back of responsibility and 
collective acceptance of the results.
We have managed to avoid being saddled with control by fiat. Our sys­
tem is flexible. It relies upon self-regulation, co-operation, communication, 
and mutual respect between industry, government, and profession. It offers 
maximum opportunity for innovation and adaptability to change. To maintain 
this healthy atmosphere we must make use of our communication and adapta­
bility to see to it that our processes and procedures keep pace with the public 
need in this modem age of rapid expansion and change.
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Critique
Of the Norby, McGarraugh, Whitman and Flynn papers
By Charles N. Berents, Vice President—Investments and Director, Hillman 
Land Company, representing the Financial Analysts Federation
Norby
In representing the common stock investor, Mr. Norby presents a plea 
for more information of an indirect financial nature. One might question 
whether the sophisticated investment analyst uses the financials as the starting 
point. He is more likely to assemble and analyze data as to economic and 
industry settings, trends, concepts, stock price habits, and so forth, in under­
taking original investigations. Financial analysis becomes more of a discipline 
around the time a commitment has been made.
There is no doubt that many companies are endeavoring to provide 
better information about the industry or industries within which they operate; 
all will eventually have to recognize this need. It has a considerable bearing on 
qualitative analysis as a highly important factor inextricably tied into the 
financial results.
I would question whether financial data really lend themselves to “projec­
tion of a company’s earning power,” as stated. They more usually tend to 
establish parameters for future expectations.
A reference that is surprising (as a parenthetical observation) is that 
return on an investment includes “capital appreciation arising from growth 
of the enterprise through retained earnings.” More familiar is that investment 
return is measured by the combination of income and capital appreciation; 
the latter is not necessarily related to the plowback.
While on the subject of investment return, one of the problems is that a 
majority of investors do not take a patient view of their holdings these days. 
One result is that supplemental information, which often has more influence 
on the short-range market fortunes of a stock, is of greater importance than 
accountants and financial officers may realize.
Implicit throughout this discussion is the intangible of confidence. It is 
clear that the serious analyst is more interested in qualitative analysis than the 
quantitative approach. Financial statements which are inadequate or poorly 
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presented do not usually find as high regard in the market place in terms of 
earnings multiples and dividend yields.
A telling point is the detailing of supplemental information required by 
the investment analyst outside the scope of certified financial statements. 
(Note: Financial analyst and investment analyst are here regarded as synony­
mous.) Footnotes developed for financial statements should be given more 
prominence and they most certainly should be stated more intelligibly.
When assets include unamortized R&D, patent development, etc., there 
is a real question as to whether accountants always understand the entry or 
presentation which has been approved. The user hopes that sound judgment 
supports the form of reporting. Comparability is not a substitute for disclosure 
and where new, or high, technology is present, it would be beneficial (and 
refreshing) to find that certifying accountants have independently sought 
expert consultation prior to rendering statements.
Depending on the treatment, too, in charging off special costs as incurred, 
or deferring all or part of the expenses, major swings in reported earnings can 
occur. There are at least one-half dozen other important categories, not to 
mention investment tax credit accounting, which can have great impact on 
earnings results.
“Managed earnings,” as described by Mr. Norby, seem to be the order 
of the day. Since this might also be described as “management earnings,” some 
better standard for the treatment of stock options probably should be generally 
adopted. One must inquire about the logic in treating them as deferrals 
through capital accounts rather than as current expense. They are income- 
related costs and should pass through the P&L account. A flat rule in these 
matters is, in Mr. Norby’s view, far better than continuing debate about vari­
able treatment, an observation with which I concur.
Reviews of the depreciation practices in the computer manufacturing 
industry and methods for charging off certain overhead expenses by Boeing 
and Lockheed provide examples as to a key area for the Symposium to examine. 
Another, which surely will be covered at length, is the method for recording 
acquisitions on the balance sheet. It might be pertinent to observe that includ­
ing negative goodwill amortization in current earnings is a gross distortion for 
practical purposes.
Even well-trained, experienced users handling financial reports encounter 
problems, but they are nowhere near the degree of those confronting the 
average investor. Large investors can afford to employ experts to analyze and 
interpret data. The author joins others, therefore, in recommending that the 
range of generally accepted accounting principles be narrowed.
Review of computer depreciation methods for reporting purposes under­
scores the need for clear statements by accountants as to the difference between 
tax and stockholder reports. This can be particularly important as regards 
interim earnings releases.
A very interesting proposal by Mr. Norby is that certified public account­
ants should work closely with clients in preparing interim reports. The value 
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would be obvious in the case of holding companies or conglomerates, many of 
which refuse to release pro-forma comparative statements.
Mr. Norby makes a clear call for the accounting profession to accept 
gracefully the fiduciary role that is being thrust on it. This certainly is justified 
despite the profession’s policy of avoiding involvement with others’ problems.
As a step in the right direction, the addition of representatives from regu­
latory agencies to the Symposium, if continued, makes sense. It would also be 
helpful to invite participants from the listing departments of national ex­
changes. The latter could be most helpful in meeting the needs of today’s 
rapid pace of change.
McGarraugh
The author opens his paper by getting at the heart of the matter—confi­
dence in the corporate financial report. Uniformity is not necessary to insure 
this, but comparability of statements and adequate supplemental information 
are essentials.
The credit grantor, due to legally enforceable rights, has a preferred 
position which could be more clearly brought out. For example, frequent 
interim reports and interview intelligence (including discussions with the CPA 
firm handling the audit, if desired), often of an “insider” nature, are supplied 
to creditors as a general practice. While the desire to hold judgmental decisions 
to the minimum is understandable, as discussed in the mid-section of the paper, 
the objective is admittedly beyond attainment. It is important, therefore, that 
the creditor combine supplemental information for interpretive evaluation of 
financial statements just as is the case with others who have capital at stake 
in a business.
As the needs of creditors emphasize cash flow more than others, there 
would seem to be little reason for this to be unavailable to stockholders. So 
long as the detailed information has already been prepared, there should be 
no problem. This, regrettably, is rarely the case. The statement that “the 
equity investor . . . should be the best informed of all suppliers of funds as 
his is the ultimate risk” is a significant observation.
The banker or short-term lender often has a further recourse to payout 
which was not mentioned. This, in the case of publicly owned corporations, 
would be the “bail out” through issue of longer-term capital. Indeed, this is 
necessary for the feeding and care of conglomerates since they engage so 
extensively in interim financing. In this respect, alerting others to improper 
or questionable use of a credit line is perhaps a duty that the banker owes to 
mutually interested parties.
The complexities of conglomerate and rapidly growing multiline com­
panies doubtless present obvious problems vis-a-vis personal communication. 
It is stated that it is “no longer . . . possible to interview corporate management 
of the company and accumulate all of the data that may be pertinent to its 
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financial position.” One might reasonably inquire, however, whether the 
deficiency lies equally with credit grantors not sufficiently staffed with the 
“trained objective professional” rather than identifying the problem primarily 
as a shortcoming of the corporate borrower.
Nonetheless, there is no disputing the view that the financial statements 
are basic to communicating and that they will continue in the primary role. 
Insofar as substandard reports are concerned, Mr. McGarraugh raises the very 
practical question of who bells the cat. Procedure followed by some of the 
Robert Morris Associates’ chapters is ineffective, and for good reasons as 
described.
The banker, however, has less risk than the longer-term investor if only 
for the reason that his payout period is considerably shorter. Thus, differences 
in evaluating financial statements variously prepared under the umbrella of 
generally accepted accounting principles probably are more tolerable. If the 
short-term creditor can secure statements of subsidiaries and/or divisional 
information, obscure accounting can largely be cleared away. Conglomerate 
accounting, primarily made available as consolidated reporting, seems to find 
attention focusing more on earnings than balance sheet data. As observed in 
another paper, accounts should come out identically in the long run regardless 
of treatment accorded during the interim. Tax advantages must be grasped, 
a fact recognized by Mr. McGarraugh. Reported earnings become managed 
earnings so readily, however, that general acceptance by the equity investor 
is surprising. Quantitative, rather than qualitative, reporting seems to be the 
vogue in certain areas.
Forcefully detailed by the author is the problem involving companies 
which customarily operate with contingent liabilities of major extent. Apart 
from possible sizable losses that should be quickly determined for the balance 
sheet, there also is the problem of non-comparability of earnings with an 
example given as the construction business, depending on completed contract 
or accrual accounting. The magnitude of contingent liabilities covering other 
recurrent items such as purchase contracts, orders in process, leases, pension 
requirements, etc., also deserve full disclosure. Stockholders do not usually 
enjoy a truly co-operative reporting effort in these respects.
Mr. McGarraugh is a protagonist of presenting dual asset values; cost 
and current market. A very real problem arises, however, in establishing com­
petence and fairness of appraisers. Although market valuations need not be 
certified and they could be presented as illuminating (hopefully) statements of 
presumed factuality, opposition of CPAs to accept and incorporate adjustments 
of this type is understandably formidable.
The tax consequences of restating capital assets must remain theoretical 
as this would have to await IRS concurrence and legislation. It might also 
prove an exercise in futility by proliferating problems such as are evident in 
foreign corporate reporting. I rather lean toward the implication in this paper 
that the difference in acquisition cost versus predecessor’s original value should 
be by way of goodwill rather than restatement.
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Inventory costing could be given supplemental treatment. Yet, the author 
seems to be critical of supplemental reports and states that an ideal financial 
report would be one that does not rely on footnotes or other disclosures for 
comprehensiveness. Simplification cannot exist in fact, however, as the busi­
ness to which this might apply would be so simple that the whole question of 
financial communication would probably be redundant.
It is entirely proper for management to retain competitive advantage or 
to avoid misleading or needlessly disturbing investors, among others, by decid­
ing what constitutes privileged information. This is the only paper reviewed 
which clearly brought out this point and described the ethical responsibility. 
One can appreciate the complications in disclosing special studies of products, 
facilities planning, contemplated new ventures, management personnel evalua­
tions, and so forth, and especially if prepared by outside experts.
Review of the handling of corporate budgets, internal financial and 
operating controls are among the responsibilities of the board of directors 
which should question an incumbent management’s capability if grievous 
errors continue. They are not a part of the independent accountant’s juris­
diction. He can only examine and advise as regards internal procedures.
The Symposium, hopefully, will bring forth specifics apropos of the 
author’s concluding general statement that “an expanded and revitalized cor­
porate financial report, independently and objectively presented, appears to 
be the best medium to accomplish that end.”
Whitman
The ideal role of corporate management in financial reporting, as repre­
sented by Mr. Whitman, would seem to embrace that of public prosecutor and 
defender. The impression created, unwittingly, I am sure, is that management 
insists on being final arbiter with sole responsibility. And accounting is placed 
at center stage for virtually everything on the economic scene which, of course, 
is an exaggeration.
The fact that users of American corporate reports receive more and better 
information than anywhere else in the world does not exempt preparers from 
endeavoring to do even more. As an example, attention is focused on the 
annual report. Little comment is directed by the author to the need for 
detailed interim reporting for the benefit of all parties concerned.
It is not conclusively proved that management has a clear mandate for 
the authority-accountability interrelationships as described. Indeed, must 
financial management be privileged to establish the rules as a condition for 
participation? This question will have to be examined by the Symposium.
Distinction of stewardship is not made clear as between operating man­
agement and directors. Passive “window dressing” boards have need, so far 
as their responsibilities to creditors and stockholders are concerned, for their 
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protection by independent accountants. If financial reporting is to become 
increasingly meaningful, public accountants should make every effort to 
assist directors and strongly support disclosure of important business facts 
which go beyond the accounting phases.
It is not enough for management to agree with adequacy of principles 
and concepts governing preparation of statements. Management and account­
ants should also co-operatively cultivate straight-forwardness. Both remain 
subordinate to other interests, especially those of stockholder-owners who, as 
described in another paper, have the ultimate risk.
Apropos of this is the author’s belief that “the interests of investors are 
adequately safeguarded by the Securities and Exchange Commission.” This, 
to say the least, is a debatable statement. If the SEC should eventually strait­
jacket accounting, as is the practice on the part of certain other regulatory 
agencies, the average investor quite probably would find the results helpful 
but also misleading. The uninitiated will continue to have difficulty in properly 
understanding financial statements. No one would be aided by having the 
preparers sheltered by conformity with statutory requirements.
If, on the other hand, publicly available reports were already suffering 
from excessive uniformity, that would be one thing; but the premise is not 
proved. This also applies to the question as to whether uniformity necessarily 
is in conflict with “important criteria of sound accounting such as the rele­
vancy, consistency and matching concepts.” That some problems do exist 
should be recognized, however, unless dissatisfaction at the grass-roots level 
should simply be dismissed in cavalier fashion.
Considerable space is devoted to discussing taxes and the philosophy of 
taxation. It seems self-evident that all corporations should do everything 
possible to minimize taxes as an expense borne by stockholders. In a few 
special instances, such as in the public utility industry, there may be some 
reason to regard tax savings as income which should be shared with the local 
consumers. The principal concern, however, should be with how taxes are 
detailed in reports prepared for general use. Misinterpretations need not 
occur so long as there is adequate disclosure.
Conglomerate accounting is a hydra-headed phenomenon which, to a 
greater extent than any other financial reporting in recent history, has grown 
to be a matter of dissatisfaction with many. Since so much of the conglomerate 
is tied in with financial management, the effort always to put the best foot 
forward can have adverse repercussions. Comparability and uniformity are 
not synonymous. Uniformity probably is impractical, but comparability as to 
format has more validity than seems generally to be acknowledged, especially 
as can be applied in specific industry classifications.
The extensive attack launched against the Accounting Principles Board 
by Mr. Whitman is certain to provoke lively discussion. Clear differentiation 
is not made as to whether his displeasure is with the jurisdictional power of 
the APB or its personnel and procedures. If there is suppression of outside 
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views, if not information, by the APB as indicated, the practice most certainly 
should be rectified.
There is no need to comment at greater length on Mr. Whitman’s paper 
other than to say that his desire to have representation in APB proceedings 
by industry, users and other interests is to be applauded. Circulating of study 
drafts prior to adoption of Opinions should be encouraged, but it has been my 
impression that this was established procedure.
In conclusion, the need for rational informed analysis by properly experi­
enced users will always be a sine qua non. Mr. Whitman enunciates this as 
his position.
Flynn
The theme of this paper is strong endorsement of the Accounting Prin­
ciples Board. Efforts to improve standards through the APB must continue 
in the absence of any comparable body providing ground rules and guidelines 
for CPAs. The Board’s procedure is outlined in considerable detail. (It should 
be noted that there evidently is conflict of understanding between Messrs. 
Flynn and Whitman as regards preparation and exposure of draft Opinions 
promulgated by the APB.)
Mr. Flynn summarizes projects now on the APB agenda, several of 
which are extremely important to outside users of the reports. In meeting 
change, the author feels that challenges should not result in over-reacting. 
Although making haste slowly may be appropriate, the possible disadvantages 
also are obvious. While comforting to some accountants and financial man­
agements, it does nothing to ameliorate problems of those who have to deal 
with financial reports.
Mr. Flynn emphasizes that corporate financial reporting has been, and 
will continue to undergo evolutionary changes through concerted efforts on 
the part of interested groups. Care must be observed in placing any restrictions 
affecting the work of independent accountants and financial executives. Exces­
sive refinements must be avoided just as inclination to ignore need for change 
must be overcome.
That “accounting principles are a kind of financial grammar which is 
indispensable” is a truism accepted by the financially sophisticated. But gram­
mar does not always promote proper communication with the uninformed. 
At issue here is “fairness” in accommodating all classes of users.
Mr. Flynn states that “. . . there are relatively few situations where man­
agement requires different accounting principles for internal reporting purposes 
than those required for reporting to stockholders. After all, the same set of 
facts and transactions is being reported upon in both cases.” Withal, it is 
appropriate to inquire whether outsiders’ needs are being properly met if there 
is a preoccupation with the format for internal reporting and the stockholder 
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report becomes a secondary, or by-product effort. Difficulties arise in recon­
ciling disclosures to the satisfaction of all concerned.
As corporations become more complex and public ownership broadens, 
the financial community increasingly desires to have the advantage of expedi­
tious yardsticks for judging performance. The author’s view is that proper 
recording of transactions and analytical interpretations of historical perform­
ance will increasingly have to satisfy practical use in predicting the future. It 
follows, therefore, that comparability in reporting will be receiving increasing 
emphasis.
References to investors’ preoccupation with earnings per share are in a 
critical vein. What the author deplores as the “earnings per share syndrome” 
is not symptomatic of the serious investor; and it certainly does not apply to 
the institutional type.
So far as earnings multiples are concerned, determination of this signifi­
cant valuation element is empirical. It generally has a less radical stock market 
influence than surprises in reported earnings, especially for interim periods. 
It is unfortunate that qualitative reporting is subordinated to the quantitative 
in view of the fact that stockholders have to rely for such long intervals on 
incomplete data. Herein lies real need for greater concern on the part of CPAs.
It is interesting that Mr. Flynn argues for financial statements adjusted 
for changing value of the dollar. Indexing would have an inverse effect on 
reported earnings by expressing results in real dollars. During an inflationary 
period, the corollary effect is that there is increasing pressure on earnings for 
larger reserve provisions for asset renewals and additions. But, if prices and 
costs cause upward asset revaluation and inhibit earnings as they would be 
reported, it follows that the treatment should be reversed during a cycle of 
deflation. It is perhaps gratuitous to observe that debate about both sides of 
the equation will not soon be settled.
The present worth concept in discounting futures is introduced without 
convincing presentation as to usefulness for creditors, investors and other 
classes of users. Question arises as to whether this would introduce excessive 
refinement bordering on the esoteric with perhaps limited internal benefit.
As a professional accountant, it is regrettable that Mr. Flynn did not 
develop in greater detail the problems and treatment of acquisition and merger 
accounting. It ties in with what he describes as “the financial statement sweep­
stakes” (and presumed growth potential). Absorbingly controversial, con­
glomerate reporting will doubtless be receiving prime attention over the next 
several years.
As giant corporations of comparatively recent creation proliferate and 
expand, their influence on our country’s economic stability cannot be mini­
mized. The sacrifice of current benefits for future promise necessitates very 
careful handling of accounting in order to deflate “pie in the sky” expectations 
on the part of the uninformed. Highly important is adequate disclosure of the 
dedication of cash earnings for debt repayment and presumed growth plow- 
back instead of dividends.
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The accounting profession ought to accept the position of leadership 
among the groups “occupying influential and co-ordinating positions.” A 
problem is whether the CPA seeks to share responsibility with others to too 
great an extent so as to avoid frictions. There is the impression that change 
of itself finds professional accountants and managements reluctant dragons, so 
to speak. If preoccupation with the status quo will have unfortunate conse­
quences, it follows, of course, that too dynamic an approach is undesirable. 
Thus, moderation, as in all things, is the ideal.
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Critique
Of the McGarraugh and Norby papers
By Dudley E. Browne, Group Vice President—Finance and Administra­
tion, Director and Member of Executive Committee and Finance Committee, 
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, representing the Financial Executives Insti­
tute
This critique covers two primary papers. The first, by Charles T. 
McGarraugh, is entitled “Conflicts and Challenges.” Mr. McGarraugh sets 
forth the views of the credit grantor. The second, by William C. Norby, is 
entitled “The Needs and Responsibilities of the Investor in Equities.” As the 
title suggests, Mr. Norby sets forth the views of the financial analyst concerned 
with investments in equities.
The critique writer’s role is twofold. First, he is to evaluate the ideas 
and proposals of the writer of the principal paper from his professional view­
point. Second, he is to identify and discuss any relevant and important issues 
that he feels have been omitted or not treated in sufficient depth. A tacit 
assumption of the format of this Symposium is that the participants will have 
read the papers beforehand.
My approach as a critique writer will be: (a) to cite the common points 
of the two principal papers; (b) to discuss the divergent views of the two 
authors; and (c) to offer my own views on the relevant points omitted by 
Messrs. McGarraugh and Norby.
Before turning to the task at hand, I would like to set forth some sugges­
tions as to how we might better profit from our attendance at this Symposium. 
In so doing, I shall take considerable liberty in paraphrasing, in part, an article 
by Chris Argyris, “Students and Businessmen: The Bristling Dialogue,” which 
appeared in the July-August 1968 issue of THINK.
Mistrust, rejection, downright hostility—these are the prevailing attitudes 
of the members of four groups concerned with the preparation and use of 
financial reports. Financial executives, independent public accountants, secur­
ity analysts, and credit grantors are involved in unplanned, uncoordinated 
attacks on each other that hide the underlying problems that each group faces.
The flaw in this dialogue is that none of the groups is listening to the 
others. Each is more interested in defending itself and discrediting the others 
than looking at the total picture. The result is, as John Gardner said at last 
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June’s Cornell commencement, that 20th century organizations are caught in 
a savage crossfire between uncritical lovers and unloving critics.
Why do we have this polarization between over-hate and over-love? One 
reason is that when one group attacks the other, each is threatened by the fact 
that its own weakness is a strength of the other group. The irony is that all 
four have had research conducted in their own organizations and have sup­
ported experimental studies that were, when conducted, the most daring ever 
done. But the fear that is the basis of over-love won out.
It is time that the polarization caused by over-haters and over-lovers, 
dispassionately observed by each organization, should be seriously examined 
and greatly reduced. We who are gathered in this unique Symposium on 
financial reporting have a special responsibility to bring about this change. 
If we do not, we could someday wake up to a world that has destroyed us in 
the name of freedom and democracy.
You may well dispute what I have just stated. But, if the four papers I 
have read beforehand are representative of the others, then again, we are in 
grave danger of talking and not listening, of seeking not to give, but only to 
take. Let us resolve for once to seek to understand views advanced by others 
that are at variance with our own. Only in so doing are we likely to go away 
from this Symposium with a sense of accomplishment.
In any event, my approach as a critique writer will not be solely that of 
a financial executive. As one who has had more than a brief passing experience 
in the function of each of the four groups, I shall try to be a catalyst in seeking 
to bring about a meaningful and fruitful discussion.
Agreement Among Papers
Turning now to the task at hand, I note certain commonality in the two 
papers under consideration. Both are written by bankers, and both authors 
are senior vice presidents of their respective banks. The initials of their last 
names are at the middle of the alphabet.
Both authors zero in on financial statements. I suppose this was dictated 
by the subject matter of this Symposium. But, in so doing, each leaves for 
possible inference the view that his only task is to deal with financial statements 
—an inference that I am sure both authors would hasten to deny.
Mr. McGarraugh, for example, does not mention such matters as cus­
tomer status, reciprocal balances, credit standing, nor priority vis-a-vis other 
creditors. Nor does Mr. Norby associate himself with the fundamentalist’s 
approach, or the subgroup thereof that supports the current fad of relative 
earnings growth, as opposed to the Dow-Jones theorists, the random walkers, 
and the new school of dart throwers. This observation is not intended in any 
way to downgrade the importance they have attributed to the financial report. 
Rather it is an attempt to place its importance in context with the total picture.
Both authors readily admit to the dynamics of their fields of interest and 
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the consequent lack of unanimity of approach by practitioners therein. Mr. 
McGarraugh, for example, says, “Credit grantors are not in agreement as to 
the information they need.” However, the credit grantor “must have confi­
dence in the underlying data.”
Mr. Norby says, “Financial analysis, in estimating the future, involves the 
use of a wide range of variables, but has not yet developed any rigorous method 
of correlating all of this information, and indeed the nature of the problem 
may preclude it.” And as for confidence, Mr. Norby notes, “Financial analysts 
start on the presumption that the financial reports are accurate and consistent.” 
Perhaps if we can keep these confessionals in mind and match them with 
the analogous ones of the other organizations represented, we can all start 
from a common ground.
The absence of any identified concern over downside risks occasioned by 
restatements of assets or liabilities surprised me. In prior confrontations with 
the subject at hand, I have always found both credit grantors and financial 
analysts to be quite vocal about the losses they suffer when such revaluations 
occur, almost to the complete exclusion of any willingness to talk about the 
broader aspects of financial reports.
Perhaps this would have been better left as a dead issue, but I think 
concern does exist and to the extent it does it undermines confidence in finan­
cial reporting. I am constantly asked how we can avoid this. And, usually, 
I am frank enough to admit I do not know. Despite every care in measurement, 
all approaches to minimizing revaluations seemingly involve ultra-conservatism 
in undervaluation of assets or overvaluation of liabilities.
Both papers evidence considerable concern over the accounting for 
mergers and acquisitions. Neither mentions taxable acquisitions, but instead 
evidences concern with pooling of interest concepts associated with the record­
ing of tax-free mergers and acquisitions. Mr. McGarraugh notes: “Pooling 
of interest conglomerates are complex and have insatiable demands for credit. 
There is not enough information to disclose all of the standards of measure­
ment that were judged desirable, necessary, and accurate. If there were one 
method, the user could be deemed knowledgeable.” Mr. Norby observes:
Most of the accounting controversies on accounting for mergers and 
acquisitions center around the method of recording acquisitions upon 
the balance sheet. Fundamentally, it would seem that accounting for 
mergers and acquisitions should be the same regardless of the method 
of payment and should show real cost. Perhaps many acquisitions 
would be hard to justify if management had to show in their account­
ing the real cost of the company acquired. Pooling of interests con­
ceals the acquisition cost but does not credit capital accounts with the 
excess of market value over book value of shares traded. Many new 
and difficult accounting problems have been created and abuses in fi­
nancial reporting have been obscured by accounting complexities. We 
see here the need for a rigorous accounting theory of mergers and 
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acquisitions which will standardize the approach and preclude the use 
of accounting technicalities to obscure the real costs and real results 
of these developments.
Obviously, both authors are disenchanted with the results to date. Each 
wants one method, with one asking for disclosure and the other for recording 
real cost. Neither evidences any understanding of the alternatives involved.
Lacking this, I find no suggestions as to how they feel the excess of the 
price paid over the value of the assets acquired should be treated. And, of 
course, some others have doubt as to the price paid when the securities issued 
in payment have price earnings ratios carried out to infinity. In the trouble­
some cases, the excess of price over net asset value involves goodwill and all 
of the historic concern as to what it is and whether and how it should be written 
off.
I suspect that there is no one method upon which wholehearted acceptance 
could be found. Asking for one method of recording is tantamount to asking 
that only one method of merger or acquisition be allowed. Whatever the 
merits of the latter are from the recording standpoint, it is not likely to occur.
Sitting in the wings, as it were, and observing the whole controversy, I 
would attribute much of our difficulty to that of putting procedures before 
principles. Lacking tangible knowledge of what we seek to reflect, we get 
involved in trying to fit transactions to procedures that did not contemplate 
the instant form of transaction. And, in too many cases, the form of the 
transaction was dictated by the very existence of this hiatus. Even when one 
starts with a rigorous logic, variations caused by differences in the relative 
price earnings ratios of acquiring and acquired companies, and the existence 
of companies restricted to cost based pricing, seemingly create infinite possi­
bilities.
I have only glossed over the problem, but, hopefully, I have identified 
some of the issues involved.
Messrs. McGarraugh and Norby both stress the need for comparability, 
with their desire for such being expressed loud and clear. The former avers: 
“The objective of fair income and expense reporting should be to attain 
comparison with previous reports of the same company and reports of other 
companies in the same business.” The latter states: “The investment process 
is the comparison of relative values; that comparison requires comparability 
of financial statements over time and between companies; and that to achieve 
comparability we must have strict, practical accounting rules, which do not 
permit deviation, and uniform application by the accounting profession.”
I have heard this from so many quarters (the term can be used advisedly 
because we have proponents of comparability in each of our four represented 
organizations), that I am beginning to get the message! However, if I am to 
be included among the proponents, I would suggest rephrasing this objective 
to that of attaining the maximum comparability. While I will have more to 
say about this in citing my own views, I do want to observe how odd this goal 
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appears when every effort is being made in each of our groups, as we seek to 
persevere over our competitors, to maximize the differences and to undermine 
any meaningful comparison.
In both papers, strong pleas are mounted for better segmented reporting 
by conglomerates. Mr. McGarraugh notes that two of the problems relating 
to conglomerates are “the inability of users to get segmented information 
relating to important product or subsidiary divisions and getting properly 
comparable operating statistics.” Mr. Norby observes that the need for more 
detailed information about widely diversified or conglomerate companies is 
readily apparent, that the analyst must understand the dynamics in each 
distinct segment, and, therefore, requires segmented sales and profit informa­
tion which can be related to economic variables.
Mr. Norby, apparently unheeding the admonishments relative to the 
problem of segmented reporting which were set forth in the Financial Execu­
tives Research Foundation’s study in this area, notes that progress has been 
made but “an even more vigorous approach seems necessary to accomplish 
the desired objective.” I have expressed at length on previous occasions my 
views on segmented reporting. They will have to be encapsulated here. I 
believe that it would be to the advantage of most companies to improve their 
reporting in this area, where possible. In some companies, despite a wholesome 
desire to display segmented reporting, integrated operations and joint costs 
create such problems that I doubt if meaningful and not misleading segmented 
reporting can be made. And if there is one message to be gotten out of the 
FERF study, it is that uniformity in this area is probably not achievable. Some 
have advocated marshalling assets along segmented reporting lines; I do not 
think our current state of the art is sufficiently advanced to permit this.
Both Mr. McGarraugh and Mr. Norby want the independent accountant’s 
responsibility enlarged. Their views as to how this is to be brought about are 
at variance, so I shall cover this point in my discussions of the individual papers.
And finally, both authors express frustration over the degree or lack of 
progress by the Accounting Principles Board of the AICPA. Mr. McGar- 
raugh’s discontent has to be inferred from his statements with respect to the 
various issues. Mr. Norby states: “Much remains to be done, beyond the 
efforts of the APB to date—perhaps beyond the boundaries of the present 
thought of the profession.”
Viewpoint of McGarraugh
So much for the common approaches of the two papers. I will now turn 
to a discussion of the individual viewpoints expressed in the two papers. In 
so doing, I shall deal with them in alphabetical order; first, Mr. McGarraugh’s 
and then Mr. Norby’s.
Mr. McGarraugh, throughout his paper, uses various terms for objectives 
to be attained in financial reporting. For example: “simplified, proper, fair 
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financial condition, desirable, necessary, accurate, and fair value.” These, 
like “truth” to the philosopher, are relative and can be the source of endless 
debate. In any event, they are relative terms and meaningless out of context 
with varying degrees of achievement offered by alternate choices. According 
to Mr. McGarraugh:
The credit grantors’ needs include information relative to cash flows, 
asset values, and lease liabilities. The financial statement should per­
mit distinguishing between earnings reported on an accrual and cash 
basis. The reluctance of the report preparer to depart from cost until 
realization causes frequent misstatements of fair financial condition. 
The credit grantor needs access to the information required to arrive 
at an understanding of the fair values involved. The increasing use of 
long-term leases presents special problems in showing the impact of 
that very real liability. This is a material item and the absence causes 
a financial report to lose valid comparability. The decision not to 
reflect should be reviewed.
The foregoing statements from Mr. McGarraugh’s paper indicate the 
credit grantors’ dissatisfaction with the existing cost-based and realization 
concepts of today’s accounting. Areas of particular concern are high market 
and low cost inventory and the lack of market values for fixed assets. These 
are not likely to be furnished in the annual reports unless there are wholesale 
revisions to current accounting concepts.
Some among the profession, like Chambers, Ross, and Sprouse, to men­
tion but a few, have proposed concepts that would move us in the direction of 
asset valuation. Such concepts, however, have the disadvantage of requiring 
more subjectivity—less objectivity—in determining values. Such an approach 
seems doubly dangerous, for on one hand it would make it more difficult for 
an injured party to claim misrepresentation, yet on the other hand it would 
subject both management and independent accountants to an ever increasing 
number of suits. Apparently, what the credit grantor really needs is a Realiza­
tion and Liquidation Statement—and if so, such is at variance with the “going 
concern” convention.
It delights me to note Mr. McGarraugh’s complaint that alternate 
methods of recording income tax accruals, although clarified by APB Opinion 
No. 11, are still somewhat confusing and that there is also some confusion 
in the way the investment tax credit benefit and special allocations of income 
are reported. I say this, because, like Mr. McGarraugh, I feel that the APB’s 
current predilection for achieving comparability of the income statement is 
creating additional problems for those, such as credit grantors, who would use 
the balance sheet to determine cash flow.
The adoption of the deferred method of recording comprehensive tax 
allocation removed any payment concept related to the deferred credit. And 
I would note similarly that APB Opinion No. 8, which deals with pension costs, 
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has created liabilities that similarly are unrelated in some instances to cash 
payments. In fact, this course of action has created a whole new need for 
supplemental analyses to identify both when and what proportion of the credit 
will be paid, if ever.
All of the immediate foregoing material suggests the use of supplemental 
data submissions. This, however, is not the preferable answer, for Mr. 
McGarraugh states that the credit grantor would prefer to have the significant 
data recorded in the statement itself in order to minimize the amount of 
collateral information necessary to arrive at a sufficient understanding of the 
data shown in the balance sheet and income statements.
Further, the ideally perfect financial report is described as having full 
comprehension and fair presentation of the data shown, without any footnotes 
or other disclosures required to provide such information, though he notes 
that this is probably unattainable. I am unable to conceive of any likelihood 
that such a goal might be achieved. I suspect that Mr. McGarraugh has similar 
views, because he then calls for increased disclosure in the following manner: 
“All of the data that are needed to provide sufficient information to a reason­
ably well trained credit grantor should be included in the report.”
Mr. McGarraugh also asks for future estimates of cash flow, described 
as: “short-term projections prepared by professionals on the announced plans 
of management. Competent managements have already prepared such cor­
porate budgets; all that remains to be done is to have the estimates of the 
judgmental premises reviewed objectively by an independent professional 
reporter.”
Whatever the merits may be of this requirement, we seem to be moving 
away from any prospects of its achievement. Legal advisers to management 
are taking an ever increasing dislike to any and all forecasts, and the AICPA 
rules do not presently permit the attestation of any forecasts.
But what seems to me to be more important is whether such information 
and the information with respect to values, if furnished to the credit grantor, 
might be construed as “insiders’ information.” I think it is, and while it is 
necessary to the credit grantor, the submission of such sets up a veritable chain 
reaction. It certainly imposes constraints on the use thereof by the credit 
grantor, a point which Mr. McGarraugh notes. It imposes similar constraints 
on every individual in the credit granting organization who becomes privy to 
such information. Obviously, such information must be kept sacrosanct from 
the investment division of the trust department.
Having of necessity given such “insiders’ information” in support of a 
loan request, what obligations are imposed upon management with respect to 
policing its use? And what obligations does management have if it obtains 
knowledge that the information has been put to uses beyond those intended? 
The answer becomes doubly difficult when one realizes that such information 
would never have been released except for the specific purpose, and should in 
most instances never be the subject of a general release.
Mr. McGarraugh suggests that the independent accountant be responsi­
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ble for the financial reports. While the courts seemingly are displaying a 
willingness to attach increasing responsibility upon the independent public 
accountant, management has and should retain the basic responsibility for the 
financial statements. Under the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts, primary 
responsibility for financial statements is placed upon management as the 
“registrant” or the “issuer or obligor.”
Indeed, the whole arrangement would fall like a row of dominoes were 
the public accountants to have to face submissions from management for 
which the latter had no responsibility. Nor can there be joint responsibility, 
for what is everybody’s responsibility soon becomes nobody’s responsibility. 
One thing seems certain: management should and must do everything in its 
power to minimize the exposure to liability of the independent public account­
ant, for in the final analysis the client is going to have to pay for the costs of 
the profession’s product liability exposure.
Any reading of recent proceedings involving SEC Rule 10b-5 cases is 
sure to cause concern as to what can be done and what cannot be done. The 
problems are difficult enough if we were to simply follow existing guidelines. 
But, as in the field of civil rights, the courts have seen fit to legislate new 
concepts and to apply them upon an ex post facto basis to the parties con­
cerned. Such an environment is certainly not conducive to encouraging the 
expansion of the amount of information presently available in financial reports.
Before concluding my critique of Mr. McGarraugh’s paper, I want to 
note his further observation:
Modern communication methods and media have provided some of 
the most exciting techniques in our business world; it is unfortunate 
that the modern financial report has not kept up with this dynamic 
trend—and its failure to do so is attributable to the fact that we have 
not recognized its vital role.
All of this is true insofar as transmission of data per se is concerned. Our 
problem is not in this area. Our problem is with information needed for 
decision-making purposes; and when we consider this we must recognize that, 
despite all of our advancement in communication transmission, we have 
equally increased our capacity to transmit biased, slanted, half-truthful mate­
rial. In my opinion, we shall find no ready answers to this problem.
Viewpoint of Norby
Mr. Norby’s paper presents the view of the financial analyst. He is a 
Chartered Financial Analyst, a past president of the Financial Analysts 
Federation, and is eminently qualified to set forth such views.
Before embarking on my critique of Mr. Norby’s paper, I want to lift 
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out of context one valuable observation he has made. Speaking of the activities 
of the APB, he states:
Some matters which have been undertaken are too theoretical to 
have much impact in the practical investment world, e.g., accounting 
for convertible securities and price-level adjustments of carrying value 
of assets—neither of which adds anything to the measurement of earn­
ing power.
From this, it seems to me, one can draw the inference that this Symposium 
might be able to develop a list of action items and their relative priority for 
the assistance of the APB. At least it is a thought worthy of some considera­
tion.
Mr. Norby, like Mr. McGarraugh, uses some relative terms to describe 
his goals of financial reporting. These include “accurate, consistent, sufficient, 
fair, comparable, sound and practical.” My comments concerning Mr. McGar- 
raugh’s use of such terms are equally applicable here.
Mr. Norby stresses the analysts’ concern over estimates of future returns 
for periods of one to five years. He notes that a projection of earning power 
is necessary to calculate future returns and that it begins with an analysis of 
historical and present earning power. This need seems patently obvious. It is 
interesting to observe, however, that while we all have been attempting to 
concentrate upon improving the presentation of both historical and current 
financial information, modern managements have developed entirely new 
capabilities of forecasting future financial information through their concen­
tration on, and development of, long-range plans.
Surely, such information would be of inestimable assistance to both the 
financial analysts and the credit grantors. But, instead of recognizing this, 
we have continued the travesty of attaching so much liability upon manage­
ment for the disclosure of such information as to seemingly guarantee that 
it will never see the light of day beyond the halls of the corporation. And our 
independent public accountants have joined in the charade by prohibiting 
any attestation thereof. Just how reasonable is this?
The view is taken in Mr. Norby’s paper that each industry group of 
companies must have its own list of specific requirements for financial data. 
The great diversity of American enterprise makes the industry approach 
necessary; broad statements applicable to all companies have little value. 
I can say a hearty “amen” to this for non-conglomerate companies. I am 
at a loss, however, to apply this concept to our conglomerates on any whole­
hearted basis. This guideline is possible of fulfillment in the non-integrated 
conglomerate, but I would think that the integrated conglomerate would have 
to come up with a single set of rules to be applied universally across the 
whole enterprise.
Mr. Norby has some interesting comments about comparability in two 
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cited areas. He states: “Other comparability questions are more difficult, 
e.g., depreciation policies applied to computers. There ought to be some 
practical judgment on the appropriate first year write-off of a computer 
which is applicable to all manufacturers and would make their earnings state­
ments more nearly comparable.” In a recent panel I was on with David Norr 
and LeRoy Layton in Fresno, California, the former defied anyone to find 
justification for the present spread of first-year depreciation rates which 
range from 10 to 50 per cent!
Admittedly, this seems on first blush to be incomprehensible and cer­
tainly destructive to comparability. To state the obvious, it does demonstrate 
a varying capability to withstand obsolescence. We might choose to brush 
this aside, but what do we say if, in respect to IBM, it reflects a management 
plan to gain a larger or protect an existing share of the market by introducing 
a new line of computers that will justify the use of the 50 per cent first-year 
depreciation rate?
This whole area is one over which we ever so lightly tread. As we move 
from the developing company with capitalization of start-up costs in order 
to match them with revenues, we move to the mature company that typically 
seeks utmost conservatism and has a penchant against carrying any unneces­
sary costs as assets. Certainly, such a course is good economics and it is good 
management, but we are all in doubt as to whether such constitutes good 
accounting.
Mr. Norby read my mind by citing the variations in practice of the aero­
space companies engaged in the production of commercial transports with 
respect to their handling of development costs. He notes that Boeing charges 
off development costs of new programs as incurred and that Lockheed inven­
tories these costs and charges out as deliveries are made and revenues received, 
with provision for current charge-off of overruns. Lockheed will report more 
current earnings than Boeing because of different accounting.
He could have added that McDonnell Douglas capitalizes both inventory 
and development costs and spreads such over the life of the program. The 
question as to how comparable this treatment is really begs the fundamental 
question. With respect to Boeing, the question must be: What is the amount 
of the hidden asset, or how much of the development costs that have been 
charged off have really been sold through the orders on hand? With respect 
to McDonnell Douglas, the question is: What is the amount of unrecovered 
costs, or how much of the capitalized costs have not been sold? For such 
represents the exposure to a possible restatement of asset value. In either case, 
the desired answer is unattainable short of a supplementary analysis.
In the case of Lockheed, we have sought to distinguish between sold 
and unsold costs. We have undertaken to capitalize those costs which we 
anticipate will be recovered by the orders on hand and to write off those costs 
which are not. In our case, we have attempted to provide the analyst with 
the information we have been led to believe is desirable. This, hopefully, 
sounds very nice; but in truth, by the selection of this method, as in the pre­
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ceding example, we have written off as much as we believe we can afford.
Mr. Norby suggests that the independent accountant’s involvement with 
quarterly reports and the text of annual reports be expanded. I am in sym­
pathy with his position. Lockheed involves its auditors in the latter, and I 
suspect that for most of the companies represented at this Symposium this 
is common practice. However, we have not chosen to show the auditor’s 
involvement with such in the certificate.
How to deal with the problem of quarterly report coverage short of a 
full audit is not clear. Perhaps I should rephrase this for the benefit of the 
professional accountants here with us. In the Yale Express System case, the 
shareholders contended that the independent auditors, though they had not 
been responsible for auditing the nine months’ figures, did have enough 
information to know the figures were incorrect. My concern, therefore, is 
how to protect the auditor by minimizing his exposure to liabilities he con­
ceivably could have with respect to quarterly figures.
As noted in my coverage at the outset of items of commonality, Mr. 
Norby seeks to expand the role of the independent public accountant. He 
states: “The accounting profession can resolve its conflicting middle position 
by fully assuming the fiduciary role that is thrust upon it anyway.” I am 
not sure I understand Mr. Norby’s point here. A fiduciary role brings to 
mind concepts of care and conservation of assets and application of the pru­
dent man rule with respect to the investment and safekeeping thereof. I find 
this role for the profession hard to accept. And, if, like Mr. McGarraugh, he 
seeks to expand the independent accountant’s role to one of primary respon­
sibility for the financial statements, I find this impossible to accept. In any 
event, the latter is not the role existing SEC statutes and rules imply.
Nr. Norby has an interesting and challenging section in his paper, under 
the heading of “Conflicts Among the Parties at Interest” (see page 105). If 
you do not readily recall this section, I urge you to reread it. He notes that 
management has broad latitude in its accounting policies so long as they fall 
within the framework of generally accepted accounting principles. Manage­
ments wish to prepare fair and accurate reports for shareholders (a minority 
fall short), yet almost all are affected by subtle motivations: optimism, because 
of a desire for success as a manager; opportunity to exercise stock options; a 
predilection for extreme conservatism; a desire to create internal reserves 
or manage earnings.
Any and all of these reporting tendencies by management are in conflict 
with the interests of investors as they lead to possible over- or under-evaluation 
of their stock or perhaps engender a false sense of security. This is a chal­
lenging area. Even for managements of highest motivation and intent, great 
objectivity is needed to arrive at reasonable answers. The matter has not been 
helped by the current push for performance, wherein the time horizon of the 
investor has been moved to a point entirely out of step with that of a manage­
ment seeking to achieve long-term growth as opposed to maximization of 
current earnings.
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And the subtle motivations of which Mr. Norby speaks are surely there, 
for they must be in an environment which permits one in government to say 
that every government has a right to lie in order to maintain its position in 
office. What frightens me most is the very real possibility that in our quest for 
comparability and simplicity we may seek to impose upon management a 
system of accounting which is unacceptable and by this fact alone, as com­
parable events in Russia and China have disclosed, motivate management 
to manipulate the figures. It seems to me that one of our principal strengths 
today is the latitude management has in presenting its figures, for in so doing 
much is disclosed that otherwise might be concealed.
Comments on Financial Reporting
So much for the individual papers. I turn now to my own additive com­
ments that could not be placed into juxtaposition with the views of the pre­
parers of these two principal papers.
I must admit that I have a rapidly growing concern as to how and where 
our financial reporting concepts fit into our total environment. In this con­
text, I mean for environment to include our form of government, a republic 
of limited democracy and protection of minorities, and our economic system, 
capitalistic free enterprise. I have assumed that our deliberations upon 
accounting matters would be viewed against this backdrop and that our actions 
would be in harmony therewith and serve to at least protect, if not to better, 
our political and economic heritage.
In this time of turmoil, reflecting as it does a passionate concern over 
individual liberty and civil rights, which has been aided and abetted by legis­
lative excursions of our courts with respect to the First and Fifth Amendments 
to our Constitution, I am appalled by the contrast between this concern over 
the liberty of individuals on the one hand and the constraints we seek to place 
on management, independent accountants, underwriters, and analysts (to 
mention but a few) on the other hand. And these constraints are justified 
by a desire to protect the investor.
In the individual area we have gone to great lengths to reaffirm our 
faith in the individual, the right of free speech, the right to be represented by 
counsel, and protection against duress and self-incrimination. In the field 
of business, however, we seemingly have forgotten all of these principles and 
pile rules upon rules, regulations upon regulations, statutes upon statutes, and 
judicial decisions upon judicial decisions that are based on the malfeasance 
of a few but are applicable to all. I wonder why the A.C.L.U. has so ignored us.
Felix Morley, in his Power in the People, wrote: “Indeed it is impossible 
to read even the bare text of the Constitution at all carefully without realizing 
that the American Republic was specifically designed to safeguard individual 
enterprise against the State.” In our quest for more disclosure, more informa­
tion, comparability, and segmented reporting, we move constantly toward 
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the socialization of business decisions. As in our government, our decisions 
will become more delayed and more ineffective as we seek beforehand to 
insure their acceptability. In moving ever in this direction, we erode the 
guiding spirit of our free enterprise system.
I have mentioned the foregoing because we seemingly have a host of 
conflicting objectives derived from many different disciplines that we must 
compose if we are ever going to make progress in the field of financial report­
ing. The nature of our problem suggests that the application of some concepts 
of system analysis might be fruitful. But, to do so requires some effective 
norm whereby system effectiveness might be measured. Certainly we are 
going to have to weigh and balance our conflicting viewpoints and make 
trade-offs between our alternate choices. Lacking any clear and unified state­
ment having a semblance of acceptability, we are lost. Somehow we are going 
to have to get down to the nitty-gritty and define the purpose or objective 
we seek to accommodate in our financial reporting. And when we do, we 
must also exercise care to assure the preservation of our concepts of govern­
ment and of economics.
I am concerned that our present mode of operation through voluntary 
organizations has no clear source of power. We have conflicting views. Do 
we solve them solely by vote, with the group having the largest membership 
prevailing? Or do we restrict the expression of views to those having an 
interest in the subject at hand? Certainly, one of the problems facing the 
APB today is whether to interpret acquiescence born of lack of interest as 
acceptance of a proposed bulletin. I would hazard the view that the section 
of APB Opinion No. 10 dealing with the accounting for the issuance of 
convertible equity slipped through because of the lack of consideration of 
the need for an informed electorate. Also involved, I believe, is the degree 
of concern we exercise over minority views. Are these forever to be brushed 
aside by the will of the majority, or must we seek some accommodation 
thereof?
I am, of course, as always, concerned about our ability to accommodate 
change and to encourage innovation and experimentation. It is unlikely that 
we will find permanent answers to any of our dilemmas. What we do today 
will surely have to be changed tomorrow. We seem, however, to be hell bent 
with a desire to cast all decisions in concrete as a monument to our failures. 
In its present form, I would say that the APB will in all probability be the 
last to adopt the new and the last to discard the old. If we are going to keep 
accounting progressive, we must encourage experimentation and permit the 
testing of new ideas in the market place. The market accorded to a company’s 
securities in some measure reflects that company’s management’s concern 
and care with respect to its financial reporting. We should be most cautious 
before we rule out this role of competition under the guise of seeking com­
parability.
Our current investment binge for “performance” also causes me concern. 
It suggests a transitory shareholder devoid of any lasting and abiding interest
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in the corporation. How is management going to cope with this emphasis on 
immediate values? How is management going to find support for those long­
term projects that are necessary for the survival of the company, but come at 
the expense of current earnings? I wonder, too, about the sale of stock by an 
existing shareholder to a new shareholder. Where did he get the impetus for 
his sale? Was it a research report of relatively narrow circulation that 
recommended disposition of the security? If so, does this constitute a new 
form of “insiders’ information” that would place upon the seller the obligation 
of disclosure? And what overtones of obligations for policing research reports 
by management does this suggest?
Before concluding, I want to make a few observations with respect to 
our desire for comparability. It is a most understandable desire and certainly 
all of us make comparisons, day in and day out. Sometimes we are knowl­
edgeable about the limitations inherent to the process; sometimes we are not. 
I think we must recognize that a driving force of business, whether it be 
banking, financial analysis, public accounting, or industrial enterprise, is to 
identify and maximize a series of differences from our competitors that be­
comes our stock in trade. Not only is this necessary to persevere against our 
competitors, it also provides us with a defense against superficial comparisons 
with them.
I am inclined to give a hearty laugh when my friends in the investment 
field lay great stress on the necessity for comparability. Did you ever try to 
seek agreement upon the basis of measuring performance of a portfolio 
manager? If I recall, there are some 28 alternative measurements avail­
able for the process. Lockheed has nine bank trustees managing its retire­
ment plan and savings plan investments. They each use a different basis of 
measurement and are disdainful of any effort on our part to judge them by 
one standard. None of our consumer products are standard; none of our 
concepts of organization, manpower utilization, or use of capital assets are 
standard. Can we really get meaningful comparisons? Neither our credit 
grantors nor our independent public accountants need feel smug about their 
omission from my examples, because I have witnessed the same distress on 
their part when one seeks to compare their performance.
You may wonder at this point why I have gone into the matters of en­
vironment, systems analysis, constituencies, change, transitory shareholders, 
and comparability. I have done so because I feel that our efforts to date have 
been hindered by our accounting blinders that force us to forever deal with 
the smaller issues and not the large. I suspect that if we had the vision to stand 
back and take a good look at the overall issues facing our society today, we 
would discover that our issues are of a much different nature than what we 




Of the Whitman and Flynn papers
By Thomas F. Russell, Vice President and Group Manager, Federal-Mogul 
Corporation, Chairman of the Corporate Reporting Committee of the Finan­
cial Executives Institute
Introduction
An essential goal of management, the accounting profession, and other 
interested parties is to eliminate undesirable or misleading practices and 
methods of reporting. In addition, it is important to narrow differences in the 
method of reporting where there is no justification based on factual circum­
stances. Recognize, however, that there are differences in the methods of 
reporting where there are conflicting principles of accounting or logical 
alternate methods for reporting the same set of facts. Inventory valuation 
methods, for example, imply certain cost flow assumptions (i.e., Lifo, Fifo, 
specific identification) which are reasonable but differences in the timing of 
expense recognition make inter-firm comparisons difficult, if not impossible. 
While the various acceptable methods of inventory valuation may prevent 
inter-firm comparisons, adequate disclosure and consistency in reporting 
allows proper inter-period comparisons of the operation of a single firm. Thus 
the idea of comparability in financial statements breaks down into two cate­
gories. One category encompasses the problems of inter-firm comparability. 
Adequate disclosure and consistency will not necessarily allow a meaningful 
comparison of two firms. The other category is interperiod comparisons of a 
single firm whether the period is one year as for annual reports or for quarterly 
or other interim reports. Each category has specific problems which require 
analysis.
Any attempts at eliminating or reducing the use of certain methods of 
accounting would in effect bring about a greater degree of uniformity, but 
uniformity is not necessarily a desired goal. Strict uniformity in accounting 
methods will not ensure comparability. The regulatory accounting methods 
prescribed by the Federal Power Commission for utilities is a case in point. 
The FPC has prescribed a set of accounts and descriptions of their use, but 
meaningfulness in reporting is lost because a proper theory of accounting is 
lacking. The utilities are forced to use a concept of “aboriginal cost” where 
asset accounts are kept at the cost to the original owner who first put the 
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assets to use in a public utility. The difference in cost when an asset is pur­
chased or otherwise acquired by another utility is carried in a separate account 
and very often the utility is permitted quick amortization not in line with the 
value or useful life of the asset. It is important to recognize that accounting 
for rate-making purposes or specific government reporting requirements is 
not necessarily good accounting for reports to shareholders or other interested 
parties. More importantly it should be apparent that any uniformity in report­
ing which ignores basic accounting principles sacrifices the usefulness of the 
report.
In order to narrow differences in accounting methods which are not 
justified by variations in factual circumstances, it is necessary to establish the 
criteria for appropriate use. Attempts at establishing criteria for accounting 
methods has been tried with limited success by the APB. The criteria for the 
pooling of interest treatment of business combinations is one example. An 
article in the August 1968 issue of The Journal of Accountancy by Jack Fisch 
and Martin Mellman outlines how the criteria established in 1957 in Account­
ing Research Bulletin No. 48 have been subjected to varied interpretations in 
current practice. There have been attempts by the accounting profession to 
establish criteria for the capitalization of leases but this has not been widely 
accepted by accountants or management. If the criteria for alternative 
methods of reporting cannot be established and be generally accepted there 
will be little progress in narrowing accounting methods for handling a given 
set of circumstances. Certain situations may have a clearly preferable treat­
ment but there will always be many situations where there is no clear preference 
on the choice of methods. Accounting methods cannot be forced upon man­
agement without extreme and undesirable consequences.
In order to approach the problems of corporate financial reporting there 
must be a clear understanding of the roles of various persons in the process 
of reporting. This is where the paper by Mr. Whitman begins.
Recent Developments Affecting Public Opinion
On Financial Reporting
The accounting profession is again faced with an impending crisis as a 
result of four important court decisions. The Westec, Texas Gulf Sulphur, 
Continental Vending Machine Company, and the BarChris cases will have 
far reaching effects. The full impact of these decisions has not yet been felt. 
Part of this conflict centers in the role of various individuals in financial 
reporting. Other important issues center on the methods of accounting for 
certain factual circumstances. These cases point out the need for clarifying 
the roles of those who prepare or assist in the preparation of financial reports, 
and the need for a narrowing of alternate accounting methods which are not 
based on variations in circumstances. As Mr. Whitman points out, confidence 
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and acceptance are indispensable to effective reporting. Clearly, the publicity 
of these cases adversely affects the public’s confidence in financial reporting.
The Role of Management
The influence of corporate executives on reporting is felt because man­
agement has the primary responsibility for the methods of accounting used 
in the published financial statements. Management must be responsive to the 
needs of users but they must weigh the cost of providing information and the 
effect of releasing information. Certain information may jeopardize the firm’s 
competitive position and the value of the shareholders’ investment. The 
criterion for additional disclosure should be the usefulness of the additional 
information. The costs of preparation, and the possible detrimental effect of 
the information release on the competitive position of the firm and thereby on 
the investor’s capital must be compared to the need for and/or the use of the 
information.
At one extreme there are certain security analysts who seem to want full 
and complete disclosure of any and all financial information without specifying 
what they need for financial analysis. Management must be selective in the 
information that is presented in financial statements, for too much information 
may be as misleading to the user as inadequate disclosure. While management 
must be concerned with adequate disclosure, it is inherently wary of new 
reporting practices and additional information requirements because of the 
aforementioned competitive risks.
We do not mean to imply that management should have a secretive or 
negative attitude toward disclosure. As Mr. Whitman points out, management 
has voluntarily provided additional information where such information was 
considered useful to interested parties, such as the printing of prior years’ 
earnings summaries and financial ratio analyses. In the area of segment 
reporting by conglomerates, management has voluntarily supplied such infor­
mation in many cases.
We believe that managements are committed to the idea of keeping the 
investors and others fully informed. However, the answer to financial reporting 
problems is not to simply supply more detailed facts but to present relevant 
facts which carry the assumptions implied in a sound theory of accounting.
Varied Uses of Accounting Data
There are many users and many uses for accounting data and the assump­
tion that there are generally accepted accounting principles begs the questions 
of acceptable to whom and for what purpose. Can a single set of figures be 
reported for all users without impairing the usefulness of the reporting? Mr. 
Whitman states that financial statements must fairly present the financial 
position of the firm. Most would agree with this statement but the concept of 
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fairness must be evaluated. If there is no single set of financial statements 
which is fair to all users then perhaps there cannot be a single set of accounting 
principles or postulates. Many of the problems of comparability stem from 
conflicting accounting principles. Mr. Whitman states that the proper match­
ing concept will go far to insure fairness to all concerned. But consider the 
position of the Chock Full-O-Nuts restaurants in 1962 where the security 
analysts were disturbed by the method of reporting research and development 
costs. The costs of research and development were deferred to match with 
the benefits to accrue hopefully from the incurred expenditure. The matching 
concept states that costs and revenues are to be matched at the point when 
revenue is realized. Deferring of research and development costs to the periods 
where the benefits are realized would seem to be a preferable treatment but 
it is not extensively used in financial reporting. This fact prevented the com­
parison of the operations of Chock Full-O-Nuts with other restaurants.
Until the logic and base of acceptance of accounting principles and 
methods is broadened and clarified it is not appropriate to singularly attack 
management for the accounting methods used. As Mr. Whitman points out, 
uniformity by fiat and not persuasion is not acceptable to management.
The Role of Independent Accountants
While we agree with Mr. Whitman that the primary responsibility for 
financial reporting rests with management, we do not feel that the development 
of accounting principles is the primary responsibility of management. Man­
agement has a stake in accounting principles as they affect the basis for 
reporting, but management has a secondary responsibility in the development 
of accounting principles. The accounting profession, in our opinion, is pri­
marily responsible for the development of accounting principles. However, 
the profession must not operate in a vacuum but must seek the co-ordination 
of its research and pronouncements of authoritative opinions with the research 
and opinions of management and other interested parties. A greater degree 
of participation and interaction is required of the various professional groups. 
This will provide the only clear path toward a cohesive set of generally accepted 
accounting principles.
Too often the concept of generally accepted accounting principles is 
taken to mean general acceptance by the Accounting Principles Board or the 
accounting profession. It should be apparent that due to the roles of other 
interested parties that a broad base of acceptance is required to narrow differ­
ences in accounting methods. If the logic of a preferred treatment can be 
established by persuasion and the criteria for the use of alternate methods can 
be established then financial reporting will be improved. It will be improved 
because of the reasonableness of the assumptions underlying the treatment of 
financial data, not simply because it would create a greater degree of com­
parability.
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While management has primary responsibility for the preparation of 
financial statements the auditor’s role is interrelated with management’s. A 
part of the CPA’s role is to advise management on the presentation of infor­
mation and the methods of reporting which fairly present the financial position 
of the firm. His responsibility is not simply to condone present practice but 
rather to advocate practices on sound principles and assumptions so that the 
logic of a preferred treatment is apparent.
About 80 per cent of all companies filing with the SEC employ one of 
eight large accounting firms and yet there is a lack of agreement among the 
large firms on accounting methods and accounting principles. The work of 
these eight large firms has a major influence on management practices. Unfor­
tunately, however, the lack of unity on accounting methods and principles is 
the cornerstone of the problems we are discussing here.
Attempts have been made by the accounting profession to narrow differ­
ences in methods not justified by differences in factual circumstances but in 
many areas of conflict there are several logical methods for reporting the same 
facts. In these areas the profession has attempted to establish preferred prac­
tice by rulings of the APB. As Mr. Whitman points out, this has been less 
than completely successful.
The Role of Security Analysts
Mr. Whitman looks at the security analyst as an important user of finan­
cial information. He states that analysts must make their informational 
requirements known. The analysts have a responsibility to determine if any 
additional information is useful and justifies the additional costs. The role of 
the financial analyst is considered in depth in the study on Financial Reporting 
by Diversified Companies conducted by R. K. Mautz for the Financial Execu­
tives Institute. Professor Mautz was disappointed by the fact that out of 1,000 
questionnaires mailed to analysts only 220 useful responses were received.
It was the investment analysts who first indicated that a more detailed 
reporting of conglomerates was required. Those individuals who require 
additional information from management must clarify what type of informa­
tion is needed.
The recent Texas Gulf Sulphur decision in the courts will have an impact 
on the role of security analysts in financial reporting. The full impact of the 
decision has not been felt. A great deal of interest in the decision is evidenced 
by the fact that a reprint of the circuit court decision is currently a best seller 
for the publisher. An important point in this court opinion is that a person 
who gives out inside information but doesn’t use it for personal profit is as 
guilty as the person who uses it. There is some question as to what is material 
information. The courts have taken a very broad definition of materiality. 
This decision if upheld on appeal to the Supreme Court may place more 
emphasis on disclosure in financial reporting and the types of formal informa­
tion required by analysts. In any case it appears that managements will be 
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more guarded in their disclosure of information to outsiders. Analysts are 
entitled to all information that is furnished to groups outside of the corporate 
structure, but do not have an exclusive license to receive other data.
The Role of the SEC
Ralph A. Martin, vice president of Standard Oil of Ohio, has stated that 
the SEC is part of “business’ conscience, and morality.” This might also be 
said of auditors but the auditor’s role has a much broader scope in this respect. 
Mr. Whitman states that the role of the SEC is to protect the public interest 
by promoting good reporting practices. He also states that full disclosure is a 
cornerstone of security regulation. Perhaps what is meant by full disclosure 
should be explained.
The SEC should be chiefly interested in seeing that investors get all the 
relevant facts and figures for their decision-making analysis. There are limits 
to the amount of protection which the SEC can give the public, for a portion 
of the public will make errors in judgment based on erroneous interpretation 
of published data. The prospectus of the Go Publishing Company is an 
interesting example. An article in The Wall Street Journal stated that the 
prospectus sounded more like a petition for bankruptcy than a prospectus. 
The company has not earned a profit since it started in 1966 and it appears 
future prospects are very dim. The firm was extremely frank in its presentation. 
The stock offering has been cleared by the SEC and the stock enjoyed a brisk 
sale.
The SEC and other governmental agencies should consistently review 
reporting requirements for their usefulness. The costs of financial reporting 
can be reduced where regulatory requirements can be derived from the under­
lying accounting structure of the firm. Unnecessary or useless reporting 
requirements should be eliminated and, if possible, reporting should be consoli­
dated to avoid the duplication of effort by management to comply.
Comparability of Financial Reports
Mr. Whitman points out that a major problem in financial reporting is 
the unjustified insistence on the comparability of the financial statements of 
different firms. A major topic in most discussions of comparability is the idea 
of uniformity versus nonuniformity for comparisons can only be made by the 
uniform treatment of similar facts. Noncomparability is caused by several 
factors:
• Inadequate disclosure
• A lack of consistency in the application of accounting methods
• Logical methods of accounting supported by conflicting accounting 
principles
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• Divergent authoritative support for various methods
• Differences in the interpretation of facts
• Variations in factual circumstances
• Differences from management’s choice of methods
In the inter-period comparison of a single firm a uniform or consistent 
treatment along with disclosure of the methods used allows a comparison of 
the financial reports of several periods of time. In many cases an alternate 
accounting method if consistently followed will produce the same result over 
time. However, because of the public’s tendency to use a single figure of the 
earnings per share in the analysis of a firm, the problem of nonrecurring or 
extraordinary charges should be discussed. Paul Grady states in Accounting 
Research Study No. 7 that only recurring items may be meaningfully compared. 
Therefore, nonrecurring gains and losses should be shown separately from 
ordinary operations. Mr. Grady further states that, “There is a strong pre­
sumption that all gains and losses will be included in periodic income state­
ments unless they are of such magnitude in relation to revenues and ex­
penses from regular operations as to cause the statements to be misleading.” 
Because of the possibility of overlooking nonrecurring items which are 
charged to retained earnings it is useful to disclose the effect of extraordi­
nary items on earnings per share. Perhaps more extended use of combined 
statements of income and retained earnings would provide more adequate 
disclosure for interperiod comparisons and highlight extraordinary items not 
reflected in the income statement.
There are many problems to be resolved in the comparability of quarterly 
or interim reports. Should interim reports be examined by auditors? How 
can interim reports be compared to the annual reports? Comparability of 
interim reports is complicated by seasonal variations in business enterprises. 
In particular the problem of allocating annual period costs may lead to a 
distortion in an attempt to relate the quarterly earnings to expected annual 
earnings. Proportioning or assigning period costs in interim reports should be 
given further consideration. The ideal interim report will be both accurate 
and predictive.
Inter-firm comparisons create further problems which Mr. Whitman has 
analyzed. Mr. Whitman points out that there have been attempts to gain a 
useless comparability by advocating strict uniformity in accounting methods, 
but that some degree of flexibility is necessary to account for changing condi­
tions in the business world and differences in factual circumstances. It is a 
fact that uniformity eliminates flexibility but on the other hand flexibility 
should not be used as an excuse to prevent improvement in accounting methods 
and the elimination of undesirable accounting practices.
Mr. Whitman stated that a degree of flexibility in the application of 
generally accepted accounting principles has accomplished the objective of 
meaningful financial reporting. The reporting methods for variations in factual 
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circumstances should be flexible, but basic principles should be uniformly 
established for authoritative support of methods based on logical assumptions 
and reasoning.
Narrowing Differences in Accounting Methods
We suggest that the first step is to effectively establish the basic accounting 
principles. Then an attempt must be made to narrow differences in accounting 
methods which are not based on sound principles of accounting or which are 
not justified by variations in factual circumstances. To justify alternate 
methods the criteria for alternate methods must be established. Emphasis must 
be placed on persuasion not compulsion. There are several ways of moving 
toward these goals. Mr. Whitman has considered the progress of the APB and 
the voluntary actions of managements as one way.
Because of managements’ unique position in determining which account­
ing methods will be used in the preparation of financial statements, it is 
important to eliminate undesirable or unjustified methods within an industry. 
The nature of the industry itself is important in justifying the particular treat­
ment of accounting information. Various industries can encourage discussion 
of accounting methods to establish criteria for the methods used. These discus­
sions might be sponsored by the FEI with the participation of other interested 
parties. In any attempt to state preferred accounting treatment it is important 
to achieve a broad base of acceptance. The work of the American Petroleum 
Institute, which has studied the accounting methods used in that industry, 
represents the type of research that is needed.
In addition to the actions of management, there is a need for further 
action by the accounting profession and the SEC. The SEC should set mini­
mum requirements for necessary information which justifies the costs of 
preparation by its usefulness. The accounting profession is faced with the 
greatest task and must have the full co-operation of all interested parties. 
Discussions prior to the issuance of rulings or pronouncements of the account­
ing profession would place the interested parties in the position of contributing 
to the research and encouraging consideration of divergent views. Unfortu­
nately, in too many instances, interested parties can only react to the rulings 
of the APB because they have not been privileged to participate fully in the 
deliberations of that body.
Flynn
Mr. Flynn presents an interesting look at the problems facing the accounting 
profession in the development of accounting principles. The increasing com­
plexity of business operations is a fact of business life. There has been a 
considerable trend towards the expansion of the economic activity of a firm 
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through the many mergers and acquisitions which have taken place. The idea 
of a conglomerate company operating in diverse and unrelated industries has 
led to the demand for a breakdown of earnings on a basis more detailed than 
overall earnings for the firm. It would seem that the problems of the past 
diminish by comparison to the problems and challenges of the future.
Sound accounting principles should be the basis for justifying accounting 
methods. An improved definition of generally accepted accounting principles 
would result in a more authoritative and more meaningful audit opinion. The 
APB has been established to provide authoritative support for accounting 
methods and practices which are consistent with sound accounting theory. 
Often the authority and significance of the APB rulings have been undermined 
by the refusal of accounting firms to qualify their opinion where they felt there 
was substantial authoritative support for an alternate method of accounting. 
This led to the opinion that departures from the rulings of the APB must be 
disclosed in footnotes or in the auditor’s opinion. The importance of sound 
reasoning and general practicality in the accounting methods is essential in 
the preparation of APB rulings and pronouncements. The co-operation, 
understanding, and acceptance by other interested parties is essential to 
effective implementation of sound accounting techniques. Perhaps the most 
important contribution of this Symposium to resolving the problems under 
discussion would be reaffirmation of the thesis expressed in the preceding 
sentence.
Fundamentally, nothing has changed since the now defunct committee 
on accounting procedures stated that “the authority of opinions reached by 
the committee rests upon their general acceptability.” In spite of the authority 
granted to the APB by its parent body, that authority has no substance if the 
Board’s pronouncements fall upon deaf ears in the financial community. 
Therefore, Mr. Flynn’s suggestion that the Board has tried to move too fast is 
particularly noteworthy when coming from one who has been a close observer.
While the APB may have been too quick in issuing its research findings 
and Opinions, it may be said that others, including management, perhaps have 
been too slow to react to pronouncements of the APB. The Omnibus Opinion 
No. 10 is an example of the failure of interested parties to adequately consider 
the implications of an Opinion prior to the APB adoption.
The suggestion that adequate time be given to test the practical applica­
tion of the draft Opinions is a step toward more authoritative Opinions with a 
broader base of acceptance. However, Mr. Flynn’s recognition of the need for 
greater participation in the formulation of Opinions by user groups outside the 
AICPA is of even greater significance. This is in contrast to the recent action 
of the APB in reducing the number of industry members on the Board. It is 
not enough to pay lip service to participation; continuing tangible evidence of 
agreement by the APB that participation is desirable is an essential ingredient 
for progress in clarifying accounting principles. An encouraging sign of 
greater participation is indicated by distribution of early drafts of recently 
proposed APB pronouncements to concerned FEI Committees, and others. 
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However, the desire for haste on the part of the APB has resulted in only scant 
time for consideration of these drafts by parties outside the Board.
Mr. Flynn suggests that there are few situations where management 
requires different principles for internal reporting than those for external 
reporting. One situation where this is not true is in component reporting. 
Most companies prepare reports of the profitability of components, but the 
accounting methods and assumptions in cost allocation and intercompany 
transfers are not suitable for external reporting. Accounting principles for 
component reporting must be established if such reports are necessary. The 
matching of costs and revenues between components differs from the matching 
of costs between periods in financial reporting. A basic principle of accounting 
is the going concern concept. The integrated operation of a firm as a whole 
has some value over the value of the separate assets. Where the amount of 
unassignable common costs is significant for a diversified firm there is con­
siderable justification for a defined profit concept, which is inconsistent with 
present accounting principles, in measuring the earnings of a segment of a 
business.
Another example of a situation where internal reporting principles are 
not accepted for external reporting is in the direct costing method of valuing 
inventories. External reporting requires full costing, limited by market values 
or net realizable value, in the valuation of inventories in the balance sheet. 
Another example relates to the realization of income at the point of sale or 
exchange in an arm’s-length transaction. Most individuals agree that income 
is earned in the manufacturing process but it is not realized until the point of 
sale. Management is concerned with responsibility accounting and therefore 
income may be recognized by management in its internal reporting upon 
transfer, but prior to its realization by sale. Methods and purposes vary 
between internal and external reporting and it seems to us that present 
accounting principles are not entirely applicable in both areas.
In discussing accounting methods which do not reflect the economic 
realities of business transactions, Mr. Flynn states that financial statements 
should be adjusted for the changing value of the dollar. The problems involved 
in providing supplemental statements based on the changing purchasing power 
of the dollar have yet to be resolved. There are, it seems to us, sound reasons 
to adhere to historical cost. What is the purchasing power of the dollar in the 
hands of a particular firm? The uniform application of the gross national 
product deflator as an index of purchasing power is an arbitrary attempt at 
uniformity. The use of an index number implies a base year for comparisons. 
What is a satisfactory base year?
The transaction concept is important to the objectivity of accounting 
data. Price-level changes are realized only at the point of sale or exchange. 
Adjustments of earnings for price-level changes would reflect anticipatory 
profits. These supplemental statements could be misleading and costly to 
prepare, and are of doubtful value in most instances.
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Critique
Of the Norby, McGarraugh, Whitman and Flynn papers
By Harry S. Meily, Executive Vice President, Security Pacific National Bank, 
representing the Robert Morris Associates
Norby
From Mr. Norby’s presentation, several essential arguments are raised: 
(1) the uses of financial reports; (2) information requirements; (3) interests of 
preparers and users; and (4) how reporting should be accomplished.
While the paper is carefully developed, some additional comments seem 
in order. These comments fall into two major classes: leadership for change 
and the quality of reporting.
It is of great importance that Mr. Norby considers the investment analysts 
to be weak in accounting training and theory. This points to a major flaw in 
much current financial reporting—it is difficult to interpret without extensive 
training, which is not normally expected of an investment-analyst. Since one 
of the primary reasons for publishing the “Annual Report” or other reports to 
stockholders is to inform them on the affairs of their company, it appears as 
a failure of responsibility to provide reports which will mislead the investor 
or analyst, either due to the complexity of reporting devices, or deliberate 
manipulation of the results to provide an attractive appearance.
The investor and the financial analyst who represents him look for relative 
values principally in terms of earnings, such as prior earnings ratios, return 
on invested capital, growth rate of earnings, and cost ratios involving labor, 
materials, and selling expense. Because of the myriad corporations and the 
astronomical amounts involved in the securities markets, it is imperative that 
comparability provide like bench marks from the beginning.
Earnings per share represents a stockholder’s proportionate interest and 
this is the figure that makes the headlines. The general public doesn’t hear 
about the explanatory footnotes. Today the quality of these earnings is masked 
because the range of generally accepted accounting principles is too wide. 
What is needed then is a narrowing of this range.
For the very reason that investment analysts are not trained to perform 
extensive analysis of the financial information to obtain the most accurate 
possible insight available from the information provided, the group of invest­
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ment analysts cannot reasonably be expected to provide leadership in the 
formulation of specific rules to govern reporting. On the contrary, they are 
seldom as interested in the specific rules of accounting for financial results as 
in the more general view that reporting should provide certain kinds of things. 
In this view, reporting should be comparable: by time periods; by companies; 
and by industries. This raises many specific issues which are not being reported 
in a meaningful way, such as pooling-of-interests mergers, depreciation report­
ing, cash flow, non-recurring gains, internal growth versus growth by acqui­
sition, etc. How these specific issues should be handled and other specific 
issues which have arisen and will arise is not as important to this group of 
users as when and how well. The timing and quality are important, due to the 
large absolute size of the number of companies and the dollar investments 
involved. These analysts, in order to properly evaluate alternate investment 
opportunities, need reasonably uniform measures of earnings, quality of earn­
ings, and potential earning power. Without uniform yardsticks, the analyst 
will be unable to arrive at a practical method of assessing the progress of a 
company or group of companies. The obvious consequence is very serious, 
in that the analyst will tend to undervalue the underlying securities if he is 
unable to satisfy himself with respect to the earnings of the company.
While it is generally recognized that changes are needed in reporting, the 
speed of the changes is underemphasized. The longer uniform accounting 
principles lag behind the rapid pace of changes in corporate reporting needs 
which stem from rapid change in the character of corporate business activity, 
the greater the problems of comparability of results. Thus, as Mr. Norby 
emphasizes, accounting principles, or rules, should be established when change 
is beginning, not when it is over. To illustrate this point, it is only necessary 
to think of any poor rule which is generally understood, as opposed to no rule 
and many solutions which are generally not understood. The results in the 
former would be easily followed, but in the latter case, they would be subject 
to varying opinions of what was being reported.
This entire paper seems to point toward several solutions to the basic 
problems of adequate reporting and the responsibility for adequacy of the 
reports.
Mr. Norby suggests that a simple solution would involve the accounting 
profession using the influence inherent in the value of the certification to the 
corporation to enforce adequate accounting principles. While this would offer 
the most simple solution, it avoids the problem of establishing the rules, or 
principles, to be enforced. Development of the rules is probably a more diffi­
cult problem than enforcement.
Another solution seems to lie with the leadership of lenders, such as 
banks, working within the committee form, such as this Symposium, or inde­
pendent of it on an individual or group basis. This would not seem reliable, 
due to the varied thinking of bankers on their own reporting, and the diverse 
requirements for information on credit in general or in a specific case. Even 
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if banks were able to agree on reporting rules, it would not seem likely that 
their requirements would correspond with those of the investor.
An unpleasant solution, which is also obvious, could involve a public 
agency such as the SEC which could both establish the rules and enforce 
compliance. A more pleasant use of this idea could involve the recommenda­
tion to the SEC or other agency of the rules desired by the accounting pro­
fession and the other interested groups.
While it is clear that these or similar solutions are not desirable, as 
recognized by the need for this Symposium, a worthwhile solution is not clear. 
It does seem, however, that the accountants have, and admit that they have, 
a quasi-fiduciary responsibility which revolves around the goodness of the 
certification. It also appears that a practical approach by the accounting 
profession should center on this goodness or lack of goodness of the certifica­
tion, and the responsibility or lack of it that is implicit.
McGarraugh
Mr. McGarraugh presents his argument regarding the respective roles 
of users and preparers of reports on three major premises:
1. The audited and certified corporate financial report has become the primary 
source of information for credit grantors and other users, but does not 
adequately meet these needs.
2. In order for it to accomplish this task, the report must be reliable and 
sufficient in disclosure of material facts.
3. The burden for fair presentation of these facts has fallen to the profes­
sional accountants due to their expertise and independence.
While each premise is well supported, the latter two require some com­
ment. As Mr. McGarraugh points out, the information requirements of the 
individual user may differ from other similar users. However, this would not 
seem to imply a comprehensive annual report, as he suggests, but special or 
supplemental reports to fulfill these special requirements. Although he 
acknowledges the value of these special reports in several places, the emphasis 
is on maximum disclosure in a single multi-purpose report. Even though he 
does not seem to establish their compatibility, these two points may be recon­
ciled by supplementing special materials to a reliable audit report to provide 
full disclosure of all material facts, and also information of possible value to 
the analyst. The issue here is not entirely disclosure, but rather, there are two 
main issues: how disclosure is best accomplished, and where the impetus for 
change should lie.
The simple, uncluttered, comprehensible, multi-purpose report, which 
Mr. McGarraugh regards as an “ideal” report, is not only probably unattain­
able, but also cannot meet all of the criteria which he has established for good 
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reporting. If a report could be written which had a uniform meaning to all 
trained users then it would also be too revealing of company operations, and 
not acceptable to corporate management. An even greater weakness of his 
“ideal” report would be that the real financial analysis would have been per­
formed by the preparer, who is not trained as an analyst, but as a reporter.
By looking beyond this artificial ideal, we may consider the more basic 
question of how disclosure is best accomplished. This would seem to involve 
either full disclosure of material facts, or adequate disclosure of material facts, 
based upon a particular user’s need to know. Clearly, some of this valuable 
information seems to be beyond adequate disclosure, and involves many judg­
mental factors normally reserved to the credit grantor or investor. Particularly, 
this would include some of the asset valuations, the cash flow schedules and 
projections and the letter on internal controls that are mentioned.
Full disclosure would appear to be impractical for two reasons: the vast 
amount of information required for such disclosure; and corporate reluctance 
to disclose information of possible value to competitors. The amount of infor­
mation would be prohibitively expensive and cumbersome to distribute and 
would represent a burden to most recipients. At the same time, regardless of 
precautions, such information made available to lenders and investors would 
eventually become available to competitors.
At the present time, this disclosure requirement is ordinarily accomplished 
on an acceptable basis between corporate management and the qualified user. 
Management will disclose adequate information if the user is able to demon­
strate a need for such information. This places the burden of evaluation on 
the user, where it properly belongs. It is no more reasonable that a manufac­
turing corporation be required to disclose all facts to each of its many sources 
of credit than it would be for a bank to justify its solvency to each of its many 
depositors.
It is also clear, however, that many additional disclosures would enhance 
the audit report. These disclosures could include a listing of the material judg­
mental decisions, which “generally accepted accounting principles” were 
employed, cost and market prices where relevant, capitalization of expenses, 
special measurement standards, acquisition accounting, compliance with 
agreements, and non-balance-sheet liabilities and assets. In short, this would 
involve disclosure of the standards employed in the preparation of the financial 
report and the audit. With this information, the qualified user would be able 
to essentially reconstruct the major accounts and satisfy himself as to the 
fairness of the presentation.
While the inclusion of these standards would make the report difficult to 
interpret without thorough analysis, the recent changes in general accounting 
standards through the Accounting Principles Board of the AICPA have simpli­
fied some of the alternate choices of principles and hold promise to further 
reduce the multiplicity of principles which may be applied in a particular 
circumstance.
The last of the three premises involves the reliance on the independent 
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accountants’ report by the report users. While the accounting profession has 
disclaimed the reliance on the audit report by users, especially in the bulletin 
“The Auditor’s Report—Its Meaning and Significance,” for a fair and accurate 
presentation, and instead, attributes deficiencies to corporate management, 
there is considerable user and corporate management reliance on the certified 
statement as a fair and accurate presentation of the financial condition of the 
company.
Credit grantors, however, are probably less inclined to regard the auditor’s 
certification as the only test of the financial condition of the company than 
some other user groups. The certification is viewed as additional assurance 
that the financial affairs of the company are as represented. In addition to 
other information—from corporate management, through credit channels and 
from contact with the company—the lender should have the analytic skills to 
evaluate the company’s financial condition.
In view of these premises, it is rather apparent that both users and pre­
parers should work toward better disclosure and that the accounting profession 
should undertake the responsibility which has been pressed upon it. Failure 
to accept this responsibility could eventually weaken the accounting profession, 
as the audit report loses its value compared to other forms of information 
which have become commonplace. That is, if the audit report is not reliable, 
users will demand increasing quantities of information directly from corporate 
management from which they may judge the financial condition of the 
company.
Many of the concepts discussed by Mr. McGarraugh point up the growing 
sophistication of bankers and other lenders in their credit roles. No longer is 
the banker able to rely on historical statement information and personal 
contact with corporate principals as the basis of credit judgments. Lender 
contact with corporate management has become more impersonal and less 
frequent and lenders are seeking other means to aid in credit evaluations. At 
the same time, the pace of business activity has increased and the corporate 
structure has become more complex. This has led to discussions of new 
methods of evaluating comparability of operating results and financial posture. 
Bankers are alert to new methods and media of communication and will 
increasingly look to new technology to assist in the complex credit decisions 
they are facing.
Whitman
Mr. Whitman holds that management is responsible for reporting of 
financial information and should therefore have a greater voice and authority 
in its preparation. At the same time he contends that both user and preparer 
groups should play major roles in influencing the principles and practices to 
be employed. In this regard, also, he is critical of the Accounting Principles 
Board, especially the emphasis on uniformity, inadequate research and the 
compulsion to adhere to the Opinions. Instead of fiat, he argues, the Board 
should use persuasion.
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Mr. Whitman believes that all would be better served if all contributed 
to development of APB Opinions, perhaps by having representatives of pre­
parer and user groups on the APB. Although not recommending any particular 
form of achieving better accounting principles, he mentions several possible 
methods of increasing the value of the APB as the vehicle for that improvement.
The proposal with the greatest merit relates to representing other interest 
groups on the APB. This could reduce problems of acceptance and communi­
cation and also improve the Board’s insight into the practical implications of 
a draft Opinion.
In our opinion, two important weaknesses mar an otherwise very well- 
reasoned paper. First, the general observation that the speed of changes in 
principles was overemphasized. From the standpoint of the accounting pro­
fession, speed is important if the independent accountants expect to maintain 
their influence over accounting principles and practice by leading in responding 
to changed conditions. The longer diverse practices are in use, the more 
difficult it will be to adopt reasonably uniform principles to deal with account­
ing problems. If public confidence in the “audit and opinion” of independent 
accountants were seriously shaken, every interested group would lose.
The second major weakness is the attempt to find a consensus of inter­
ested parties prior to change. This implies a strongly pragmatic approach, 
evident in other portions of the paper. Even if it seemed possible to obtain this 
consensus, the effect of such an approach could damage the theoretical frame­
work of accounting by introducing more exceptions to existing theory and 
identifying them as principles. From both standpoints, this would probably 
not serve our interests in better accounting.
Flynn
Central to Mr. Flynn’s paper is his general conception that the accounting 
profession has been recently subjected to rapid changes, both by users and 
the AICPA through the Accounting Principles Board. While standing in favor 
of change, and agreeing with most of the Opinions of the APB, he believes that 
the “user” impetus for the change and the pace of the change will result in 
impractical and inflexible rules which will damage everyone’s interests. This 
conflict of where the responsibility for change should lie and by implication, 
where the responsibility for accounting principles should lie, runs throughout 
the paper. The suggestion is always present that authority for “good account­
ing principles” should rest with the accountant-practitioner, but everyone 
should share the responsibility for those principles. This suggestion is especially 
clear in his treatment of the APB where he indicates that the Board has been 
too responsive to pressure for change and that this kind of pressure and 
response could seriously damage accounting and reporting practices.
This seems to be a somewhat narrow view both of the role of the inde­
pendent accountant and the role of users, despite indications that Mr. Flynn is 
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in favor of changes which have been taking place. Perhaps it was this view of 
accounting principles as being primarily in the independent accountant’s 
domain which led to the many outside pressures for changes in principles, and 
influenced the creation of the APB.
We as users have come to believe that this narrow view is not the prevalent 
view of independent accountants. It appears that many accountants would 
welcome even more rapid change, in order to make accounting principles more 
responsive to current needs.
As a user of published financial reports, it is not entirely clear to me 
where authority should reside, but responsibility and authority should be 
together. It is clear that if the accounting profession does not lead in principles, 
others will. As Mr. Flynn admits, the SEC was on the verge of requiring 
changes in “generally accepted accounting principles” for their purposes, but 
is now willing to wait for the APB. The IRS has also, over many years, altered 
accounting practices. These single-purpose changes are undesirable, primarily 
because financial statements are put to many uses, and it is far more attractive 
to employ a single set of statements for all purposes, than many special purpose 
reports. However, contrary to Mr. Flynn’s comment that one report should 
serve all users, this is not currently true in practice. Most businesses have at 
least two reports: the IRS tax report, and the stockholders’ report. In addition, 
some firms may need additional reports (e.g., special management information 
reports; reports to regulatory agencies, as the ICC; special information reports 
or supplements for lenders; etc.). The worst feature of the proliferation of 
reports is that it necessitates additional material (normally not provided) to 
fully understand the facts being reported.
The largest question may be: If the independent accountants, and the 
management of the businesses they audit, do not respond to the needs of the 
users within a reasonable period of time, won’t this reduce the value of the 
“audit and opinion” to such an extent as to threaten its future? If, due to 
complexities of business organization, lenders need a special report, a separate 
tax report is prepared for the IRS, management uses a special program to 
audit its computers for internal control, other special reports are prepared for 
institutional investors, regulatory agencies and securities analysts—who will 
want the “audit and opinion” of the independent accountant?
On the need for periodic conferences, such as this one, Mr. Flynn agrees 
that they are desirable, but would prefer to treat specific accounting problems 
in greater depth. This evades the central issue of the roles of the interested 
groups.
Synthesis
The papers discussed above represent essentially divergent views of the 
common problem that is the basis for this Symposium.
Although each paper attempts to recognize the needs of the other 
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interested groups, those needs are defined differently by each group for the 
other groups. Thus, the papers as a whole seem to suggest little common 
grounds for agreement.
The most common area would lie with the simplification of accounting 
principles, primarily by reducing the latitude of preparers in the selection of 
principles to fit a specific case. This solution is considered attractive by the 
users, but less so by the preparers, especially the financial executive.
None are anxious to lead in solving this disagreement, and the AICPA 
and the APB have placed the accounting profession in between corporate 
management and the interested users. Obviously, this is a highly untenable 
position and has resulted in adopting the inconsistent posture of -claiming to 
be the authority on accounting, while denying the general validity of their 
certification.
The easy solution is to apply more pressure on the accounting profession 
to formulate and enforce the requisite changes in accounting practices. This, 
however, does not seem to be a healthy solution. The accounting profession 
would probably lose, rather than gain, influence due to the conflict which 
would develop between that group and the corporate finance group, abetted 
by the pressure from users.
A more reasonable solution could lie in a permanent group, such as the 
APB, composed of representatives of all interested groups, including the 
relevant government regulatory agencies. While this would seem to be a 
cumbersome solution, it might be able to devise rules which would have a 
higher degree of acceptance by the interested parties.
Another possible solution, which might place excessive burdens on the 
corporate management, could involve a split certification. This approach 
could develop a highly simplified, rigid rule reporting system for stockholders 
or investors with a strong certification of goodness and few or no explanatory 
notes. The report for lenders could involve a more detailed presentation with 
a very limited certificate and an exposition of principles employed. This 
approach would relieve the existing pressure for quick solutions to special 
reporting problems, permit corporations to ration information on a “need” 
basis, and provide investors with understandable information. This should 
permit the accounting practices to evolve rapidly enough to satisfy the require­
ment of Mr. Norby for “more rapid determination and development of 
accounting principles [that] is needed in today’s rapid pace of change in the 
corporate sector of the economy. New rules should be established when 
change is beginning, not when it is over,” without pushing the accounting 
profession into positions that are unacceptable to itself or the other parties.
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The Measurement of Income
By Robert T. Sprouse
Professor, Stanford University
The primary purpose of this paper is to raise questions, not to provide 
answers. It is intended to serve as a basis for the discussion of the problems 
of income measurement at two levels: First at the general level—the purpose 
for which the measurement is intended, the concept of income to be measured, 
the components whose net result provides the measurement, and some of the 
problems involved in the recognition and measurement of those components. 
Second, at the specific level—a set of specific related accounting issues that 
arise in the measurement of income from intercorporate investments. This 
particular set of problems was chosen because of their increasing significance, 
their currently unresolved status, and their imminent consideration by the 
Accounting Principles Board.
The General Problem of Income Measurement
The purpose of financial statements is to provide information which is 
useful in making rational economic decisions. Because different kinds of 
information are needed for different kinds of decisions, the nature of the 
information that should be provided and the form in which it should be 
presented are dependent upon the decision to be made. For example, the 
Internal Revenue Service has the responsibility for determining the amount 
of federal corporate income tax to be paid by each corporation under the 
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. In making that determination, 
certain financial statements containing certain kinds of information presented 
in a certain degree of detail have been found to be useful and have been 
prescribed. The purpose of the financial statements prepared for corporate 
income tax purposes is specific; taxable income is defined in great detail in 
the Internal Revenue Code and the Federal Income Tax Regulations.
In sharp contrast, the information contained in the financial statements 
published in corporate annual reports is used for varied and unspecified pur­
poses and the final figure appearing in the income statement is not well defined. 
Items included in the measurement of the income of one corporation may be 
excluded from the measurement of the income of another; measurements of 
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similar items may be made on one basis by one corporation and made on an 
entirely different basis by another.1 Sometimes these differences reflect the 
different environmental circumstances in which corporations operate, but 
often these differences merely reflect different accounting policies more or less 
arbitrarily chosen among alternatives that are considered to be equally 
acceptable for financial reporting purposes. A corporation might well account 
differently for its foreign operations in a country having rigid governmental 
restrictions and experiencing rampant inflation and for its foreign operations 
in a country with a tradition of free enterprise and a history of stable currency. 
On the other hand, environmental circumstances are not likely to explain 
different accounting treatments of the tobacco inventories of two domestic 
tobacco companies1 2 or different accounting treatments of the investment 
credits associated with the acquisitions of identical aircrafts by two com­
peting airlines.3
1 To the extent that different accounting procedures are specifically provided for, differences 
may also exist in the measurement of “taxable income” reported to the Internal Revenue 
Service. The obvious incentive for taking the largest possible deductions as early as possible, 
however, tends to dictate such elections.
2 R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company reports substantially all of its inventories on the basis of 
last-in, first-out cost; P. Lorillard Company and others report their inventories on the basis 
of average cost.
3 For example, American Airlines, Inc. and United Air Lines, Inc. reflect the investment tax 
credit in income in the year the credit is utilized; Northwest Airlines, Inc. and Delta Air 
Lines, Inc. amortize utilized investment tax credits over a period of years.
To provide measurements of income that are most useful—or, more gen­
erally, to provide financial information that is most useful—it seems necessary, 
therefore, to start with the objectives to be served or the uses for which that 
information is intended. With objectives or uses established, the concepts 
with which those uses are concerned can be formulated and relevant measure­
ments can be undertaken.
Uses of Measurements
There seems to be general agreement that although the financial state­
ments published in corporate annual reports may serve a variety of purposes 
they are primarily intended to provide information that is helpful in making 
rational investment decisions—decisions on the part of current and prospective 
investors to buy, to hold, and to sell debt and equity securities. Income 
measurements are particularly relevant for investment decisions made with 
respect to a continuing enterprise—a perpetuity. The enterprise can continue 
to survive and prosper only if its resources are maintained; the income figure 
is determined after providing for a recovery of all the resources expired in the 
income earning activity.
In contrast, measurements of flows of working capital or measurements 
of cash flows may be more useful for decisions involving limited periods of 
time. The economic wisdom of an investment in a new machine may be deter­
mined by the cash flows that result from the machine’s operation during its 
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limited life. When that life expires, the cash flows cease, and the machine is 
no longer of any consequence. The ability to settle an obligation that will 
mature on a specific date may depend on the cash flows that will take place 
before that date. Whether the enterprise will be able to maintain its current 
level of operations after the cash has been used and the debt has been settled 
need not be of any concern to the creditor. His interest in the enterprise is 
essentially terminated when the debt is paid.
Investors in common stocks, however, typically base their decisions on 
the assumption that the business enterprise will have a perpetual existence. 
They are likely to be interested in the measurement of income either as an 
indication of the amount of dividends that may be distributed without reducing 
the future earning capacity of the business enterprise or as an indication of 
the amount of growth that can be expected, if income is retained and reinvested 
in the enterprise. Some combination of dividends and growth may be the 
objective. If the amount of dividends is less than the amount of income, one 
would tend to assume that the underlying earning power of the enterprise is 
not only being maintained, but being strengthened.
Measurements of income, therefore, provide a basis for predicting future 
earnings. Such predictions have obvious relevance to all investors—to current 
and prospective preferred stockholders, noteholders, and bondholders, as well 
as to current and prospective common stockholders. The profitability of 
operations, as indicated in measurements of income, provide a basis for assess­
ing the long run “safety” of future dividends on preferred stock and interest 
on debt as well as a basis for predicting the amount of future dividends to 
common stockholders and/or for increased underlying earning power and, 
hence, growth in the value of common shares.
Concept of Income
Probably the most widely quoted, and most appealing, concept of income 
is that of the noted economist, J. R. Hicks:
The purpose of income calculations in practical affairs is to give 
people an indication of the amount which they can consume without 
impoverishing themselves. Following out this idea, it would seem that 
we ought to define a man’s income as the maximum value which he 
can consume during a week, and still expect to be as well off at the 
end of the week as he was at the beginning. Thus when a person saves, 
he plans to be better off in the future; when he lives beyond his in­
come, he plans to be worse off.4
Conceptually, the measurement of how “well off” an individual or busi­
ness unit is at any point of time implies the determination in real terms of the
4 J. R. Hicks, Value and Capital, 2d ed. (London, Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 172. 
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capitalized value of prospective net cash receipts. However, the uncertainty 
with respect to the amounts and timing of prospective net cash receipts and 
the uncertainty with respect to future price levels and appropriate rates of 
discount prevent measurements of income in that sense. To a great extent, 
accountants have ignored changing price levels, the time value of money, and 
future cash flows and have accepted invested cost, measured in terms of 
numbers of dollars, as an appropriate basis for valuation. Usually, at the date 
of acquisition, invested cost can be said to be the equivalent of market value; 
market value is presumed to represent the best estimate of the capitalized 
value of prospective receipts of cash or valuable services. Subsequent changes 
in outlook, changes in the purchasing power of the dollars invested, and 
changes in the revelant rate of interest are ignored for accounting purposes.
With this in mind, Hicks’ concept of income might be modified to describe 
corporate income as we know it in practical affairs today:
The income of a business enterprise during any given period of time 
is that number of dollars which, if there were no additional invest­
ments or disinvestments (i.e., dividends and purchases of treasury 
stock) by the stockholders during the period, could be distributed by 
the enterprise to its stockholders without impairing the number of 
dollars of stockholders’ equity in the enterprise at the beginning of 
the period.
Although the current practice in the U.S. is to measure all amounts in 
terms of numbers of dollars regardless of the purchasing power those dollars 
represent, this version of Hicks’ concept of income could easily be modified 
to focus on purchasing power:
The income of a business enterprise during any given period of time 
is that amount of purchasing power which, if there were no additional 
investments or disinvestments by the stockholders during the period, 
could be distributed by the enterprise to its stockholders without im­
pairing the purchasing power of the stockholders’ equity in the enter­
prise at the beginning of the period.
Furthermore, although current practice in the U.S. relies largely on 
invested cost—which could be measured either in terms of numbers of dollars 
or in terms of purchasing power—as the basis for accounting measurements, 
the same concept might easily be adapted to the use of “current values” as 
the basis for accounting measurements.
In any case, it is to be noted that the measurement of this concept of 
income is dependent upon the measurement of stockholders’ equity. The 
measurement of stockholders’ equity, in turn, is necessarily dependent upon 
the measurement of assets and liabilities. This suggests that the concept of 
assets and the concept of liabilities are more fundamental than the concept of 
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income. Indeed, to my knowledge, no one has ever managed to formulate 
a concept of income that is not directly or indirectly dependent upon the 
concepts of assets and liabilities. There is good reason to expect, therefore, 
that any attempts to improve the measurement of income that ignore the 
measurement of financial position and the concepts of assets and liabilities 
embodied therein, are doomed to failure.
Furthermore, because the nature of income is obviously more funda­
mental than the rules and procedures adopted to implement its measurement, 
a meaningful concept of income is fundamental to the establishment of sound 
rules and procedures. Some erratic results are almost certain to be produced 
by a process of deciding on an ad hoc basis what should be and what should 
not be included in the measurement of income without first resolving the 
nature of income.
Measurement Rules and Procedures
Those who make use of the income figure are also frequently interested in 
the nature and magnitude of various transactions from which income is the net 
result—for example, the amount of sales made during the period, the amount 
of depreciation estimated to be applicable to the period, the amount of wages 
earned during the period, the amount of taxes attributable to the period and 
so forth. Typically, therefore, the measurement of income is accomplished 
by separately recognizing and measuring significant classes of revenues and 
gains and separately recognizing and measuring significant classes of expenses 
and losses. When these are summarized, the algebraic sum represents the 
net change in stockholders’ equity resulting from operating transactions, 
financial transactions, and other economic events, exclusive of stockholders’ 
investments and disinvestments. The income statement, therefore, is a sum­
mary of the non-stockholder transactions that affected stockholders’ equity; 
net income is the net effect.
A large portion of the problems encountered in the measurement of 
income are the result of the artificial segmentation of the life of an enterprise 
into calendar periods—e.g., months, quarters, and years. Such divisions are 
necessarily arbitrary; measurements of income during these arbitrary periods 
are necessarily tentative. It is a rare business indeed that does not have some 
incomplete transactions at the end of a fiscal period—receivables that have 
not yet been collected, inventories that have not yet been disposed of, equip­
ment that will continue to be useful next period, or debts that have not yet 
been paid. Investors and other decision makers, however, cannot wait for 
information until the business enterprise ceases to exist and an accurate 
accounting can be made. Accordingly, in order to supply income information 
periodically, rules must be adopted, estimates must be made, and costs must 
be allocated among fiscal periods. This is the unique responsibility of the 
financial accountant, but the tentative nature of his rules, estimates, and allo­
cations must not be overlooked.
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Revenues
Although it is generally acknowledged that income is attributable to the 
entire process of business activity—not just to the moment of sale or the 
delivery to a customer—it is also generally acknowledged that, as a practical 
matter, the amount of income attributable to the entire process of business 
activity is frequently not determinable until the income earning process is 
terminated by a sale or delivery.
Indeed, it is often stated as a general rule that revenues should be recog­
nized at the time of sale—that is, the entire change in stockholders’ equity 
resulting from the production and delivery of a product should be identified 
with the period during which the sale is made. The support for this rule lies 
primarily with the objectivity of measurement which is possible at that point. 
The selling price (revenue) has been determined; the most significant costs 
of earning the revenue (expenses) have been incurred. Furthermore, at the 
time of sale, revenues have been realized—that is, there has been a conversion 
by means of an arm’s-length transaction into new liquid assets (cash or 
receivables).5
5 W. A. Paton and A. C. Littleton, An Introduction to Corporate Accounting Standards (Amer­
ican Accounting Association, 1940), p. 49.
6 Report of Certain Petroleum Industry Accounting Practices (New York, American Petroleum 
Institute, 1965) pp. 55-62. See also “Resurvey as of December 31, 1966,” pp. 22-26.
It must be acknowledged, however, that in practice there are a wide 
variety of acceptable, and desirable, exceptions to “time of sale” and “realiza­
tion” which tend to negate the validity of both as basic criteria for revenue 
recognition. On the other hand, there is no set of circumstances in which 
the recognition of revenues before they have been earned is acceptable. For 
example, revenues are sometimes realized in advance—as in the case of 
magazine publishers and insurance companies. Such advance collections do 
not become recognized in the measurement of income, however, until they 
have been earned—by publishing and distributing the magazines and by 
bearing the risk of unforeseen insured losses. In other cases, it is common 
practice to recognize earned revenues before “time of sale” and/or before 
“realization.” Consider the following examples.
1. United States Leasing Corporation’s income from lease underwriting 
includes participations in the residual proceeds of the leased equipment at 
lease termination. These “participations in residuals are recorded as income 
at their discounted value on the lease commencement date.” The company’s 
auditors render an unqualified opinion.
2. The Superior Oil Company, a producer of crude oil, natural gas, and 
natural gas liquids, values its inventories of products “at market price” thereby 
recognizing earnings at time of production, rather than at time of sale. This 
practice is quite common among crude oil producers. Superior’s auditors 
render an unqualified opinion.
6
3. South Puerto Rico Sugar Company (a New Jersey corporation) values 
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its inventories that have been sold, but not shipped, “at estimated net contract 
sales prices” and its inventories that have not been sold “at estimated sales 
prices.” The effect is to base its measurement of income on production rather 
than sales. The company’s auditors render an unqualified opinion.
4. Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company “records profits 
on its long-term shipbuilding contracts through estimates on the percentage- 
of-completion basis and on its other long-term contracts as billings are made 
thereon. Estimated major losses on such contracts are recorded in the year 
first recognized. The performance of such contracts may extend over periods 
as long as several years.” The auditor’s opinion is unqualified.
5. Atlas Chemical Industries, Inc., recognizes its “equity in earnings of 
50 per cent owned companies” in its measurement of income. Recognition 
of this equity in earnings “is included whether or not there has been any 
realization of those earnings in the form of cash dividends.” The company’s 
auditors render an unqualified opinion.
These few examples are by no means an exhaustive list of recognitions of 
revenue that ignore “time of sale” and/or “realization.” These examples are 
representative, however, of practices that are widely used and which are 
desirable and properly acceptable for the purpose for which published financial 
statements are intended—that is, for appraising past performance as a basis 
for predicting future performance. Income should not be equated with cash 
and receivables; income encompasses increases in well-being, whatever the 
form.
In practice, the crucial constraint on the recognition of revenues as they 
are earned is not realization or sale; it is the feasibility of objective measure­
ment. Revenues should be—and usually are—identified with the period 
during which the major economic activities necessary to the creation and 
disposition of goods and services have been accomplished, whenever objective 
measurements of the results of those activities are available. These two 
conditions—accomplishment of major economic activity and objectivity of 
measurement—are fulfilled at different stages of activity in different cases— 
probably most frequently as late as time of delivery of a product or perform­
ance of a service, but sometimes at an earlier point of time.
Revenue recognition which is useful and meaningful and which, happily, 
is overwhelmingly manifested in accounting practice as it exists today, rests 
on those two conditions. Revenues are identified with the period during which 
the major economic activities are accomplished, provided objective measure­
ments of the results are available. This is what accountants do and why they 
are doing it. Assertions related to realization and time of sale are misleading; 
they are too narrow to encompass a significant portion of accounting practice.
Expenses
Expenses arise as the resources of a business enterprise are utilized in 
the creation of revenues. Basically, however, all expenses are related to cash 
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expenditures, or their equivalent. There are no exceptions. Cost of goods 
sold, depreciation, wages, advertising, research and development, income 
taxes (deferred as well as currently payable), interest (including amortization 
of any bond discount), and every other expense either is the result of a past 
cash outlay (or its equivalent) or will require a future cash outlay (or its 
equivalent). Accordingly, when people refer to “non-cash expenses,” they 
can only mean expenses that did not require cash outlays this period. All 
expenses reduce the cash balance at some time or other, and all expenses which 
continue to be incurred will continue to require cash. The qualification “or 
its equivalent” is necessary only to recognize the acquisition of assets and 
services and the settlement of debt in exchange for shares of stock. For various 
reasons, often involving tax advantages, shares of stock may be used instead 
of cash payments; presumably the same shares of stock could have been 
issued for cash. For purposes of this discussion, therefore, the substitute of 
shares of stock for cash can be ignored.
As in the case of revenues, accounting for expenses involves two major 
problems—timing and measurement. Most expenses can be identified either 
with specific revenues or with specific periods of time. The recognition of 
revenues, therefore, dictates that certain expenses closely associated with those 
revenues be recognized at the same time—e.g., cost of goods used. Other 
expenses have no direct relationship to revenues but do have a direct relation­
ship to the period during which revenues are recognized—e.g., the salaries of 
the corporate officers.
Measurement of expenses becomes increasingly complex (1) the greater 
the number of periods that receive valuable services as a result of a single cash 
outlay and (2) the longer the interval between the cash disbursement and the 
expiration of those acquired services.
When more than one period receives economic services from a single 
cash outlay—past or future—expense measurement requires some allocation 
of the cost of the economic services among the periods benefited. Often this 
allocation is necessarily arbitrary.
The time interval between cash disbursement and expiration of services 
introduces three other complications: (1) changes in the purchasing power of 
the monetary unit, (2) changes in the value of individual assets due to tech­
nological changes or shifts in demand, and (3) the time value of money.
The major problems of expense measurement are exemplified in the 
estimate of depreciation—the expiration of service potential owing to use, 
deterioration, and obsolescence. The time interval between cash disbursement 
and the expiration of acquired services tends to be longest for these kinds of 
assets; the number of accounting periods during which valuable services are 
received from a single cash outlay tends to be greatest for these kinds of assets. 
Accordingly, in addition to the necessity of arbitrary allocation of the initial 
cost among periods benefited, changes in the general price level, changes in the 
specific prices of the individual assets themselves, and the time preference for 
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cash are factors which affect the validity of the measurement of depreciation.
Surely no aspect of the measurement of income has created more mis­
understanding, more fallacious analysis, and more wild interpretation than 
that of depreciation. Like all expenses, however, depreciation is the result 
of a cash outlay. If an enterprise is to continue operations indefinitely, it must 
continue to pay cash for labor, continue to pay cash for materials, and continue 
to pay cash for the replacement of capital equipment. Among these productive 
factors, the relative importance of cash expenditures for property, plant, and 
equipment has become increasingly great with the acceleration of substituting 
machinery for labor.
Depreciation is no less an expense merely because it must be estimated. 
Most accounting measurements involve estimates of one kind or another. In 
terms of wealth and income, the exhaustion of service potential of plant and 
equipment is no different from the expenditure of cash and the use of inven­
tories. All are economic goods and all are necessary to the continuing 
operations of a business enterprise. There must be a continuous cash flow 
(receipts and disbursements), a continuous flow of inventories (sale and 
replenishment), and a continuous flow of plant and equipment (use and replace­
ment) if the enterprise is to operate indefinitely.
The most serious defect in the conventional measurement of depreciation 
expense is not that it is an estimate—that can never change. It is the failure 
to recognize the time preference for cash, the impact of changes in the general 
price level, and changes in the specific prices of assets. Basing the depreciation 
estimate on the number of dollars of some unspecified purchasing power 
invested some time in the past does not provide an income measurement as 
useful for predicting future incomes as accountants are capable of providing. 
With the current state of the art and the experience of accountants in other 
countries, accountants have the capability of significantly improving the 
measurement of income.
Gains and Losses
Ranking high among the most significant actions of the Accounting 
Principles Board is Opinion No. 9, issued in December 1966, entitled “Report­
ing the Results of Operations.” Without any explicit reference to an income 
concept, the measurement of which was the subject of discussion, the Board 
concluded “that net income should reflect all items of profit and loss recognized 
during the period except for prior period adjustments.”7 It would be interesting 
to know whether the Hicksian concept of income with which the Board’s 
conclusion is completely consistent—or any other explicit concept of income, 
for that matter—played a role in the Board’s deliberations. This was not the 
first time that an Opinion had been published specifying what should and/or 
7 APB Opinion No. 9, “Reporting the Results of Operations” (New York, American Institute 
of CPAs, December, 1966), p. 107.
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what should not be included in income with no explicit clue as to the concept 
of income the measurement of which the Board was attempting to improve.8
8 For example, in APB Opinion No. 2, “Accounting for the ‘Investment Credit’ ” (New York, 
American Institute of CPAs, December, 1962), the Board stated: “There is no significant dis­
agreement with the view that the investment credit is a factor which influences the determi­
nation of net income. The basic accounting issue before us therefore is not whether the 
investment credit increases net income but, rather, the accounting period(s) during which it 
should be reflected in the operating statement. Resolution of the accounting issue, in large 
part, rests upon the accounting principles relative to the realization of income.” (p. 5) The 
Board then proceeded to eliminate the alternative of considering the investment credit a 
“subsidy by way of a contribution of capital,” stating that “this concept, in our opinion, is 
the least rational because it runs counter to the conclusion that the investment credit in­
creases net income of some accounting period(s).” (p. 6)
9 Prior to the issuance of APB Opinion No. 9, this matter was covered in ARB No. 43, “Re­
statement and Revision of Accounting Research Bulletins” (New York, American Institute 
of CPAs, 1953), chapter 8.
A major variation in reporting income measurements had always been 
the decision to include or to exclude extraordinary items—that is, the gains 
and losses resulting from non-recurring transactions that are generally unre­
lated to the corporation’s typical business activities. Due to the permissiveness 
of earlier recommendations,9 it had been left largely to management to decide 
whether or not to include extraordinary items in measuring income. Many of 
us have had a strong suspicion that managements, being human like the rest 
of us, tended to include in income extraordinary gains and to exclude from 
income extraordinary losses.
Basically, APB Opinion No. 9 calls for the inclusion of all extraordinary 
gains and losses in the measurement of net income, but requires that they be 
specifically identifiable as extraordinary items and be deducted separately from 
a subtotal labeled “income before extraordinary items.” Accountants refer to 
this as the “clean surplus” rule or the “all-inclusive” measurement of net 
income. Under the new Opinion, only items that are clearly identifiable as 
corrections of prior period’s measurements of net income may be excluded; 
such corrections are treated as direct adjustments to retained earnings. The 
criteria for classifying an item as a prior period adjustment are quite severe; 
presumably such corrections will be rare, the most likely candidates being 
settlements of prior years’ income taxes following litigation or negotiation with 
the Internal Revenue Service.
The effect of the Opinion may be illustrated with an example. In its 1966 
annual report, General Mills, Inc., adjusted its retained earnings to reflect costs 
from closing its Refrigerated Foods Division facilities and a reduction in some 
reserves provided in prior years for liquidation of certain operations. The net 
adjustment to retained earnings was a deduction of $1,381,000. In its 1967 
annual report, published subsequent to the recommendation of the Accounting 
Principles Board, General Mills reclassified the $1,381,000 adjustment and 
reported it as an extraordinary item deducted in arriving at net earnings for 
1966. In the reported comparison of 1967 and 1966 earnings, the effect was 
to reduce 1966 earnings per share by $.18.
This part of APB Opinion No. 9 is a great step forward in creating some
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semblance of comparability among companies and, perhaps more important, 
among a series of fiscal periods for one particular company. It does not solve 
all the problems, however; controversy and variation will still surround the 
classification of items as “typical or customary business activities” that affect 
the results of ordinary operations without need for separate disclosure versus 
classification as nonrecurring extraordinary items that must be reported sepa­
rately as adjustments to operating income in arriving at the final net income 
figure.
Earlier this year, United Fruit Company issued a press release reporting 
1967 net earnings of $4 per common share as compared to $3.06 for 1966. 
In the text of the news release, the inclusion of an after-tax gain of $1,037,000 
or $.13 per share from the sale of the company’s interest in stock of Gorton 
Corporation was mentioned. Accordingly, in its “Earnings Digest” of Feb­
ruary 9, The Wall Street Journal deducted the $1,037,000 from United Fruit 
Company’s net income and reported its earnings per share at $3.87 as com­
pared to $3.06 for the previous year. This matter was particularly distressing 
to United Fruit Company “in view of the market decline in the price of the 
stock.” It seems that in January the chairman of the board of United Fruit 
Company made a prediction before the Rhode Island Society of Security 
Analysts that United’s earnings for 1967 would be about $4 per share. The 
company argued that the readers of The Wall Street Journal must have con­
cluded that the earnings were less than estimated. Accordingly, the company 
charged that The Journal’s publication of the $3.87 figure was misleading and 
“a disservice to the investing public and the financial community.”
In the financial statements in United Fruit’s annual report, the gain is 
apparently included with “sales of products and services,” no separate mention 
whatsoever being made of any gain on sale of stock. The auditors rendered 
a clean opinion on these statements.
In some respects, therefore, the problem of accounting for extraordinary 
items has simply been moved, not solved. These items will now be included 
in net income but whether they affect the results of operations or are separately 
identified as nonrecurring and nonoperating may continue to vary to some 
extent from company to company.
The Measurement of Income From Intercorporate Investments
During the past decade a rapidly increasing number of corporations have 
been engaging in intercorporate investments in one form or another.10 This 
10 “Accounting Trends and Techniques” (New York, American Institute of CPAs, 1967) re­
ported 646 affiliated companies (less than 50 per cent ownership), unconsolidated subsidiaries 
(more than 50 per cent ownership) and associated companies (50 per cent jointly owned) 
among the 600 1966 annual reports examined. For 1956, the total for the 600 annual re­
ports was 396.
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increased activity has accentuated the need for a re-examination and a con­
sistent resolution of a whole set of related problems involved in measuring the 
results of such investments. This group of related problems is presented here 
as a possible test for the application of any set of objectives, concepts, and 
recognition and measurement principles that might be proposed as a general 
framework for analyzing the problems of income measurement—the approach 
advocated at the outset of this paper.
Intercorporate investments may create at least three distinguishable kinds 
of problems: (1) investments involving less than 50 per cent ownership, where 
control is necessarily questionable, (2) investments involving exactly 50 per 
cent ownership, where control is usually shared with one other corporation 
that owns exactly 50 per cent, and (3) investments involving more than 50 
per cent ownership, thereby establishing prima facie control.
Investments involving less than 50 per cent ownership. Currently, ac­
counting for investments involving less than 50 per cent ownership seems to 
depend, at least in part, on the industry in which the investing corporation is 
considered to be primarily involved. Investment trusts—both closed-end and 
open-end—typically account for such investments at market value, recogniz­
ing increases and decreases in such market values as well as any dividends 
received; most industrial companies account for such investments at cost, 
recognizing only cash dividends received. For example, in its 1967 annual 
report Owens-Illinois reported its 29.3 per cent ownership of Owens-Corning 
Fiberglas and its less than 5 per cent ownership of Pennsylvania Glass Sand 
and some shares of Container Corporation of America stock at cost. That 
cost was incurred in the 1930’s, and amounted to about $2.7 million. The 
1967 year-end market value of the investment in Owens-Corning Fiberglas 
alone was about $130 million and the underlying book value of its equity 
in Owens-Corning Fiberglas at that date was about $62.5 million. Further­
more, about three-fourths of the Owens-Corning Fiberglas investment and all 
the Pennsylvania Glass Sand and Container Corporation investments were 
classified as current assets and thereby included in working capital. If market 
values were used, as they are by investment trusts, Owens-Illinois December 
31, 1967 working capital would have been nearly doubled. Under such cir­
cumstances, the significance of reporting these investments in 1967 financial 
statements at their cost in the 1930’s is not at all clear.
Du Pont accounted for its investment in General Motors at underlying 
net equity for about 40 years prior to the required divestiture of that invest­
ment, although the annual increases were not reported as income. For its 1967 
financial statements, Northern Pacific Railway Company switched from report­
ing its 48.59 per cent ownership in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad 
at cost, recognizing only cash dividends as income, to reporting that investment 
at underlying net equity, recognizing as income its share of undistributed 
earnings as well as cash dividends received. The change added nearly $8 
million to its 1966 earnings, or almost 90 cents per share to the $5.08 earnings 
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per share previously reported for 1966. The change also added over $260 
million to the investment account and to Northern Pacific’s retained earnings.
Which of these three alternatives should be used for investments involving 
less than 50 per cent ownership—at market value as reported by investment 
trusts, at cost as reported by Owens-Illinois, or at equity as reported by 
Northern Pacific? Differences in practice cannot be explained by differing 
degrees of “objectivity” or the presence and absence of “realization,” because 
the situations are identical in those respects.
Investments involving exactly 50 per cent ownership. Jointly owned 50 
per cent investments present a much less complicated problem but one which 
has, nevertheless, not been resolved. Typically, these investments are not held 
as temporary investments and there is no quoted market value that might be 
used in reporting. The choices therefore are only two: report at cost recogniz­
ing as income only cash dividends received or report at equity recognizing as 
income 50 per cent of the earnings or losses of the joint venture. Currently 
both methods are widely used. Standard Oil Company of Ohio and Atlas 
Chemical Industries jointly own Solar Nitrogen Chemicals on a 50-50 basis. 
Standard Oil reports its half ownership using the cost method; Atlas Chemical 
Industries reports its half ownership using the equity method. During the last 
three years Solar has declared no cash dividends, reinvesting its earnings in 
expansion. Accordingly, Standard Oil has included no income from its invest­
ment in Solar during those three years. At the same time Atlas Chemical has 
been recognizing 50 per cent of Solar’s earnings each year—an amount repre­
senting as much as a quarter of Atlas’ earnings—$.35 of the $1.41 earnings 
per share reported by Atlas during 1965.
In one of its 1966 actions, the Accounting Principles Board took the 
position that, in consolidated statements, unconsolidated domestic subsidiaries 
should be accounted for using the equity method. Expressly unaffected by this 
opinion were foreign subsidiaries and “jointly owned (50 per cent or less) 
companies.” Skeptics have suggested that companies have a tendency to use 
the cost method for joint ventures during the early years of getting established 
while losses are likely to be incurred and to switch to the equity method once 
the joint venture is on its feet and showing earnings.
Reporting income and financial position on the basis of the historical 
cost of investments that have been held for any significant period of time is 
wholly inconsistent with the acknowledged function of accounting to provide 
useful information. Under what circumstances would any creditor or investor 
consider Owens-Illinois’ investment of $2.7 million in the 1930’s to be the 
most useful information about those investments that accountants are capable 
of providing in 1968? If income measurement is viewed as a process of report­
ing the effects of past events as a basis for making predictions of the effects of 
future events, strong support can be mustered in favor of the equity method 
for investments in uncontrolled affiliates, 50 per cent owned and less than 50 
per cent owned, foreign and domestic, and in favor of the use of market value 
213
for temporary investments in marketable securities held by industrial corpora­
tions as well as those held by mutual investment trusts.
Investments involving more than 50 per cent ownership. One might 
expect that accounting for investments involving more than 50 per cent owner­
ship, and therefore control, would have been resolved long ago. This is not 
the case. The final set of recommendations issued in 1959 by the AICPA 
committee on accounting procedure, the predecessor of the Accounting Prin­
ciples Board, dealt with consolidated financial statements. The committee 
stated that “there is a presumption that consolidated statements for a parent 
company and its subsidiaries . . . are more meaningful than separate statements 
and that they are usually necessary for a fair presentation when one of the 
companies in the group directly or indirectly has a controlling financial interest 
in the other companies.”11 The committee also stated that, as a general rule, 
ownership by one company, directly or indirectly, of over 50 per cent of the 
outstanding voting shares of another company is a condition pointing toward 
consolidation.11 2
11 ARB No. 51, “Consolidated Financial Statements” (New York, American Institute of CPAs, 
1959), p. 41.
12 Ibid.
13 The Wall Street Journal (October 11, 1962), p. 24.
14 The Wall Street Journal (November 19, 1963), p. 8.
15 Securities and Exchange Commission, “Adoption of Amendments to Rule 14a-3,” Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, Release No. 7324 (May 1964).
In 1962, a couple of years after this recommendation was issued, the 
SEC halted trading in the common stock of Atlantic Research Corporation on 
the American Stock Exchange. Looming large among the factors contributing 
to this action was the 1961 annual report to stockholders of Atlantic Research 
Corporation which reported net income of $1,473,000 while the report filed 
with the SEC reported a loss of $1,066,000 for the same year.13 The financial 
statements in the annual report included investments in certain wholly-owned 
unconsolidated subsidiaries carried at cost. In the statements filed with the 
SEC, these subsidiaries were consolidated, their losses more than offsetting the 
earnings of other segments of the enterprise. Both the unconsolidated state­
ments in the annual report and the consolidated statements filed with the SEC 
were accompanied by the unqualified opinion of the company’s auditors.
This incident gave rise subsequently to a change in the SEC rules govern­
ing information to be furnished to security holders in connection with the 
solicitation of proxies—that is, in annual reports.14 The amended rule requires 
that “any differences, reflected in the financial statements in the report to 
security holders, from the principles of consolidation or other accounting 
principles or practices, or methods of applying accounting principles or prac­
tices, applicable to the financial statements of the issuer filed or proposed to 
be filed with the Commission, which have a material effect on the financial 
position or results of operations of the issuer, shall be noted and the effect 
thereof reconciled or explained in such report.”15 The impact of this require­
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ment, now several years old, is difficult to assess; probably only those who are 
corporate managers and auditors really know the extent to which this new 
SEC requirement has influenced financial reports to stockholders.
In March 1968, Value Line called attention to Newmont Mining’s ac­
counting which had an effect not unlike that of Atlantic Research Corporation. 
Newmont reported an increase in earnings per share—$5.33 for 1967 as 
compared to $5.15 for 1966. These earnings were based on unconsolidated 
financial statements, however, that included the cash dividends received from 
about ten, more than 50 per cent owned, subsidiaries rather than Newmont’s 
equity in the earnings of those subsidiaries. Whereas dividends received were 
about $2.4 million greater in 1967 than in 1966, equity in net earnings of 
subsidiaries declined nearly $17 million. Value Line suggested, therefore, 
that a more meaningful comparison might be consolidated earnings of $5.10 
for 1967 as compared to consolidated earnings of $6.57 for 1966.16 A different 
picture, to be sure.
16 The Value Line Investment Survey (March 8, 1968) p. 980. See also, Robert Metz, “Market 
Place: How Newmont Lists Earnings,” New York Times (April 18, 1968), p. 68. The above 
estimated consolidated earnings were based on the consolidation of those subsidiaries 80 per 
cent or more owned by Newmont. Value Line estimated $4.96 for 1967 and $6.93 for 1966 
if 50 per cent or more owned subsidiaries were consolidated.
17 Victor L. Andrews, “Should Parent and Captive Finance Companies Be Consolidated?” The 
Journal of Accountancy (August 1966), pp. 48-56.
With Accounting Research Bulletin No. 51 stating that consolidated 
statements are usually necessary for a fair presentation when one company has 
a controlling financial interest in other companies and the 1966 Accounting 
Principles Board Opinion No. 10 stating that in consolidated financial state­
ments the equity method should be used for any unconsolidated domestic 
subsidiaries, one might have expected that Newmont’s accounting policies 
would not be acceptable. Apparently, however, some ambiguity about proper 
reporting remains; the auditors’ opinion about the Newmont financial state­
ments was unqualified.
The 1959 recommendations about consolidated financial statements 
expressly suggest that consolidation of certain kinds of subsidiaries might be 
inappropriate. Specifically, the recommendations suggest that separate state­
ments may be required for a subsidiary which is a bank or an insurance 
company and may be preferable for a finance company where the parent and 
the other subsidiaries are engaged in manufacturing operations. For example, 
Swift & Company, which is usually viewed as a meat-packing company, does 
not consolidate its insurance company subsidiaries such as its wholly owned 
Globe Life Insurance Company. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company 
does not consolidate its wholly owned Allis-Chalmers Credit Corporation, 
Allis-Chalmers Leasing Corporation, and Allis-Chalmers International Finance 
Corporation.
There are those who feel strongly that these so-called “captive finance 
companies” should be consolidated.17 Presumably the 1966 recommendations 
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of the APB requiring a parent’s recognition of its share of the earnings (or 
losses) of unconsolidated domestic subsidiaries was expected to insure that the 
measurement of income would not be affected by the frequently adopted 
accounting policy of not consolidating captive finance companies, but there 
are still a few of us diehards, who continue to believe that the balance sheet 
has the potential to provide useful information—information about resources 
employed, debt paying ability, capital structure and certain other elements 
related to risk. Captive finance companies seem inevitably to be financed with 
a very high portion of debt relative to equity; their consolidation would often 
change the consolidated capital structure significantly.18 The unresolved 
accounting issue here then is whether separate financial statements for captive 
finance companies are “more informative to shareholders and creditors of the 
parent company than would be the inclusion of such subsidiaries in the con­
solidation.”19
18 For empirical evidence, see Victor L. Andrews, “Captive Finance Companies,” Harvard Busi­
ness Review (July-August 1964), pp. 80-92.
19 ARB No. 51, “Consolidated Financial Statements,” p. 42.
20 “Lump-sum write-offs of intangibles should not be made to earned surplus immediately after 
acquisition, nor should intangibles be charged against capital surplus” but “intangibles should 
be written off when it becomes reasonably evident that they have become worthless.” ARB 
No. 43, “Restatement and Revision of Accounting Research Bulletins,” chapter 5.
Business Combinations
A closely related unresolved accounting problem is the accounting for 
business combinations, where two or more corporations are brought together, 
by one means or another, for the purpose of carrying on their previously 
separately conducted businesses. In most cases, this is a matter of one corpo­
ration acquiring another corporation.
When the combination is the result of a cash acquisition—directly or by 
means of a cash tender offer—the transaction is necessarily accounted for as 
a purchase. Where the cost is different from the book value of the equity 
acquired, the perplexing problem of accounting for this difference—often 
referred to as goodwill or negative goodwill—is necessarily encountered. Once 
established, goodwill may be reported undisturbed among the assets for an 
indefinite period of time, goodwill may be amortized over some, usually 
arbitrary, period of time, or goodwill may be written off in lump-sum fashion. 
The lump-sum write-off of goodwill immediately after acquisition is not con­
sidered acceptable accounting practice although only a brief delay may suffice.20 
For example, in September 1965, Alsco, Inc., purchased all the stock of Selec- 
tile Company, Inc., for cash in an amount about $1,079,000 in excess of the 
book equity of Selectile. At that time Alsco announced that “it is not the intent 
of the company to amortize the excess cost.” During the immediately following 
fiscal year, the $ 1,079,000 goodwill was written off. A footnote explained that 
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“developments since acquisition have demonstrated that no value can be 
attributed to goodwill.”
When one corporation acquires another by issuing some of its shares in 
exchange for the outstanding shares of the acquired corporation, management 
may elect to account for the transaction as a pooling of interests rather than as 
a purchase, thereby avoiding the goodwill problem. If such a transaction is 
treated as a purchase, the market value of the stock issued is considered the 
purchase price and is accounted for like a cash purchase. In such a case, if 
this market value exceeds the book equity acquired, goodwill necessarily arises. 
When treated as a pooling of interests, however, the market value of the stock 
issued is ignored; instead, the book value of the equity acquired is accounted 
for, thereby avoiding any recognition of goodwill. The main distinction 
between these accounting treatments then is quite simple: in a purchase the 
accounting focuses on the price paid—that is, the cash paid or the market 
value of the stock issued; in a pooling of interests, the accounting focuses on 
the book value of that received—the purchase price is ignored.
Over time the “pooling-of-interests” concept has deteriorated far beyond 
meaning. Initially intended to apply to the combination of corporations of 
similar size, both of which might reasonably be viewed as continuing their 
previous activities, management, and ownership interests in a modified legal 
form,21 the “pooling of interests” treatment has now been extended to virtually 
any acquisition by exchange of shares whatever the size, purpose, or expecta­
tions. If there was any remaining concept or theory underlying the pooling 
procedure, the practice of “partial pooling” has surely stretched it beyond all 
reasonable bounds.
21 For a brief historical review, see Arthur R. Wyatt, ARS No. 5, A Critical Study of Account­
ing for Business Combinations (New York, American Institute of CPAs, 1963), chap. 3.
This extension to “partial pooling” may be illustrated by Eltra Corpora­
tion’s acquisition of another company in two steps. Eltra purchased some 
shares for cash and later acquired the remainder by exchange of shares. 
Acquisition of part of the company has been accounted for on a pooling basis 
and part of the acquisition of the same company has been accounted for on a 
purchase basis. In Eltra’s case, the book value of the part deemed to be pur­
chased was over $10 million greater than its cost, giving rise to the anomaly 
of a “deferred credit” that is reported among Eltra’s liabilities and that is being 
added to Eltra’s income at the rate of 3/4 of $1 million per year.
Extensions of the pooling accounting treatment (perhaps it would be 
more correctly referred to as a non-accounting treatment) have also enhanced 
the current popularity of the use of convertible securities in corporate acquisi­
tions. Pooling is now acceptable when securities that merely have potential 
for conversion into common equity are issued in exchange for the common 
shares of the acquired company. One can readily appreciate the attractiveness 
of issuing convertible preferred in exchange for common in acquiring other 
companies. As long as the earnings derived from companies acquired by issu­
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ing convertible preferred are greater than the preferred dividend requirements, 
such acquisitions are bound to be reflected in increased earnings per share on 
the outstanding common shares. This delightful—perhaps illusory—phenome­
non, however, may well be temporary; it disappears upon conversion. On the 
other hand, as long as still other new acquisitions can be negotiated, each one 
contributing earnings in excess of the preferred dividend requirement, the 
process—and the illusion—may be perpetuated.
Reporting pro forma earnings per share figures that reflect potential 
dilution in past results may be one solution for providing useful information 
about such transactions. A more fundamental accounting issue, however, is 
whether accountants have fully exercised their capabilities and fulfilled their 
responsibilities when they fail to report the objectively measurable considera­
tion involved in arm’s-length transactions—that is, the market value of shares 
issued in corporate acquisitions.
To be sure, by avoiding reporting the exchange value of the acquisition 
transaction, accounting for goodwill is obviated and, admittedly, accounting 
measurements of goodwill are essentially meaningless. Amounts reported as 
goodwill in statements of financial position are necessarily historical in nature 
and partial in content. Reporting such amounts is not likely to serve an 
important purpose; on the other hand, reporting such amounts is not likely 
to do any harm.
Amortization of goodwill in the measurement of income is more danger­
ous. The accountant’s role has never included a subjective valuation of good­
will; neither should his role include a subjective estimate of the rate of its 
decline. He has no special talent for clairvoyance. Including either the account­
ant’s subjective judgment of the rate of decline of goodwill or any admittedly 
arbitrary amortization of goodwill can serve only to make the income measure­
ment less meaningful and the investor’s analysis more difficult. Indeed, the 
crucial element inherent in the investment decision is the investor’s subjective 
evaluation of corporate goodwill—internally created goodwill as well as 
purchased. If corporate goodwill is on the decline, that will be reflected in 
the measurement of income without compounding the trend and confounding 
the user by deducting its amortization.
Summary
At the outset, an attempt was made to demonstrate the need in measuring 
income for starting with the objectives to be served or the uses to be made of 
the measurement. With objectives or uses established, the concepts with which 
those uses are concerned can be formulated and relevant rules and measures 
can be devised. The interrelated concepts of income, assets, and liabilities were 
asserted to be fundamental in this scheme. Explicit principles of recognition 
and measurement must be related to such a foundation.
Current practice in accounting for intercorporate investments was pre­
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sented in order to consider the extent to which such an approach is and is not 
manifested in practice and to consider the extent to which such an approach 
might prove to be fruitful.
Is there an existing set of objectives, concepts, and principles that permit 
recognition of changes in the quoted market value of temporary intercorporate 
investments in one industry and not in another? Do the purpose of income 
measurement and the concept of income to be measured call for recognition 
only of cash dividends from 50 per cent owned affiliates or for recognition of 
50 per cent of the earnings of such affiliates? Are the objectives of income 
measurement served best by reporting historical cost of long-term investments 
in less than 50 per cent owned affiliates and by reporting underlying equity for 
long-term investments in more than 50 per cent owned affiliates? What is the 
accountant’s responsibility for describing any special circumstances that he 
accepts as justification for deviations from the norm? Must the meaningful 
reporting of the acquisition of another corporation be sacrificed because of an 
outmoded attitude about accounting for goodwill?
The “pooling or goodwill” dilemma provides a particularly challenging 
opportunity for the application of an established framework for analysis. An 
ad hoc solution to the “pooling or goodwill” dilemma, made without reference 
to an analytical framework that is applied consistently to all accounting prob­
lems is not likely to be satisfactory. Whether goodwill should be recognized, 
as in accounting for a “purchase,” and whether recognized goodwill should 
be permanently capitalized, amortized in the measurement of income, or 
eliminated by lump-sum deduction from stockholders’ equity are questions 
that can be satisfactorily answered only by reference to the fundamental 
nature of assets, liabilities, and income and the objectives to be served by their 
measurement. These issues cannot be resolved merely on the basis of the 
personal preferences of those charged with their resolution. A convincing and 
effective solution to such problems is much more likely to be obtained by 
careful analysis based on established objectives, concepts, and principles.
219
Critique
Of the Sprouse paper
By Robert M. Trueblood, Chairman, Policy Group, Touche, Ross, Bailey & 
Smart, Past President, American Institute of CPAs, representing the American 
Institute of CPAs
Dr. Sprouse’s paper on measurement of income identifies a number of 
lacks in current financial accounting practices. He has pointed his finger at 
the major logical inconsistencies in the present framework of generally ac­
cepted accounting principles. Two such inconsistencies relate to the unreality 
of the profession’s failure to take into account price-level changes, and to the 
current acceptance of varying methods by which the realization concept is 
applied in the recognition of revenue. In touching upon accounting practices 
for goodwill, business combinations, and intercorporate investments, Dr. 
Sprouse has underscored other areas of concern to both academicians and 
practicing accountants interested in the improvement of general purpose 
financial reporting.
It is inevitable that any description of current financial accounting is 
going to sound like a catalog of accounting problems. But one might have 
hoped for a more explicit program for correction and adjustment from Dr. 
Sprouse. One feels that his erudite paper tends more to constitute simply 
another exhortation for the profession to “get with it.” I concur in the import 
of the exhortation. It is timely and it is needed. I would nonetheless have 
preferred a more explicit roadmap for improvement from the mind and hand 
of so distinguished an accountant as Dr. Sprouse.
It is a decade ago since the then leaders of the profession recognized that 
the business community and professional organizations were not making suffi­
cient progress in the improvement of financial accounting and reporting. In 
recognition of that lack, the American Institute established the Accounting 
Principles Board. The Accounting Principles Board, throughout its nine years 
of existence, has been charged with a dual responsibility for establishing sound 
basic concepts for accounting and for dealing with specific areas of practice. 
Although the Board devoted much of its time during its first five years to 
dealing with basic concepts, it was unable to reach agreement as to what the 
basic concepts of accounting should be. In fact, during its first five years, the 
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production of the Board was trivial, and such Opinions as were issued related 
largely to practice as distinguished from concepts.
During the past four years, the Board has devoted itself primarily to 
dealing with specific problems and has achieved a relatively good record of 
production by issuing a number of reasonably significant Opinions. However, 
for the most part, the Opinions issued during this period represent a codifica­
tion of present practice—admittedly with some refinements and elaborations. 
In my view, changes in practice recommended by recent Opinions have been 
largely directed toward eliminating obvious abuses in financial reporting— 
which, of course, is a good thing.
I do not mean to minimize the collateral efforts of the Board in the area 
of research. However, the research effort, in most cases, has been long and 
slow. I would observe that much of the research production of the Board has 
been of a codifying or conversational nature. Valuable as such efforts may 
be, it is my opinion that only Accounting Research Studies Nos. 1 and 3— 
written by Drs. Moonitz and Sprouse—have contributed in any large way to 
the enrichment of the literature.
Despite the admitted need for fundamental improvements in accounting, 
institutional experience during the past decade almost seems designed to 
preclude innovation. In order to protect the public from abuse and misuse, 
the concept of generally accepted accounting principles has, in effect, been 
limited to practices authorized in official pronouncements or having substantial 
precedent in published reports. The requirement that CPAs must report 
departures from APB Opinions, together with the SEC policy of refusing to 
accept auditors’ reports with correctable exceptions, have had the desired effect 
of bringing practice into prompt conformity with studied decisions. But the 
requirement for disclosure of departures from APB Opinions also has the 
effect of prohibiting experimentation with new accounting practices. In fact, 
it is only in the rare situation in which an enterprise is involved in a completely 
novel set of circumstances that new or differing accounting practices may be 
developed.
It is becoming increasingly clear that, under our present Institute machin­
ery and structure, some group or body—hopefully the APB—must assume a 
responsibility for leadership in designing and suggesting basic improvements 
in generally accepted accounting principles at the higher, broader levels. In 
referring to such fundamental improvements, I mean changes which go beyond 
the mere refinement of the present practices. It is essential that this larger role 
be performed by professional institutions if significant change and adaptation 
are to be experienced in the future. I say this because individual business 
entities are largely and properly precluded from the role of innovator, and the 
SEC probably does not desire to assume that role.
Forward-looking changes in generally accepted accounting principles 
must, by their very nature, be evolutionary. A complete overhauling of basic 
accounting principles on a given date is obviously not a practical possibility. 
Too radical a change in fundamentals at any one time could not be tolerated 
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because a precipitous change would create chaos in the securities markets, 
would hamper efforts at comparability, and might well be an intellectual shock 
not readily absorbed by the business community.
In order to accomplish an evolution toward a better and more logically 
structured set of accounting principles, the Board must have clearly defined 
goals. In my view, the Board preferably should reach forward and operate 
intensively at a number of levels of production simultaneously:
1. Research is paramount. The desired research should be something more 
substantive than codification and conversation. Such efforts should use 
extensively the many talents of the academic community. Research at 
both the conceptual and empirical levels—with interaction between the 
two—is essential.
2. A brief statement of the general objectives and purposes of financial ac­
counting should be issued by the Board.
3. A series of statements of accounting objectives in specific subject areas, 
stated in terms of broad principles, should be formulated.
4. Practice bulletins, consistent with stated objectives and codifying currently
acceptable practice, should be prepared.
To illustrate my thinking about the interrelationship of these several 
levels of output, one can turn to the issue of accounting for price-level changes. 
The Board has already sponsored the publication of Accounting Research 
Study No. 6. We might hope that at the next level of production the Board 
will issue a statement of objectives for price-level accounting—which brings 
together all of the reasons and arguments for restatement of financial data in 
terms of current prices in a manner consistent with the broad objectives of 
financial accounting. The Board might then issue a series of practice bulletins 
which would, piece by piece and bit by bit, fit existing practice into the frame­
work of the overall objective with respect to price-level accounting. The 
Institute’s recent recommendation that personal financial statements carry an 
optional column restating historical costs to current values would be an 
example.
I think it important that all four levels of production be developed under 
the auspices of the Accounting Principles Board. However, research should 
be sponsored by the Board, as distinguished from being developed and pro­
duced by the Board. This serves the necessary purposes of academic freedom, 
elimination of bias on the part of Board members, and the stimulation of 
thought.
The suggested releases on accounting objectives should be set forth in a 
manner which makes clear that such objectives do not necessarily represent 
presently acceptable practice. I think it essential that statements of objectives 
be worked out in some detail, as distinguished from a series of broad philo­
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sophical dissertations. The statements of objectives should be oriented largely 
to the needs of the users of financial statements. And it is important that the 
statements of objectives include criteria for judging proposed and separately 
issued practice bulletins.
In the development of practice bulletins, it will be necessary to be quite 
specific about tests for application and the details of procedural implementa­
tion. Such a series would serve as the day-to-day working guide for the 
practicing profession.
I would envision continuous change in both the stated objectives and in 
the practice bulletins. It is reasonably logical and necessary to expect that 
there should be a lag, probably a substantial lag, between currently acceptable 
practices and those objectives considered to be ultimately desirable.
I think the reporting of earnings per share is a subject which illustrates 
the usefulness of the separation of statements of objectives from practice 
bulletins. The APB made a false start in Opinion No. 9 on this subject. The 
Board is presently struggling with a revision of the earnings per share section 
of Opinion No. 9—without the benefit of a concise, intelligent summary of 
objectives. The new release on earnings per share is in the nature of a practice 
bulletin—by my definition. And it will probably not be very useful if only 
because it was not preceded by a thoroughly documented statement of objec­
tives about the nature of complex securities and the purposes of earnings per 
share calculations.
I agree with the implication of Dr. Sprouse’s paper that perhaps the 
greatest need by way of improving financial accounting is to move toward the 
use of current values. We have far too long relied exclusively on historical 
cost data as a basis for most financial accounting. Again, using this need for 
change as an illustration of the need for the revamping of our institutional 
procedures, it is simply impossible on one day to abandon historical cost and 
on the next to institute a requirement for current values. Following the pro­
cedure I have proposed, we might expect that the profession could, with 
relative ease, come to a long-range objective on the subject and then, over 
time, implement that objective in manageable pieces.
Of next importance, I would classify materiality as a candidate for active 
and hard work. I understand that the research study on this subject is not off 
the ground, but I feel the Board would be derelict if some statement of objec­
tives on the matter of materiality were delayed for more than two years. 
Hopefully, practice bulletins on materiality would follow very shortly.
After many years of research, a study on the subject of goodwill has 
recently been published. This completes the research which has been author­
ized by the American Institute in the area of business combinations. Accord­
ingly, the Board will shortly begin to consider the question of accounting for 
business combinations. I am hopeful that a broad, philosophical, long-term 
objective is developed before detailed and explicit practice bulletins are 
released. Certainly the statement of objectives should not be delayed beyond 
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a year. Clearly in this area, what we least need is a codification or refinement 
of present practice. But a serious reconsideration of basic concepts is com- 
pellingly necessary.
There are many other topics on the agenda of the Board which have 
been on that agenda far too long. A statement of objectives—or broad policy 
—is needed promptly on extractive industries, inventories, depreciable prop­
erty, intercorporate investments, and research and development expenditures. 
In terms of specific industries, prevailing financial accounting practices in the 
extractive industries are in most urgent need of fundamental change. The 
many acceptable alternative practices in accounting for inventories and depre­
ciable assets—with no significant guidance at the practice bulletin level— 
present serious accounting problems for virtually all industries.
I do not assume that I am making a new or startling suggestion in recom­
mending that APB Opinions, as we know them, be replaced by a series of 
practice bulletins and by a series of releases on objectives. Certainly others 
in practice share my dissatisfaction with the present concept of the develop­
ment of APB Opinions. Many have encouraged a search for better procedures.
The time is short in terms of the future of our profession. And the 
patience of a considerable number of practitioners may be even shorter. The 
cost of the Board is tremendous. The efforts of firms and individuals involved 
in the machinery are staggering to the uninitiated. Although there is no time 
for a cessation of effort to do a review of the operations of the Board, I think 
there is time to restructure the Board’s approach to improving financial 
accounting and reporting. In my opinion, if we do not take enough time 
shortly for self-appraisal and perceptive analysis, there will be no time for 
the profession at all. And the Board will atrophy into a state of nothingness.
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Critique
Of the Sprouse paper
By David Norr, Partner, First Manhattan Co., representing the Financial 
Analysts Federation
Income Is a Set of Conventions
Time is what we measure with a watch. Income is what we measure 
with a profit and loss statement. Simple and brutal. Of course, there are 
concepts such as sidereal time, utilized by a handful. But for the bulk of us, 
reference to a watch or a telephone time signal is adequate.
As Robert Sprouse points out, financial statements “are primarily in­
tended to provide information that is helpful in making rational investment 
decisions.” With the investor playing a primary role, it should be possible to 
agree on the determination of income.
Thus, it should be possible for us to conduct our everyday affairs, to 
invest wisely, without much of the confusion which shrouds alternative prac­
tices. It should be possible to reach working conclusions without inordinate 
delay, until a more basic study is done on some related topic. As underlying 
principles are determined, whether of sidereal time or income, the working 
definitions can be altered.
Organizing to Take Effective Action
It does little good for leaders of the accounting field to say, as they did 
a few years ago, it is time to stop criticism, roll up our sleeves and go to work. 
A few years have passed since then and the problems have not been solved; 
the rate of progress is painfully slow.
Nor do professional investors appreciate being told, as the then president 
of the AICPA said to the New York Society of Security Analysts a few years 
ago, that there are only a handful of oil companies on the New York Stock 
Exchange using unconventional accounting. To which we add that only ten 
to 20 railroads use ICC accounting, only a handful of steels use accelerated 
depreciation for shareholder purposes, only a few construction companies use 
the completed contract method, and first-year depreciation for computer 
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companies varies from 10 per cent to 40 per cent, but only a handful of 
companies are involved.
The stakes are significant. The value of securities on the New York Stock 
Exchange alone exceeds $600 billion. Twenty-four million investors and 
their representatives in the financial community rely heavily on published 
reports. A public trust and duty is involved. The investor needs comparable, 
clear financial data.
In recent years analysts and accountants have often exchanged speakers 
at their conventions. I am glad there is a dialogue, that we are learning more 
of the other’s problems and pressures. And hopefully what is said may provide 
new ideas and help. But is this enough? I do not think so.
The real question is this—how can we step up accounting research? 
How can we put more resources to work on these complex problems? How 
then can the attack upon problems be made? I have heard the chairman of 
the Accounting Principles Board describe the very full schedule of preparation 
and board meetings. Many firms have devoted time, measured in man years, 
to topics such as pension accounting.
But is this the best way to be organized? If the APB works under a 
crushing burden, is that conducive to the best research? Perhaps the reduction 
of the 21-man Board to 19 and then 18 results in greater efficiency, but does 
it pose a greater burden on the other members? Or, if the burden is not 
increased on the remaining members, would an enlarged Board be capable 
of more coverage?
These questions are asked, and must be asked, because of the urgency 
of the problems. Whatever happened to the study on research and develop­
ment costs? Does the combination of accounting research and maintenance 
of an active practice mean that research must take a back seat?
Or take the work on materiality. Apparently a paper recommending 
this as a topic for the APB was done four years ago. After three years a 
subcommittee was formed which held its first meeting one year later.
When I look at the vast resources of the banking system I wonder if 
other procedures might not be adopted. What would it cost for the banks, 
in collaboration with the AICPA, to form study projects? Thus, several 
years ago when the subject of research and development costs was recom­
mended for study, adequate manpower and money could have been brought 
to bear in an independent research project. Would not the task of the Institute 
subcommittee have been eased if on the day the subcommittee was formed it 
had been presented with a compilation of papers and writings comprising the 
significant literature? Would not the research process be speeded if a study 
group—composed of bankers, financial executives, etc.—had already studied 
the subject of research and development costs for the last few years and then 
turned its research over to the APB? Would we not be deeper into the 
subject by now? This is suggested not as criticism but as an illustration of a 
way to increase the total accounting research effort.
Certainly, had this been done in connection with materiality, we might 
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be closer to solving some of our problems. Of course, these study groups 
might find it useful to work with the American Accounting Association, the 
Financial Executives and other groups active in accounting research. Co­
operation, co-ordination and teamwork are always welcome.
What I suggest, in short, is a massive step-up in accounting research as 
an aid to the Accounting Principles Board. Add money and manpower to the 
research effort, whether through banks, contributions from AICPA members, 
FEI grants and other devices. There is little doubt in my mind that this would 
be helpful.
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants now spends 
$300,000 to $400,000 on research in addition to the very substantial time 
of the APB members and their assistants for which no charge is made. Can 
we not increase this sum, whether done through the Institute or through 
related organizations?
Does not the study, generously financed by the Financial Executives 
Institute, of diversified companies provide a beacon light? The FEI con­
tributed $118,000 for this purpose, hired an independent worker and produced 
a worthy study of a complex issue. I do not believe that the APB had the 
resources at that time to undertake the study and produce results in such 
a short period. Diligent, thorough, independent research characterized the 
output, although many of those sponsoring the study probably were not fond 
of the conclusions, I would guess. Though financed by the FEI, I cannot 
imagine questioning the integrity of the work.
I am encouraged by that and wonder if we cannot have more such help 
from interested parties financing independent, scholarly research.
For example, one of the great problem areas largely ignored to date is 
comparability within an industry. The American Petroleum Institute surveyed 
the accounting practices of its members some time ago and then made recom­
mendations to achieve greater comparability. I believe this was the first 
industry to take such a step and is certainly a worthy achievement. (Unfortu­
nately, as I understand it, one member objected to the elimination of full 
cost accounting. As a footnote there has been a question in some areas that 
this company adopted full cost accounting for foreign operations a few years 
ago, with no material change and no disclosure of the event.)
This inventory of oil accounting practices has been followed by another. 
Despite the lack of substantial progress, possibly posed by the limits of the 
role of industry trade associations, all industries could be most helpful to the 
cause of accounting research if they inventoried their accounting practices. 
Even if these trade associations cannot achieve uniformity or cannot eliminate 
unnecessary alternatives, the detail could be turned over to the APB for 
further thought and study.
Consider some of the possibilities of improved reporting within a few 
industries: (a) finance, (b) life insurance, (c) oil and mining companies, (d) 
steel companies, (e) aircraft manufacturers, (f) electronics, (g) office equipment.
As Mr. Sprouse wrote, environmental circumstances do not explain many 
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accounting variations. Indeed, I cannot believe the trend to straight-line 
depreciation and consolidation of foreign earnings in the steel industry is 
the art of judgment by accountants. Somehow the shadow of Jimmy Ling 
crosses the page.
Thus all of us, financial executives, trade associations, bankers, account­
ants, analysts, might embark on a stepped-up, co-ordinated, co-operative effort 
designed to put more light on accounting problems.
But this increase in accounting research is not merely designed to hasten 
the process. It also has a public relations aspect. If investment bankers enter 
a meeting with a better understanding of residuals, are they not better able to 
discuss problems more logically? If airline managements have better under­
standing of the investment tax credit, bankers a better understanding of the 
weaknesses in bank reporting, would we not have more light and less heat? 
Would that not be true of all of us—investment bankers, bankers, investors, 
and management—who may be faced with a drop in earnings based on a 
change in accounting? Is not reform and change then easier to achieve?
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Critique
Of the Sprouse paper
By Thomas A. Murphy, Treasurer, General Motors Corporation, represent­
ing the Financial Executives Institute
Before considering the individual subjects covered by Professor Sprouse 
in his paper on “The Measurement of Income,” it might be helpful to consider 
first the purpose of financial statements. The first sentence of the paper states 
that “the purpose of financial statements is to provide information which is 
useful in making rational economic decisions.” This may well be a purpose, 
but certainly it is not the primary purpose. Professor Sprouse comes closer 
to the real purpose of financial statements when he subsequently states that 
they are intended “for appraising past performance as a basis for predicting 
future performance.” In this sense, they may form a basis for making economic 
decisions but are primarily and initially to report on management performance.
To my mind then, the primary purpose of corporate financial statements 
is to discharge management’s obligation to report to its stockholders on its 
stewardship and to society on the progress of the business. This is a manage­
ment privilege and responsibility as well as a management obligation. It is well 
established that financial statements are the representations of management 
and that the fairness of those representations is an implicit and integral part 
of management’s responsibility. This position is supported by Statements on 
Auditing Procedure No. 33 issued in 1963 by the committee on auditing 
procedure of the AICPA and is consistent with the requirements of the SEC 
proxy rules and the listing agreement of the New York Stock Exchange. 
Further, it is inherent in the bylaws of corporations.
The fact that financial statements are an integral part of management’s 
responsibility is most significant and of paramount importance in any con­
sideration of the adequacy of corporate financial statements. Also, I think 
it is important to bear in mind the responsibilities which management assumes 
when it reports on its stewardship. Because of these responsibilities, manage­
ment should not be placed in a straitjacket by accounting rules which must 
be uniformly applied to all companies regardless of differing circumstances. 
Corporate management has a duty to the owners of the business to select 
those accounting principles which will best serve the interests of the business 
and the owners and to disclose adequately the impact of those principles on 
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the reported results. It also has the prerogative to develop accounting prin­
ciples and it should exercise that prerogative to the fullest extent.
The essential difference between businesses engaged in similar activities 
is management, not accounting principles and practices. Managers have many 
organizational and operational choices available to them. One company may 
operate with centralized management, others may be decentralized. One 
may own its productive facilities while others may operate with leased property. 
Degrees of integration, differences in manufacturing processes, and location 
of facilities, to list a few differences, will create disparity in the reports of 
similar businesses, and the use of uniform accounting principles will not make 
them the same. There is no suggestion, nor should there be one, that businesses 
engaged in similar activities must employ the same business methods. And, 
similarly, there is no reason why they must employ the same accounting 
principles in reporting the results obtained by the business methods they select. 
Because of variations in management effectiveness, we have variations in 
operating results. In investment evaluation, as Professor Mautz found in his 
research on diversified companies, the investor places a high degree of reliance 
on a company’s management and its performance.
Transactions, events, and situations can be viewed differently by different 
managements. Accordingly, it is understandable that similar situations might 
be reported differently by different managements. If, in the opinion of 
management, a fair presentation results from the consistent application of 
recognized accounting principles, management should be permitted to prepare 
its financial statements based on those principles. Consistency, not uniformity, 
is the key. Professor Sprouse’s paper does not appear to recognize the essential 
difference between the two. For example, he states that part of APB Opinion 
No. 9 “is a great step forward in creating some semblance of comparability 
among companies and, perhaps more important, among a series of fiscal 
periods for one particular company.” (Emphasis added.)
A good deal of Professor Sprouse’s paper focuses on aspects of financial 
reporting which either do not exist or which are confined to isolated instances. 
It carries forward the impression, created by vocal groups inside and outside 
the accounting profession, that businessmen periodically pick and choose 
those accounting principles and methods which give them the best results for 
the most recent period or an artificial record of growth. In fact, responsible 
businessmen follow consistent practices which create an atmosphere of reli­
ability in the reported results, and it is an essential function of the independent 
accountants to add to this atmosphere.
The standards of financial reporting adopted by most businesses in the 
United States have been exemplary and the accounting profession and the 
SEC have contributed importantly to this achievement. I think we should be 
proud of this fact and, without being complacent, redouble our efforts to 
assure a continuation of this condition. To this end, I believe it would be 
most constructive if we all were—to use one of Professor Sprouse’s expressions 
in a different context—to emphasize the positive and refrain from creating 
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or contributing to the impression that all financial reporting is inadequate or 
misleading. If there are cases where managements are abusing the privilege 
of reporting on their results, the accounting profession should ferret them 
out and insist that the reporting practices be corrected. This is the function 
of the independent public accountant, just as it is the function of management 
to advance the interests of its stockholders.
In this light, most, if not all, of the concerns expressed by Professor 
Sprouse disappear. Any “suspicion that managements, being human like the 
rest of us, tended to include in income extraordinary gains and to exclude 
from income extraordinary losses,” should be dispelled, as should the sug­
gestion “that companies have a tendency to use the cost method for joint 
ventures during the early years of getting established while losses are likely 
to be incurred and to switch to the equity method once the joint venture is 
on its feet and showing earnings.”
Accounting and reporting practices may disguise a condition for short 
periods of time but, since they must be applied consistently, not over long pe­
riods. For this reason, the most meaningful and reliable measure of operations 
is the company’s earnings record for an extended period, determined on a con­
sistent basis.
These general observations on financial reporting cover broadly the 
overall impact which I received from Professor Sprouse’s paper. They are 
offered in the spirit of fostering the type of discussion which I believe the 
professor had in mind. I would also like to offer in the same spirit a few 
comments on specific areas.
Uses of Measurements
As previously stated, I doubt that there is general agreement that financial 
statements published in corporate annual reports are primarily intended to 
provide information for making rational investment decisions. Although such 
statements are used in connection with the making of investment decisions, I 
believe that the primary purpose is to discharge management’s responsibilities 
to its stockholders on its stewardship and to society on its progress.
Concept of Income
Acceptance of the “stewardship” approach to financial statements pre­
cludes the necessity of recognizing purchasing power or price-level changes 
in preparing financial statements. I would not like to see financial statements 
prepared on an “as if” basis; I think they should report transactions and events 
as they actually existed. And I, for one, still feel “cost or market whichever 
is lower” is a good guideline to follow. The goal of financial reporting should 
be consistency and conservatism with adequate disclosure where necessary 
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for a clear understanding of circumstances. However, statements may be 
supplemented with price-level data when they are used for other purposes 
which require such data.
In considering the dependency of income upon stockholders’ equity and 
the dependency of stockholders’ equity upon assets and liabilities, we should 
also consider the effect thereon of procedures resulting from the recently 
adopted concepts of accounting for income taxes. It seems that the recognition 
of large assets and liabilities as a result of interperiod allocation practices has 
changed the significance of assets and liabilities.
Revenues
I agree that the constraint on recognition of revenues is the feasibility 
of objective measurement; however, if a basis other than time of sale is used, 
the risk of error in measurement can be great.
Expenses
The impact of changes in purchasing power and changes in the specific 
value of assets are factors which must be considered in fiscal management, but 
are they factors which should be considered in management’s financial state­
ments? I think not.
Gains and Losses
This item is closely related to the subject of reporting for accounting 
changes which is now under study by the APB. I feel that it will be unfortu­
nate if that study concludes that adjustments are to be made retroactive to 
prior year reported results, particularly in those circumstances where the 
decision to initiate the change was made by management. In my judgment, 
prior year adjustments should be avoided. Retroactive changes which affect 
previously reported net income can present serious practical and legal prob­
lems. I have in mind, specifically, the treatment to be accorded adjustments 
in circumstances where a company’s profit-sharing or incentive plans are based 
on reported net income. Changing previously reported results in the light of 
subsequent events can hardly contribute to investor understanding or to the 
stature of either the business community or the accounting profession.
Intercorporate Investments
If the activity in which a company had an investment were a wholly- 
owned unincorporated unit of the company, the equity in the operations of 
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the unit would automatically be included in that of the company. The fact 
that the unit’s operations have been legally segregated is hardly a basis for 
excluding the results of the subsidiary from the presentation of operations. 
There is a definite distinction between the write-up of corporate assets to reflect 
current values and the recognition of earnings realized by subsidiaries.
It is doubtful from a practical standpoint whether the ownership of 50 
per cent of voting securities, as distinguished from the ownership of more than 
50 per cent, is sufficient to justify the exclusion of the equity in a company’s 
income.
Fair presentation appears to be the controlling factor in determining the 
accounting and reporting requirements of investments involving less than 
50 per cent.
Business Combinations
The pooling concept as originally defined was rational and justified, but 
I agree it has been stretched beyond all reasonable bounds and has deteriorated 
far beyond meaning. But that doesn’t mean that there are no situations where 
application of the pooling concept would be proper. I think that the fault 
lies within the accounting profession for agreeing with the shortsighted prac­
tices of those who have gotten out of bounds.
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Critique
Of the Sprouse paper
By Harry S. Long, Vice President, First Security National Bank of Beaumont, 
Texas, Member of the National Conference of Bankers and CPAs, representing 
Robert Morris Associates
In the traditional accounting sense, Dr. Sprouse has done a splendid job 
in discussing the measurement of income. Unfortunately, he has done little 
more than this. An objective of the Symposium and its writers is (1) to identify 
the immediate problems involved in corporate financial reporting and (2) to 
consider possible solutions to the problems. Dr. Sprouse’s paper falls short 
of these objectives because in many instances he only raises problems.
It is my firm opinion that the accounting profession must broaden the 
scope of its responsibility. It is not enough to confine its responsibility to 
the reporting of just the assets and liabilities of a business and supposedly the 
income earned during a period of time in managing these assets and liabilities. 
An accountant must recognize that there is much more to a business than just 
these items. The obvious and most important ingredient is business manage­
ment—people.
Every corporation, if it is to be successful, has to recognize that it has a 
service or services to perform and that the service or services have to be 
wanted and needed by our society. This reason for existence may be the 
manufacturing of a product, the performance of a service or the sale of 
products. Something is being performed that society is willing to pay for. 
If the corporation is to be successful, society must be willing to pay more for 
its performance than it costs a corporation to render the performance. The 
difference between these two is income.
How well the corporation performs will depend to a large degree upon 
the abilities and capabilities of its management—how well it performs will 
depend upon the makeup of its assets. In other words, what it has to work 
with, how well it continues to perform over a period of time will depend on 
how its management reinvests in itself and in its capital assets. Over the 
short period, these investments can be curtailed and short-range income will 
look better. By the same token, imprudent management could invest unwisely 
in itself and in its capital assets, thereby causing an unwarranted contraction 
of income—particularly future income. All of these things need to be recog­
nized in the measurement of income.
Traditionally, the accounting approach has been to look to and weigh 
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just assets, liabilities, revenues, and expenses. Too little attention has been 
devoted to the make-up of management, and to recognizing reinvestment in 
itself, in technological changes and in its capital assets. I believe that the 
accountant must find a way to (1) evaluate management and (2) to measure 
management’s investment in its future self, in technological change, and in 
capital investment. Admittedly, such measures will be hard to come by, but 
they are vitally needed.
If such information can be added to the work that accountants now do, 
our society, whether it be management, creditors, purchasers, investors, or 
what have you, will be in a better position to evaluate the corporation. We 
need to develop ways to measure management that we can add to our tradi­
tional measures of liabilities, assets, revenues, and expenses. In other words, 
I am saying that we need to add more measurements in our reporting. It is 
this lack of more measurement that is ham-stringing us—not the way in which 
we are presently reporting what we do report. Our society is insisting that 
the accounting profession develop ways to measure management and ways 
to determine if the business is reaching its optimum goals and maximizing 
profits along the way.
A primary purpose of financial reports is to measure the performance 
of management, and this measurement inspires and demands increased and 
better performance in the future. Financial reports are a form of responsibility 
reporting. They are a report card. The fact that financial reports are required 
helps at least in a degree to improve management. Because our present reports 
are so limited in scope, management is not fully measured. Society cannot 
long endure this, and this is the reason the accountant is coming increasingly 
under the gun.
We need to develop a generally accepted group of accounting principles 
to measure management, which when coupled with our present generally 
accepted accounting principles will provide objective meaningful reports that 
fully account for how well management has performed in its preceding period.
Everyone agrees that full disclosure is of prime importance. Everyone 
also agrees that objective measurement is a must. When the accountant limits 
full disclosure to just the measurement of assets, liabilities, revenues, and 
expense and holds these fully disclosed items out to society as a measure of a 
business, full disclosure has not been complied with, because measurement of 
management has been ignored. (Examples of things that could be evaluated 
are its make-up, size, age, ability to change, and many other things.) How 
well management has performed in terms of its optimum capabilities has been 
ignored. Take an overly simplified example: A given business makes 
$100,000. If it had had the best possible management and utilized its assets 
in the best way possible, it might have made $200,000 or $500,000.
Brilliant scholars, like Dr. Sprouse, need to look beyond traditional 
accounting and develop a way to measure the management of a business. The 
corporations of today represent great globs of people, assets, services, and 
liabilities. Unlike the individual proprietor who founded the business and had 
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his own well-being in mind, corporate management of today may or may not 
have the same purposes in mind. Management of old in most cases also owned 
the business. Management of today is usually far removed from ownership, 
and new methods must be developed to insure proper and adequate manage­
ment performance. This is our task today.
Dr. Sprouse starts his paper, “The purpose of financial statements is to 
provide information which is useful in making rational economic decisions.” 
As accounting reports stand today, they do provide information, but they 
provide only limited information, not nearly enough to make rational economic 
decisions. Is the accounting profession going to be content to provide only 
half a loaf?
Dr. Sprouse makes the statement, “[Financial statements] are primarily 
intended to provide information that is helpful in making rational investment 
decisions.” Investment decisions are important, but any prudent investor in 
his right mind will go much further than present-day financial statements in 
gathering information to make rational investment decisions. If you doubt 
this, look at an SEC prospectus. Looked at another way, I don’t think we 
can say that it is the prime purpose of corporate annual reports to serve these 
investors. The first purpose of a corporate financial report is that it is provided 
to satisfy demands for reporting made by society. It is management’s way of 
showing society how well it has performed. It is an accounting to society.
Other prime readers of the financial statements are business creditors. 
They are vitally interested in the information. Dr. Sprouse says: “[What hap­
pens after] the debt is settled need not concern the creditor. His interest 
in the enterprise is essentially terminated when the debt is paid.” As a banker 
and a creditor to business, I strongly disagree with the statement. Most 
creditors have a continuing interest in a business they have helped finance. 
It continues long after a given indebtedness has been paid. Future credit 
will be needed. Future assets will be purchased and will have to be financed. 
Seasonal credit is always needed. Credit was extended in the first place to 
help the business grow with the hope that it would be a continuing customer 
for many years. Somewhat similar to investors, many creditors invest their 
time, talents, and assets in a business with a view of having a long and con­
tinued relationship with the business. Bankers particularly fit this category.
Taxation and Income
In my opinion, more of the paper should have been devoted to the ques­
tion, “Should income determination move more closely toward taxable 
income? or vice versa?” The income tax bite for most large corporations 
represents 50 per cent of its taxable income. It is just good business to 
minimize this tax bite as much as possible, even at the risk of understating 
corporate assets. The assets are still used in the business even though they 
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are understated, and in addition to this, the corporation still has the funds 
that it would have had to pay in taxes in its working capital to help increase 
its operating income.
Because of the impact of taxation in the operation of a business, income 
determination should move closer to taxable income. Taxes are perhaps the 
largest expense a business encounters and certainly for this reason, if no 
other, warrant serious consideration. It is income after taxes that is used to 
pay dividends or is used for growth. This is the income everyone is really 
interested in.
Too much emphasis has been placed on the concept of deferred income 
taxes supposedly caused by taking advantage of some favorable tax law. An 
example is accelerated depreciation. In our society today where values con­
tinue to go up, up, up, there becomes more basis for the reasoning that deferred 
income taxes, because of the accelerated depreciation or what have you, will 
never have to be paid, as the depreciated assets will continuously be replaced 
by other high-cost assets, and as a consequence, the deferred income tax 
liability will be deferred indefinitely. A similar argument can be made in the 
installment sales situation as well as the investment tax credit. Regardless 
of the position taken though, if full disclosure and sufficient detail are provided, 
interested parties can recast the information for their own purposes and needs.
Valuation of Assets
Tax laws can have a very important bearing, and here I am referring to 
Dr. Sprouse’s discussion concerning the value to place on corporate invest­
ments. An increase in the carrying value of assets on a financial statement 
can increase the economic cost of owning the asset, and as a result decrease 
the business’s income. An example is the effect of the ad valorem tax in the 
case of banks and the franchise tax in the case of other corporations. Carrying 
value of assets is not nearly as important as knowing how they are valued. 
Market value or other than book value can be given by footnote when these 
values have significance.
Inventory Valuation
Inventory valuation can have a marked effect on the measurement of 
income. Conservatism, uncertainty of sale, and tax savings all strongly dictate 
that it be conservatively valued. It is said that an understatement of inventory 
this year tends to offset and have an opposite effect on income measurement 
the following year; however, the statement fails to recognize that a continued 
undervaluation of inventory will perpetuate the tax savings and delay the 
recognition of income indefinitely.
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Changes in the Dollar
Dr. Sprouse makes a number of statements on the changes in the value 
of the dollar and concludes that accountants are capable of doing better 
“with the current state of the art and the experience of accountants in other 
countries.” At best, this statement needs more elaboration. Frankly, I can’t 
see that any useful purpose can be served by converting the dollar cost to 
some estimated figure.
He raised this question in several places, but I don’t believe he came up 
with any answers. Overall adjustments for inflation would at best be guesses 
and difficult to make. Users of financial statements need to consider the 
inflation aspect, and if in a given situation, the accountant felt its effect to 
be really material, it could possibly be covered as an adjunct to the statements 
as a separate schedule or by notes to the statements.
Uniformity
A business as complex as the conglomerate Ling-Temco-Vought or 
General Motors Corporation cannot be explained nor can its performance be 
measured in two uniform reports consisting of a balance sheet and an income 
statement. By the same token, the reporting for such businesses cannot be 
put into a form simple enough for the non-professional to understand. Too 
many items of important business significance are involved in such businesses 
to permit a simplified uniform statement capable of intelligent use. Stated 
simply, a complex business with many divisions, subsidiaries and what have 
you, cannot be reported on in simple terms. By the same token, simple-minded 
or unsophisticated people will never be able to analyze and interpret the neces­
sary statements for such businesses. If such statements were put in a form 
that such people could understand, they would become so vague and general 
that the intelligent analyst would be unable to independently and properly 
evaluate the business. In essence, such a simplified report becomes the pre­
parer’s evaluations and conclusions about something that is really much more 
complex. The preparer may or may not be right in his evaluations, summaries 
and conclusions.
In their seeking to meet society’s needs, learned accountants and others 
plead for uniformity in financial reports, the obvious reason being that if 
Business A reports in a manner similar to Business B, the two businesses can 
be compared and managements weighed. What we really must do is to find 
a way to weigh managements independently from making the assets and liabili­
ties they use uniform in financial statements. Businesses are not alike. Their 
make-up is different, their needs are different, their management views and 
objectives are different. It’s crying into the wind to get on this uniformity jag. 
To be uniform is to be locked in, as there is just one way—the uniform way. 
With rapid technological change in business today, it is idiotic to assume such 
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a posture. Reporting needs change with the times. Educated people should 
be permitted to make these changes when warranted.
All of this discussion can lead to only one conclusion, and that is financial 
reports for corporations should be prepared in such a way that they present 
fully and in detail all of the transactions of consequence as well as the financial 
position of the business in such a way that intelligent people may be able to 
make their own independent evaluations about the business. These people 
are investors, account brokers, accountants, analysts, credit men, and bankers.
Speaking of summarizing information into one or a few simple state­
ments raises the question of earnings per share. This question becomes particu­
larly important in the conglomerate situation, where more often than not 
convertible securities are issued. Frankly, there has been entirely too much 
emphasis on earnings per share, and this has risen to a large extent through 
the investment industry. There should be a little more caution in the use of 
net earnings or net income and earnings per share with or without the con­
vertible problem. Either way, the figures can be misleading unless the person 
using them is aware of how they are computed, why they are computed that 
way, and the relatively recent background of the company making the com­
putation.
Much of the latter half of Dr. Sprouse’s paper is devoted to raising ques­
tions and not suggesting answers, as this great man is eminently qualified to do. 
To this extent, I am disappointed. To me, the Owens-Illinois investment 
should be reported at its cost. Full disclosure by way of footnote or parenthesis 
can give the market value and book value information. Book value figures in 
this situation are no more realistic than the Owens-Illinois book value on its 
statement inasmuch as it did not show the increased value of its own equity 
in the ownership interest. Market value, on the other hand, deserves no more 
than a footnote acknowledgment as the assets might never be sold, and dump­
ing that large a block on the market might materially reduce the carrying 
value of the asset. Looked at still another way, the company for management 
reasons might not be able to sell the stock. It might have to keep it to maintain 
needed relations with the company. Full disclosure is the answer in this area.
In the 50-50 investment situation, Standard reported properly; Atlas did 
not, in my opinion. Solar followed the management practice of reinvesting its 
earnings in expansion—a management decision that time might prove wise or 
unwise. In either case, the measure Atlas took would be wrong. At best, the 
information should be footnoted and not carried into Atlas’ statement. Even 
though I disagree with the way Atlas reported this income, I can accept the 
reporting, if enough detail was given to show exactly what was done, why, 
and so forth (full disclosure with sufficient detail).
Consolidations
Beginning on page 214, Dr. Sprouse discusses whether or not statements 
should be consolidated. This decision should be left to the independent judg­
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ment of qualified independent CPAs in every instance. If consolidation more 
accurately portrays the relation, it should be done. If, on the other hand, it 
distorts proper financial information, statements should not be consolidated 
based strictly on the percentage of ownership in a given situation. Here, full 
disclosure is very important, particularly information concerning intercorpo­
rate transactions, receivables, payables and consolidating data.
In the case of business combinations, full disclosure of the transaction 
whether it be purchase or pooling because of merger is extremely important. 
Reasonable people can disagree in these areas, and objective measurement is 
often difficult if not impossible. Because of the very complexity of such trans­
actions, there can be no simple way to show the information.
Miscellaneous Thoughts
Important Changes
Every so often a business makes a material change in its operations that 
has a market effect on the measurement of income. These changes need to be 
commented on in some detail. As a measure of management, were they 
well-thought-out or impromptu?
Change in Management
Since financial statements can be used to measure effectiveness of man­
agement, new management should not be “saddled” with mistakes of the old. 
Examples: Overinvestment in fixed assets, excessive inventories, costly pension 
plans, purchase contracts, union contracts, etc. All these can have a strong 
bearing on the nature and measurement of income. If there is a significant 
change in management, such things need to be carefully evaluated.
Perpetual Existence of a Business
Dr. Sprouse makes a statement that “Investors base their decisions on 
the assumption that a business enterprise will have a perpetual existence.” 
He also says, “An enterprise can continue to survive and prosper only if its 
resources are maintained.” I submit that a business can survive, prosper, and 
have perpetual existence only if it provides for adequate, confident, continu­
ing future management and enough research and development work to take 
care of technological change. It is not enough just to maintain resources. 
Growth has to be provided for. In other words, resources have to increase.
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Summary
All through this critique, I have stressed strongly that the primary pur­
pose of financial reporting is, or should be, to measure the performance of 
management. I have also stressed that it is important that the accounting 
profession broaden its scope and find better ways to measure management. 
I emphasized that the accounting reports should show how management has 
reinvested in itself and improved itself if that is the case. Business manage­
ment, just like business assets, grows old and needs to be replaced. If this is 
not done, the value of assets deteriorates and earnings suffer. In recent years, 
many highly regarded old companies have been acquired by aggressive, young 
management, and now in our society we have many conglomerate companies.
If management of these businesses had been aware of its deterioration 
and because of meaningful reporting had been forced to improve itself, most 
if not all would not be targets for outside purchasers. Many of the fantastic 
bargains would not have been made. Be that as it may, however, the account­
ing profession is faced with the matter of one corporation acquiring another 
corporation, and then another, and another.
These tremendous bargains have to be recognized and recorded in the 
consolidated reports. They are a fact of life. Management has either done a 
good job in purchasing, or for some reason has paid too much. Either event 
needs to be recognized and recorded in full detail. Reasonable people can 
disagree as to the methods used; however, if the reporter has provided sufficient 
detail and full disclosure, the users of the information can recast it as they 
see fit.
When stock is issued in an acquisition, it is usually issued in fairly large 
blocks. It is very questionable whether an issue of such size is readily market­
able. However, if there is a market, it can be recognized by footnote. The 
issuance of convertible securities is often necessary to effect a purchase from 
the buyer’s standpoint; because of the tax break (interest is deductible, divi­
dends are not for tax purposes), their issuance is cheaper. At least for a period, 
the buyer’s equity owners do not have a dilution. On the other hand, the seller 
has a period in which he can get out for X number of dollars and has a 
reasonable return while he is waiting to see what he has gotten into. All of 
these things are facts of life. Yes, they are fair. Yes, they are proper. Our 
financial reporting should not be a vehicle for making mergers less attractive. 
Financial reporting, however, should be a strong vehicle for making manage­
ment of a business strong and continuous. This would help eliminate the 
unrealistic bargain found in many mergers of today.
Every user of the financial information prepared by the accounting 
profession has to recognize that the accountant is preparing information for 
quite a few users. It is unfair to the accountant for a given set of users to 
insist that the accounting information be prepared in just a certain way. At 
best, any specific user only has the right to ask for full disclosure. If any given 
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user has full disclosure, and perhaps a brief explanation that tells him why the 
accountant reported in the way that he did, the user will be able to recast the 
information to suit his own specific needs. If he lacks this ability, he has no 
right to complain in the first place.
On the other side of the coin, the accountant has to recognize that the 
financial information he prepares is necessarily relied on by many users. The 
accountant, as a professional, has the right to use his best judgment in the 
form he presents his information, but by the same token he, in my opinion, 
also has an obligation to provide for full disclosure. He must recognize that 
the information he uses is capable of different interpretations. He must give 
enough information in his reports to permit specific users to recast that infor­
mation for their own needs if they see fit.
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Procedure, representing the American Institute of CPAs
It is the independent audit function which adds credibility to financial 
statements. The auditor’s endorsement provides some degree of assurance as to 
(1) the reliability of the financial data incorporated in the financial statements 
and (2) the propriety of the presentation of such data including disclosure of 
all pertinent information. Without this added credibility, how much reliance 
could be placed on financial reports? If they were deemed to be of question­
able reliability, on what basis could bankers and other credit grantors make 
loans? Or investors supply capital? Or the government gather statistics 
needed to perform intelligently its regulatory function? Although the account­
ing profession has been subjected to frequent attacks of criticism, the basic 
faith in the independent auditor’s objectivity and integrity has not been shaken 
to any perceptible extent. The certified public accountant, in his function of 
independent auditor, continues to perform a much needed service, and indeed 
is doing it much more effectively.
If there is a problem concerning the auditor’s role in society today, and 
I suspect there is, it is a lack of understanding, or more properly, some mis­
understanding by most people outside of the profession of just what his role 
really is. More specifically, there seems to be a lack of understanding of what 
auditing involves and what auditors do and cannot do. Does the public 
understand, for example, that auditors do not make management decisions? 
Or that they do not assure the continued success of the business? Or even 
that they cannot always be certain that they have gotten all the facts?
Auditor's Function
A half century or so ago, when independent auditing was developing into 
a profession, the persons principally interested in having an audit made were 
the owners of the enterprise. Usually they were few in number and most likely 
were active in managing the business. The most important objective of the 
audits at that time was the discovery of errors and irregularities or even fraud, 
if it existed or was suspected. The auditor’s procedures consisted chiefly of 
checking the details of transactions and tracing them into the accounting rec­
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ords. The fairness of the financial statements prepared from these records and 
the adequacy of the disclosures were probably considered of minor concern.
With the expansion of public ownership with non-owner management 
and the development of stock exchanges, more attention was focused on 
financial statements themselves. To an ever-increasing degree, the auditor’s 
opinion on them became more important. This attention to financial state­
ments and the auditor’s opinion was magnified as the need for sound accounting 
principles began to be realized. The importance of the independent auditor’s 
role in developing sound financial reporting was recognized. In the meantime, 
the increasing size and complexity of businesses made it less and less prac­
ticable for the auditor to examine individual transactions and the books and 
records to the extent needed to provide any absolute assurance of discovering 
fraud or other irregularities.
As a result of this progression, the primary purpose of an audit today 
is to enable the independent auditor to express an opinion on the fairness of 
the financial statements, their compliance with generally accepted accounting 
principles and the consistency of their application. While the discovery of 
irregularities may result, the auditor’s examination is not designed for that 
purpose nor can it be relied upon to disclose defalcations or other similar 
irregularities. In this connection, however, the auditor does assist management 
in meeting its responsibility for safeguarding the company’s assets by suggest­
ing improvements in the accounting controls and procedures to lessen oppor­
tunities for defalcations and the possibility of errors and irregularities.
Auditing Standards and Procedures
The independent auditor’s examination, made for the purpose of express­
ing an opinion on financial statements, is carried out in accordance with 
auditing standards adopted by the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants.1 These standards are qualitative and not quantitative. They 
may be summarized very briefly as:
1 American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Statements on Auditing Procedure No. 
33, Chapter 2.
1. General standards, which require that the services be undertaken by trained 
people with professional competence who are independent of those being 
audited.
2. Standards of field work, which require that the work be properly planned, 
that an evaluation of the internal controls be made, and that sufficient 
evidential matter be obtained.
3. Reporting standards, which prescribe the manner in which the auditor 
must report on the results of his examination.
The determination of the type and extent of the auditing procedures the 1
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auditor need apply in each circumstance to place him in a position to render 
an opinion on the fairness of the financial statements depends entirely on his 
professional judgment. In determining these procedures, he must be satisfied 
that there is no basic conflict of interest between himself and management 
which might influence his judgment; in other words, he must be truly inde­
pendent. To be independent, he cannot have any financial interest in, or 
serve as an officer or director of the company being audited. He must also 
see to it that there are absolutely no limitations placed upon the procedures 
which he might want to apply, or on the information which is to be made 
available to him.
Since he must be satisfied that management is performing its job, the 
auditor must evaluate the effectiveness of the internal controls which manage­
ment has established. The extent of his other auditing procedures depends 
very much on the results of this evaluation, since adequate internal controls 
can reduce considerably the probability of irregularities. As part of his 
appraisal he also reviews the functions of the internal auditors and examines 
the reports on the results of their examinations.
Of the evidential matter which might be available to him, he is, of course, 
more satisfied with that which is obtained from sources outside the enterprise 
than that obtained from within. He is also more satisfied with that which he 
can physically observe than with that which is represented to him. Usually 
he must rely on evidence that is persuasive rather than convincing to the 
degree of absolute certainty.
He must depend upon testing and sampling of a limited number of 
transactions or recordings in confirming his judgments. He is forced to work 
within economic limits in that he must perform his audit within a reasonable 
length of time and at a cost which is not prohibitive or unreasonable in the 
light of the circumstances.
The testing of evidential matter and the compilation of the amounts 
which appear in the financial statements are only parts of the independent 
auditor’s function. Besides these audit tests, he must also satisfy himself that 
the accounting principles used are acceptable and that they have been followed 
consistently. He must also be satisfied that the financial statements constitute 
a fair presentation. Among other things, this involves reviewing the descrip­
tion of amounts, their proper grouping and the adequacy of the disclosure 
made not only in the statements but also in the notes accompanying them. He 
must follow specifically prescribed rules for wording his report on the financial 
statements. All of this involves the use of sound judgment based upon con­
siderable professional training and experience.
The Computer
While the appearance on the scene of large-scale computers has not 
changed the auditor’s basic approach to auditing, they have most certainly 
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had an impact. They may be described as just another form of bookkeeping 
machine, but their immense capabilities and great flexibility have required 
auditors (both partners and staff) to devote considerable time and effort in 
obtaining a knowledge of them. In many cases, computer experts have been 
hired by auditing firms to assist in the education process and to advise clients 
on the feasibility of installing them. Aside from this additional service which 
the auditor has been able to render to his clients, the special expertise also 
enables him to adjust his auditing procedures to fit the changed environment 
of clients’ information systems.
There was some tendency at first for many auditors to audit around the 
computer, i.e., to treat it much as another bookkeeping machine, ignoring the 
attendant changes in the controls and the flow of data. Better understanding 
enabled the auditor to evaluate the controls over the computer center and to 
test the programming and the performance of the equipment. Gradually 
auditors have developed the ability to use the computer to perform their tests 
of the records produced.2 In some cases this has provided auditors with a 
means of testing much larger samples of transactions and records, thereby 
providing them with a greater degree of assurance.
2 Gordon B. Davis, CPA, PhD, Auditing & EDP (New York, American Institute of CPAs, 
1967), Chapter 12.
3 The standard short-form report suggested in Chapter 10 of Statements on Auditing Procedure 
No. 33 reads:
“We have examined the balance sheet of X Company as of June 30, 19__ and
the related statement(s) of income and retained earnings for the year then 
ended. Our examination was made in accordance with generally accepted audit­
ing standards, and accordingly included such tests of the accounting records and 
such other auditing procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. 
“In our opinion, the accompanying balance sheet and statement(s) of income 
and retained earnings present fairly the financial position of X Company at June 
30, 19__ , and the results of its operations for the year then ended, in conformity
with generally accepted accounting principles applied on a basis consistent with 
that of the preceding year.”
The Auditor's Report
Do the users of auditor’s reports understand very much about this role 
of the independent auditor? There seems to be plenty of evidence that they 
do not. If so, why not? Doesn’t his report make clear what the auditor has 
done and what responsibility he is assuming with respect to the financial 
statements? Some of us are convinced that the present standard form of 
auditor’s report not only does not make either of these clear but, unfortunately, 
may even be a major contributor to the general misunderstanding. Public 
relations counsel for the American Institute told the members attending the 
annual meeting in 1964: “Too many stockholders haven’t the foggiest idea 
what your certificate means, and, if I may say so, I think the time is ripe for 
its revision in layman’s language and in the light of changed circumstances in 
the past 30 years—particularly that of wide stock ownership.”
The standard short-form report3 (sometimes referred to as the “certifi­
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cate”) was adopted in substantially its present form 34 years ago. Considerable 
accounting literature has been devoted to the wording used in it and its 
intended meaning is fairly well understood by the accounting profession and 
by the more sophisticated users of auditor’s reports. However, despite con­
tinuous efforts on the part of the profession to educate the vast mass of less 
sophisticated users—those who consciously, but somewhat innocently, rely on 
the reports—the auditor’s role still seems to be mostly misunderstood. Most 
users think of the financial statements themselves, and probably even more 
so the notes, as comprising part of the auditor’s report rather than being the 
representations of management. The report itself does little to dispell this 
notion or to make clear that the auditor is only expressing his opinion on 
management’s report.
The auditor’s report indicates that his opinion is based upon an exami­
nation “made in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards.” 
While this assertion refers to the specific standards adopted by the AICPA, 
referred to previously herein, the reader of the report is placed under an 
obligation to either research the meaning of the phrase or make an assumption, 
based on little personal knowledge of accounting and auditing, as to what 
it means. The words which follow, “and accordingly included such tests of 
the accounting records and such other auditing procedures as we considered 
necessary,” while the wordiest phrase in an otherwise terse report, do not 
communicate much about the standards. I, personally, would like to see word­
ing that referred briefly to the basic standards, i.e., independence, professional 
care, evaluation of controls and sampling and testing of evidential matter. 
Specific, although brief, references to the basic standards would be more useful 
than the vague wording now used which has no direct relation to them.
The opinion paragraph (or sentence) really receives the most criticism. 
A Forbes editorial4 said in part: “All these certifications usually bear the phrase 
‘according to generally accepted accounting principles,’ a phrase which is now 
coming to be generally accepted as damned meaningless.” It is most unlikely 
that the Accounting Principles Board of the AICPA, or any other body, is 
ever going to define a whole set of “generally accepted accounting principles.” 
But even if they were defined in technical literature of what use would even a 
reference to such literature be in a report without some further clue as to the 
justifications for their acceptability?
4 Forbes, October 15, 1966.
Take also the words “present fairly.” They also are not subject to easy 
interpretation. Within the profession itself, some contend that the “fairly” 
implies some approximation while others contend it is meant to imply honesty.
Much could be done to clarify, in layman’s language, the nature of the 
auditor’s examination and its limitations, and the meaning of the opinion 
expressed. A clearer report could do much toward bringing about a better 
understanding of the auditor’s role.
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Adequacy of Scope
Regardless of how described, is the usual scope of examination of the 
independent auditor sufficiently extensive as to justify the added credibility 
it attaches to financial statements? This is a perfectly valid question to be 
raised by users of auditor’s reports. Despite the occasional criticisms, I think 
the answer must be strongly in the positive. The few isolated instances of 
failure by auditors to discover material misstatements or omissions in financial 
statements are highly publicized and overshadow the thousands of audits made 
each year which cannot be questioned. The auditor’s efforts in seeing that 
financial data are reliable and in insisting on proper statement presentation 
are not evident since they are known only to himself and his client. The fact 
that auditors seldom have to take exception to clients’ statements does not 
mean that they readily accede to their clients’ views, but is evidence of their 
persuasiveness. If this were not so, accounting principles would have totally 
disintegrated.
The auditor’s greatest risk of being involved with misleading financial 
statements is likely to stem from high-level fraud rather than from insufficient 
auditing procedures. By this, I mean deliberate and clever concealment of 
facts from the auditor or misrepresentations to him by top management. Such 
deceit can be extremely difficult, if not impossible to uncover. Most highly 
publicized scandals result from this type of fraud.
Understanding as to Scope of Audit
It is most important to the independent auditor that each of his clients 
fully and clearly understand the role he plays and the extent of his responsi­
bilities. While the scope of his examination, i.e., the auditing procedures and 
the extent of tests, must be solely the decision of the auditor, the client should 
be satisfied with the qualitative aspects of the examination made, i.e., the 
degree to which the auditor observes the auditing standards previously men­
tioned. Although the auditor is usually selected by the company officers, he 
should be answerable only to the board of directors and stockholders since 
it is management’s performance on which he is reporting.
To provide a means of communication between the auditor and the board 
of directors, it has been recommended5 that an audit committee be appointed 
from the board to deal with the selection of the auditor and the arrangements 
for the engagement. An audit committee should review with the auditor the 
scope of the examination in general terms, making sure, among other things, 
that the auditor is following a consistent pattern of rotation of audit emphasis. 
The committee should inquire into personnel assigned to the examination to 
determine that there is sufficient continuity of staff to assure familiarity with 
the organization but also due regard for rotation of supervision to attain a 
5 “AICPA Executive Committee Statement on Audit Committees of Boards of Directors,” 
The Journal of Accountancy, September 1967.
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fresh and independent approach to the examination. The committee should 
also review the results of the audit to satisfy themselves that management 
co-operated fully with the auditor in making available all records and informa­
tion requested. It should also receive from the auditor any suggestions he may 
have for improvements in controls, procedures and methods of operations 
which the auditor is in a position to offer as a result of his work.
Effectiveness of the Auditor's Report
Despite the improvements which might be made in the specific wording 
of the auditor’s standard short-form report, the reporting standards established 
by the profession have been most effective in promoting better financial report­
ing. These standards require that the auditor specifically state any exception 
to compliance with generally accepted accounting principles he may have 
with respect to the statements examined. A full explanation of his exception 
and its effect on the financial statements must be included in his report. An 
exception may relate to the accounting principle or practice followed in 
determining amounts shown in the statements, to the description of the item 
or the manner in which it is presented or to the adequacy of the disclosures, 
including the information shown in the notes. If the exception is so material 
as to affect the fairness of the statements as a whole he is required to render 
an “adverse opinion,” i.e., he must say in so many words that the statements 
“do not present fairly. . . .”
The auditor must also report specifically on any changes in accounting 
principles and practices from those applied in the preceding period if the 
change has a material effect on the comparability of the statements. The 
effect of the change and his approval of it as an acceptable accounting treat­
ment must be included in his report.
In addition to stating his views on the propriety of the accounting prin­
ciples employed, he must report on any material restrictions imposed on his 
audit scope and qualify his opinion with respect to the items affected by the 
restriction. Again, if the restrictions are so material as to affect his ability to 
report on the statements as a whole, he must disclaim an opinion.
These reporting requirements have had an important influence on the 
financial reporting due to the reluctance of clients to have exceptions appear 
in the auditor’s report on their statements. The refusal of the SEC to accept, 
as a general matter, qualified reports on statements filed with it in connection 
with security offerings bolsters the auditor’s position with respect to the state­
ments. The result has been greater adherence to sound accounting principles.
Accountants' Legal Responsibility
While the profession is striving to create a better understanding of the 
auditor’s role in connection with the examination of financial statements, there 
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is some possibility that the courts may change some former concepts of the 
auditor’s legal liability therewith. Such a development could have a consider­
able effect on the auditor’s relationship to the statements and on the extent of 
his auditing procedures. A recent study, “Accountants’ Liabilities for False 
and Misleading Financial Statements,”6 7notes the increasing number of law­
suits against auditors. It traces the development of both the common law and 
statutory concepts of legal liability and reports on a number of important cases 
currently in litigation. That auditors may be held to greater responsibility may 
be a result of these actions. The recent decisions in the cases of Fischer v. 
Kletz and Barry Escott v. BarChris Construction together with the civil and 
criminal actions in connection with Continental Vending Machine Company 
all have serious legal implications.
6 Columbia Law Review (December 1967).
7 R. K. Mautz and Hussein A. Sharaf, The Philosophy of Auditing (American Accounting 
Association), Chap. 6.
8 American Institute of CPAs, Statements on Auditing Procedure No. 33, Chap. 1.
9 Statement on Auditing Procedure No. 38 (September 1967).
That the courts can have an influence on the role of the independent 
auditor has been generally accepted. Mautz and Sharaf recognize this in the 
following quote:
It is expected that a profession will have difficulty in establishing the 
limits of its responsibility. The important role which judgment plays 
in professional practice, and the exercise of judgment is never free 
from unfortunate consequences, contributes to this. The continuing 
adaptation of a profession to changes in its social environment and 
its own methods and resources require continuing modification of its 
relationship to clients and to others.1
In its own literature8 the profession has attempted to establish what it 
considers to be its responsibilities. Any indication that decisions of the courts 
might increase the auditor’s responsibilities particularly as to third parties 
substantially beyond that heretofore contemplated, would certainly lead to a 
reappraisal of the extent of auditors’ tests. This would particularly be so if 
the courts established a criterion for materiality which entailed a degree of 
accuracy greater than what has been considered up to now to be tolerable for 
the purpose of being satisfied that the financial statements “present fairly. ...”
Unaudited Statements
A number of court cases involving auditors relate to statements they had 
not audited but had associated themselves with through other services, such as 
preparation of tax returns, assistance with preparation of monthly or quarterly 
statements, etc. Official literature of the AICPA9 makes it clear that a CPA 
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has no responsibility for performing any auditing procedures when he is 
associated with statements under such circumstances and that he must disclaim 
any opinion on them. Although the cases have not been publicized, there are 
indications10 11that the courts may hold that the auditor has some responsibilities. 
The extent of such responsibility apparently cannot yet be discerned from 
individual cases. Should the profession find that an auditor has substantial 
responsibilities, either to his client or to third parties, for unaudited statements 
with which he is associated, there would be strong pressures toward avoiding 
nonaudit clients since the fees would not be nearly commensurate with the 
risks entailed. There may even be a reluctance by auditors to be associated 
at all with statements they had not examined, even those of audit clients 
which might be included in statements filed with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission covering interim periods. A strong feeling in this direction could 
lead to the necessity for audits of interim periods for registration purposes.
10 Thomas W. Hill, Jr., LL.B., CPA, “The Public Accountants’ Legal Liability to Clients and 
Others,” The New York Certified Public Accountant (January 1968).
11 Forbes (May 15, 1967).
Whether or not trends toward the extension of auditors’ auditing pro­
cedures and avoidance of association with unaudited statements develop—and 
if they do, the degree and speed to which they do—depends largely upon the 
influences of court decisions. It can be assumed that the decisions will reflect 
an increasing public demand for more credibility and greater accuracy in 
financial reporting. To provide this, business enterprises will have to shoulder 
the burden of added costs of audits and auditors will have to face the prospect 
of increasing their staffs of trained personnel, a problem which is even now 
most acute.
Expanded Role of Auditors
Coincident with the developing possibility that a reappraisal of the 
auditor’s legal responsibility may tend to extend the scope of his usual exami­
nation of financial statements is the likely prospect of an expansion of the role 
of the independent auditor. Forbes11 referred to the “growing credibility gap” 
in corporate earnings reports and pointed to the accounting profession’s re­
sponsibility to make financial reports less flexible and more “precise.” The in­
vestor’s demands, and those of his advisors, are for more and more information 
from corporate management. The inclusion of ten-year summaries of earnings 
and of a wide variety of statistical data in annual reports of public companies 
is testimony to the recognition of these demands. The demand for profit 
reporting by product lines for companies in diversified fields has led to the 
SEC suggesting this as a requirement. Is it not likely that the “credibility gap” 
will require an independent and objective report on the fairness of these data? 
I have no doubt that any such demand will be met since there is no reason 
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why the auditor cannot examine the data and report on it. More importantly, 
it cannot be denied that his report would serve a useful purpose.
There are already instances where independent auditors report publicly 
on the adequacy of their clients’ systems of internal controls, either separately 
or in connection with their report on the financial statements. Some govern­
ment agencies, including the SEC in certain instances, require a report by the 
auditor on the effectiveness of the internal controls. Many CPAs resist this 
trend toward reporting on controls, arguing that no criteria for determining 
the adequacy of controls or standards for reporting on them have been estab­
lished. The reply to this may well be that there were no established accounting 
principles, or for that matter auditing standards, for years after auditors began 
rendering opinions on financial statements. If the investing public or credit 
grantors decide there is a need for some assurance as to accounting controls 
and procedures, the need will have to be met. The practice will probably 
develop gradually rather than by fiat. Except where required by a government 
agency, any supplementary report on controls by the independent auditor 
would be published initially on a voluntary basis, i.e., where both client and 
independent auditor agree to do so. Naturally, the report would be given only 
in cases where an affirmative opinion could be rendered. If the auditor recog­
nized shortcomings in the controls, it is likely that his client would take prompt 
action to remedy the deficiencies, as he now does deviations from generally 
accepted accounting principles, in order that he might get a “clean” opinion. 
The end result would be much improved controls. I must reject any argument 
that the independent auditor would be under such undue pressure to report 
favorably that he would capitulate to his client’s demands for such a report 
when not warranted. For years, auditors have successfully maintained inde­
pendence in reporting on financial statement presentation. I cannot see why 
the same degree of independence and integrity cannot be expected in any 
expanded role.
Management Performance
Independent auditors have, during the last twenty years or so, expanded 
their services for clients far beyond auditing and the traditional tax work. 
Referred to generally as “management services,” they provide a wide variety 
of services such as computer feasibility studies, system design, cost control, 
production and inventory controls, budgeting, organization structure, opera­
tions research, and in some cases such things as plant layout, psychological 
testing, market surveys, public opinion polls and executive recruitment. Some 
question has been raised as to whether the performance of these services, 
particularly the latter group cited,12 affects the auditor’s independence in 
12 Manuel F. Cohen, Chairman, SEC, “The SEC and Accountants: Co-operative Efforts to 
Improve Financial Reporting,” at the Seventy-Ninth Annual Meeting of the American In­
stitute of CPAs, Boston, October 5, 1966.
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carrying out his attest function, i.e., the audit of the financial statements. The 
auditor’s training and experience with accounting records, internal controls, 
cost systems, organization and operation of business enterprises generally 
provided competence in these fields. The need for the services and the auditors’ 
intimate knowledge of their clients’ businesses made it a natural extension of 
their services. As problems extended beyond the more normal fields of the 
auditor’s knowledge, the larger firms, at least, hired engineers, mathematicians, 
computer experts and other specialists to provide the necessary technical 
knowledge to round out their ability to perform a complete job.
Any investigation, I am sure, would establish that the various auditing 
firms have unquestionable competence in the particular fields of service each 
may offer. Further investigation would also prove it extremely difficult to 
demonstrate that the performance of any one of these services affects in any 
way the independence of the auditor. On the contrary it would be easy to 
demonstrate that the performance of these services has made a significant 
contribution to the health of the business enterprises serviced and unquestion­
ably redounded to the benefit of creditors, stockholders and probably the 
economy as a whole. To challenge the profession’s rendition of any of these 
services because they do not seem to fit the “image” of the independent auditor 
is to ignore the needs of the business community.
It is possible, if not even probable, that, because of the auditor’s com­
petence in the many fields of management in which he now renders consulting 
or advisory services, he may in the near future be expected to provide objective 
assurance, i.e., to attest to the adequacy and effectiveness of his client’s infor­
mation system. How far this might extend will depend on the profession’s 
willingness to accept the additional responsibilities. I am inclined to think, 
however, that the independent auditor’s role as an auditor of management 
performance as such, as suggested by John L. Carey,13 is more remote. Just 
as the appraisal of an individual investment depends on the particular investor’s 
objective, performance by management can be measured in many ways. Is 
management producing good and steady income? Or is it building for greater 
value in the future? Is it concentrating on one product line or in an industry 
in which it has know-how and is established? Or is it diversifying in order to 
spread the risk? Who decides which criteria to use? Each investor’s interest 
may be different! Even if independent auditors had the capability of appraising 
management performance, the practicality of reporting on it is not now 
apparent.
13 John L. Carey, The CPA Plans for the Future (New York, American Institute of CPAs, 
1965) pp. 201, 213.
On the other hand, reporting on the information system itself, i.e., the 
organization, the processes and procedures by which management is provided 
with data necessary for making informed business decisions, seems to be prac­
tical. I expect that the practice would have to develop gradually and envision 
its development much in the same way that I expect reporting on the effective­
ness of internal controls will eventually come about.
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Budgeted Results
One single part of the information system as a whole which might be the 
first step in expanded reporting by management, and if so, likely to be attested 
to by independent auditors, is budgeted results for ensuing periods. If such a 
proposal might shock managements, it is certain to horrify CPAs who are 
more or less prohibited by their code of ethics from associating their names 
with forecasts.
To deal with management first, the initial question will probably be, 
Why publish forecasts? This idea is not original with me. Financial analysts 
and other report users have been asking for forecasts and these requests have 
been brought to the attention of the SEC. It is difficult to see how anyone 
could seriously question the usefulness of supplying information as to manage­
ment’s forecasts for the near future. Credit grantors and, perhaps even to a 
greater degree, investors and potential investors are interested in past financial 
results only as an indication of expected future performance. Granted that 
past results can be measured with some degree of accuracy, whereas projec­
tions are subject to considerable guesswork. Nevertheless, a reasonably 
reliable projection, in addition to and related to current actual results, can be 
most valuable in making investment decisions. The emerging generation, being 
better educated, more mature and by and large disillusioned with traditional 
ways, is going to demand more and more information—and get it.
What about the practicalities? Can companies provide budgeted figures? 
The answer will be provided quickly. Management must prepare budgets in 
order to run the business intelligently. Therefore, the information is, or should 
be, available. Any admission that it is not would be a condemnation of man­
agement. But are the credit grantors, or the investors, or their advisers in a 
position to properly understand and evaluate the interplay of the many basic 
assumptions which enter into the preparation of a budget? The answer to this 
question might well be—give us the information and let us worry about that! 
I suggest that managements will be rated quickly on the reliability of their 
forecasts as actual performance is compared with previous forecasts. There­
fore, the information will become more and more useful as time goes by.
Will publishing budgets, with the knowledge that they will be compared 
later with actual results, not tempt managements to juggle figures to meet the 
published budgeted results? This is where the attestor is needed. The CPA, 
i.e., the independent auditor, has the necessary capability to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the budgeting system and the procedures followed. He can 
appraise the reasonableness of the relationships of income, costs, and expenses 
based on clearly defined assumptions. He will be expected to find some way of 
communicating the results of these efforts to third parties without misleading 
them as to the degree of assurance he is providing.
As to the ethics of dealing with forecasts, a careful reading of Rule 2.04 
of the Code of Professional Ethics of the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants and of Opinion 10 of its committee on professional ethics indi­
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cates that there are means available for reporting on forecasts. No doubt some 
further guidelines and possibly a set of basic standards for reporting publicly 
will be needed.
The Changing Role
In contemplating the auditor’s role, past, present and the likely future, 
it becomes clear that it is in a constant state of evolution. The changes, though, 
are responsive to the changing environment rather than to any conscious 
attempts to alter the basic concepts of auditing or to achieve what would be 
referred to in industry as diversification. The change from detail auditing to 
examinations for the purpose of reporting on the fairness of financial state­
ments resulted from the expanded reliance on financial statements by credit 
grantors and investors. The development of more sophisticated accounting 
principles and auditing procedures resulted from the growth in size and 
complexities of businesses and, probably more so, on the recognition of a 
responsibility to an expanded public ownership. These factors also brought 
about the demands for more and more disclosure in financial statements.
The need for help with the establishment of more efficient accounting 
methods and effective business controls, together with the advent of the 
computer age, resulted in the rapid growth of management services by 
independent auditors. They responded to the demand and expanded their 
capabilities to meet them. The demands of an ever-growing and also more 
sophisticated user group, backed up by a government dedicated to what it 
considers best for the public interest, will tend to increase significantly the 
amounts of financial information which businesses will have to furnish. Man­
agements of publicly held business enterprises will have to adjust to being held 
more and more responsible for their performance and to operating in a public 
arena. The credibility gap will tend to submit them to more attestation, both 
in breadth and depth, by their independent auditors. The auditors, on the 
other hand, will have to be ready to expand the scope of their services and to 
be willing to undertake the burden of the additional responsibilities. This 
entails developing additional standards and guidelines. Although some man­
agements and some auditors may look with alarm at these prospects, consider 
the alternative. The additional safeguards for the investing public could be 
provided by direct surveillance by government agencies.
Conclusion
In summary, the role of the auditor has been evolving in a changing 
environment. His relationship to his clients and his responsibilities to third 
parties have been fairly well established in practice and are understood within 
his profession. His role is not as well understood by the users of financial 
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statements and even less by the public as a whole. His standard short-form 
report on financial statements does not help their understanding and possibly 
adds to the misunderstanding. Changing environment, particularly as reflected 
in court decisions, is likely to cause a reappraisal of the accountants’ responsi­
bilities—particularly to third parties. Such a reappraisal may indicate an 
increase in the extent of auditing procedures to provide the auditor with 
assurance and satisfaction more commensurate with his increased risks. The 
changing environment would seem also to indicate a broadening in scope to 
include examination and reporting on controls, procedures, organization and 
possibly budgets.
It becomes clear from a contemplation of the professional auditor’s role 
that its evolution is not influenced significantly by the clients who bear the 
burden of its cost nor by the profession itself but, to the greatest extent, by 
outside influences such as the needs and demands of the users of its product, 
the requirements of regulatory authorities and the judicial determination of 
professional responsibility—all of which form a part of the social environment 
in which the profession functions. To the extent that his role is expanded, 
additional responsibility naturally attaches to the auditor. The profession 
must be ever ready to assume this additional responsibility and I am sure it 
presently is ready, as it has been in the past.
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Critique
Of the Roth paper
By Albert J. Bows, Partner, Arthur Andersen & Co., Former Chairman, 
AICPA Committee on Auditing Procedure, representing the American Insti­
tute of CPAs
A discussion of the role of the auditor must start with a determination 
by the accounting profession of whether it will continue to be a profession or 
become a business. If it is to be a profession, it must decide to remain inde­
pendent of its clients in carrying out its role of expressing opinions on their 
financial statements. It is difficult to see how this can be done if the auditor 
undertakes such activities as plant layouts, psychological testing, market 
surveys, and executive recruitment. The fact that Roth suggests that these 
services are demanded by the business community is not a sound reason for 
the profession to undertake them. How can an auditing firm really be inde­
pendent of a corporate president that it has recently recruited for a substantial 
fee? (See his comment on page 255.) What would an intelligent director or 
stockholder think?
Whatever the ultimate fate of diverse management consulting functions, 
there undoubtedly will be a requirement for expanded roles by the auditor 
to cover information which is not now covered in the typical annual or SEC 
report, including internal control. Most boards of directors should insist on a 
report from their auditor on internal control and accounting controls as to 
whether they are adequate. If a director is really interested in reliable informa­
tion being released during the year, he should have this covered by an audit 
discipline. He should also know whether interim statements are reasonably 
accurate.
Even when more reports are required, the cost of independent audits 
need not rise relative to other costs. The auditing profession must come to 
grips with how it is performing its work. It must guard against the tendency 
to become more detailed rather than more perceptive. Good audits should be 
performed at reasonable prices by highly intelligent individuals who work on 
a professional basis. Our real problem is to develop techniques that relate to 
the big audit problems of each client.
I do not agree that the auditor should check corporate budgets, as Roth 
suggests. As soon as several major companies do not meet their budgets, the 
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public will obviously react to auditing for what it is in these situations—a 
technical performance without substance. All we need to do as a profession 
is to try to certify to projections and we will lose the remaining confidence the 
public now has in us.
There is a great need now to require auditors’ opinions on quarterly 
earnings reports and other statistical and financial information which are part 
of complete reporting to investors and we should logically expand our services 
in this way. It is not logical for much of this financial information to be 
unaudited when stock trading takes place daily as a result of these releases. 
The annual report is only one medium for communicating with the investing 
public on one day of the year. The other forms of communication are at least 
equally important. Even the creditor will rarely extend credit solely on the 
basis of the annual report but may very well do so based on interim reports.
One of the major problems facing the auditing profession today is an 
adequate definition of standards. We need to do a much better job of defining 
and making the public aware of what we do and what we cannot do. These 
standards, however, cannot be self-serving. If they are established primarily 
for the purpose of avoiding legal liabilities, they will not be respected either 
by the courts or the public. If they are sound and reflect the public need, they 
will be respected.
It is unlikely that the profession will grow in stature by seeking to take 
on less responsibility. There is a great danger in overreaction to current law­
suits, and there is some evidence that too many of the profession’s actions today 
are being undertaken to avoid legal liability.
The auditing profession can do a lot to protect itself from lawsuits and 
lack of credibility by insisting on a more thorough check of inventories, 
long-term contracts, disclosures of poolings, and affiliated relationships. More 
attention needs to be paid to these critical areas of audits in order to be of 
service to the public.
I would also suggest that the profession concentrate its energies on making 
present accounting practices more useful to creditors and investors before it 
delves into new fields. The work of the Accounting Principles Board and the 
auditing procedure committee needs to be much further along before we reach 
out for new and untried areas. We must solve the problem of reporting for 
conglomerates, of earnings per share, of goodwill, poolings, and tax credits; 
if we have the courage to come up with sound answers to these problems, then 
the public may want us to do more.
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Critique
Of the Roth paper
By Louis M. Warlick, Vice President and Associate Director of Research, 
Loomis Sayles & Co., Inc., representing the Financial Analysts Federation
As a professional investment analyst and adviser, I use accounting state­
ments regularly as essential tools in the day-to-day work of evaluating company 
operations. In a sense, therefore, I am in the position of a “customer” for the 
accounting product and that fact undoubtedly colors my perspective on the 
“role of the auditor.”
It is not surprising that most of Mr. Roth’s discussion of this subject is 
devoted to well-documented support of the traditional function of auditing, 
as I understand it, and the propriety of various steps that are accepted as good 
auditing procedure and reporting.
This is a natural and entirely appropriate approach, but, frankly, I would 
like to have seen some greater examination of possible need for change in 
response to the present environment. As one example, in particular, I would 
have welcomed more inquiry into the basic justification of auditing with 
emphasis on the pros and cons for broadening the evaluation aspect of the 
auditor’s work. As the function of accounting has enlarged and its complexi­
ties increased, I believe that it has become insufficient to develop one set of 
figures along one line of accounting practice and to just present this on a 
“take it or leave it” basis.
It is a truism that no single earnings figure can ordinarily be exact (except 
over the entire life of a corporation), and many sources have pointed to the 
increasing element of discretion involved in deriving earnings results. It 
appears to me that these circumstances call for some move by the auditor 
toward placing a final earnings figure in the appropriate context of assump­
tions, judgments, and necessary but arbitrary decisions used in preparation of 
the accounting statements.
Certainly, there is little room to question the two primary objectives 
which the author has set forth for the auditor. The importance of reliable 
data is self-evident, and surely fairness of financial statements, reflecting sound 
accounting principles consistently applied, is the major goal with which few 
would disagree. It does seem, however, that these objectives do not go far 
enough, that they are related more closely to the form than to the substance 
261
of accounting results, and that they are not sufficiently broad to deal adequately 
with the increasingly fluid situation we find in corporate organization, opera­
tions and financial reporting.
Certain contrary evidence undoubtedly can be cited, but I believe that 
implicit in this more or less conventionally defined approach to the audit­
ing function is the concept of greater precision or exactitude than the facts 
justify. Certainly, problems of distributing allocated costs rationally to 
product and time periods are not at all new, to mention just one aspect. 
However, as most industry has become more capital intensive and new fixed 
cost items such as research, expenditures, pensions, and so forth, have mounted 
in importance, the weight of indirect costs has increased sharply in the profit 
and loss equation. This alone, as I see it, has introduced an element of 
variability to accounting figures that makes an increasingly wide range of 
results defensible within “generally accepted accounting principles.” I believe 
this will be true even if there is welcome progress through further refinement 
and changes in the Opinions of the Accounting Principles Board toward nar­
rowing the spread of acceptable treatment for many of these large indirect 
costs.
Along similar lines, other changes in the accounting environment, par­
ticularly the development of multi-line companies as major factors on the 
corporate business scene, have tended to call for a broadened scope of responsi­
bility for the auditor in connection with published financial statements. As 
individual figures for widely disparate business operations are agglomerated, 
whether in revenues or costs, the meaning of an unqualified final earnings 
figure is necessarily diluted.
To represent that such developments affecting corporate accounting call 
for a more interpretative role for the auditor is not to belittle the profession’s 
role of setting accounting principles. In fact, this evolving situation seems to 
call for more and increasingly specific guidelines to narrow areas of difference 
and deficiency. Nor do I visualize an evaluation of the figures by the auditor 
for their meaning relative to the company’s operation, which is the job of the 
financial analyst. What I do suggest, however, is that instead of limiting his 
qualifying comments to “exceptions” or their absence, the auditor might well 
take a more positive approach attempting to put the figures in their proper 
setting—highlighting decisions on accounting treatment and their general 
significance where alternatives exist that would give materially different results. 
This in essence would be giving some evaluation of the accounting application 
and its effect. It does not seem realistic to just follow a procedure that would 
tend to imply a “black or white” answer which I suspect is the result of current 
accepted practice.
Stated another way and admittedly oversimplified, the present auditor’s 
statement purports to convince those having use of the figures that the state­
ments can be believed because the auditor has determined that they are fair 
and consistently follow accounting rules. To me, this is not enough when so 
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much accounting background information needs to be known before even 
attempting an evaluation of the company’s operations from the figures. (The 
author indicates some dissatisfaction with the present auditor’s statement but 
not, I believe, along lines that would significantly broaden the auditor’s inter­
pretative comments.)
Of course, it is general practice to include at least the most important 
qualifications to the figures in footnotes to the accounting statements and with 
sufficient diligence a trained accountant or analyst often could get the back­
ground to put the figures in their proper perspective.
I submit, though, that accounting statements should not be prepared just 
for such professional people and that it is a difficult, time consuming, and often 
frustrating problem for analysts to search out all of the meaningful details. 
Why should the auditor not take the lead and bring the salient points to the 
forefront—highlighting accounting treatment important to an understanding 
of the figures and, where pertinent, pointing to the consequences of alternative 
approaches? At least, the possibility of some broadening of the auditor’s role 
along these lines would seem a fruitful subject for inquiry.
I suppose one likely objection to such a proposal might be its adverse 
ramifications for the auditor’s long-established client relationships. This brings 
up another example of an area which I would think might appropriately be 
examined relative to need for change. By repeated reference, the author 
emphasizes the independent characteristic of the auditor, and I believe that the 
executive committee of the AICPA has stressed this aspect by recommending 
an audit committee of outside directors for publicly owned corporations both 
to nominate auditors and to discuss matters not satisfactorily resolved by 
auditors and management. Others, however, both from within and outside the 
accounting profession, have pointed to management pressures for liberal 
accounting treatment and their consequences. To minimize such circum­
stances, might a policy requiring systematic rotation of auditors, say every 
five years, have merit? Undoubtedly there are real advantages to a continuity 
of auditors up to a point but a periodic change might have its advantages, too. 
Again, this appears an area for constructive inquiry.
As a final example where change might get greater emphasis, several 
events of recent months make me wonder whether the advent of wide-scale 
computerization of accounting functions is being adequately handled in terms 
of auditing approach and procedure. I refer specifically to three instances of 
major corporations (Borden, Cenco, and May Department Stores) where very 
substantial accounting charges have been required to adjust for cumulative 
discrepancies in computerized accounting for accounts receivables. These may 
be just isolated occurrences with no broader implications and I am certainly 
in a position to do little more than raise the question as to their significance. 
Possibly, they just indicate that effective auditing has revealed internal inade­
quacies of computer programs and accounting checks. However, if uninten­
tional shortcomings of this nature, presumably related to programing faults, 
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can produce variances of such magnitude, there would seem to be some serious 
risks if deliberate action were involved.
Undoubtedly the increased difficulty in following audit trails through 
highly computerized accounting systems has been countered in many cases by 
the auditor’s sophisticated computer programs that can make appropriate tests 
of a client’s data processing systems. In any case, though, it appears an area 
of significant change where the role of the auditor might properly come under 
closer scrutiny.
I have touched briefly here on three aspects of the auditor’s work where 
a degree of change appears in order or is at least a proper subject for inquiry. 
Aside from the merit of each individual suggestion, however, and underlying 
all of them is my thought that, in the role of the auditor as in so many other 
professions, the increasing complexity of day-to-day problems and decisions 
together with the greater involvement of the lay public in the final results has 
brought the need for reassessment of accepted procedures and approaches and, 
in particular, a broadened area of responsibility.
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Critique
Of the Roth paper
By R. E. Pfenning, Comptroller, General Electric Company, representing the
Financial Executives Institute
Mr. Roth has given us a broad and comprehensive discussion of the role 
of the auditor. I will confine my remarks to two areas covered in his discussion.
It seems to me that the auditor has two basic reporting responsibilities and 
they are to report what he did and to report what he found. In longer form 
reports issued by public auditors or in reports such as those prepared by mem­
bers of the corporate audit staff of General Electric Company, these two basic 
responsibilities can be discharged with clarity and understandability. Mr. 
Roth’s comments were concerned chiefly with the standard short-form report 
by public auditors which is reproduced in millions of copies of corporate 
annual reports. Here the auditor is the victim of space constraints as he tries 
to discharge his two basic reporting responsibilities. In disposing of the respon­
sibility to tell what he did, he uses the words, “generally accepted auditing 
standards” and the other words to which the author referred. By usage, as 
well as by AICPA definition, these words have acquired rather precise mean­
ings just as all words associated with professional procedures have a habit of 
doing. Undoubtedly there are many readers of auditors’ reports who are not 
familiar with these precise meanings but I do not believe that this is a major 
factor in the difficulties presently being encountered by auditors. There was 
a time when the scope of an audit was a matter of negotiation between the 
client and the auditor. Under such circumstances, there was considerable 
question about what an auditor did on a particular assignment and whether 
the scope of his work was adequate. However, some 30 years ago it was made 
clear that the auditor had responsibility for determining the scope of work 
necessary for examinations of financial statements and I believe it is now 
generally assumed that he discharges this responsibility properly unless some­
thing arises to indicate otherwise.
It seems to me that many of the difficulties presently being encountered 
by auditors in the courts, the public press, and elsewhere revolve around his 
responsibility to tell what he found as a result of his examination. The ques­
tions are not confined to what he should have said in his formal report but 
branch out into questions of, Did he or should he have informed major cred­
itors? Did he or should he have informed the public prior to the issuance of 
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his formal report?—and so forth. These are rather broad questions and their 
resolution could well provide a major turning point in the responsibility of an 
auditor to tell what he found.
Mr. Roth points out the inadequacies of the standard short-form report 
as a medium for informing others as to what an auditor learned as a result of 
his examination. Again, in the interests of conciseness, this form of report 
uses words such as “generally accepted accounting principles” and Mr. Roth 
and others raise a question as to whether the words have the preciseness of 
meaning which the manner of their use would imply. I, for one, am inclined 
to agree with the Forbes editorial that in many instances the words are 
“damned meaningless.” I am not particularly concerned that it is most unlikely 
the Accounting Principles Board is ever going to define a whole set of generally 
accepted accounting principles. I am more concerned by the lack of attention 
which is paid to those principles which they do establish and define. Also, I 
personally feel that the certified public accountants must shoulder more blame 
for this lack of atttention than we practitioners in industry.
Each Opinion which is issued by the Accounting Principles Board in­
cludes notes with respect to the nature of generally accepted accounting prin­
ciples and the action of the Council of the Institute with respect to disclosure 
of departures from Opinions of the Accounting Principles Board. These notes 
include the caveat that, “The Council action also requires that departures from 
Board Opinions be disclosed in footnotes to the financial statements or in 
independent auditors’ reports when the effect of the departure on the financial 
statements is material.” I fully realize that the question of materiality is one 
which is resolved by the exercise of judgment and I certainly am not one who 
is inclined to determine that everything is material. However, some of the 
accounting Opinions include requirements for disclosure of principle as was 
the case in the Opinion on accounting for the cost of pension plans. Such 
requirements do not lend themselves to the test of materiality. In addition, 
any requirement for disclosure of principle in connection with pension costs 
almost automatically qualifies as a material matter inasmuch as for most 
companies the liability for pensions represents the company’s largest liability. 
Accordingly, it was most disturbing to observe the very few instances in which 
any attention was paid to the disclosure requirement on pension costs in 1967 
annual reports. It was even more disturbing to me to observe that this lapse 
went by unmentioned in the auditors’ reports. The best way for certified public 
accountants to create a credibility gap is to deliberate at great length on 
accounting opinions, publish them with great fanfare, and then disregard them.
In discussing the expanding role of auditors, Mr. Roth mentions the 
likelihood that management will be required to publish forecast results which 
would be attested to by independent auditors. He quickly mentions that such 
a proposal might shock management and horrify CPAs. I’m neither shocked 
nor horrified. I’m petrified at the thought of the hazards which would be 
associated with this expansion of the auditors’ work. I do not doubt that the 
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proposal will be made for a requirement that management publish forecast 
results. That would be a natural outgrowth of all the discussion which has 
taken place in recent years on segmented profitability reporting, the clamor 
for more and more information by securities analysts and the promulgation 
of the idea that the primary objective of accountants should be to improve the 
predictive value of accounting. However, I am petrified by the thought that 
anyone could contemplate, in Mr. Roth’s words, that:
. . . the independent auditor, has the necessary capability to evaluate 
the effectiveness of the budgeting system and the procedures followed. 
He can appraise the reasonableness of the relationships of income, 
costs, and expenses based on clearly defined assumptions. He will be 
expected to find some way of communicating the results of these 
efforts to third parties without misleading them as to the degree of 
assurance he is providing.
Sometimes our British cousins see things more clearly than we do. As 
many of you probably know, the Council of the Institute of Chartered Ac­
countants in England and Wales issued a “guidance” for auditors who are 
asked to give reports on profit forecasts of companies. I would like to quote 
the first three paragraphs of the introduction to that “guidance.”
1. Profit forecasts are normally prepared solely for internal use by the 
managements of companies, but there may be occasions when, for fi­
nancial reasons, they are disclosed to outsiders. In such circumstances 
auditors or consultant accountants (subsequently referred to collec­
tively as “reporting accountants”) may be asked to review and report 
on forecasts to boards of directors.
2. It is emphasized that profit forecasts necessarily depend on sub­
jective judgments and are, to a greater or less extent, according to the 
nature of the business, subject to numerous and substantial inherent 
uncertainties, which increase markedly the further forward in time the 
forecasts stretch.
3. In consequence profit forecasts are not capable of confirmation 
and verification by reporting accountants in the same way as financial 
statements which present actual results, and there is no question of 
their being “audited” in any sense, even though the reporting ac­
countants may also be the company’s auditors. It is important that 
reporting accountants should make this clear when they accept in­
structions to review profit forecasts, and in the wording of their report 
they should take care to avoid giving any impression that they are in 
any way confirming, underwriting, guaranteeing or otherwise accept­
ing responsibility for the ultimate accuracy and realization of forecasts. 
Moreover, bearing in mind their special status and authority, report­
ing accountants should do or say nothing to encourage directors, third 
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parties or the public to place mistaken reliance on statements as to 
future profits the achievement of which must always be subject to 
uncertainty.1
1 “Accountants’ Reports on Profit Forecasts,” Members Handbook, the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales (Gee and Company, London). This statement by 
Council was also published in the September 1968 Accountancy (the journal of the Institute 
of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales).
You will note the stress which is placed on the uncertainties associated 
with forecasts of operating results, a fact with which we in industry have been 
coping for many years. This element of uncertainty was highlighted in London 
by the release of some financial information at about the same time the Council 
of the Institute issued its guidelines. About a year ago, when General Electric 
Company, Ltd. (no kin of my employer) began its ultimately successful efforts 
to acquire Associated Electrical Industries, the management of AEI opposed 
the acquisition. As part of the proceedings, AEI asked its auditors to report 
on the profit forecasts of the company to the merchant bank acting on their 
behalf. According to an article in the September 1968 issue of Accountancy, 
the auditors reported with a letter outlining what they had done to check the 
forecasts in the limited time available and ended with the paragraph:
On the basis of our inquiries we have formed the view that the fore­
cast profits of £10m, £16m, and in excess of £20m respectively for 
the years 1967, 1968 and 1969 have been prepared on a fair and 
reasonable basis and in a manner consistent with the principles fol­
lowed by the company in preparing recent published annual accounts.
The financial news which broke this year was that instead of a profit of 
£10 million for 1967, AEI sustained a loss of £4.5 million. The AEI manage­
ment and the auditors apparently are now busily engaged in trying to explain 
what happened.
I sincerely hope that it will be a long time in this country before manage­
ment takes on the task of publishing forecast results, and I hope that it will 
be even longer before our certified public accountants take on the task of 
attesting to the validity of the forecasts. In my opinion, this would be one of 
the better ways of destroying their credibility, not only with respect to forecasts 
but with respect to their other activities.
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Critique
Of the Roth paper
By Arthur L. Nash, Manager, Senior Credit Officer and Member of the Credit 
Committee, Brown Brothers Harriman & Co., Past President of Robert Morris 
Associates, representing Robert Morris Associates
The paper entitled, “The Role of the Auditor,” prepared by Joseph Roth, 
covers this subject so adequately that it is difficult for me to be critical. How­
ever, I am able to comment on, and expand upon, certain subject areas from 
personal experience running back 40 years, both as a user of audits in credit 
analysis, and lending, and an “amicus curiae” of the accounting profession. 
Over this lengthy period, I have witnessed many of the changing philosophies 
in auditing practice, and have been privileged to have had a minuscule part 
in the formulation of some of the principles and standards currently in force, 
through participation in joint discussions with committees of the American 
Institute of CPAs and state CPA societies.
At the inception of his paper, Mr. Roth focuses on what would seem to 
be a, if not the, major problem concerning the auditor’s role in society today. 
This is a lack of understanding, or a real misunderstanding by unsophisticated, 
and, perhaps, even knowledgeable readers as to what the auditor can, and 
cannot do, and to what he is attesting.
The Certificate
To a major degree, in the opinion of the writer, this problem may spring 
from the character and wording of the auditor’s certificate. The writer recalls 
vividly the stresses, strains, and struggles which the committees of the pro­
fession went through in the 1930’s in developing the certificates currently 
recommended. Although it was recognized that it would be desirable, if 
possible, to be specific in the description of the scope of the audit, the pro­
fession chose to be general in phraseology in an effort to make the certificate 
a “general purpose” certificate and to avoid possible criticism and questions 
which would arise from the failure to mention, specifically, each and every 
procedure undertaken by the auditor. Thus sprang the phrases “generally 
accepted auditing standards,” and “generally accepted accounting principles,” 
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which, as Mr. Roth points out, have meaning to most CPAs, but not to the 
public.
Thus it would appear that the profession has been “hoist by its own 
petard,” and they are now “damned if they do, and damned if they don’t.”
I believe that, in the public eye, their status as financial wizards may have 
been magnified by the development of an image of financial acumen in uncov­
ering fraud and misuse of funds. Such a picture has been created by the public 
press, and other writers, in the past when reference has been made to “sending 
in CPAs to check a company’s books,” when a company’s finances are in ques­
tion or an embezzlement has taken place. Although this image may have been 
diminished somewhat by recent publicity, I believe that many people still 
mistakenly regard a CPA’s opinion as being, in effect, a guarantee of accuracy 
of financial statements. Now, the profession finds itself in the position of 
attempting to modify this image, without seriously impairing it. As Mr. Roth 
states, the objectives have changed, and the primary purpose today is “to 
express an opinion on the fairness of the financial statements, their compliance 
with generally accepted accounting principles, and the consistency of their 
application.” However, the public has not been kept abreast of these changes, 
and still regards the CPA as a “financial policeman.”
Purpose
In the foregoing paragraphs, reference has been made to the certificate 
as being a “general purpose” certificate. This brings to mind the fact that in 
present day business, it would seem that “general purpose” audits are not as 
useful as they have been in the past. Many bankers would like to have 
“special purpose” reports, i.e., long-form, and I dare say that, with the more 
complex corporate organizations, “special purpose” reports should be ex­
tremely useful. Under such circumstances, it would appear that any changed 
phraseology in the certificates might have to take into consideration whether 
or not the audit was “general purpose,” or “special purpose.”
Scope
To the trained credit or security analyst, the word “examine,” as used in 
the “scope” paragraph, should not be unclear, and the auditor’s opinion rela­
tive to the “accompanying balance sheet” should not lead to the conclusion 
that the auditor himself prepared the figures. However, it seems evident that 
many users, certainly the “average reader” and the less sophisticated stock­
holder, believe that the auditor has prepared the balance sheet, income 
account, and surplus reconciliation and that they are his figures on which he 
is expressing an opinion. Perhaps this implication might be clarified by such 
introductory words as, “We have been furnished with the ‘balance sheet,’
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‘income account’ and ‘surplus reconciliation’ of XYZ Company, as of--------- ,
19—, for the purposes of verification and audit. We have examined . . — 
and so forth.
In a dream one night, in the midst of preparing this critique, I even 
developed a scope paragraph which spelled out exactly what verification pro­
cedures were carried out. Unfortunately, like many dreams, the factual 
development of the words in cold daylight indicated the difficulties faced by 
the profession in an effort to keep the scope paragraph to a reasonable length 
and still cover the situation. One cannot help but be sympathetic with those 
who have undertaken this task in rephrasing the certificate. There is, however, 
little doubt that such a rephrasing is necessary. Mr. Roth’s question as to 
whether the public understands that auditors “may not be certain that they 
have gotten all of the facts,” is vividly pointed up in newspaper comments in 
recent cases in which the accused auditors have indicated that they did not 
know about certain matters until after the audit was certified. This problem 
of being sure that all facts have been obtained will always be present, and it 
does seem that if the auditing profession is to defend itself against the unsophis­
ticated public, it should make clear, somehow, the frailties of the profession 
in this direction.
Independence
Further, in the field of public understanding, is the matter of auditor and 
management decisions. Mr. Roth implies that auditors do not make manage­
ment decisions, and although this probably is generally true, it is a known fact 
that in certain trades, in New York at least, the CPA is an integral part of the 
management team, and that he makes arrangements for loans from banks 
who would not otherwise lend money to the company without his presence. 
Perhaps these are the exceptions which prove the rule.
Standards and Principles
It is doubtful if many financially “knowledgeable” people really under­
stand the standards of the accounting profession, and certainly, insofar as ac­
counting principles are concerned, some prominent CPAs have indicated that 
there are too many “accounting principles” for handling the same situation. 
Education and publicity will improve the understanding of standards, but much 
work needs to be done in the area of clarifying “principles.” The profession is 
cognizant of this, but the road towards simplification is likely to be long and 
arduous. In the meantime, it does seem that the principles used, or approved 
under certain circumstances, deserve some comment where there are several 
possibilities, and, perhaps, where there is an alternative, the auditor should 
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comment in some way in a footnote as to the effect of the alternative method, 
or methods, on the statements, “if material.”
Materiality and Judgment
Materiality has been a sticky problem for the accounting profession and 
for others for many years. Many efforts have been made to define materiality, 
but, unfortunately, it has so far been almost impossible to find a definition 
which will cover all situations. What is material to “A” may not be material 
to “B” under the same set of circumstances, and, certainly under differing 
circumstances, the variations of opinion might be even greater. Steps are 
being taken in an effort to improve the definition of materiality, and a com­
mittee of the American Institute is currently studying this in depth.
Materiality, at the present time, however, is unquestionably, a matter for 
the judgment of the CPA on the engagement. His judgment is, of course, predi­
cated upon conditions as he sees them, and at the time of his audit. In view 
of this, then, reliance upon the competence of the CPA becomes important, and 
those users who must rely on his competence should have a method of evalu­
ating it. Unfortunately, at the present time, the available sources of informa­
tion on individual CPAs or firms are limited. Steps have been recommended, 
at times, for improvements in this area without startling success. Judgment 
on the part of the CPA must be as much a guiding factor in the determination 
of materiality in the future as it is now.
Credibility
Mr. Roth concludes that the usual scope of examination of the inde­
pendent auditor in an unrestricted engagement is sufficiently extensive to justify 
credibility for the financial statements. I do not wholly agree with Mr. Roth 
that the “greatest” risk springs from high-level fraud, i.e., deliberate conceal­
ment of facts, and misrepresentation of facts to the CPA by top management. 
In reviewing some of the “financial wrecks” of the past, the writer observed, 
from hindsight, that in many of those “wrecks,” there was evidence of clever, 
if not fraudulent, practices on the part of corporate officers and employees. 
Clearly these individuals so manipulated corporate financial affairs as to make 
it difficult, if not impossible, for auditors to clearly develop the financial 
structure.
In contrast to Mr. Roth, it is my opinion that a greater risk may spring 
from problems created by the complexity of business today, the widespread 
development of conglomerates, and the potentials for legitimate financial 
sleight of hand through availability of varying accepted accounting principles 
for the same set of facts.
Management, in a complex situation, has problems in keeping abreast 
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of all the facets of the business, and although no misrepresentation may be 
involved, it is possible to color a presentation by using different acceptable 
accounting principles, with the result that the reader may be misled or con­
fused. There has been much said by CPAs, themselves, about the differing 
results possible in making a presentation, predicated upon applying different 
principles. Therefore, it would seem that these risks continue until the ac­
counting options are reduced.
With respect to the effectiveness of the auditor’s report, Mr. Roth clearly 
brings out that standards specifically state that any exception to compliance 
with generally accepted accounting principles must be stated, even to the extent 
of requiring the rendering of an adverse opinion. Further, the auditor must 
report all material restrictions or limitations placed on his audit scope, and 
these reporting requirements presumably have had an influence on reporting 
as clients do not like to have exceptions. However, among the critics of audit 
reports are banks and bankers. Unfortunately, for competitive reasons, it is 
known that banks have accepted unsatisfactory audits, and hence, have con­
doned slipshod reporting through failure to insist upon more adequate financial 
data, or by not engaging in a discussion with the client and the CPA as to the 
bank’s requirements. It has long been a strong recommendation of the Robert 
Morris Associates, and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 
that banks discuss their requirements with the CPA and the client before 
making major financial commitments. Furthermore, many users of reports 
have not made a practice of ascertaining the independence and the competence 
of the CPA (individual or firm) whose audit is being reviewed. As mentioned 
previously, it is difficult to obtain satisfactory information along these lines.
Expanded Role of Auditors
Mr. Roth discusses the expanding role of the auditor in an able fashion. 
As a user, the writer believes that most of the developments in the profession 
are appropriate, provided that adequate communication exists between the 
auditor and the reader, and that the reader understands the varying roles being 
accepted by the auditor with respect to the client, and he makes clear any 
possible conflicts.
Internal Controls
Although the tenets of the auditing profession stress the importance of 
evaluating internal controls, I believe that too few users understand the extent 
to which a responsible auditor, on an unrestricted engagement, checks these 
elements. Perhaps some reference should be made in the certificate, or in a 
footnote, to the adequacy of internal controls, instead of leaving this to be one 
of the “vague” elements involved in the generalization of auditing standards. 
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Many knowledgeable readers among bankers lack familiarity with the complete 
scope of a proper questionnaire on internal controls, and internal check.
A Bank's Requirements
I believe that if we bankers were to spell out our “ideal” requirements to 
the CPAs, most of us would opt for a “long-form” report containing:
1. A careful outline of scope with a more careful spelling-out of any limita­
tions on the engagement, to the end that the reader will understand what 
the CPA has done, and to what he is attesting. Not every reader knows 
what accounting principles are, or what auditing standards may be.
2. Full disclosure of all material facts.
3. Clear, concise and understandable terminology.
4. Adequate and understandable footnotes. (No confusing wording.)
5. Complete independence and objectivity of opinion.
6. Intimation of any serious questions on internal controls.
Conclusion
In summary, the auditing profession has come a long way in the last 50 
years. It has done a good job in policing itself and in evaluating professional 
progress. To a great extent, significant changes have been brought about by 
the profession, itself, as it has become aware of the changing requirements of 
client and user. While there has been evidence, on occasion, of a lack of care 
in some supervisory areas, the plethora of court cases in recent years would 
seem to have been more frequently a product of the complexity of business, 
plus a lack of understanding by users as to the auditor’s responsibilities. In­
formed users, such as banks, and other creditors, who receive audit reports in 
support of credit facilities, must accept some responsibility for any inadequa­
cies, since they have not insisted upon meticulous, and responsible reporting, 
and have condoned deficiencies in audit standards and procedures.
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